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Research	  Summary	  	   Australian	   security	   intelligence	   organisations	   collect,	   analyse	   and	  disseminate	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  nation	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  its	  citizens.	  Ideally,	  the	  intelligence	  function	  should	  be	  politically	  neutral,	  and	  detached	  from	  the	  policy	  objectives	  of	  the	  government	  it	  serves.	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  supply	   impartial	   advice	   to	   political	   leaders	   to	   assist	   with	   the	   development	   of	  national	   security	   policy.	   But	   what	   happens	   when	   intelligence	   ceases	   to	   be	  impartial	  and	  is	  used	  as	  a	  political	  means	  to	  support	  a	  policy	  preference?	  More	  significantly,	  what	  happens	  when	  intelligence	  is	  manipulated	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim?	  The	   short	   answer	   is	   that	   intelligence	   becomes	   politicised.	   But	   findings	   in	   this	  study	   show	   that	   the	   term	   ‘politicised	   intelligence’	   is	   perhaps	   a	   simple	   way	   of	  describing	   a	   complex	   process.	   Questions	   remain	   about	   what	   this	   process	  involves,	  how	  it	  occurs,	  and	  what	  function	  it	  serves	  that	  require	  a	  more	  detailed	  explanation.	   For	   example,	   how	   does	   intelligence	   become	   politicised?	   What	  constitutes	   politicisation,	   and	   in	  what	   forms	   can	   it	   appear?	   And,	   what	   are	   the	  general	  preconditions	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  invoke	  such	  actions?	  	  	  
Spinning	   the	   secrets	   of	   state	   answers	   these	   questions	   by	   providing	   a	  history	   of	   intelligence	   politicisation	   in	   Australia	   from	   1901	   to	   1975.	   While	   a	  growing	   body	   of	   research	   explores	   the	   history	   and	   functions	   of	   the	   Australian	  intelligence	   community,	   little	   is	   known	   about	   the	   problem	   of	   intelligence	  politicisation	   in	   Australia.	   Remarkably,	   the	   variety	   of	   forms	   that	   constitute	  politicisation,	   and	   the	   conditions	   under	  which	   it	   can	   occur	   are	   even	   less	   clear.	  
	   2	  
This	  study	  identifies	  the	  forms	  and	  clarifies	  its	  emergence.	  Drawing	  on	  archival	  documents,	   political	   manuscripts,	   Hansard	   publications	   and	   historical	  newspaper	   accounts	   the	   study	   presents	   several	   case	   histories	   of	   politicised	  intelligence	  in	  Australia.	  The	  study	  develops	  an	  empirical	  framework	  in	  which	  to	  theorise	  about	  how	  politicisation	  occurs,	  and	  pays	  close	  attention	  to	  identifying	  and	  explaining	  the	  conditions	  enabling	  this	  behaviour	  to	  arise.	  	  	  To	  develop	  this	  framework,	  the	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  core	  sections.	  Section	   one	   begins	   by	   establishing	   the	   context	   of	   the	   study,	   outlining	   the	  research	  questions,	  and	  introducing	  the	  central	  argument.	  It	  then	  reviews	  some	  of	  the	  major	  studies	  and	  theoretical	  perspectives	  in	  the	  academic	  literature	  that	  guide	   the	   subsequent	   analysis.	   Section	   two	   provides	   several	   historical	   case	  studies.	   Each	   case	   study	   presents	   evidence	   of	   politicisation	   in	   Australia	  identifying	   and	   explaining	   the	   means,	   forms,	   and	   conditions	   under	   which	  politicisation	   occurred.	   The	   final	   section	   presents	   the	   answers	   to	   the	   principal	  research	  questions	  and	  offers	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  overall	  findings.	  	  	   In	   this	   thesis,	   findings	   indicate	   that	   when	   political	   leaders	   face	   strong	  opposition	   to	   a	   policy	   choice	   they	   are	   sometimes	   tempted	   to	   politicise	  intelligence	   to	   overcome	   that	   resistance.	   In	   doing	   so,	   the	   politicisation	   of	  intelligence	   is	   often	   used	   as	   a	  means	   of	   promoting	   a	   policy	   goal	   by	   selectively	  disclosing	   secret	   information	   to	   support	   that	   goal.	   In	   this	   way,	   intelligence	   is	  used	   to	   persuade	   a	   sceptical	   audience	   toward	   the	  wisdom	  of	   a	   policy	   decision	  either	   through	   targeted	   leaks,	   public	   disclosure	   and	   the	   publicisation	   of	   secret	  information.	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Additional	   findings	   indicate	   that	   secret	   intelligence	   can	   be	   an	   effective	  means	  of	  discrediting	  political	  opposition	  and	  the	  intentions	  and	  authenticity	  of	  activist	  political	  groups.	   In	  short,	   this	  study	  argues	   that	  politicising	   intelligence	  offers	   a	  means	   of	   advancing	   preferred	  policy	   interests	   through	  promotion	   and	  persuasion	   while	   also	   offering	   a	   means	   of	   undermining	   the	   authority	   and	  legitimacy	  of	  opposition	  groups.	  	  	  	  	   The	   findings	   of	   the	   study	   suggest	   that	   intelligence	   organisations	   might	  also	   engage	   in	   acts	   of	   politicisation,	   but	   for	   different	   reasons.	   For	   instance,	  intelligence	   organisations	   may	   use	   their	   own	   resources	   to	   undermine	   the	  political	   leadership,	   or	   subvert	   a	   desired	   policy	   goal	   of	   a	   government,	   if	   they	  believe	  that	  policy	  or	  administration	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  their	  organisational	  interests.	  In	  this	  context,	  politicisation	  is	  a	  means	  of	  political	  subversion.	  	  	   The	   study	   shows	   that	   politicisation	   can	   take	   on	   several	   different	   forms	  ranging	   from	   direct	   political	   intervention,	   where	   intelligence	   is	   forced	   to	  conform	   to	   policy	   preferences,	   through	   to	   more	   subtle	   variations	   occurring	  through	  unintended	  analytical	  biases.	  Explanations	  as	  to	  what	  conditions	  cause	  intelligence	   to	   be	   used	   for	   political	   purposes	   can	   be	   grouped	   around	   three	  variables:	  turbulent	  political	  and	  social	  circumstances,	  and	  conditions	  relating	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  ministerial	  oversight	  and	  control	   exercised	  over	   the	   intelligence	  service.	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Chapter	  One	  




When	  the	  eyeglasses	  are	  out	  of	  focus,	  everything	  one	  sees	  through	  them	  is	  
distorted.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Jacques	  Ellul	  1965:	  61)	  	  	  	  	  Taking	  a	  nation	  to	  war	  is,	  perhaps,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  contentious	  decisions	  a	  political	   leader	  will	  have	  to	  make.	  Even	  more	  contentious	  is	  the	  manipulation	  of	   national	   security	   intelligence	   as	   evidence	   to	   support	   that	   decision.	   In	   April	  2013,	   on	   the	   tenth	   anniversary	   of	   the	   Iraq	   War,	   former	   Prime	   Minister	   John	  Howard	   remarked	  on	  what	  he	   called	   the	   ‘eternal	  dilemma’	   of	   intelligence.	   In	   a	  speech	  delivered	  to	  the	  Lowy	  Institute	  in	  Sydney	  he	  said	  that	  	  ‘almost	  always,	  the	  art	   of	   intelligence	   assessment	   involves	   assembling	   a	   mosaic	   from	   varying,	  incomplete	   and	   sometimes	   contradictory	   sources.	   Intelligence	   assessments’,	   he	  claimed	   ‘never	   produce	   evidence	   beyond	   a	   reasonable	   doubt’	   (Howard	   2013).	  Howard’s	   statement	   is	   a	   clear	   departure	   from	   the	   confidence	   that	   his	  government	  had	  placed	  on	  intelligence	  ten	  years	  earlier.	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Prior	   to	   the	   Iraq	   War,	   which	   began	   in	   March	   2003,	   intelligence	  assessments	  formed	  part	  of	  a	  very	  public	  campaign	  to	  build	  political	  support	  for	  the	   intervention.	   On	   several	   occasions,	   Australian	   political	   leaders	   publicised	  intelligence–derived	   information	   from	   Australia,	   the	   United	   States,	   and	   Great	  Britain	   in	   support	   of	   their	   claims	   that	   Iraq	   possessed	   weapons	   of	   mass	  destruction.1	  ‘The	  available	  intelligence	  indicates	  Saddam	  Hussein	  has	  continued	  to	   work	   on	   his	   chemical	   and	   biological	   capabilities	   and	   has	   maintained	   his	  nuclear	  aspirations’	  John	  Howard	  told	  the	  Federal	  Parliament	  on	  18	  March	  2003.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	   then	  declared	  that,	   	   ‘Australia	  has	   joined	  a	  coalition,	   led	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  intends	  to	  disarm	  Iraq	  of	  its	  prohibited	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction’	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  18	  March	  2003:	  12505	  &	  12507).	  	  	  Iraq’s	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  (WMD)	  were	  never	   found.	  Concerns	  were	   raised	   as	   to	   whether	   political	   leaders	   prevailed	   upon	   intelligence	  information	  as	  a	  pretext	  for	  their	  actions.	  Widespread	  criticisms	  —	  some	  offered	  by	   members	   of	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   community	   —	   contended	   that	  intelligence	   was	   politicised	   in	   order	   to	   rationalise	   the	   case	   for	   military	  intervention.	   2 	  Two	   official	   government	   inquiries	   followed. 3 	  	   Both	   inquiries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1 	  For	   a	   selection	   see:	   ABC	   Radio	   AM	   Program,	   9	   September	   2002;	   House	   of	  Representatives	   17	   September	   2002;	   Senate	   17	   September	   2002;	   House	   of	  Representatives	  4	  February	  2003;	  John	  Howard	  Address	  to	  the	  National	  Press	  Club,	  13	  March	  2003;	  House	  of	  Representatives	  18	  March	  2003.	  	  	  	  	  2See:	  Sounds	  of	  Summer:	  The	  Future	  of	  Intelligence	  Agencies,	  ABC	  Online,	  PM	  Program,	  31	  December	  2003,	  http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2003/s1018566.htm	  	  And,	  The	  Age	  13	  March	  2003:	  2;	  The	  Age	  14	  February	  2004:	  1;	  The	  Bulletin	  17	  February	  2004:	   11;	   Wilkie,	   A	   (2004)	   Axis	   of	   Deceit;	   and	   Wilkie,	   A	   (2007)	   ‘The	   Military	   and	  Intelligence	  Services’	  in	  Silencing	  Dissent.	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addressed	  the	  accuracy	  of	   intelligence	  presented	  to	  the	  Australian	  government,	  but	   judgments	   regarding	   the	   politicisation	   of	   intelligence	   were	   given	   less	  consideration.	  	  	  Official	   indifference	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   politicisation,	   however,	   is	   not	  without	   precedent	   in	   the	  Australian	   context	  —	  and	   the	   Iraqi	  WMD	   case	   is	   but	  one	  of	  many	  examples.	  On	  several	  other	  occasions,	  intelligence	  has	  been	  used	  to	  serve	   political	   ends.	   For	   example,	   in	   1987,	   analysts	   at	   Australia’s	   Defence	  Intelligence	   Organisation	   (DIO)	   predicted	   the	   military	   coup	   in	   Fiji,	   but	   this	  assessment	   was	   never	   disseminated	   to	   policy-­‐making	   officials	   because	   senior	  management	   feared	   that	   drawing	   inaccurate	   intelligence	   conclusions	   would	  damage	  their	  careers.	  	  Later	  in	  1995,	  Joint	  Intelligence	  staff	  in	  Darwin	  produced	  several	   intelligence	   assessments	   on	   potential	   military	   threats	   to	   Northern	  Australia	  that	  uncovered	  flaws	  in	  defence	  force	  planning.	  The	  assessments	  were	  buried	   because	   the	   findings	   contradicted	   the	   views	   of	   senior	   policy-­‐makers	   in	  Canberra.	   In	  1999,	  an	   intelligence	  report	  compiled	  by	   Joint	   Intelligence	  staff	   in	  Brisbane	   predicted	   the	   result	   of	   the	   referendum	   in	   East	   Timor	   and	   the	   likely	  reaction	   by	   the	   Indonesian	   government.	   Senior	   policy-­‐makers	   in	   Canberra	  rejected	   the	   assessment	   because	   the	   advice	   ran	   counter	   to	   their	   policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3See:	  Parliamentary	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  ASIO,	  ASIS	  and	  DSD	  (2003)	  Intelligence	  on	  Iraq’s	  
Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction;	   and	  The	  Report	  on	  the	  Inquiry	  into	  Australian	  Intelligence	  
Agencies	  (2004).	  	  
	  9	  
preferences.	  Subsequently,	  the	  assessment	  was	  suppressed	  (Parliamentary	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  ASIO,	  ASIS	  and	  DSD	  2003:	  7–8).4	  	  The	   aforementioned	   examples	   are	   of	   more	   than	   anecdotal	   importance.	  They	  reveal	  a	  consistent	  trend	  whereby	  political	  leaders	  engage	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  politicising	  intelligence	  to	  either	  promote	  a	  preferred	  policy	  outcome,	  or	  ignore	  intelligence	  when	  it	  does	  not	  suit	  their	  political	  predispositions	  (Pillar	  2006:	  19).	  Throughout	   Australian	   political	   history,	   this	   pattern	   has	   been	   repeated.	   But	  reasons	  as	  to	  why	  political	   leaders	  might	  engage	  in	  politicising	  intelligence	  and	  questions	  regarding	  how	  it	  can	  occur	  have	  been	  subject	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  candour	  and	  have	   not	   received	   adequate	   attention.	   This	   thesis	   attempts	   to	   address	   that	  problem.	  	  	  	  
Spinning	   the	   secrets	   of	   state	   is	   an	   historical	   study	   of	   how	   Australian	  national	   security	   intelligence	   has	   been	   manipulated	   for	   partisan	   political	  purposes.	  In	  other	  words,	  it	   is	  a	  history	  of	  intelligence	  politicisation	  specifically	  within	   the	   Australian	   context.	   	   In	   scope,	   the	   study	   ranges	   from	   the	   first	  intelligence	  operations	  conducted	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Commonwealth’s	  formation	  in	  1901	  until	   the	   first	   substantial	   review	  of	   their	  powers	  and	  conduct	   in	  1975.	  This	   time	   frame	   was	   chosen,	   first,	   because	   the	   richness	   of	   archival	   sources	  available	  made	  the	  study	  stronger,	  and	  second,	   it	   then	  enables	  a	  more	  rigorous	  exposition	   of	   the	   contemporary	   dimensions	   about	   intelligence	   politicisation	   to	  take	   place.	   After	   all,	   the	   Iraq	   case	   of	   2003,	   might	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Submission	  presented	  to	  the	  Committee	  by	  the	  Australian	  Defence	  Association,	  available	  at	  http://www.aph.gov.au/parliamentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=pjcaad/wmd/subs.htm	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‘spectacular’	  case	  of	  politicisation,	  however,	  as	  the	  following	  chapters	  will	  show,	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  the	  last	  century	  is	  replete	  with	  similar	  'spectacular’	  cases.	  This	  thesis	  will	  contend	  that	  intelligence	  politicisation	  in	  the	  Australian	  context	  is	  not	  spectacular	  but	  routine,	  however,	  understanding	  how	  and	  why	  it	  occurs	  is	  under	  theorised	  and	  under	  researched.	  Part	  of	  the	  object	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  clarify	  theoretical	  insights	  into	  the	  subject.	  	  	  To	   contextualise	   the	   subject	   and	   provide	   a	   richer	   understanding	   of	   the	  events	  described	  in	  this	  study,	  the	  material	  often	  covers	  aspects	  of	  political	  and	  social	   history,	   including	   perspectives	   on	   organisational	   culture	   and	   legislative	  measures	  of	  the	  time.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  study	  employs	  a	  qualitative	  approach	  to	  a	  multiple	   case	   study	  methodology,	   and	   is	   intended	   to	  deliver	  a	  broad	  history	  of	  how	   intelligence	   organisations	   function	   when	   interacting	   with	   politics	   and	  policy,	  specifically	  analysing	  how	  politicisation	  can	  result	  from	  this	  interaction.	  	  	  
Spinning	   the	   Secrets	   of	   State	   is	   not	   a	   complete	   history	   of	   the	   Australian	  intelligence	   community	   —	   this	   has	   been	   dealt	   with	   extensively	   elsewhere.5	  It	  does,	   however,	   reconstruct	   several	   important	   episodes	  of	   that	  history	   focusing	  specifically	  on	   instances	  of	  politicisation	   that	  have	  not	  been	  dealt	  with	   in	  great	  detail.	  Each	  chapter	  is	  designed	  as	  a	  stand–alone	  study	  focusing	  on	  a	  specific	  era	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	   instance,	   see:	   Ball,	   D.,	   Horner,	   D	   (1989)	   Breaking	   The	   Codes:	   Australia’s	   KGB	  
Network,	   1944–1950,	   Allen	   &	   Unwin:	   NSW,	   Australia;	   Cain,	   F	   (1983)	   The	   Origins	   of	  
Political	  Surveillance	  in	  Australia,	  Angus	  and	  Robertson	  Publishers:	  London,	  Sydney,	  and	  Melbourne;	   Cain,	   F	   (1994)	   The	   Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation,	   An	  
Unofficial	   History,	   Frank	   Cass	   and	   Co:	   Essex,	   England;	   McKnight,	   D	   (1994)	   Australia’s	  
Spies	  and	  their	  Secrets,	  Allen	  &	  Unwin:	  New	  South	  Wales,	  Australia.	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of	   Australian	   intelligence	   history.	   Each	   chapter	   describes	   how	   politicisation	  occurred	   under	   various	   political	   administrations	   identifying	   problems	   in	   the	  relationship	  between	  Australian	  intelligence	  organisations	  and	  government,	  and	  explains	   how	   intelligence	   was	   corrupted	   and	   used	   to	   serve	   partisan	   political	  interests.	  At	  a	  broader	  level,	  the	  study	  analyses	  the	  causes	  of	  this	  behaviour	  and	  describes	  what	  factors	  contribute	  toward	  intelligence	  becoming	  politicised.	  The	  evidence	  presented	   in	   each	   chapter	   draws	   on	  previously	   classified	   intelligence	  material,	   archival	   documents,	   political	   papers	   and	   other	   primary	   sources	   to	  reveal	  Australia’s	  hidden	  history	  of	  politicisation.	  	  	  
Key	  terms	  and	  definitions	  	  To	   assist	   the	   reader	   from	   the	   outset,	   I	   attempt	   a	   definition	   of	   two	   key	  terms	  used	  throughout	   this	  study	  —	  intelligence	  and	  politicisation.	   I	  shall	  start	  with	  the	  first	  and	  move	  on	  to	  the	  second.	  	  	  	  Although	   intelligence	  has	  been	  practiced	   in	  Australia	   for	  over	  a	  century,	  the	   term	   intelligence	   remains	  notoriously	  difficult	   to	  define	  with	  any	  precision.	  The	   academic	   literature	   on	   the	   subject	   is	   filled	   with	   various	   attempts	   to	  articulate	   a	   definition,	   although	   with	   mixed	   success	   (Warner	   2002,	   2008;	  Wheaton	   &	   Beerbower	   2006).	   	   In	   defining	   intelligence,	   there	   has	   been	   an	  evolution	   of	   the	   term	   in	   the	   United	   States	   literature	   on	   the	   subject.	   In	   1957,	  Washington	  Platt	  argued	  that	  intelligence	  was	  ‘a	  meaningful	  statement’	  derived	  from	  carefully	  selected	   information	   intended	   to	  make	  national	  policy	  problems	  clear	  (Platt	  1957:	  8).	  Another	  early	  attempt	  suggested	  that:	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Intelligence	  is	  the	  official,	  secret	  collection	  and	  processing	  of	  information	  on	   foreign	   countries	   to	   aid	   in	   formulating	   and	   implementing	   foreign	  policy,	   and	   the	   conduct	   of	   covert	   activities	   abroad	   to	   facilitate	   the	  implementation	  of	  foreign	  policy.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Random	  1958:	  76)	  	  As	   soon	   as	   this	   definition	   appeared,	   it	   attracted	   criticisms.	  As	   one	   critic	  noted,	   not	   all	   intelligence	   is	   officially	   conducted,	   nor	   is	   it	   always	   focused	   on	  aiding	  foreign	  policy.	  Intelligence	  can	  be	  obtained	  from	  open	  sources	  and	  it	  often	  focuses	  on	  aiding	  domestic	  policy	  as	  well	  (Bimfort	  1958:	  77).	  	  	  Later	   definitions	   began	   to	   focus	   on	   intelligence	   as	   a	   form	   of	   knowledge	  creation.	   For	   example,	   Klaus	   Knorr	   wrote	   in	   1964	   that	   intelligence	   is:	   ‘an	  operation	   for	   procuring	   and	   processing	   information’,	   while	   in	   1965,	   Sherman	  Kent	  in	  his	  seminal	  book	  Strategic	  Intelligence	  made	  a	  similar	  judgement	  (Knorr	  1964:	   1).	   ‘Intelligence’,	   according	   to	   Kent	   could	   be	   best	   defined	   as	   ‘the	  knowledge	   which	   our	   highly	   placed	   civilians	   and	   military	   men	   must	   have	   to	  safeguard	   the	   national	   welfare’	   (Kent	   1965:	   vii).	   Robert	   R.	   Bowie	   condensed	  these	   definitions	   into	   broad	   and	   simple	   terms,	   but	   one	   that	   again	   focused	   on	  knowledge	   creation.	   ‘Intelligence’	   Bowie	   claimed	   ‘is	   knowledge	   designed	   to	  assist	  action’	  (Bowie	  in	  May	  1986:	  3).	  	  	  The	   tendency	   to	   define	   intelligence	   within	   a	   narrow	   framework	   of	  knowledge	   creation	   is	   also	   evident	   in	   the	   Australian	   context.	   In	   1977,	   Justice	  Robert	  Hope,	  in	  his	  Royal	  Commission	  report	  on	  Australian	  intelligence	  agencies	  quoted	  Kent’s	  definition	  of	  intelligence	  as	  subset	  of	  knowledge	  creation	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	   3	  A:	   15).	   	   Remarkably,	   past	   definitions	   of	   intelligence	   have	   been	   carried	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down	   to	   the	  present	  day,	  with	   little	  modification.	  For	  example,	   in	  2011	   former	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Assessments,	  Allen	  Gyngell,	  described	  intelligence	   as	   ‘useful	   information’,	   while	   the	   Director	   of	   the	   Australian	   Secret	  Intelligence	   Service,	   Nick	   Warner,	   recently	   said	   that	   ‘intelligence	   in	   our	  particular	  realm	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  secret	  information	  gleaned	  without	  the	  official	  sanction	  of	  the	  owners	  of	  that	  information’	  (Gyngell	  2011:	  2;	  Warner	  2012:3).	  	  	  The	  above	  definitions	   reveal	   two	   important	  points.	  First,	   thinking	  about	  defining	   intelligence	   in	  the	  Australian	  context	  over	  the	   last	   thirty	  years	  has	  not	  significantly	  evolved.	  Second,	   there	  has	  been	  a	   lack	  of	   interest	   in	   theorising	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  	  	  US	   scholars	   of	   intelligence	   continue	   to	   examine	   the	   evolving	   context	   of	  defining	   intelligence,	   and	   now	   recognise	   that	   intelligence	   is	   more	   than	  information	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  knowledge.	  Some	  now	  suggest	   that	   its	  purpose	  —	   to	   inform	   policy	   decision-­‐making	   —	   must	   be	   included	   in	   any	   concise	  description	   (Sims	   1995:4).	   Mark	   Lowenthal’s	   definition	   of	   intelligence	   as	  ‘information	  that	  meets	  the	  stated	  or	  understood	  needs	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  has	  been	   collected,	   processed,	   and	   narrowed	   to	   meet	   those	   needs’,	   follows	   this	  convention	  well,	  as	  do	  several	  others	  (Lowenthal	  2006:	  2).	  6	  But	  there	  is	  another	  element	   that	   some	  authors	   suggest	  must	  be	   added	   to	   any	   concise	  definition	  of	  intelligence	   —	   the	   secrecy	   that	   surrounds	   the	   collection	   and	   protection	   of	  government	  information	  (Shulsky	  1995:	  17;	  Warner	  2002;	  Gill	  &	  Phythian	  2012:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  example,	  see:	  Wheaton,	  K.	  J.,	  Beerbower,	  M.	  T	  (2006)	  ‘Towards	  a	  New	  Definition	  of	  Intelligence’,	  Stanford	  Law	  and	  Policy	  Review,	  Vol.	  17	  (319),	  p.	  329.	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19).	   	   Even	   more	   eclectic	   definitions	   can	   be	   found	   in	   an	   examination	   of	   the	  broader	   literature	   on	   the	   subject,	   but	   the	   purpose	   here	   is	   not	   to	   review	   this	  material.	  It	  is,	  rather	  to	  show	  the	  uncertainty	  and	  variability	  among	  specialist	  on	  the	   issue.	   	   With	   the	   use	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   examples,	   I	   use	   the	   term	  intelligence	  in	  a	  broad	  sense	  so	  that	  it	  embraces	  the	  following	  areas:	  	  Intelligence	  is:	  a	  secret	  state	  activity.	  It	  is	  the	  collection	  of	  information	  from	  
open	   and	   closed	   sources,	   and	   the	   collation	   and	   analysis	   of	   such	   information.	  
Intelligence	   is	   a	   product,	   designed	   to	   reduce	   uncertainty	   and	   provide	   impartial	  
advice	   to	   government	   for	   assisting	   policy	   development.	   Intelligence	   in	   a	   broad	  sense	  includes	  all	  of	  these	  attributes.	  	  	   Just	  as	  definitions	  of	  intelligence	  are	  debated	  in	  the	  literature,	  so	  too,	  are	  definitions	  of	   intelligence	  politicisation.	  The	   term	  has	  appeared	   in	  a	  number	  of	  discussions	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  politics	  and	  society	  and	  intelligence	  and	   policy,	   as	   a	   result	   it	   is	   often	   defined	   using	   different	   interpretations.	   It	   is	  possible	   to	  analyse	  and	  attempt	   to	  understand	   the	  politicisation	  of	   intelligence	  both	   in	  a	  general	  and	  specific	  sense.	  Some	  observers	  using	  the	  broad	  approach	  have	   suggested	   that	   politicisation	   may	   be	   used	   to	   mean	   ‘the	   act	   of	   suffusing	  everything	  with	  politics	  and	  dragging	  it	  into	  the	  political	  realm’	  (Ellul	  1972:	  vii).	  Australian	   economic	   historian,	   Ronald	   Hartwell,	   in	   his	   introduction	   to	   The	  
Politicization	   of	   Society	   argues	   that	   the	   term	   politicisation	   means	   ‘a	   pervasive	  tendency	  for	  making	  all	  questions	  political	  questions…	  and	  all	  decisions	  political	  decisions’	  (Hartwell	  1979:	  14).	  The	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  this	  broad	  point	  of	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view	   is	   that,	   the	   act	   of	   making	   the	   apolitical	   political	   is	   designated	   as	  politicisation.	  	  	  	  Politicisation,	   in	   regard	   to	   intelligence	   is	   usually	   conceptualised	   more	  narrowly.	   It	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   two	   characteristics:	   (1)	   the	   manipulation	   and	  distortion	  of	  intelligence	  analysis,	  and	  (2)	  the	  political	  misuse	  of	  the	  intelligence	  product	  for	  partisan	  purposes.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  disagreement	  in	  the	  literature	  about	   attributing	   responsibility	   for	   performing	   the	   act	   of	   politicisation.	   For	  example,	   Stephen	   Marrin	   (2013)	   argues	   that	   intelligence	   politicisation	   is	   the	  distortion	  of	  intelligence	  to	  conform	  to	  policy	  preferences	  by	  analysts.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	   so	   for	   John	  Gentry	   (1993)	  and	   Joshua	  Rovner	   (2011).	  They	  use	   the	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  intelligence	  product	  by	  policy-­‐makers	  to	  support	  policy	  preferences.	  As	  Gentry	  argues,	  intelligence	  politicisation	  is:	  	  The	  alteration	  of	  an	  otherwise	  objective,	  methodologically	  sound	  course	  of	   the	   conception,	   production,	   and	   review	   of	   an	   intelligence	   product	   to	  serve	  a	  personal,	  bureaucratic,	  ideological,	  policy,	  or	  political	  purpose.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (Gentry	  1993:	  230-­‐231)	  	  Other	   scholars	   take	   a	   more	   generalised	   approach	   arguing	   that	   intelligence	  politicisation	   is	  not	   the	  product	  of	  one	   specific	  group,	  but	  occurs	  as	  a	   result	  of	  both	   analytic	   distortions	   and	   the	   improper	   political	   use	   of	   the	   intelligence	  product	   (Pillar	   2010;	   Lucas	   2011).	   As	   this	   brief	   discussion	   reveals,	   consistent	  definitions	  of	  intelligence	  politicisation	  are	  hard	  to	  find,	  even	  in	  a	  broad	  sense.	  	  	  	   This	   thesis	   recognises	   the	  difficulty	   in	  defining	   the	   term	  and	  advances	  a	  definition	  —	  not	  exhaustive,	  unique	  or	  exclusive	  of	  all	  others	  —	  but	  one	  inferred	  from	   several	   key	   authors	   on	   the	   topic.	   In	   this	   study,	   the	   politicisation	   of	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intelligence,	  as	  I	  use	  it,	  refers	  to	  the	  actions	  of	   intelligence	  officers	  and	  political	  leaders	   but	   constitutes:	   the	   manipulation	   of	   intelligence	   to	   reflect	   a	   preferred	  
policy	  outcome;	   to	  vindicate	  a	  policy	  choice;	  or	  alternatively,	   the	  manipulation	  of	  
intelligence	   to	   undermine	   the	   success	   of	   a	   policy	   goal	   (Ransom	   1987;	   Handel	  1987;	  Hastedt	  1987;	  Gentry	  1997;	  Treverton	  2008;	  Rovner	  2011).	  	  In	  the	  course	  of	   this	   study,	   the	   term	  politicisation	  will	   be	   applied	  with	   varying	   emphasis.	   At	  some	   points	   the	   emphasis	   will	   be	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   political	   leaders,	   while	   at	  other	   points	   it	  will	   focus	   on	   the	   actions	   of	   intelligence	   officers,	   but	   overall	   the	  definition	  will	  remain	  constant.	  	  	  
Research	  Questions	  The	  first	  question	  addressed	  in	  this	  study	  is	  designed	  to	  provide	  a	  better	  understanding	   of	   why	   political	   leaders,	   or	   intelligence	   organisations,	   might	  engage	   in	   the	  act	  of	  politicising	   intelligence	  when	   the	  practice	   is	   recognised	  as	  damaging	   to	   both	   intelligence	   organisations	   and	   political	   leaders	   (Betts	   2007:	  74).	  The	  purpose	  of	  question	  one	  is	  to	  probe	  what	  motivates	  this	  behaviour,	   to	  explore	  what	  is	  achieved	  by	  doing	  so,	  and	  to	  investigate	  how	  politicisation	  takes	  place.	  Question	  one	  asks:	  	  	  
How,	  and	  by	  what	  means	  has	  intelligence	  been	  politicised	  in	  Australia?	  	  Intelligence	  politicisation,	  the	  literature	  suggests,	  can	  assume	  a	  variety	  of	  forms	  and	  connote	  numerous	  meanings.	  For	  example,	   in	  1987,	  Professor	  Harry	  Howe	   Ransom,	   one	   of	   the	   first	   scholars	   to	   examine	   the	   subject	   of	   politicised	  intelligence	  concluded	  that	  ‘politicization	  has	  multiple	  meanings’	  (Ransom	  1987:	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26).	  Put	  another	  way,	  Ransom’s	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  politicisation	  can	  manifest	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms,	  and	  that	  the	  techniques	  of	  manipulation	  lack	  uniformity.	  This	  theme	   runs	   throughout	   the	   current	   literature.	   In	   2008,	   Gregory	   F.	   Treverton	  concluded	   that	   ‘politicization	   can	   have	   at	   least	   five	   different	   if	   overlapping	  meanings’	  (Treverton	  2008:	  93).	  Rovner’s	  (2011)	  study	  identified	  eight	  varieties,	  while	   two	   subsequent	   articles	   (Marrin	   2013;	   Hastedt	   2013)	   suggest	   several	  other	   variations.	   Notably,	   all	   of	   these	   studies	   reflect	   the	   continued	   interest	   in	  theorising	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  a	  conspicuous	  absence	  of	  this	  methodological	  overview	  in	  the	  Australian	  literature.	  Question	  two	  of	  this	  study	  was	   designed	   to	   address	   this	   issue	   by	   assessing	   the	   manifold	   forms	   of	  politicisation	  that	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Australian	  context.	  In	  doing	  so,	  question	  two	  asks:	  
Which	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Australian	  context?	  	   Just	   as	   the	   literature	   identifies	   various	   assumptions	   about	   what	  politicisation	   achieves	   and	   what	   forms	   it	   can	   take	   on,	   so	   too,	   there	   are	  assumptions	  about	  what	  causes	  politicisation.	  According	  to	  Paul	  Pillar,	  ‘context	  is	  all–important’	   when	   attempting	   to	   explain	  why	   politicisation	   can	   occur	   (Pillar	  2006:21).	   Question	   three	   is	   designed	   to	   probe	   the	   subject	   of	   intelligence	  politicisation	  beyond	   articulating	   the	  means	   and	   identifying	   the	   various	   forms.	  The	  intention	  is	  to	  identify	  whether	  intelligence	  politicisation	  is	  contingent	  upon	  broader	   external	   factors	   such	   as	   the	   political,	   social,	   and	   organisational	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  takes	  place.	  To	  explore	  this	  theme,	  question	  three	  asks:	  	  	  
Under	  what	  conditions	  has	  intelligence	  been	  politicised	  in	  Australia?	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Thesis	  structure	  In	  order	  to	  answer	  the	  proposed	  research	  questions	  this	  thesis	  is	  divided	  into	   three	   core	   sections.	   The	   first,	   and	   remaining	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	  devoted	   to	   outlining	   the	   central	   argument	   advanced	   in	   the	   study.	   Next,	   a	  description	   of	   the	   primary	   sources	   of	   information	   is	   provided.	   Section	   one	  concludes	  with	  a	  review	  of	  the	  key	  academic	  literature	  on	  Australian	  intelligence	  history	  and	  the	  theoretical	  aspects	  of	  politicisation	  that	  inform	  this	  study.	  	  	  	   Section	   two	   of	   the	   study	   is	   comprised	   of	   five	   historical	   case	   study	  chapters.	  These	  chapters	  are	  used	  to	  construct	  the	  historical	  narrative	  in	  which	  I	  analyse	   examples	   of	   how	   intelligence	   can	   become	   politicised.	   Each	   case	   study	  provides	   preliminary	   conclusions	   identifying	   the	   means	   of	   politicisation,	   the	  specific	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  that	  occur,	  and	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  it	  took	  place.	  Chapter	  two	  is	  titled:	  ‘Agent	  of	  empire	  or	  servant	  of	  the	  nation	  1901–1910’	  and	  examines	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  governments	  of	  Edmund	  Barton	  and	  Alfred	  Deakin	   used	   intelligence	   to	   enhance	   the	   success	   of	   their	   defence	   and	   foreign	  policy	  preferences.	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  chapter	  indicate	  that	  political	  conditions	  underpinned	  by	  strategic	  considerations,	  unique	  to	  Australia	  at	  the	  time,	  played	  a	   significant	   role	   in	   shaping	   how	   intelligence	   was	   used	   to	   achieve	   a	   desired	  political	  outcome.	  	  	  	  	  
	  19	  
The	   third	   chapter	   titled:	   ‘Loyalty	   and	   allegiance:	   Australian	   intelligence,	  radical	   politics	   and	   conscription	  1914–1918’,	   represents	   an	   even	  more	   serious	  case	   of	   politicisation	   where	   the	   government	   of	   William	   Morris	   Hughes	   used	  intelligence	   as	   a	  means	  of	   incriminating	   those	  who	  opposed	   the	  policies	   of	   his	  government	  during	  Australia’s	   involvement	   in	  World	  War	  One.	   In	   this	   chapter,	  political	  and	  social	  conditions	  were	  motivating	  factors,	  which	  drove	  the	  Hughes	  government	   to	   manipulate	   intelligence	   in	   order	   to	   vindicate	   their	   policy	  objectives,	  while	  also	  deriding	  political	  opposition.	  	   Chapter	   four	   titled:	   ‘Systems	   error:	   Intelligence	   inquiries,	   politicisation,	  and	  administrative	  ruination	  1940	  –	  1948’,	  examines	  the	  turbulent	  development	  of	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   community	   during	   the	   Second	   World	   War.	   The	  chapter	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  administrative	  behaviour	  and	  institutional	  culture	  of	  government	  at	  this	  time	  created	  a	  highly	  politicising	  environment	  which	  led	  to	  a	  series	  of	   conflicts	  over	   the	  administrative	  control	  of	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	  services.	  The	   findings	  of	   this	  chapter	  show	  how	  organisational	   factors	  can	  be	  a	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  politicisation	  of	  an	  intelligence	  service.	  	   The	   fifth	   and	   sixth	   chapters	   examine	   the	  politicisation	   of	   the	  Australian	  Security	   Intelligence	  Organisation	  (ASIO)	  during	   the	  period	  of	  1950	   through	   to	  1975.	   The	   first	   case	   study	   entitled,	   ‘Red	   revelations:	   ASIO	   and	   the	   Australian	  Parliament	  1949–1972’,	  demonstrates	  how	  ASIO	  intelligence	  material	  was	  used	  to	   support	   and	   justify	   the	   conservative	   government’s	   anti-­‐communist	   political	  agenda.	   The	   final	   case	   study,	   ‘From	   the	   shadows	   to	   the	   spotlight:	   Intelligence	  leaks,	   subversion,	   and	  media	   intercession	  1972–1975’,	   examines	   an	   episode	   in	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which	  some	  ASIO	  officers	   intentionally	  manipulated	  the	  Australian	  news	  media	  to	  express	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Whitlam	  government	  and	  leaked	  intelligence	  to	  news	  media	  outlets	  to	  propagate	  their	  own	  political	  agenda	  to	  the	  public.	  The	  findings	  of	   these	   chapters	   reveal	   that	   political,	   social,	   and	   conditions	   related	   to	  ministerial	  control	  all	  contributed	  to	  intelligence	  serving	  a	  political	  purpose.	  	   Section	   three	   concludes	   the	   study.	   Chapter	   seven	   draws	   together	   the	  findings	  of	  each	  case	  study	  chapter	  and	  presents	  the	  final	  analysis	  of	  the	  research	  questions.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  chapter	  synthesises	  the	  overall	  findings	  and	  provides	  a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	  means	   and	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   found	   throughout	  each	   case	   study	   identifying	  what	   conditions	  made	   this	   possible.	   Chapter	   seven	  concludes	   by	   reflecting	   on	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   findings	   and	   the	   future	   of	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  relations	  in	  Australia.	  	  	  	  	  
Argument	  The	   central	   argument	   presented	   throughout	   this	   thesis	   is	   based	   on	   two	  propositions.	  The	  first	  involves	  evaluating	  what	  purpose	  politicising	  intelligence	  serves.	   I	  argue	  that	  political	   leaders	  engage	   in	  politicising	   intelligence	   for	   three	  primary	  reasons.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  promote	  contentious	  policy	  choices.	  In	  the	  words	  of	   Lawrence	   Freedman,	   ‘the	   advantage	   of	   using	   intelligence	   as	   a	   promotional	  device	   lies	   in	   its	  authority’	   (Freedman	  2004:	  36).	  For	   instance,	  political	   leaders	  can	  draw	  on	  the	  apparent	  objectivity	  and	  imprimatur	  of	  intelligence	  to	  reinforce	  the	   logic	   behind	   their	   policy	   choices.	   When	   brought	   into	   public	   debates,	  intelligence	  is	  not	  only	  useful	  for	  justifying	  controversial	  policies,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  help	  to	  promote	  their	  necessity	  (Pillar	  2010:	  474).	  Second,	  if	  political	  leaders	  are	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unable	   to	   develop	   political	   and	   social	   consensus	   for	   a	   policy	   goal,	   politicising	  intelligence	   by	   revealing	   selective	   aspects	   of	   it	   in	   public,	   provides	   a	  means	   of	  persuading	   sceptics	   toward	   accepting	   the	   wisdom	   of	   that	   goal	   (Rovner	   2011:	  13).	   Third,	  when	   political	   leaders	   face	   opposition	   from	   groups	   and	   individuals	  who	   openly	   challenge	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   policy,	   intelligence	   can	   be	   used	   to	  discredit	   and	   undermine	   dissenting	   views	   (McKnight	   2008	   a:	   712–13).	   I	   also	  argue	  that,	  on	  rare	  occasions	  intelligence	  organisations	  can	  politicise	  intelligence	  in	  order	  to	  undermine	  the	  policy	  goals	  of	  government.	  	  	   The	  second	  proposition	  regards	  evaluating	  the	  political	  and	  social	  context	  in	  which	  politicisation	  takes	  place.	  First,	  I	  argue	  that	  politicising	  intelligence	  can	  be	   an	   effective	  means	   of	   neutralising	  political	   opposition.	   Tumultuous	  political	  conditions	  can	  create	  incentives	  for	  political	  leaders	  to	  use	  intelligence	  to	  assail	  their	   political	   opponents.	   As	   this	   thesis	   will	   demonstrate,	   because	   intelligence	  services	   —	   specifically	   domestic	   organisations	   —	   in	   the	   past	   have	   collected	  information	   of	   a	   political	   nature,	   often	   on	   various	   politicians	   themselves,	   this	  information	   is	   valuable	   for	   disarming	   the	   potency	   of	   alternative	   political	  viewpoints.	   Intelligence	   when	   used	   in	   the	   domestic	   political	   context	   not	   only	  provides	   a	   competitive	   edge	   over	   political	   opposition	   groups	   but	   also	   has	   the	  potential	   to	   reveal	   political	   secrets	   and	   personal	   indiscretions	   (Born	   &	   Leigh	  2007:5).	  	  	  Second,	   highly	   contentious	   policies	   can	   sometimes	   incite	   social	   unrest.	  Under	   such	   conditions,	   opposition	   and	   activist	   groups	   can	   emerge.	   Chapters	  three	   and	   five	   show	   that	   during	   the	   First	   World	   War	   and	   the	   Vietnam	   War,	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political	  leaders	  often	  used	  intelligence	  to	  monitor	  activist	  groups	  that	  objected	  to	   government	   policy.	   On	   numerous	   occasions,	   intelligence	  was	   used	   for	  more	  than	   informing	   policy.	   It	   was	   used	   to	   suppress	   dissident	   groups,	   collect	  information	   on	   them,	   and	   to	  maintain	   an	   advantage	   over	   them.	   The	   key	   point	  here,	  and	  one	  that	  extends	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  is	  that	  political	  leaders	  can	  use	  intelligence	   to	   undermine	   opposition	   groups	   who	   do	   not	   support	   their	   policy	  goals.	   Social	   conditions	   created	   by	   contentious	   policy	   initiatives	   can	   greatly	  influence	   the	   use	   of	   intelligence	   to	   enforce	   conformity	   to	   policy	   and	   thereby	  become	  politicised.	  	  	  





Data	  sources	  The	   evidence	   used	   to	   inform	   this	   study	   is	   derived	   from	   three	   primary	  sources	   and	   is	   contextualised	  by	   a	   large	   body	   of	   secondary	   literature.	   Primary	  sources	  include	  (1)	  various	  files	  contained	  in	  the	  National	  Archives	  of	  Australia	  (herein	  cited	  NAA),	  and	   to	  a	   limited	  extent	  Great	  Britain	   (herein	  cited	  NA).	   (2)	  The	  private	  papers	  of	  Australian	  and	  British	  politicians	  and	  government	  officials	  —	   including	   their	   official	   correspondence	   —	   which	   are	   derived	   from	   the	  Australian	   National	   Library	   and	   the	   British	   Library,	   and	   (3)	   the	   newspaper	  archives	   of	   the	   Victorian	   State	   Library.	   Official	   Hansard	   publications	   and	   the	  eight–volume	   report	   of	   the	   Hope	   Royal	   Commission	   into	   the	   Australian	  Intelligence	  Services	  are	  two	  invaluable	  primary	  sources	  also	  used	  to	  support	  the	  evidence	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	   The	   archival	   records	   used	   in	   this	   study	   were	   found	   in	   several	   federal	  Australian	   government	   agencies	   that	   collected	   and	  used	   intelligence	   at	   various	  times.	   These	   include:	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   Office;	   Attorney	   General’s	  Department;	   Governor	   General’s	   Office;	   the	   Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps;	   the	  Military	   Intelligence	   Section	   of	   the	   Army;	   the	   Counter	   Espionage	   Bureau;	   the	  Commonwealth	   Investigation	   Branch;	   the	   Special	   Intelligence	   Bureau;	   Security	  Service;	   and	   the	   Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation.	   While	   these	  records	   frequently	   provide	   valuable	   information,	   they	   are	   also	   at	   times	  fragmentary	   and	   incomplete.	   Sometimes	   case	   files	   were	   scattered	   across	   a	  variety	  of	  government	  departments	  while	  the	  organisation	  of	  such	  material	  was	  often	  inchoate	  and	  unclear.	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Histories	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  	  Not	  until	  fairly	  recently	  has	  the	  subject	  of	  intelligence	  in	  Australia	  shifted	  from	   an	   esoteric	   research	   subject	   to	   one	   of	   legitimate	   academic	   inquiry.	  Beginning	   in	   the	   1970s,	   a	   number	   of	   Australian	   researchers	   began	   studying	  aspects	  of	  Australian	   intelligence	  history,	   amassing	  a	   large	  amount	  of	  evidence	  relating	  to	   the	  past	   indiscretions	  and	   improprieties	  of	  various	  agencies.	  Among	  the	   early	   scholars	   in	   the	   field	   is	   Frank	   Cain	   (1979)	   whose	   PhD	   thesis	   and	  subsequent	   book	   focused	   on	  political	   surveillance	   in	  Australia	   during	   the	   First	  and	  Second	  World	  Wars.	  Another	  early	  work	   to	   influence	   the	   field	   is	  Desmond	  Ball’s	   A	   Suitable	   Piece	   of	   Real	   Estate	   (1980),	   which	   considered	   the	   role	   of	  American	  signals	   intelligence	  bases	   in	  Australia,	  and	  US–Australian	   intelligence	  cooperation.	  In	  1985,	  Guy	  Verney,	  investigated	  the	  role	  of	  Military	  Intelligence	  in	  post	   federation	   defence	   planning	   in	   his	   PhD	   thesis	   titled	   The	   Army	   High	  
Command	   and	   Australian	   Defence	   Policy	   1901–1918.	   This	   body	   of	   literature	   is	  critical	  to	  anyone	  wishing	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  topic	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  history	  and	   was	   pivotal	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   field	   of	   inquiry	   because	   it	  demonstrated	  that	  quality	  research	  could	  be	  achieved.	  	  	  Throughout	   Australia	   important	   studies	   on	   intelligence	   then	   emerged	  from	   a	   number	   of	   scholars	   at	   various	   universities.	   Among	   them	   was	   Jenny	  Hocking	   (1988)	   from	   Sydney	   University	   whose	   PhD	   thesis	   explored	   the	  development	  of	  Australia's	  domestic	  counter–terrorism	  strategy,	  and	  later,	  Fiona	  Capp’s	   (1993)	   pioneering	   study	   Writers	   Defiled,	   which	   examined	   how	   the	  Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation,	   from	   1920	   to	   1960,	   had	   placed	  Australian	   literary	   figures	   under	   surveillance.	   David	   McKnight’s	   (1998)	   PhD	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thesis	   was	   another	   important	   contribution	   furthering	   the	   field	   of	   study.	   The	  
conspiratorial	   heritage:	   Comintern,	   espionage	   and	   the	   Russian	   tradition	   of	  
'konspiratsya',	  1919–1945,	  investigated	  aspects	  of	  intelligence	  history	  within	  the	  context	   of	   Soviet	   espionage	   activity	   in	  Australia.	   Each	   author	   has	   continued	   to	  publish	   widely	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   intelligence	   and,	   along	   with	   several	   other	  specialised	   authors,	   they	   have	   made	   a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   better	  understanding	   the	   history	   of	   intelligence	   in	   Australia.	   Although	   these	   works	  focus	  on	  particular	  aspects	  of	  Australian	   intelligence	  history,	  remarkably,	   there	  exists	  no	  full-­‐length	  study	  of	  intelligence	  politicisation	  in	  Australia.	  This	  is	  a	  gap	  the	  present	  study	  seeks	  to	  fill.	  	  	   Authors	   specialising	   in	   related	   fields,	   such	   as	   diplomacy,	   defence,	   and	  foreign	   policy,	   have	   enriched	   the	   historiography	   of	   Australian	   intelligence	  studies.	   But	   again,	   they	   offer	   little	   theoretical	   insight	   into	   how	   or	   why	  intelligence	   is	   politicised.	   Nevertheless,	   their	   perspectives	   are	   particularly	  valuable	   because	   they	   often	   concentrate	   on	   peripheral	   issues	   that	   intelligence	  historians	  ignore	  such	  as	  how	  intelligence	  can	  be	  used	  to	  support	  diplomacy	  and	  international	   relations.	   One	   author	   of	   significance	   is	   military	   historian	  Christopher	   Coulthard-­‐Clark	   whose	   book	   The	   Citizen	   General	   Staff:	   The	  
Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps	   1907–1914	   (1976)	   examines	   the	   origins	   of	  Australia’s	   first	   intelligence	   organisation,	   the	   Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps.	  Coulthard-­‐Clark’s	   book	   is	   meticulously	   researched	   and	   provides	   a	  comprehensive	   description	   of	   the	   early	   intelligence	   community.	   However,	   it	  leaves	   many	   aspects	   regarding	   the	   misuse	   of	   intelligence	   in	   political	   decision	  making	   unresolved.	   For	   example,	   although	   the	   author	   cites	   one	   of	   the	   first	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instances	  of	  politicisation	  occurring	  in	  this	  era,	  very	  little	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  topic.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  infer	  from	  Coulthard-­‐Clark’s	  discussion	  what	  circumstances	  led	   to	  politicisation	  and	   the	  work	  offers	   little	   insight	   into	  why	  political	   leaders	  attempted	   to	   use	   intelligence	   to	   vindicate	   their	   policy	   decisions.	   I	   discuss	   this	  case	  in	  chapter	  two	  and	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  causes	  and	  conditions,	  which	  led	  to	  one	  of	  Australia’s	  first	  instances	  of	  politicisation.	  	  	   The	   literature	  on	  Australian	  defence	  and	   foreign	  policy	  history	  has	  both	  strengths	   and	   limitations	   in	   respect	   to	   the	   study	   of	   intelligence	   politicisation.	  Neville	  Meaney,	   for	  example,	  has	  contributed	  several	  books	  and	  articles	  on	   the	  subject,	   the	  most	   important	   of	  which	   are	  The	  Search	  For	  Security	   in	   the	  Pacific	  (1976)	  and	  Australia	  in	  World	  Crisis	  (2009).	  On	  the	  positive	  side,	  Meaney’s	  work	  often	   touches	  on	  matters	  of	   intelligence	  and	  provides	  useful	   insights	  about	   the	  activities	   of	   the	   early	   intelligence	   community.	   The	   biggest	   limitation	   is	   that	   it	  rarely	  probes	  deep	  enough	   to	   reveal	   anything	  about	   the	   inner	  workings	  of	   the	  relationship	   between	   intelligence	   organisations	   and	   government.	  Nevertheless,	  Meaney’s	   work	   is	   invaluable	   for	   establishing	   background	   and	   context	   to	   the	  events	  examined	  in	  this	  study.	  	  	  Subsequently,	   Meaney	   discusses	   issues	   that	   are	   more	   relevant	   to	   the	  subject	  of	   intelligence	  politicisation	  in	  a	  1979	  article,	   ‘Australia’s	  Secret	  Service	  in	  World	  War	  One’.	  The	  premise	  of	  this	  short	  study	  is	  that	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  the	  government	  of	  William	  Hughes	  used	  the	  intelligence	  services	  to	  repress	  groups	   threatening	   the	   success	   of	   implementing	   compulsory	   military	  conscription.	  Meaney	   cites	   a	   number	   of	   relevant	   examples	   to	   demonstrate	   his	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argument	  but	  the	  article	  is	  short	  on	  detail	  and	  has	  other	  drawbacks.	  For	  instance,	  Meaney	  provides	  no	  discussion	  on	   the	  concept	  of	  politicisation	  or	  explanations	  as	  to	  why	  it	  could	  have	  occurred.	  A	  possible	  explanation	  for	  this	  omission	  is	  that	  the	   concept	   of	   intelligence	   politicisation	   was	   an	   anachronism	   at	   the	   time.	   But	  more	  concerning	  is	  that	  no	  references	  or	  bibliography	  are	  attached	  to	  the	  article,	  which	   makes	   it	   difficult	   to	   corroborate	   any	   of	   the	   evidence	   presented.	   	   As	   a	  result,	  the	  article	  is	  a	  handy	  reference	  but	  needs	  to	  be	  treated	  with	  some	  caution.	  	  	  	   Richard	  Hall’s	   (1978)	  The	  Secret	   State	   is	  another	  work	   that	   reflects	   the	  absence	  of	  a	  sound	  methodological	  approach.	  In	  scope,	  Hall’s	  book	  is	  substantial.	  It	  covers	  the	  history	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  from	  the	  pre-­‐federation	  period	  to	  the	   Whitlam	   era	   in	   1975.	   A	   former	   journalist	   and	   advisor	   to	   Prime	   Minister	  Whitlam,	   Hall	   experienced	   first-­‐hand	   some	   of	   the	   events	   he	   discusses	   and	   it	  might	  be	  expected	  he	  would	  add	  useful	   insights	   to	   the	   subject.	  But	  overall,	   the	  work	   has	   limitations,	   the	  most	   significant	   of	   which	   is	   that	   the	   research	   is	   not	  supported	  by	  sufficient	  evidence.	  Throughout	  the	  book,	  Hall	  quotes	  and	  refers	  to	  specific	  evidence	  but	  not	  one	  citation	  or	  reference	  is	  given,	  and	  subsequently	  no	  bibliography	   is	   provided.	  While	   the	   book	  makes	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   field	   of	  study,	  without	   references	   and	  a	  bibliography	  Hall’s	   claims	  become	   speculative,	  as	  the	  veracity	  of	  his	  argument	  cannot	  be	  empirically	  verified.	  Consequently,	  The	  
Secret	  State	  tends	  toward	  exhortation	  rather	  than	  rigorous	  analysis.	  	  	   Other	   studies	   provide	   a	   more	   measured	   evaluation	   of	   the	   Australian	  intelligence	  community	  and	  the	  problems	  underpinning	  its	  development.	  One	  of	  significance	   is	   Jacqueline	  Templeton’s	  report,	  which	  comprises	  two	  of	   the	  eight	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volumes	   published	   for	   the	   Hope	   Royal	   Commission	   in	   1977.	   Templeton	   was	  commissioned	   to	   write	   a	   history	   of	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   services	   from	  1900	   through	   to	   1950	   and	   her	   analysis	   relies	   on	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   archival	  material	  sequestered	  for	  the	  commission.	  The	  report	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  history	  of	   the	  political,	   organisational,	   and	  bureaucratic	   problems	  encountered	  by	   various	   government	   administrations	  when	   establishing	   several	   of	   the	   early	  intelligence	   services.	   Templeton’s	   report	   is	   nicely	   balanced	   and	   carefully	  researched,	  but	  at	  times	  cursory.	  This	  is	  most	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  guiding	  her	  report,	  which	  was	  to	  establish	  background	  context	  to	  the	  Hope	  Royal	  Commission.	  In	  any	  case,	  it	  is	  a	  significant	  and	  important	  contribution	  for	  anyone	  wanting	   to	   understand	   the	   early	   relationship	   between	   the	   Australian	  government	  and	  its	  intelligence	  services.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Frank	  Cain	  has	  published	  widely	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  history	  and	  his	  most	  important	  work	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  The	  
Origins	   of	   Political	   Surveillance	   in	   Australia	   (1983).	   The	   argument	   Cain	   puts	  forward	  is	  that	  since	  their	  establishment	  conservative	  political	  groups	  have	  used	  Australian	   intelligence	   agencies	   for	   partisan	   political	   advantage,	   principally	   by	  using	   them	   to	   undermine	   opposition	   and	   stifle	   dissent.	   The	   book	   evaluates	   a	  number	  of	  instances	  where	  intelligence	  organisations	  interfered	  with	  groups	  and	  individuals	   that	   opposed	   the	   government’s	   political	   goals,	   specifically	   during	  World	  War	  One.	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Cain’s	  research	   is	   impressive,	  and	  methodologically	  sound.	  Although	   the	  work	   is	  based	  on	  an	  extensive	  evaluation	  of	  archival	  documents	  Cain’s	  analytic	  focus	   is	   at	  points	   rather	  narrow.	  He	  discusses	   several	   cases	  where	   intelligence	  was	   used	   for	   partisan	   political	   purposes	   but	   his	   emphasis	   is	   generally	   on	  exposing	   the	   behaviour	   of	   the	   intelligence	   organisation	   rather	   than	   examining	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  what	  motivates	  their	  actions.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Cain’s	  focus	  is	  directed	  away	   from	  the	  politics	  of	   intelligence	  and	   toward	   the	  misbehaviour	  of	  intelligence	   organisations.	   As	   a	   result,	   Cain	   pays	   little	   attention	   to	   evaluating	  whether,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  the	  behaviour	  of	  political	  leaders	  contributed	  to	  the	  problems	   he	   analyses.	   Another	   limitation,	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   relevance	   to	   this	  study,	  is	  that	  Cain’s	  focus	  is	  again	  directed	  away	  from	  the	  relationship	  between	  intelligence	   and	   politics	   toward	   the	   relationship	   between	   intelligence	  organisations,	  trade	  unions,	  and	  labour	  organisations.	  This	  tends	  to	  narrow	  the	  perspective	  of	  his	  study	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  consider	  the	  broader	  political	  context	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  during	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  his	  study.	  	   The	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  community	  and	  the	   relationships	   it	   has	   formed	  with	   overseas	   intelligence	   organisations	   is	   the	  subject	   of	   several	   well–considered	   studies.	   British	   historian	   Christopher	  Andrew’s	  1989	  paper,	  ‘The	  Growth	  of	  the	  Australian	  Intelligence	  Community	  and	  the	   Anglo–American	   Connection’	   is	   a	   short	   but	   comprehensive	   survey	   of	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	  services.	   It	  details	   the	  evolution	  of	  several	  organisations	  and	  outlines	  the	  impact	  British	  and	  American	  interests	  have	  had	  on	  the	  structure	  and	  development	  of	  these	  institutions,	  but	  also	  the	  objectives	  they	  have	  pursued.	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Andrew’s	  work	   is	   of	   significance	   to	   this	   study	   for	   several	   reasons.	   The	   first	   is	  because	   it	   provides	   invaluable	   references	   to	   primary	   documents.	   Second,	   at	  numerous	   junctures	   the	   work	   examines	   many	   of	   the	   cases	   discussed	   in	   this	  thesis.	  The	  biggest	  limitation	  of	  Andrew’s	  paper	  is	  its	  brevity.	  At	  several	  points,	  significant	   issues	   are	   only	   lightly	   probed	   and	   given	   a	   partial	   analysis.	  Nevertheless,	   the	   paper	   makes	   a	   significant	   contribution	   to	   the	   history	   of	   the	  Australian	  intelligence	  community.	  	  	  	  Desmond	   Ball,	   both	   as	   author	   and	   co-­‐author,	   has	   produced	   numerous	  studies	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  organisations.	  Ball’s	  bibliography	  of	   published	   books	   and	   articles	   reveals	   a	   substantial	   publishing	   history	   of	  material	   dealing	   with	   various	   aspect	   of	   intelligence	   history.	   One	   book	   of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  thesis	  is	  Breaking	  the	  Codes:	  Australia’s	  KGB	  Network	  
1944–1959,	  written	  in	  conjunction	  with	  David	  Horner7	  (1998).	  The	  authors	  state	  that	  the	  book	  is	  a	  case	  study	  of	  the	  role	  signals	  intelligence	  played	  in	  uncovering	  Soviet	  espionage	  activity	  in	  Australia,	  which	  they	  detail	  in	  an	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  subject	  (Ball	  &	  Horner	  1998:	  xiv).	  In	  eighteen	  chapters,	  the	  material	  covers	  a	  vast	   amount	   of	   territory,	   much	   of	   which	   is	   devoted	   to	   unearthing	   the	  circumstances	   leading	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   Australia’s	   early	   counter-­‐espionage	  agencies.	  	  But	  the	  book	  also	  includes	  insightful	  analysis	  on	  post	  World	  War	   Two	   intelligence	   and	   security	   arrangements	   with	   the	   United	   States	   and	  Great	  Britain	  and	  organisational	  problems	  each	  of	  the	  agencies	  encountered.	  The	  strength	  of	  Ball	  and	  Horner’s	  book	  is	  both	  its	  historical	  scope	  and	  its	  analytical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  The	  forthcoming	  three-­‐volume	  set	  about	  the	  Official	  History	  of	  ASIO	  was	  published	  too	  late	  to	  be	  reviewed	  this	  study.	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depth.	   Based	   on	   previously	   unreleased	   documents	   from	   the	  Australian,	   United	  Kingdom,	   and	   the	   United	   States	   archives,	   along	   with	   interviews	   from	   those	  involved	  in	  the	  events,	  it	  delivers	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  that	  is	  indispensible	  to	  understanding	  the	  evolution	  and	  functionality	  of	  the	  early	  Australian	  security	  intelligence	  services.	  	  	  	  Another,	   but	   often–neglected	   approach	   to	   the	   study	   of	   Australian	  intelligence,	   comes	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   former	   intelligence	   officers.	   One	  account,	   although	   somewhat	   dated	   now,	   is	   Sub	  Rosa:	  Memoirs	  of	  an	  Australian	  
Intelligence	   Analyst	   by	   R.	   H	   Mathams	   (1982),	   which	   outlines	   his	   thirty-­‐year	  career	  as	  Director	  of	  Scientific	  and	  Technical	  Intelligence	  at	  the	  Joint	  Intelligence	  Bureau. 8 	  According	   to	   Mathams,	   Sub	   Rosa	   is	   intended	   to	   highlight	   that	  intelligence	   analysis	   is	   an	   important	   function	   which	   significantly	   supports	   the	  formulation	  and	  implementation	  of	  government	  policy.	  The	  work’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  advocate	   for	   greater	   public	   recognition	   of	   the	   craft	   of	   analysis	   as	   a	   legitimate	  profession	  (Mathams	  1982:	  1–2).	  	  	  Mathams’	   book	   tends	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	   evolution	   of	   Australia’s	  analytical	   intelligence	   structure	   and	   intelligence	   analysis	   as	   an	   occupation,	   but	  provides	   few	   insightful	   details	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   intelligence	   and	  politics.	  This	  theme	  is	  continued	  in	  his	  second	  contribution,	  a	  monograph	  titled	  ‘The	   Intelligence	   Analysts	   Notebook’	   (1988).	   Given	   Mathams’	   extensive	  experience	   in	   the	   area,	   it	   might	   be	   expected	   that	   he	   would	   provide	   some	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	  Joint	  Intelligence	  Bureau	  was	  established	  in	  1947.	  In	  1970	  it	  merged	  into	  the	  Joint	  Intelligence	   Organisation,	   and	   in	   1990,	   JIO	   then	   became	   the	   Defence	   Intelligence	  Organisation.	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commentary	  about	  the	  challenges	  analysts	  face	  in	  dealing	  with	  political	  pressure	  and	  how	  it	  might	  affect	  their	  work.	  But	  both	  works	  fail	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  Mathams’	   contribution	   provides	   only	   limited	   insights	   into	   how	   intelligence	  interacts	  with	  politics	  and	  the	  problems	  analysts	  encounter	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  policy-­‐makers.	  	  	  Harvey	  Barnett,	   former	  Deputy	  Director	   of	  Operations	   at	   the	  Australian	  Secret	   Intelligence	   Service	   (ASIS)	   and	   later	   Director	   General	   of	   the	   Australian	  Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation	   (ASIO)	   follows	   a	   similar	   pattern	   in	   his	   book	  
Tale	  of	  the	  Scorpion	  (1988).	  Barnett	  states	  in	  the	  introduction	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  his	  book	  is	  to	  ‘neither	  accuse	  or	  defend,	  but	  to	  offer	  a	  different	  explanation	  of	  past	   facts	  and	  events’	   (1998:	  viii).	  This	  objective	   is	  partially	  achieved,	  which	   is	  perhaps	  reassuring	  to	  the	  organisation	  itself.	  Barnett	  does	  not	  accuse	  or	  defend,	  and	   no	   revelations	   or	   previously	   unknown	   facts	   are	   revealed.	   Tale	   of	   the	  
Scorpion’s	   empirical	   chapters	   offers	   a	   blend	   of	   historical	   and	   political	  commentary	  but	  it	  fails	  to	  improve	  on	  previous	  accounts	  by	  Ball	  or	  Cain.	  	  	  The	   strength	   of	   Barnett’s	   memoir	   is	   in	   delivering	   an	   insiders	   account	  (although	   a	   rather	   diluted	   one)	   of	   the	   challenges	   a	   director	   of	   an	   intelligence	  organisation	   faces	  when	  conducting	   their	  work.	  Chapter	  nine	   is	  devoted	   to	   the	  subject	  of	  ASIO	  and	  politics	  but	   the	  political	   tensions	  between	   intelligence	  and	  policy	  are	  only	  stated	  implicitly.	  	  Barnett	  recognises	  that	  an	  effective	  intelligence	  organisation	  must	  be	  politically	  impartial	  but	  argues	  that	  the	  Director	  General	  is	  often	   ‘hostage	   to	   political	   fortune’.	   Barnett	   does	   not	   elaborate	   on	   the	   subject	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(Barnett	  1998:	  222–3).	  Given	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  job,	  he	  concludes	  that	  he	  was	  happy	  to	  retire	  early.	  	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  considered	  authors	  on	  the	  topic	   is	  David	  McKnight	  who	  produced	   several	   books	   and	   articles	   on	   the	   history	   of	   Australian	   intelligence	  organisations.	   The	   most	   comprehensive	   is	   Australia’s	   Spies	   and	   their	   Secrets	  (1994),	  which	   charts	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	  Organisation	   during	   the	   Cold	   War	   Period.	   In	   some	   ways,	   McKnight’s	   study	  represents	   a	   shift	   away	   from	   the	   traditional	  methodology	  of	   straight	   historical	  analysis.	   Although	   drawing	   on	   substantial	   archival	   sources,	   the	   study	   is	  supplemented	  with	  interviews	  from	  numerous	  former	  ASIO	  intelligence	  officers,	  various	  political	  leaders,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Australian	  Communist	  Party,	  which	  results	   in	  a	  study	  that	  contributes	  new	  and	  insightful	  material	   to	  the	  subject	  of	  Australian	  intelligence	  history.	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  relevance	  to	  this	  study,	  there	  are	  some	  minor	  limitations.	  For	  example,	   McKnight	   identifies	   that	   the	   events	   surrounding	   the	   defection	   of	  Vladimir	   and	   Evdokia	   Petrov	   and	   the	   subsequent	   Royal	   Commission	   on	  Espionage	  during	  1950s	  had	  resulted	  in	  a	  politicised	  and	  polarising	  environment	  in	   which	   ASIO	   functioned	   (McKnight	   1994:	   87).	   Several	   other	   instances	   of	  politicised	  intelligence	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  book,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  attempt	  to	  define	  the	   concept	   or	   explain	   it	   with	   any	   precision.	   Notwithstanding	   these	   minor	  limitations,	  McKnight’s	  contribution	   is	  highly	  relevant	  to	  this	  study	  particularly	  for	  establishing	  context	  and	  background.	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The	   theme	   of	   ASIO	   operating	   in	   a	   highly	   politicised	   environment	   is	  continued	   in	   McKnight’s	   2008	   article,	   	   ‘Partisan	   Improprieties’,	   which	   firmly	  demonstrates	   the	   politicisation	   of	   intelligence	   in	   the	   Australian	   context.	   The	  article	  offers	  a	  tightly	  focused	  analysis	  of	  the	  interplay	  between	  intelligence	  and	  politics	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   politicisation	   as	   much	   as	   it	   does	   on	   questions	  regarding	  the	  appropriate	  oversight	  and	  accountability	  of	  the	  organisation.	  Using	  archival	   documents,	   McKnight	   explores	   the	   use	   and	   abuse	   of	   ASIO	   by	   several	  conservative	   political	   leaders	   from	  1962	   to	   1972	   and	   attempts	   to	   explain	  why	  the	  organisation	  by	  1972	  had	  become	  subject	  to	  accusations	  of	  politicisation.	  In	  the	   final	   analysis,	  McKnight	   argues	   that	   excessive	   political	   control,	   not	   agency	  autonomy,	   was	   the	   primary	   factor	   that	   had	   enabled	   many	   of	   the	   abuses	  (McKnight	   2008	   a:	   708).	   	   The	   real	   value	   of	   ‘Partisan	   Improprieties’	   is	   that	   it	  demonstrates	  an	  important	  idea.	  Excessive	  political	  control	  over	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	   can	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   pushing	   it	   toward	   the	   partisan	   political	  objectives	  of	  its	  own	  masters.	  	  	   Several	   implications	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   a	   review	   of	   the	   Australian	  literature.	   Despite	   the	   diversity	   of	   historical	   studies	   devoted	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  Australian	   intelligence	   history	   over	   the	   last	   few	   decades,	   few	   studies	   have	  specifically	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   politicisation.	   What	   is	   missing	   from	   these	  studies	   is	   a	   sound	   methodological	   and	   theoretical	   approach	   to	   studying	   the	  concept	   of	   intelligence	   politicisation.	   Indeed,	   very	   little	   analysis	   is	   focused	   on	  identifying	   how,	   and	   under	   what	   conditions,	   intelligence	   is	   likely	   to	   become	  politicised.	   In	  most	   cases,	   the	   causal	  mechanisms	   that	   can	   invoke	  politicisation	  are	  not	  made	  explicitly	  clear	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  politicisation	  is	  applied	  loosely	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to	   describe	   a	   variety	   of	   situations.	   In	   short,	   the	   Australian	   literature	   is	  historically	   rich,	   but	   theoretically	   poor.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   a	   more	   robust	  framework	   to	  guide	   this	   study	   I	   conducted	  a	   review	  of	   research	  on	   the	  subject	  found	   in	   the	   United	   States.	   I	   found	   the	   American	   literature	   had	   paid	   more	  attention	   to	   the	   conceptual	   and	   theoretical	   development	   of	   the	   subject.	   The	  following	   discussion	   examines	   that	   literature	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   exploring	   two	  central	   themes:	   (1)	   the	   theoretical	   discussion	   addressing	   definitions	   and	   the	  variegated	   forms	   of	   politicisation,	   and	   (2)	   the	   extant	   theoretical	   frameworks,	  which	   attempt	   to	   explain	   how	   politicisation	   can	   occur	   in	   the	   relationship	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy.	  	  	  	  
Theoretical	  perspectives:	  Definitions	  and	  forms	  	  An	  investigation	  of	  the	  American	  literature	  reveals	  a	  long	  and	  contentious	  debate	   over	   how	   to	   define	   and	   operationalize	   politicisation	   as	   an	   analytical	  concept,	   and	   identify	   the	   variety	   of	   forms	   it	   can	   take	   on.	   In	   the	   early	   1980s	  definitions	   of	   politicised	   intelligence	   relied	   on	   examining	   the	   behaviour	   of	  intelligence	   organisations	   —	   specifically	   their	   staff.	   These	   early	   definitions	  tended	   to	   characterise	   politicisation	   as	   the	   distortion	   of	   intelligence	   analysis	  without	  contemplating	  the	  political	  misuse	  of	  the	  intelligence	  product.	  One	  early	  definition	   put	   forward	   by	   Harry	   Howe	   Ransom	   (1987)	   argues	   that	   although	  ‘politicization	   has	   multiple	   meanings’	   it	   could	   generally	   be	   defined	   as	   when	  intelligence	   analysis	   is	   influenced	   by	   imbedded	   policy	   positions	   (Ransom	  1987:26).	   While	   making	   a	   noteworthy	   contribution,	   Ransom’s	   definition	   is	  restrictive	   because	   it	   considers	   only	   how	   an	   intelligence	   analyst’s	   assessment	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could	  result	   in	  distortion.	  It	  makes	  no	  inferences	  about	  how	  intelligence	  can	  be	  manipulated	  by	  those	  who	  receive	  and	  use	  the	  product.	  	  	  	   Despite	  Ransom’s	  restrictive	  definition,	  his	  study	  identifies	  three	  forms	  of	  politicisation.	   The	   first	   is	   termed	   partisan	   politicisation,	  which	   Ransom	   argues	  can	  occur	  ‘when	  an	  agency	  or	  an	  issue	  has	  become	  a	  point	  of	  contention	  between	  organised	   political	   groupings,	   normally	   political	   parties’.	   The	   second	   is	   what	  Ransom	  describes	  as	  ‘popularization,	  or	  publicity’,	  where	  intelligence	  is	  brought	  into	  public	  debate	  to	  generate	  discussion	  on	  the	  ends	  and	  means	  of	  policy.	  The	  third	   form	   Ransom	   identifies	   is	   ‘intelligence	   to	   please’	   where	   intelligence	  analysts	   are	   influenced	   by	   imbedded	   policy	   assumptions	   and	   produce	  assessments	  to	  support	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  policy-­‐makers	  (Ransom	  1987:	  26).	  	   Ransom’s	  work	   not	   only	   influenced	   the	   field	   of	   study	   but	   it	   also	   forced	  others	  to	  think	  about	  clarifying	  the	  concept.	  Michael	  Handel’s	  (1987)	  article	  ‘the	  politics	  of	  intelligence’	  expanded	  upon	  Ransom’s	  model	  and	  began	  investigating	  how	  political	   leaders	  might	  engage	   in	  politicising	   intelligence.	  Handel	   identifies	  two	   additional	   forms	   of	   politicisation,	   which	   articulate	   Ransom’s	   concept	   of	  ‘intelligence	  to	  please’.	   	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  can	  occur	  when	  political	  pressure	  is	  applied	  to	  the	  intelligence	  analysis	  process	  causing	  analytic	  distortions	  to	  arise.	  More	   importantly,	   Handel	   identified	   that	   political	   leaders	   could	   misuse	  intelligence	  assessments	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  interests,	  emphasising	  efforts	  to	  corrupt	   intelligence	  by	   those	  who	  consume	   its	  product	   (Handel	  1987:	  6).	  After	  examining	   the	   issue	   Handel	   concluded	   that	   politicisation	   usually	   results	   from	  ‘the	   fact	   that	   intelligence	   is	   essential	   to	   the	   promotion	   of	   all	   political	   interests	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including	  those	  of	  intelligence	  organizations	  and	  political	  leaders’	  (Handel	  1987:	  13).	  	   The	   way	   in	   which	   intelligence	   can	   be	   manipulated	   to	   promote	   party	  political	  interests	  is	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  two	  studies	  conducted	  by	  Glen	  P.	  Hastedt	  (1987;	  2005).	  His	  first	  article	  titled,	  ‘The	  new	  context	  of	  intelligence	  estimating:	  politicising	   or	   publicizing’	   expands	   on	   Ransom’s	   concept	   of	   popularisation.	  Hastedt	  reframed	  the	  term	  as	  ‘publicization’,	  which	  he	  argues	  is	  the	  public	  use	  of	  secret	   intelligence	   to	   advance	   the	   political	   or	   policy	   agendas	   of	   a	   government	  (Hastedt	  1987:	  57).	  Hastedt	  later	  provided	  a	  more	  extensive	  examination	  of	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  2005	  article	  titled	  ‘Public	  intelligence:	  Leaks	  as	  policy	  instruments’,	  which	   demonstrated	   that	   publicised	   intelligence	   could	   be	   an	   effective	  promotional	  device.	  Citing	  examples	  from	  the	  Carter	  and	  Reagan	  administrations	  Hastedt	  highlights	   that	  political	   leaders	   can	   selectively	   choose	   intelligence	   that	  supports	  their	  policy	  agenda,	  but	  also	  that	  when	  used	  in	  public	  intelligence	  can	  be	  a	  powerful	  tool	  of	  persuasion.	  	  	  More	   recently,	   Gregory	   Treverton	   (2008)	   provides	   a	   definition	   of	  politicisation	  that	  builds	  on	  Hastedt’s	  concept	  of	  selectivity.	  Treverton	  ultimately	  defines	   politicisation	   as	   ‘commitments	   to	   perspectives	   or	   conclusions,	   in	   the	  process	   of	   intelligence	   analysis	   or	   interaction	  with	   policy,	   that	   suppress	   other	  evidence	   or	   views	   or	   blind	   people	   to	   them’	   (p:	   93).	   From	   this	   definition,	  Treverton	   infers	   that	   politicisation	   can	   have	   several	   different	   if	   overlapping	  meanings.	  He	  also	  suggests	  that	  some	  can	  apply	  simultaneously.	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But	  more	  importantly	  Treverton	  identifies	  a	   form	  of	  politicisation	  which	  he	   calls	   ‘cherry	   picking’	   or	   in	   some	   cases	   ‘growing	   some	   cherries’,	   in	   which	  senior	  officials,	  usually	  policy	  officials,	  pick	   their	   favourite	   intelligence	  out	  of	   a	  range	   of	   assessments.	   He	   also	   argues	   that	   political	   leaders	   can	   cause	  politicisation	  by	   ‘asking	   leading	  questions’	  or	  asking	  questions	   repeatedly.	  And	  finally	  Treverton	  identifies	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘a	  shared	  mindset’,	  whereby	  intelligence	  and	   policy	   share	   strong	   presumptions	   leading	   to	   skewed	   analysis	   (Treverton	  2008:	  93).	  	   In	  2011,	   Joshua	  Rovner	  published	  a	  study	  which	  brought	  together	  much	  of	  the	  previous	  theoretical	  work	  on	  the	  subject.	  His	  book,	  Fixing	  the	  Facts	  (2011),	  focuses	  on	  examining	  how	  both	  political	   leaders	  and	   intelligence	  organisations	  could	  contribute	  toward	  politicisation.	  Rovner	  examines	  six	  prominent	  cases	  of	  politicisation	   in	   various	   US	   administrations	   occurring	   over	   a	   forty-­‐year	   time	  frame.	  The	  study	  found	  that	  on	  several	  occasions	  political	  leaders	  had	  pressured	  intelligence	  organisations	  (direct	  manipulation)	  to	  change	  their	  estimates	  so	  that	  it	  supported	  their	  policy	  choices.	  But	  Rovner	  also	  found	  that	  on	  other	  occasions	  intelligence	   organisations	   had	   deliberately	   skewed	   their	   estimates	   in	   order	   to	  undermine	  a	  policy	  choice	  of	  the	  government.	  For	  the	  most	  part	  this	  was	  done	  to	  either	   protect	   organisational	   interests	   or	   for	   personal	   gain.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	  important	   aspect	   of	   Rovner’s	   study	   is	   that	   he	   identified	   that	   the	   more	   subtle	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  were	  a	  more	  pervasive	  problem.	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Rovner	   identified	   eight	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   in	   total.	   In	   short,	   these	  include:	   direct	   manipulation,	   where	   policy-­‐makers	   pressure	   intelligence	   to	  produce	  specific	  findings.	  Indirect	  manipulation:	  where	  policy-­‐makers	  send	  tacit	  signals	   to	   intelligence	   analysts	   about	   what	   are	   acceptable	   and	   unacceptable	  conclusions.	  A	  third	  form	  of	  politicisation	  similar	  to	  that	  of	   ‘group	  think’	  occurs	  when	  widely	  held	  strategic	  assumptions	  and	  social	  norms	  restrict	  the	  bounds	  of	  acceptable	   intelligence	   analysis.	   Rovner	   termed	   this	   embedded	   assumptions.	  Another	   form	   of	   politicisation	   he	   identified	   is	   intelligence	   subverting	   policy.	  According	   to	   Rovner,	   this	   occurs	   when	   intelligence	   organisations	   skew	   their	  estimates	   to	  undermine	  policy	  decisions.	   Intelligence	  parochialism	  was	   another	  form	   Rovner	   identified	   which	   he	   argues	   can	   occur	   when	   analysts	   tailor	   their	  findings	   for	   personal	   or	   professional	   gain,	   and	   conversely,	   bureaucratic	  
parochialism,	  where	   intelligence	   organisations	   tailor	   findings	   to	   support	   their	  organisational	   interests.	   The	   final	   two	   forms	   identified	   were	   partisan	  
intelligence,	   and	   intelligence	   as	   a	   scapegoat.	   Rovner	   argues	   that	   partisan	  
intelligence	   occurs	   when	   political	   parties	   misuse	   intelligence	   for	   partisan	  political	   gain.	   Alternatively,	   intelligence	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   scapegoat	   when	  policies	   go	   awry.	  Here	   political	   leaders	   can	   either	   deride	   intelligence	   if	   it	   does	  not	   support	   their	   policy	   decisions,	   or	   intelligence	   is	   blamed	   for	   policy	   failures	  (Rovner	  2011:	  205).	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Theoretical	  perspectives:	  Intelligence,	  policy	  and	  politicisation	  	  Two	   central	   themes	   dominate	   the	   literature	   on	   intelligence	   and	   policy	  relations	   and	   the	   subject	   of	   politicisation.	   Both	   revolve	   around	   the	   idea	   of	  proximity,	  or	  more	  specifically,	  how	  close	  or	  distant	  intelligence	  should	  operate	  in	  regard	  to	  policy.	  The	  first	  approach	  is	  termed	  the	  traditionalist	  model,	  and	  the	  second	  the	  activist	  model	  (Hulnick	  1986:214;	  Handel	  1987:11;	  Bar-­‐Joseph	  1995:	  23;	  Johnson	  &	  Wirtz	  2011:	  165–6).	  9	  While	  both	  recognise	  that	  politics	  plays	  an	  unavoidable	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   functions	   of	   an	   intelligence	   organisation,	   they	  reach	   different	   conclusions	   about	   how	   politicisation	   occurs.	   New	   explanations	  have	  also	  recently	  emerged,	  which	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  topic.	  These	  theoretical	  perspectives	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  tie	  together	  several	  strands	  of	  thinking,	  each	  of	  which	  help	   to	   structure	   the	   theoretical	   framework	  of	   this	   study.	  The	   following	  discussion	  reviews	   the	   two	  prevailing	   theories	  and	   then	  moves	   to	  examine	   the	  third.	  	  	  
Traditionalist	  theory	  The	  first	  point	  of	  view	  is	  the	  traditionalist	  model.	  Advocates	  of	  this	  model	  argue	  that	   intelligence	  should	  be	  distanced	  from	  politics,	  research	   independent	  judgments,	   and	  avoid	   tailoring	  assessments	   to	   satisfy	   the	  policy	  preferences	  of	  decision-­‐makers	  (Handel	  1987:	  11).	  Essentially	  the	  traditionalist	  model	  rests	  on	  one	  central	  proposition:	  intelligence	  should	  be	  separated	  from	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  political	  influence	  and	  enhance	  objectivity.	  According	  to	  Sherman	  Kent,	  the	  original	   proponent	   of	   the	   traditionalist	   model,	   intelligence	   agencies	   must	   be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  The	  Traditionalist	  model	  is	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Kent,	  or	  professional	  model,	  and	  the	  Activist	  model	  is	  also	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Gates,	  or	  Realist	  model.	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bureaucratically	  separated	   from	  the	  policy-­‐making	  apparatus	  of	  government	   to	  enhance	  political	  impartiality	  (Kent	  1951:200).	  The	  rationale	  being	  that	  political	  influence,	   and	   subsequently	   politicisation,	   increases	  when	   intelligence	   officials	  interact	  too	  closely	  with	  policy-­‐makers	  (Hulnick	  1986:	  213).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  traditionalist	  model	   suggests	   that	   keeping	   intelligence	   at	   an	   arm’s	   length	   from	  politics	  will	   enable	   objective	   analysis	   and	   limit	   political	   influence.	   However,	   it	  fails	   to	   acknowledge	   that	   all	   judgments	   on	   intelligence	   matters	   are	   to	   some	  extent	   value–laden	   regardless	   of	   the	   bureaucratic	   context	   in	   which	   they	   are	  made.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   traditionalist	   approach	   rests	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	  politicisation	  is	  a	  product	  of	  bureaucratic	  proximity,	  and	  thus	  attempts	  to	  delimit	  political	   contact	   between	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   in	   order	   to	   reduce	   its	  occurrence.	  	  	  	   Traditionalist	   theory	   infers	   that	   politicisation	   is	   a	   condition	   that	   occurs	  due	   to	   the	   structural	   arrangement	   of	   government	   bureaucracy.	   Politicisation	  takes	   place	   through	   a	   process	   of	   gradual	   or	   unconscious	   assimilation	   of	   ideas	  when	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   officials	   work	   in	   proximity	   to	   each	   other.	   The	  solution	  to	  delimit	  the	  prospect	  of	  politicisation	  is	  that	  intelligence	  must	  remain	  distant	  from	  the	  political	  arena	  otherwise	  it	  risks	  becoming	  a	  participant	  in	  the	  policy	  debate	  (Handel	  1987:	  11).	  Thus,	  the	  nexus	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  becomes	   the	   site	   of	   contention	   where	   the	   conditions	   of	   politicisation	   arise.	  	  Accordingly,	  politicisation	  is	  represented	  as	  a	  structural	  problem.	  It	  is	  product	  of	  bureaucratic	  proximity	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy.	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But	  research	  indicates	  that	  that	  traditionalist	  model	  is	  problematic	  when	  put	   into	   practice.	   Stephen	   Marrin	   (2009)	   examines	   such	   problems.	   Marrin	  analysed	   the	   relationship	   between	   US	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   departments	  examining	  how	  significant	  proximity	  was	  in	  causing	  politicisation.	  He	  studied	  the	  concept	  of	  proximity	  through	  two	  empirical	  case	  studies.	  The	  first	  examines	  the	  pre-­‐9/11	  attacks	  and	  the	  second	  the	  pre-­‐Iraq	  War	  intelligence	  assessments.	  	  His	  study	   found	   that	  when	  proximity	  between	   intelligence	  and	  policy	   increased,	   so	  too	   did	   its	   usefulness	   to	   the	   policy-­‐maker.	   More	   significantly,	   he	   found	   no	  indication	  that	   increased	  proximity	  actually	  caused	  politicisation	  (Marrin	  2009:	  296).	   Marrin’s	   findings	   point	   to	   an	   inconsistency	   in	   the	   traditionalist	   theory,	  which	  indicates	  that	  increasing	  proximity	  may	  actually	  have	  positive	  effects.	  	  	  Australian	   academic	   Frank	   Cain	   (1994)	   has	   made	   similar	   observations.	  	  Cain	  paid	  particular	   attention	   to	  how	  excessive	  bureaucratic	   isolation	  between	  intelligence	  and	  government	  had	  contributed	  towards	  the	  politicisation	  of	  ASIO	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  He	  argues	  that	  a	   lack	  of	   legislative	  and	  political	  control	  of	  ASIO	  allowed	  it	  to	  pursue	  the	  ideological	  objectives	  of	  its	  managers	  and	  directors	  (Cain	   1994:	   213–214).	   What	   is	   pertinent	   about	   Cain’s	   analysis	   is	   that	   he	  identifies	   another	   limitation	   of	   traditionalist	   theory:	   that	   the	   extremes	   of	  bureaucratic	  separation	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  institutional	  silos	  within	  the	  security	   apparatus.	   Under	   conditions	   of	   total	   isolation,	   intelligence	   agencies	  become	   beholden	   to	   no	   one	   except	   those	  who	   control	   the	   organisation.	   Cain’s	  analysis	  highlights	  that	  too	  much	  separation	  can	  actually	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  and	  allow	  politicisation	  to	  occur.	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Gregory	  Treverton	  from	  the	  RAND	  Corporation	  attributes	  specific	  analytic	  pathologies	  such	  as	   ‘shared	  mindset’	  and	  ‘groupthink’	  as	  further	  antecedents	  of	  political	   isolation	   (Treverton	   2008:	   94).	   	   He	   argues	   that	   when	   intelligence	  organisations	   operate	   in	   isolation,	   analysts	   and	  managers	   tend	   to	   fall	   back	   on	  what	  he	  calls	  the	  ‘house	  line’.	  Psychologist’s	  Straus,	  Parker	  and	  Bruce	  identified	  similar	   cognitive	   behaviours	   among	   intelligence	   analysts	   in	   their	   2011	   study.	  They	  found	  that	  bureaucratic	   isolation	  can	  give	  rise	  to	  a	   form	  of	  organisational	  groupthink	  where	   isolation	   from	   outside	   views	   results	   in	   a	   failure	   to	   consider	  alternatives	   and	   enhances	   pressure	   towards	   organisational	   conformity,	   which	  can	   induce	   poor	   decision-­‐making	   (Straus,	   Parker	   &	   Bruce	   2011:135).	   Under	  these	   conditions,	   intelligence	   organisations	   can	   develop	   what	   Treverton	   calls	  ‘tunnel	   vision’	   where	   analytical	   assumptions	   based	   on	   previous	   experience	  constrains	  analysis	  and	  leads	  to	  a	  form	  of	  bureaucratic	  parochialism	  (Treverton	  2008:94).	  	  	   Similar	  observations	  were	  reported	  in	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  Butler	  Review	  of	  Intelligence	   on	   Weapons	   of	   Mass	   Destruction	   in	   Britain	   in	   2004.	   Lord	   Butler	  reported	   that	   the	   Joint	   Intelligence	   Committee	   tended	   to	   colour	   their	  assessments	   based	   on	   the	   ‘prevailing	   wisdom’	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   past	  assessments	  (Butler	  2004:	  112).	  He	  concluded	  that	  because	  Britain	  had	  very	  few	  sources	  on	   the	  ground	   in	   Iraq	  previous	   intelligence	  estimates	  had	  a	   significant	  influence	   on	   how	   current	   estimates	   were	   drafted.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   different	  cultural	   and	   structural	   factors	   that	   exist	   between	   US,	   UK,	   and	   Australian	  intelligence	   agencies,	   bureaucratic	   isolation	   appears	   to	   have	   similar	  consequences.	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  An	  ethnographic	  study	  conducted	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	  Rob	  Johnston	  in	  2005	   came	   to	   a	   similar	   conclusion.	   Johnston	   conducted	   numerous	   interviews	  with	   intelligence	  analysts	   at	   fourteen	  US	   intelligence	  agencies.	  His	   study	   found	  that	   the	   validation	   of	   new	   data	   was	   often	   questionable.	   The	   most	   pervasive	  problem	  Johnston’s	  study	  identified	  was	  ‘confirmation	  bias’,	  where	  an	  emphasis	  is	   placed	   on	   supporting	   organisational	   opinion	   rather	   than	   testing	   new	  hypotheses	  (Johnston	  2005:	  21).	  According	  to	  Johnston,	  confirmation	  bias	  arises	  because	  analysts	  start	  their	  process	  by	  examining	  pre-­‐existing	  analytic	  products	  to	   establish	   a	   base	   line.	   ‘The	   existing	   analytic	   products	   describe,	   implicitly	   or	  explicitly,	  a	  set	  of	  working	  hypotheses	  that	  an	  analyst	  may	  wish	  to	  reflect	  in	  his	  or	  her	  own	  work’	  (Johnston	  2005:	  22).	  He	  suggests	   that	  what	   tends	  to	  occur	   is	  that	  the	  analyst	   looks	  for	  current	  data	  that	  confirms	  the	  existing	  organisational	  opinion	  or	  the	  opinion	  that	  seems	  most	  probable	  and,	  consequently,	  is	  easiest	  to	  support	   (Johnston	   2005:23).	   The	   danger	   of	   confirmation	   bias	   is	   that	   analysts	  tend	  to	  filter	  out	  evidence	  that	  challenges	  organisational	  preconceptions.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  organisational	  norms	  and	  personal	  politics	  can	  unintentionally	  intrude	  into	  the	  intelligence	  process	  and	  politicise	  the	  product.	  	  	  In	   short,	   the	   traditionalist	   approach	   is	   a	   somewhat	   idealised	   model	   of	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  relations.	  It	  suggests	  that	  politicisation	  is	  a	  condition	  that	  results	  from	  a	  close	  working	  relationship	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  where	  political	  and	  policy	  assumptions	  become	  comingled	  with	  intelligence,	  resulting	  in	  distortion	   or	   skewed	   analysis.	   It	   seeks	   to	   impose	   structural	   barriers	   between	  intelligence	  agencies	  and	  their	  political	  masters	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  politicisation	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from	   taking	   place	   (Betts	   2007:	   100).	   While	   there	   is	   some	   merit	   to	   the	  traditionalist	   approach,	   it	   tends	   to	   presuppose	   that	   bureaucratic	   or	   structural	  conditions	   are	   the	   main	   cause	   of	   politicisation.	   This	   constitutes	   the	   issue	   of	  politicisation	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  bureaucratic	  dysfunction.	  It	  places	  little	  emphasis	  on	  investigating	  how	  external	  social,	  or	  internal	  organisational	  factors	  might	  lead	  to	   politicisation.	   A	   particular	   criticism	   reported	   in	   each	   of	   aforementioned	  studies	  of	   the	   traditionalist	  model	   is	   that	   such	   factors	  need	   to	  be	   incorporated	  into	  the	  study	  of	  politicisation.	  	  	  
Activist	  theory	  The	   second	   theoretical	   perspective	   is	   termed	   the	   activist	   model.	   This	  model	   is	   based	   purely	   on	   practical	   considerations	   (Bar-­‐Joseph	   1995:	   23).	   The	  underlying	   logic	   is	   that	  when	   intelligence	   is	   produced	   closer	   to	   policy-­‐making	  objectives	   it	   tends	   to	   be	  most	   useful	   (Betts	   2007:76).	  According	   to	   the	   activist	  view,	  increasing	  proximity	  encourages	  cooperation	  and	  communication	  resulting	  in	   an	   improved	   intelligence	   product	   rather	   than	   fostering	   politicisation.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  activist	  model	  argue	  that	  intelligence	  involvement	  in	  politics	  is	  both	   necessary	   and	   a	   legitimate	   means	   of	   supporting	   policy-­‐making	   decisions	  (Bar-­‐Joseph	   1995:	   23).	   This	   point	   underscores	   the	   activist	   argument	   that:	  intelligence	   is	   always	   political	   because	   it	   is	   part	   of	   the	   policy	   decision-­‐making	  process	   (Shulsky	   1995:	   85).	   It	   is	   assumed	   that	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   have	   a	  symbiotic	   relationship	   and	   the	   closer	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   the	  better	   both	   systems	   function.	   Intelligence	   must	   be	   close	   to	   policy	   in	   order	   to	  understand	  what	  the	  policy-­‐maker	  needs,	  and	  to	  serve	  those	  needs.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge	  for	  knowledge’s	  sake	  under	  the	  traditionalist	  model	  is	  considered	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to	  have	  no	  practical	  purpose.	  Rather,	  intelligence	  should	  only	  pursue	  knowledge	  that	   is	  of	  actionable	  use	  to	  the	  policy-­‐maker.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  they	  must	  work	  together	  closely	  and	  collaboratively.	  	  	   Some	  adherents	  to	  the	  traditionalist	  model	  express	  a	  view	  that	  increasing	  proximity	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy	  is	  an	  invitation	  for	  politicisation	  (Betts	  2007:	  77).	  But	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  refute	  this	  assumption.	  For	  instance,	  Marrin’s	  study	  found	  that	  in	  the	  British	  system	  where	  intelligence	  is	  incorporated	  closer	  to	   the	   policy-­‐making	   framework,	   it	   is	   both	   more	   influential	   and	   often	   less	  politicised	  than	  in	  the	  US	  model	  of	  bureaucratic	  separation.	  He	  argues	  that	  this	  is	  most	   likely	   due	   to	   the	   norms	   of	   British	   intelligence	   culture	   where	   rewarding	  ‘analytic	  integrity’	  is	  encouraged	  (Marrin	  2009:	  296–7).	  	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  reported	   in	   Marrin’s	   study	   indicates	   that	   improving	   professional	   practice,	   not	  bureaucratic	  separation,	  is	  the	  most	  effective	  way	  to	  reduce	  politicisation.	  	  	   Israeli	   academic	   Uri	   Bar-­‐Joseph	   (1995)	   reported	   similar	   findings.	   Bar-­‐Joseph	  conducted	  four	  case	  studies	  where	  intelligence	  agencies	  had	  interfered	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  United	  States,	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  Israeli	  governments.	  He	  found	  in	   all	   cases	   when	   ‘intelligence	   professionalism’	   was	   low	   there	   was	   a	   higher	  likelihood	   for	   intelligence	   to	   become	  politicised.	  Bar-­‐Joseph	   found	  no	   evidence	  that	   increased	   proximity	   caused	   politicisation,	   but	   rather	   factors	   relating	   to	  personal	   and	   institutional	   professionalism	   are	   more	   significant	   (Bar-­‐Joseph	  1995:	   358	   &	   361).	   In	   short,	   Bar-­‐Joseph	   reported	   that	   the	   lower	   the	   level	   of	  professionalism	  in	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	  the	  higher	  the	  possibility	  analysts	  and	  managers	  will	  resort	  to	  doctoring	  their	  products	  to	  please	  policy-­‐makers.	  In	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this	   sense,	   the	   personal	   integrity	   of	   the	   intelligence	   official	   and	   the	  professionalism	   of	   the	   intelligence	   organisation	   were	   key	   factors	   that	   would	  limit	  the	  possibility	  of	  politicisation.	  	  	  	  	  The	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  activist	  model	  suggests	  that	  politicisation	  is	  not	   an	   issue	   related	   to	   the	   organisational	   arrangement	   of	   government	  bureaucracy	   and	   the	   proximity	   between	   intelligence	   and	   policy.	   Rather	  politicisation	   is	   connected	   to	   personal	   integrity	   and	   organisational	  professionalism.	  If	  intelligence	  professionals	  are	  to	  work	  in	  relative	  proximity	  to	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  serve	  their	  needs,	  a	  highly	  professional	  organisational	  culture	  is	   what	   will	   guard	   against	   politicisation.	   In	   short,	   the	   activist	   approach	  represents	  a	  more	  realistic	  working	  relationship	  between	  intelligence	  and	  policy.	  It	  suggests	  politicisation	  is	  somewhat	  inevitable,	  but	  frames	  its	  causes	  as	  internal	  and	   generated	   by	   the	   intelligence	   professional	   and	   not	   bureaucracy	   (Gates	  1992).	   Nevertheless,	   it	   places	   significant	   responsibility	   on	   the	   intelligence	  analyst	  to	  resist	  temptation	  and	  uphold	  his	  or	  her	  integrity	  in	  the	  face	  of	  political	  pressure.	  	  	  In	  summary,	  traditionalist	  theory	  indicates	  that	  the	  manifest	  conditions	  of	  politicisation	  may	  be	  related	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  government	  bureaucracy,	  while	  the	   activist	   theory	   suggests	   they	   are	   personal	   in	   nature.	   More	   importantly,	  however,	   these	   two	   theories	   are	   limited	   because	   of	   this	   focus	   and	   need	  expansion.	   This	   is	   because	   traditionalist	   and	   activist	   theories	   only	   consider	  politicisation	  to	  be	  a	  product	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community.	  Little	  consideration	  is	  given	  to	  how	  political	  leaders	  misuse	  intelligence	  and	  politicise	  its	  product.	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Policy	  oversell	  and	  domestic	  politics	  More	   recent	   treatments	   of	   the	   subject	   tend	   to	   redirect	   attention	   away	  from	   the	   intelligence	   community	   as	   the	   instigators	   of	   politicisation,	   and	   focus	  more	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  political	  leaders.	  Joshua	  Rovner,	  for	  example,	  developed	  a	  theoretical	   model	   of	   politicisation	   based	   on	   domestic	   politics	   rather	   than	  bureaucracy	  or	  personality.	  At	  the	  core	  of	  his	  book,	  Fixing	  the	  Facts	  (2011)	  is	  the	  argument	   that	   intelligence	   provides	   an	   effective	   public	   relations	   vehicle	   for	  political	   leaders	   to	  sell	   controversial	  policy	  decisions.	  Rovner	  examines	  several	  prominent	  cases	  of	  politicisation	  in	  various	  US	  administrations	  occurring	  over	  a	  forty-­‐year	   time	   frame.	   The	   study	   found	   that	   in	   all	   cases	   political	   leaders	  responded	   to	   domestic	   public	   criticism	   by	   utilising	   intelligence	   to	   oversell	   a	  controversial	  policy	  decision.	  Rovner	  terms	  this	  phenomenon	  the	  ‘policy	  oversell	  model’	  (Rovner	  2011:36).	  	  	  	  	   In	   short,	   the	  policy	  oversell	  model	  holds	   that	  politicisation	   is	   inherently	  linked	   to	   controversial	   domestic	   political	   decisions.	   	   Intelligence	   is	   likely	   to	  become	   politicised	   when	   policy-­‐makers	   publicly	   commit	   themselves	   to	   highly	  controversial	   issues.	   Political	   leaders’	   goals	   of	   maintaining	   their	   positions	   of	  power	   and	   gaining	   support	   for	   their	   policies	   generate	   incentives	   for	   them	   to	  pressure	   intelligence	   organisations	   to	   manipulate	   intelligence	   in	   a	   way	   that	  reinforces	  their	  preferred	  policies.	  Political	  leaders	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  impose	  this	  pressure	   after	   they	   make	   their	   policy	   commitments	   public	   and	   after	   the	  emergence	   of	   a	   ‘critical	   constituency’	   in	   opposition	   to	   such	   policies	   (Rovner	  2011:38).	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According	   to	   Rovner,	   the	   composition	   of	   a	   critical	   constituency	   is	   any	  group	  that	  has	  the	  power	  to	  obstruct	  policy	  plans	  or	  threaten	  the	  political	  future	  of	  a	  policy-­‐maker	  (Rovner	  2012).10	  Once	  a	  leader	  signals	  their	  intentions,	  policy	  failures	   become	   nontrivial	   and	   policy	   options	   less	   flexible.	   In	   order	   to	   avoid	  paying	  political	  costs,	  policy-­‐makers	  often	  rely	  on	  intelligence	  to	  justify	  the	  logic	  of	   their	  actions.	   In	  this	  situation,	   intelligence	   is	  used	  to	  oversell	  a	  controversial	  policy	  choice	  and	  to	  establish	  consensus.	  	  	   If	  a	  policy	  commitment	  is	  uncontroversial,	  a	  critical	  constituency	  will	  not	  arise	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  politicisation	  is	  deemed	  unlikely	  because	  the	  policy-­‐maker	  has	  no	  incentive	  to	  oversell	  their	  decision.	  However,	  expressing	  a	  public	  commitment	   to	   a	   controversial	   issue	   where	   public	   and	   political	   opposition	  arises,	   policy-­‐makers	   become	   vulnerable	   to	   political	   costs	   (Rovner	   2011:	   36).	  When	   publicly	   committed	   leaders	   face	   such	   opposition,	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  incentive	  to	  pressure	  intelligence	  agencies	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  justifies	  the	  leader’s	   position	   (Rovner	   2011:37).	   In	   this	   situation,	   intelligence,	   because	   it	   is	  perceived	  to	  be	  objective	  and	  politically	  neutral,	  can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  public	  advocacy	  vehicle	   to	   convince	   a	   sceptical	   public	   that	   a	   policy	   choice	   is	   rational	   (Rovner	  2012).	   Rovner’s	   oversell	   model	   is	   built	   on	   two	   independent	   variables.	   	   First,	  political	  leaders	  must	  publicly	  commit	  to	  a	  policy	  choice,	  and	  second,	  there	  must	  be	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   critical	   constituency	   in	   opposition	   to	   that	   policy.	  When	  both	  are	  present,	  intelligence	  is	  likely	  to	  become	  politicised.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Personal	  correspondence	  with	  the	  author,	  16	  June	  2012.	  	  
	  53	  
Rovner’s	  research	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  this	  study	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  highlights	  that	  politicisation	  is	  not	  only	  tied	  to	  conditions	  of	  bureaucratic	  proximity	  and	  personality,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  dependent	  on	  how	  intelligence	  is	  used	  by	  political	  leaders	  in	  a	  political	  context.	  Second,	  Rovner’s	  study	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  manifest	  conditions	  of	  politicisation	  not	  only	  occur	  as	  a	  response	  to	  political	  controversy,	   but	   also	   as	   a	   response	   to	   government–societal	   relations	   over	   the	  determination	   of	   policy	   goals.	   In	   short,	   intelligence	   politicisation	   is	   tied	   to	  matters	   of	   promoting	   or	   obstructing	   policy	   goals	   within	   the	   socio–political	  context.	  	  	  	  	   Taken	   together,	   the	   traditionalist,	   activist,	   and	   policy	   oversell	   models	  provide	   a	   basic	   theoretical	   framework	   for	   understanding	   what	   might	   cause	  intelligence	   to	   become	   politicised.	   Politicisation,	   the	   traditionalist	   and	   activist	  theory	   suggests,	   can	   occur	   when	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   operate	   in	   close	  proximity,	   or	   alternatively	   it	   might	   occur	   through	   a	   lack	   of	   professional	   or	  organisational	  integrity.	   	  Courtesy	  of	  Rovner’s	  model,	   intelligence	  might	  also	  be	  politicised	  when	  political	   leaders	  need	  a	  mechanism	  to	  sell	  controversial	  policy	  decisions	  or	  face	  social	  resistance	  to	  a	  policy	  goal.	  In	  short,	  these	  models	  offer	  a	  preliminary	  framework	  in	  which	  politicised	  intelligence	  can	  be	  studied.	  The	  aim	  of	   this	   thesis	   is	   to	   build	   on	   and	   broaden	   these	   frameworks.	   But	   more	  importantly,	  it	  seeks	  to	  determine	  whether	  these	  theoretical	  models	  apply	  to	  the	  Australian	  context	  or	  whether	  another	  explanation	  is	  needed.	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Agent	  of	  empire	  or	  servant	  of	  the	  nation:	  
Australian	  intelligence	  1901–1910	  
	  	  	  This	  chapter	  explores	  the	  early	  Australian	  intelligence	  community,	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  how	  intelligence	  was	  politicised	  in	  the	  struggle	  to	  achieve	  security	   in	   the	  years	  between	  1901	  and	  1910.	   It	   investigates	   the	  way	   in	  which	  political	   leaders,	   the	   military,	   and	   intelligence	   officials	   interfered	   with	   the	  intelligence	   process	   to	   vindicate	   their	   own	   political	   agendas,	   and	   how	   this	  behaviour	   can	   be	   explained	   as	   a	   form	   of	   politicisation.	   The	   first	   part	   of	   the	  chapter	   is	  historical	  and	   traces	   the	  events	  surrounding	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	  community,	   focusing	  as	  much	  as	  possible,	  on	  how	  these	  events	   impacted	   upon	   the	   future	   use	   of	   intelligence	   by	   political	   leaders.	   The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  will	  examine	  a	  series	  of	  case	  studies	  about	  intelligence	  politicisation	  during	  the	  period	  under	  discussion,	  identifying	  the	  conditions	  that	  enabled	   and	   motivated	   this	   behaviour.	   The	   chapter	   then	   concludes	   with	   a	  discussion	  on	  the	  preliminary	  findings.	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Antecedents:	  Intelligence	  pre-­‐federation	  	  The	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  intelligence	  to	  inform	  Australian	  security	  policy	  was	   of	   little	   concern	   to	   the	   colonial	   governments	   before	   federation.	   Australia	  was	   dependent	   on	   Britain	   for	   all	   intelligence	   assessments	   regarding	   security	  matters	   in	   its	   immediate	   vicinity	   (La	   Nauze	   1965:	   515).	   But	   in	   1870,	   British	  troops	   withdrew	   from	   Australia	   leaving	   the	   colony	   to	   provide	   for	   its	   own	  defences.	  The	  colonial	  governments,	  in	  turn,	  formed	  a	  small	  corps	  of	  permanent	  troops	   supported	   by	   a	   militia,	   volunteers,	   and	   partly	   paid	   soldiers.	   But	   the	  Australian	   force,	   limited	   in	   resources	   and	   experience,	   lacked	   any	   capacity	   to	  collect	   and	   collate	   strategic	   information	   and	   its	   use	   in	   policy	   planning	   was	  largely	   circumscribed.	   By	   1875,	   the	   Intelligence	  Branch	   of	   Britain’s	  War	  Office	  started	   to	  request	  detailed	   information	  on	   the	  defence	  resources	  of	   the	  colony.	  The	  Australian	  forces	  proved	  incapable	  of	  supplying	  the	  most	  rudimentary	  form	  of	   information	   required	   to	   fulfil	   this	   request.	  Three	  years	  after	   the	   Intelligence	  Branch	  had	  requested	  information	  the	  colony	  had	  submitted	  nothing	  relevant	  to	  the	  War	  Office	  (Johnson	  1974:	  54	  &	  58).	  	  	   Proposals	   were	   floated	   to	   remedy	   this	   situation.	   In	   July	   1878,	   the	  Queensland	   government	   received	   a	   report	   on	   the	   Defences	   of	   Queensland.	  Lieutenant	   Colonel,	   Peter	   R.	   Scratchely,	   of	   the	   Royal	   Engineers	   reported	   that	  measures	  adopted	  up	  to	  1878	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  area	  ‘were	  so	  incomplete	  as	   to	   be	   particularly	   useless	   for	   purposes	   of	   defence’.	   Scratchely	   proposed	  several	   recommendations	   to	   improve	   security	   in	   the	   region,	   one	   of	  which	  was	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the	   establishment	   of	   an	   intelligence	   corps.	  He	   suggested	   that	   the	   corps	   during	  times	  of	  peace	  could	  make	  ‘accurate	  plans	  of	  the	  country	  between	  Brisbane	  and	  the	   sea–coast’	   and	   in	   the	   larger	   areas	   to	   the	  North.	   In	   times	   of	  war,	   the	   corps	  could	   perform	   ‘the	   duties	   of	   scouts,	   guides,	   orderlies	   and	   escorts,	   and	   would	  cooperate	   with	   police	   in	   harassing	   an	   enemy	   that	   attempted	   to	   advance	   on	  Brisbane’	  (Legislative	  Assembly	  of	  Queensland	  1878:	  529	  &	  535).	  	  	  	  Similarly,	   a	   Royal	   Commission	   appointed	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	   military	  service	   of	   New	   South	   Wales	   in	   June	   1892	   reported	   that	   the	   intelligence	  departments	   of	   foreign	   nations	   ‘with	   which	   we	   may	   some	   day	   be	   engaged	   in	  hostilities,	   have	   long	   ago	   worked	   out	   in	   the	   most	   complete	   detail	   everything	  necessary	   for	   such	   an	   undertaking’.	   The	   Commission	   recommended	   that	   an	  officer	   from	   one	   of	   the	   two	   garrison	   regiments	   be	   appointed	   to	   undertake	   ‘all	  intelligence	  work’	  necessary	  for	  security	  of	  New	  South	  Wales.	  	  This	  position	  was	  to	   include	   training	   troops	   in	   tactics,	   military	   field	   fortifications,	   military	  sketching	   and	   ‘everything	   connected	   with	   the	   defence	   of	   positions	   covering	  Sydney’	  (New	  South	  Wales	  Legislative	  Assembly	  1892:	  571	  &	  576).11	  Despite	  the	  recognised	   weaknesses	   in	   regional	   security,	   pressure	   from	   London,	   and	   the	  Royal	  Commission’s	  recommendations,	  the	  colonial	  governments	  never	  deemed	  necessary	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  intelligence	  department.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  The	  Royal	   Commission’s	   report	   is	   contained	   in:	   ‘Votes	   and	   Proceedings	   of	   the	  NSW	  Legislative	  Assembly’,	  Session	  of	  1892–93,	  Vol.	  7,	  p.	  571.	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The	   colonial	   government’s	   lethargy	   toward	   establishing	   an	   intelligence	  function	  was	  equally	  matched	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  value	  it	  believed	  an	  intelligence	  service	  could	  contribute	  to	  policy	  formulation.	  Rather	  than	  establish	  any	  formal	  means	   of	   collecting	   intelligence,	   colonial	   authorities	   preferred	   to	   rely	   on	  information	   obtained	   from	   	   ‘travellers,	   missionaries,	   British	   settlers,	   reports	  from	   the	   British	   Navy	   and	   newspapers’	   for	   its	   informed	   sources	   of	   strategic	  information	   (Thompson	   1970:	   413–6).	   This	   amateur	   approach	   to	   matters	   of	  intelligence	  and	  security	  perhaps	  reflects	  colonial	  attitudes	  toward	  defence	  and	  foreign	   policy	   of	   the	   time.	   As	   one	   of	   the	   foremost	   authorities	   on	   Australian	  defence	   history,	   Neville	   Meaney,	   points	   out	   this	   was	   probably	   due	   to	  complacency,	  because	   	   ‘questions	  of	  defence	  and	   foreign	  policy	  seemed	  remote	  and	   largely	   irrelevant’	   to	   colonial	   policy	   planners	   (Meaney	   1976:	   15).	   For	   the	  most	  part,	  Australia	   felt	  removed	   from	  the	  centres	  of	   international	  conflict	  and	  confident	   in	   the	   supremacy	   of	   the	   British	   Navy	   for	   protection	   and	   advice.	  Colonial	   governments	   placed	   little	   recognition	   in	   the	   value	   or	   utility	   an	  intelligence	  service	  might	  provide.	  Indeed,	  this	  attitude	  would	  prevail	  until	  after	  the	  events	  of	  the	  South	  African	  conflict	  of	  1899–1902.	  12	  	  	  	  	   The	  South	  African	  conflict,	  or	  Boer	  War,	  was	  the	  most	  significant	  event	  in	  prompting	  colonial	  governments	  out	  of	  the	  mindset	  that	  intelligence	  would	  be	  of	  negligible	   use	   in	   security	   policy	   planning.	   A	   number	   of	   Australians	   had	   gained	  first-­‐hand	  experience	  while	  serving	  in	  the	  British	  Intelligence	  section	  during	  the	  conflict	  and	  greatly	   impressed	  the	  commanders	  of	   these	  units	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  South	  African	  conflict	  can	  be	  generally	  divided	  into	  three	  phases:	  (1)	  October	  –	  December	  1899;	  (2)	  December	  1899	  –	  September	  1900;	  (3)	  September	  1900	  –	  May	  1902	  (Australian	  War	  Memorial).	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1976:	   2).	   More	   influential	   in	   shaping	   colonial	   attitudes,	   however,	   were	   the	  findings	   of	   another	   British	   Royal	   Commission	   established	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	  performance	   of	   the	   British	   Army	   Intelligence	   Department	   during	   the	   war	  (Templeton	  1977:	  19).	  	  	  Post-­‐War	   introspection	   had	   brought	   about	   charges	   that	   the	   British	  Intelligence	  Department	  had	  succumbed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  failings	  during	  the	  initial	  phase	   of	   the	   conflict.	   Politicians	   demanded	   an	   explanation	   for	   Britain’s	  humiliating	   defeat,	   failed	   foreign	   policy,	   and	   inadequate	   military	   planning.	  Intelligence	  failure	  provided	  the	  perfect	  scapegoat.	  The	  British	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	   War,	   Lord	   Lansdowne,	   protested	   that	   ‘the	   government	   had	   as	   little	  expectation	   of	   War	   with	   the	   Orange	   Free	   State	   as	   they	   had	   of	   war	   with	  Switzerland’	   (Gudgin	   1999:	   27).	   Less	   highly	   placed	   individuals	   such	   as	   Army	  Field	   Commanders	   griped	   that	   the	   Intelligence	   Department	   had	   ‘failed	   to	   give	  warning	   of	   the	   attack	   on	   Natal	   which	   commenced	   the	   Boer	   offensive,	   had	  incorrectly	  assessed	   the	  enemy’s	  numerical	   strength	  and	   their	  armaments,	  and	  had	  not	  provided	  adequate	  maps	  or	  topographical	   information	  to	  British	  forces	  in	   the	   field’	   (Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1976:	   3).	   After	   an	   intense	   period	   of	   criticism	  emanating	   from	  both	   the	  military	   and	  public,	   the	   Intelligence	  Department	  was	  arraigned	  before	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  under	  the	  guidance	  of	  Lord	  Elgin.	  	  	  	   Elgin’s	   report	   discovered,	   contrary	   to	   widely	   held	   accusations,	   that	   the	  Intelligence	   Department	   had	   issued	   a	   succession	   of	   reports	   warning	   the	   War	  Office	   of	   the	   likelihood	   of	   war.	   Moreover,	   it	   had	   emphasised	   that	   the	   conflict	  ‘would	   be	   both	   costly	   and	   bloody’	   (Gudgin	   1999:	   28-­‐29).	   The	   Commission	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subsequently	   revealed	   that	   numerous	   documents	   prepared	   by	   the	   Intelligence	  Department	  had	  accurately	  assessed	  the	  strength	  and	  size	  of	  the	  Armies	  in	  South	  Africa	  and	  analysed	   the	  military	  and	  political	   situation	  accordingly	   (Elgin	  et	  al,	  1903:	   10-­‐13).	   It	   also	   noted	   that	   Cabinet	   ignored	   a	   number	   of	   the	   intelligence	  assessments	   prepared	   by	   the	   Director	   of	   Military	   Intelligence,	   General	   John	  Ardagh.	  Other	  documents	  prepared	  by	  the	  Intelligence	  Department	  had	  allegedly	  been	   ‘deliberately	   altered’	   because	   of	   ‘the	   political	   desire	   to	   avoid	   talk	   of	  war’	  (Gudgin	  1999:	  29).	  	  	  The	   Commission’s	   findings	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   Intelligence	  Department,	   with	   considerable	   accuracy,	   had	   forewarned	   the	   British	  government	  over	  matters	  connected	  with	  the	  Boer	  conflict.	   	  The	  majority	  of	  the	  charges	  were	  then	  dismissed.	  Lord	  Elgin	  vindicated	  the	  Intelligence	  Department	  praising	   them	   for	   outstanding	   performance	   under	   stringent	   budgetary	  restrictions	  and	  limited	  staffing.	  He	  stated	  that:	  The	  Intelligence	  Department	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  had	  so	  an	  important	  bearing	  on	  the	  preparations	  for	  War	  that	  they	  cannot	  fail	  to	  be	  of	  interest.	  That	   it	  was	  undermanned	   for	   the	  work	   for	   the	  preparations	   for	   a	  Great	  War	  will	  scarcely	  be	  denied.	  But	  a	  considerable	  measure	  of	  success	  must	  be	   admitted.	   The	   outcry	   of	   therefore	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   good	  maps	  was	  not	  altogether	  well	  informed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Elgin	  et	  al,	  1903:	  127	  -­‐131)	  	  	  	  	   The	   findings	   of	   the	   Elgin	   Royal	   Commission	   had	   a	   great	   impact	   on	  reshaping	   the	   Australian	   government’s	   attitude	   toward	   the	   value	   intelligence	  could	   provide	   in	   military	   and	   strategic	   planning.	   As	   historian	   Jacqueline	  Templeton	  argues,	  Australian	  military	   thinking	  was	   influenced	  by	   these	  events	  and	   structures	   for	   shaping	   the	   early	   Australian	   intelligence	   community	   ‘were	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inspired	  specifically	  by	  the	  South	  African	  experience’	  (Templeton	  1977:	  19).	  By	  vindicating	   the	   role	   intelligence	   had	   played	   in	   the	   war,	   the	   Elgin	   Royal	  Commission	   demonstrated	   the	   importance	   of	   intelligence	   during	   a	   time	   when	  the	   Commonwealth	  Military	   Forces	  were	   in	   their	   formative	   stages	   (Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1976:	   3-­‐6).	   The	   implication	   was	   that	   if	   Australia	   were	   to	   become	   self-­‐determined	   in	  matters	  of	  defence	  and	   foreign	  policy	   it	  would	  need	  a	  proficient	  means	  of	  obtaining	   information	  on	   its	   immediate	  environment.	  The	   findings	  of	  the	   Elgin	   Commission	   revealed	   two	   important	   points	   to	   Australian	   statesmen.	  One,	   intelligence	  could	  be	  of	  considerable	  value	   in	  military	  and	  strategic	  policy	  development.	   And	   two,	   the	   relationship	   between	   intelligence	   and	   policy	   was	  highly	   problematic.	   Both	   of	   these	   points	   would	   foreshadow	   future	   problems	  encountered	  between	  Australian	  intelligence	  officials	  and	  their	  political	  masters	  for	  the	  next	  several	  decades.	  	  	   Australia’s	   foray	   into	   the	  world	   of	   intelligence	   thereby	   had	   a	   decidedly	  militaristic	   tone.	   With	   federation	   in	   1901,	   came	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  Commonwealth	   Military	   Forces,	   which	   were	   placed	   under	   the	   command	   of	   a	  British	   Officer,	   Major	   General	   Edward	   Hutton,	   General	   Officer	   Commanding	  (GOC).	  Of	   the	   eight	   officers	   selected	   to	   form	   the	  Australian	  Headquarters	   Staff,	  Hutton	  chose	  an	  artillery	  officer	  whom	  he	  had	  served	  with	  previously	  during	  the	  Boer	   War.	   Major	   William	   Throsby	   Bridges	   was	   appointed	   Assistant	  Quartermaster-­‐General	   and	   assigned	   to	   oversee	   intelligence,	   military	  organisation,	   mobilisation	   and	   topography	   (Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1976:6).	   For	   the	  next	   decade,	   the	   Commonwealth	   government	   would	   look	   to	   the	   intelligence	  community	  for	  advice	  on	  matters	  of	  military	  and	  strategic	  planning.	  In	  this	  sense,	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understanding	   how	   intelligence	   would	   be	   used	   to	   shape	   strategic	   policy	  decisions	   must	   thereby	   be	   placed	   into	   the	   wider	   context	   of	   how	   the	   first	  Commonwealth	  governments	  contextualised	  issues	  of	  defence	  policy,	  specifically	  in	  the	  Pacific	  region.	  	  
*****	  
	  
Case	  study	  one:	  The	  New	  Hebrides	  
One	  of	  the	  directions	  in	  which	  the	  Australian	  character	  is	  likely	  to	  manifest	  itself	  in	  
an	  aggressiveness	  that	  old-­‐world	  observers	  may	  reckon	  unreasonable	  is	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  Pacific	  Islands	  in	  our	  neighbourhood.	  13	  (Alfred	  Deakin)	  	  	  Only	   days	   after	   Federation,	   the	   Commonwealth	   government	   began	  collecting	   intelligence	   on	   its	   neighbours.	   On	   22	   January	   1901,	   Arthur	  Mahaffy,	  Deputy	   Commissioner	   for	   the	  Western	   Pacific	   in	   Samoa,	   dispatched	   an	   urgent	  letter	   to	   the	   newly	   appointed	   Australian	   Prime	   Minister,	   Edmund	   Barton.	  Mahaffy	   urged	   Barton	   to	   act	   on	   a	   matter	   of	   extreme	   importance	   to	   the	  Commonwealth	  that	  required	  ‘decided	  and	  immediate	  action’	  (NAA:	  A	  1108,	  Vol.	  3).	  14 	  The	   matter	   of	   immediate	   importance	   Mahaffy	   referred	   to	   was	   that	   a	  significant	   influx	   of	   Frenchmen	   and	   their	   ‘aggressive	   behaviour’	   had	   placed	  Commonwealth	   subjects	   under	   ‘humiliating	   disabilities’	   in	   the	  New	  Hebrides15	  —	   a	   remote	   island	   in	   the	   Western	   Pacific.	   ‘Frenchmen’,	   he	   griped	   to	   Barton,	  ‘were	   boasting	   that	   in	   six	   months	   the	   whole	   group	   would	   be	   theirs’	   (NAA:	   A	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Alfred	  Deakin,	  anonymous	  letter	  to	  the	  Morning	  Post,	  19	  March	  1901.	  	  	  14	  References	  cited	  as	  NAA	  refer	  to	  National	  Archives	  of	  Australia	  files	  (herein	  NAA).	  	  	  15	  The	   New	   Hebrides	   later	   became	   known	   as	   Vanuatu	   after	   gaining	   independence	   in	  1980.	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1108,	  Vol.	  3).	  Mahaffy	  contended	  that	  unless	  the	  imperial	  ‘laissez-­‐fair’	  approach	  to	  security	  policy	  in	  the	  Pacific	  was	  corrected	  the	  islands	  would	  slip	  away	  from	  the	   Empire	   and	   into	   French	   hands.	   He	   recommended	   to	   Barton	   that	   a	   ‘special	  commission	   with	   secret	   instructions	   to	   report	   on	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	   New	  Hebrides’	   be	   dispatched	   as	   soon	   as	   possible.	   The	   result	   of	   which,	   Mahaffy	  claimed,	   would	   ‘reveal	   a	   state	   of	   affairs	   so	   startling	   as	   to	   call	   for	   immediate	  action	  on	  our	  part’	  (NAA:	  A	  1108,	  Vol.	  3).	  	  	   The	  New	  Hebrides	  had	  been	  a	  sore	  point	  of	  Australian,	  British	  and	  French	  diplomacy	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years.	  Although	  the	  British	  and	  French	  had	  colonised	  the	   islands	   in	   the	   Eighteenth	   Century,	   the	   issue	   of	   sovereignty	   and	   legal	  jurisdiction	   had	   never	   been	   adequately	   settled.	   Issues	   regarding	   land	   claims	  between	  French	  and	  British	  settlers	  became	  acute	  during	  the	  period	  1900	  -­‐	  1902	  which	  led	  to	  increasing	  Anglo-­‐French	  antagonism.	  The	  Australian	  government’s	  interest	  in	  the	  islands	  was	  not,	  however,	  based	  on	  issues	  of	  sovereignty	  or	  legal	  jurisdiction.	  Australia’s	  interest	  was	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  national	  security.	  The	  Australian	   government	   actively	   sought	   an	   extension	   to	   the	  British	   Empire	  that	   would	   include	   the	   annexation	   of	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  protecting	  Australian	  security.	  Commonwealth	  policy,	  in	  this	  respect	  was	  aimed	  at	  stopping	  French	  control	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  so	  that	  it	  could	  not	  build	  military	  bases	   from	  which	   it	   could	   launch	   attacks	   on	   Australia	   (Meaney	   1976:	   94).	   As	  Alfred	  Deakin,	  writing	  under	   the	  nom	  de	  plume	  of	   the	   ‘Special	   Correspondent’	  informed	  the	  London	  Morning	  Post,	  ‘the	  desire	  for	  the	  possession	  of	  these	  islands	  on	   the	   part	   of	   Australians	   is	   not	   simply	   an	   unappeasable	   earth	   hunger’.	   The	  desire	   for	   annexation	   was	   inspired	   by	   the	   prospect	   of	   foreign	   naval	   fleets	  —
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namely	   French	  —	   using	   its	   ‘splendid	   harbours	   for	   naval	   operations’	   (Morning	  
Post	  12	  March	  1901).	  16	  	   Despite	   security	   concerns	  of	   the	  Australian	  government,	   the	  British	  had	  continually	   rebuffed	   plans	   of	   annexation.	   This	   decision	   was	   based	   on	   the	  assumption	   that	   the	   French	   would	   never	   freely	   relinquish	   their	   rights	   to	   the	  islands	  and	  the	  British	  would	  not	  risk	  war	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  what	  British	  Prime	  Minister,	   Lord	   Salisbury,	   argued	  was	   ‘the	   extravagant	   nature	   of	   colonial	   fears’	  (Meaney	  1976:	  21).	  Aware	  that	  the	  British	  strategic	  view	  of	   the	  region	  differed	  significantly	  from	  their	  own,	  the	  Australian	  government	  realised	  that	  they	  would	  have	   to	  push	   their	   concerns	   about	   keeping	  French	  naval	   bases	   out	   of	   the	  New	  Hebrides	  more	  vigorously	  to	  the	  British	  government.	  	   Probably	  frustrated	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  British	  concern	  for	  uniquely	  Australian	  security	   interests	   in	   the	   Pacific,	   Barton	   sought	   the	   acquisition	   of	   external	  information	  regarding	  French	  activity	   in	   the	  New	  Hebrides.	   Intelligence,	   in	   this	  case,	  would	  provide	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  serving	  his	  political	  interests	  and	  in	  a	  more	  tacit	  way,	  it	  could	  be	  used	  to	  orchestrate	  public	  opinion	  and	  provoke	  action	  toward	  the	  Australian	  cause.	  On	  8	  February	  1901,	  Wilson	  Le	  Couteur,	  Secretary-­‐Treasurer	  of	  the	  Shipmasters’	  Association	  of	  Australia,	  volunteered	  his	  services	  to	  the	  government	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/1).	  Barton	  then	  instructed	  a	  former	  New	  South	  Wales	   Police	   Detective	   to	   vet	   Le	   Couteur.	   On	   17	   July,	   he	   was	   cleared	   for	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Between	  1901	  and	  1914,	  Alfred	  Deakin	  penned	  a	  series	  of	  anonymous	   letters	  about	  Australian	  political	  affairs	  that	  were	  published	  in	  the	  London	  Morning	  Post.	  A	  selection	  of	  the	  letters	  can	  be	  found	  in:	  Federated	  Australia	  (1968)	  edited	  by	  John	  La	  Nauze,	  and	  the	  full	  series	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  Deakin	  Papers	  MS	  1540,	  Series	  7,	  Subseries	  7.5,	  see:	  http://www.nla.gov.au/apps/cdview/?pi=nla.ms-­‐ms1540-­‐7-­‐374	   	   for	   a	   partial	   digital	  collection.	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assignment,	   and	   on	   1	   August,	   the	   government	   accepted	   his	   offer	   (NAA:	   A35,	  2/10;	   A	   35,	   2/12).	   Le	   Couteur’s	   mission	   was	   to	   remain	   top-­‐secret	   and	   the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs,	  Atlee	  Hunt,	   instructed	  him	  that	  ‘you	  will	  take	  every	  possible	  care	  that	  the	  object	  of	  your	  visit	  is	  not	  to	  be	  made	  public	  in	  any	  way,	  either	  in	  Sydney	  or	  in	  the	  islands’	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/12).	  Despite	  the	  government’s	  wish	  for	  discretion	  on	  the	  matter	  it	  would	  not	  take	  long	  before	  it	  became	  public.	  The	  first	  case	  in	  which	  an	  Australian	  official	  was	  seconded	  on	  an	   intelligence	   mission	   would	   coincide	   with	   the	   first	   instance	   of	   politicising	  intelligence	  to	  support	  a	  predetermined	  policy	  preference.	  Intelligence	  was	  to	  be	  publicised	   in	   order	   to	   establish	   consensus	   support	   for	   a	   distinctly	   Australian	  foreign	  policy	  aim.	  	  
Le	  Couteur’s	  assignment	  Officially	  Le	  Couteur	  was	  to	  collect	  information	  on	  the	  nature	  and	  manner	  of	  English	  and	  French	  settlement,	  evaluate	  the	  size	  of	  their	  population,	  ascertain	  their	   economic	   interests,	   and	   survey	   the	   attitudes	   of	   Europeans	   and	   natives	  toward	   the	   future	   of	   the	   islands.	   He	  was	   also	   to	   ‘observe	   carefully	   and	   report	  fully’	   on	   the	   ‘public	   actions	   and	   utterances’	   of	   the	   Governor	   of	   New	   Caledonia	  who	  was	  at	  the	  same	  time	  visiting	  the	  islands	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/12).17	  To	  preserve	  the	   necessary	   secrecy	   of	   Le	   Couteur’s	   assignment	   he	   was	   made	   a	   temporary	  employee	  of	  Burns,	  Philp	  and	  Company,	  with	   the	  view	  to	  obtaining	  copra	   from	  the	   islands.	  18	  But	   such	  cover	  appears	   to	  have	  been	   insufficient.	  Hunt	  was	   later	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Le	  Couteur’s	  visit	  did	  not	  end	  up	  coinciding	  with	  the	  Governor	  of	  New	  Caledonia,	  and,	  thereby,	  he	  did	  not	  report	  on	  his	  ‘utterances’	  (A	  35,	  2/23).	  	  	  	  18	  Copra	   is	   the	   oil	   extracted	   from	   dried	   and	   crushed	   coconut	   kernels.	   It	   became	   a	  valuable	  commercial	  product	  during	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century.	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informed	  that	  a	  resident	  on	  the	  island	  Epi	  had	  made	  public	  statements	  referring	  to	   Le	  Couteur’s	   presence.	  Hunt	   reminded	  Le	  Couteur	   that	   ‘I	   hope	   the	  object	   of	  your	   visit	   is	   being	   kept	   as	   quiet	   as	   possible’	   (NAA:	   A	   35,	   2/18).	   Although	   Le	  Couteur’s	  presence	  was	  probably	  known,	  he	  was	  instructed	  to	  proceed.19	  	  	  In	  an	  unofficial	  capacity,	  Le	  Couteur	  was	  to	  collect	  information	  that	  might	  help	   strengthen	   the	   Australian	   point	   of	   view	   in	   representations	   to	   London	  against	   the	  French	   (Hall	  1978:	  127).	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   intention	  of	   the	  mission	  was	  perhaps	  to	  amass	  political	  capital	  for	  the	  government	  as	  Barton	  had	  already	  declared	   Australia	   should	   have	   a	   national	   policy	   on	   the	   Pacific	   Islands	   with	   a	  preference	  for	  imperial	  annexation.20	  Indeed,	  Le	  Couteur’s	  intelligence	  would	  be	  most	   useful	   in	   coercing	   domestic	   and	   British	   attitudes	   toward	   Barton’s	  aspiration	   of	   Imperial	   annexation	   of	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  Australian	  security.	  	  	  Le	  Couteur	  left	  Sydney	  on,	  Saturday	  7	  August	  1901,	  by	  the	  S.	  S.	  Mambare	  for	   the	   New	   Hebrides.	   En	   route,	   he	   called	   on	   Lord	   Howe	   and	   Norfolk	   Island,	  arriving	  at	   the	  Port	  of	  Aneityum,	  on	  16	  August.	   	  Over	  a	   three-­‐month	  period,	  he	  visited	   ten	   islands	   of	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   archipelago	   collecting	   detailed	  information	  on	  the	  French,	  and	  interviewing	  local	  residents.	  Upon	  his	  return,	  this	  information	  was	  presented	  to	  Barton	  via	  the	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Le	   Couteur	   requested	   that	   the	   government	   issue	   him	   with	   a	   rifle	   and	   a	   revolver,	  however,	   this	   request	   was	   denied	   by	   Barton	   because	   it	   would	   have	   drawn	   further	  attention	  to	  his	  presence,	  see:	  NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/14.	  	  20	  For	   an	   overview	   of	   Barton’s	   policy	   on	   the	   Pacific	   Islands	   see	  The	  Age,	   12	   February	  1901;	  The	  Age	  15	  February	  1901;	  Meaney	  1976:	  94–96.	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26	  November	  1901.	  Le	  Couteur	  reported	  that	  French	  subjects	  (341)	  were	  of	  a	  far	  greater	  number	  than	  British	  (146)	  and	  that	  the	  French	  population	  was	  steadily	  increasing	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23).	  This,	  he	  suggested,	  had	  a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  land	  disputes	  between	  the	  British	  and	  French.	  Of	  the	  three	  million	  acres	  that	  comprised	  the	  total	  land	  area	  of	  the	  islands,	  the	  French	  had	  acquired	  almost	  two	   million	   acres	   compared	   with	   eighty-­‐eight	   thousand	   owned	   by	   British	  subjects.	   Le	   Couteur’s	   inquiries	   revealed	   that	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   the	   French	  had	  acquired	  such	  vast	  tracts	  of	  land	  from	  the	  indigenous	  population	  was	  highly	  irregular.	   In	   many	   instances,	   he	   found	   that	   the	   land	   claimed	   by	   the	   French	  government	  had	  never	  been	   legitimately	   acquired.	  Nonetheless,	   the	   title	   deeds	  had	   been	   passed	   on	   to	   French	   settlers	   (NAA:	   A	   35,	   2/23).	   This	   he	   added	   had	  caused	  considerable	  tensions	  and	  sometimes-­‐violent	  incursions	  between	  natives	  and	  French	  planters.	  Because	  of	  the	  dubious	  dealings	  of	  the	  French,	  the	  natives	  of	   the	   islands	   displayed	   a	   preference	   for	   dealing	  with	   the	   British,	   of	  which	   Le	  Couteur	  reported	  ‘do	  not	  resort	  to	  such	  practices’	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23).	  	  	  	   Matters	   of	   legal	   arbitration	   and	   commerce	   were	   also	   detailed	   in	   his	  assessment.	   Le	   Couteur	   reported	   that	   the	  majority	   of	  New	  Hebrideans	  wanted	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  with	  French	  settlers,	  but	  they	  lacked	  any	  avenue	  of	  legal	  redress	  in	  which	  they	  could	  air	  their	  grievances	  over	  land	  disputes.	  	  According	  to	  Le	   Couteur,	   Commonwealth	   subjects	   ‘had	   no	   locus	   standi 21 	  and	   their	  representations	  are	  ineffective’.	  A	  number	  of	  settlers	  pledged	  to	  Le	  Couteur	  that	  they	   would	   pay	   the	   salary	   of	   a	   legal	   representative	   if	   the	   British	   government	  would	   appoint	   one.	   In	   his	   own	  words,	   Le	   Couteur	   described	   the	   current	   legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  The	  right	  to	  legal	  standing	  before	  a	  court.	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arrangements	  on	  the	  island	  as	  ‘a	  farce’	  arguing	  that	  the	  powers	  conferred	  upon	  commanders	   of	   British	   War	   ships	   were	   too	   limited	   to	   intervene	   on	   behalf	   of	  Commonwealth	  citizens	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23).	  	  	  	   According	   to	   Le	   Couteur	   the	   ‘most	   glaring	   weakness’	   was	   the	   lack	   of	  protection	   the	   British	   government	   provided	   its	   own	   subjects.	   	   He	   added	   with	  some	   astonishment	   that	   the	   British	   War	   ships	   allocated	   for	   the	   protection	   of	  Commonwealth	   citizens	   on	   the	   islands	  were	   rarely	   present	   during	   the	   cyclone	  season	   from	   December	   through	   to	   April.	   For	   ‘four	   months,	   sometimes	   longer,	  British	   settlers	   are	   absolutely	   without	   protection.	   The	   danger	   is	   very	   real’	  stressed	  Le	  Couteur,	  adding	  that	  the	  situation	  ‘calls	  for	  some	  form	  of	  protection…	  possibly	  a	  gun	  boat	  should	  be	  detached	  for	  this	  service’	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23).	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  the	  attitudes	  held	  by	  British	  and	  French	  settlers	  towards	  the	  future	  of	  the	  islands,	  Le	  Couteur	  reported	  that	  most	  favoured	  the	  British	  over	  the	  French.	   He	  was	   told	   that	   	   ‘a	   number	   of	   French	   settlers	   have	   lost	   faith	   in	   their	  government	  and	  would	  not	  be	  adverse	  to	  British	  occupation’	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23).	  According	   to	   the	   account	   of	   one	   French	   settler,	   the	   population	   was	   almost	  without	   exception	   ‘averse	   to	   the	   French’	   and	   the	   ‘natives	  were	   praying	   to	   the	  Queen	  for	  annexation’.	  	  Le	  Couteur	  added	  that,	  ‘if	  annexation	  is	  to	  take	  place	  the	  British	   settlers	   are	   of	   course	   unanimous	   for	   imperial	   occupation’.	   As	   to	   the	  natives,	  they	  were	  entirely	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  British,	  however,	  Le	  Couteur	  qualified	  this	  by	  indicating	  that	  the	  natives	  were	  ‘all	  things	  to	  all	  men’	  and	  would	  give	  out	  to	   the	   highest	   bidder	   (NAA:	   A	   35,	   2/23).	   Such	   intelligence	   would	   support	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Australia’s	   claim	   to	   imperial	   annexation	   when	   made	   public,	   but	   more	  importantly	  when	  revealed	  to	  Whitehall.	  	  	  	   The	   result	   of	   Le	   Couteur’s	   intelligence	   would	   now	   be	   essential	   to	  establishing	   credibility	   for,	   and	   consensus	   behind,	   the	   Barton	   government’s	  Pacific	   policy	   aspirations.	   In	   order	   to	   create	   this	   consensus,	   Le	   Couteur’s	  intelligence	   assessments	  were	   released	   ‘anonymously’	   to	   the	  public	   in	  The	  Age	  newspaper	   in	   a	   series	   of	   special	   reports	   (Thompson	   1980:	   168).	   The	   articles	  editorialised	   the	   benefits	   of	   imperial	   annexation	   and	   the	   scourge	   of	   French	  belligerence.	  	  The	  first	  article	  titled:	  ‘The	  Story	  of	  French	  Aggression’	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  British	  attitudes	  toward	  Commonwealth	  defence	  and	  trade	  interests	  in	  the	  Pacific.	  ‘The	  Prime	  Minister	  has	  brought	  the	  views	  of	  the	  Australian	  people	  to	  the	   notice	   of	   the	   home	   authorities’	   reported	   The	   Age.	   ‘The	   latest	   information	  [read	   intelligence]	   shows	   that	   the	   agitation	  must	  be	   continued	   if	   an	  unfriendly	  nation	  is	  not	  to	  obtain	  an	  impenetrable	  footing	  within	  handy	  reach	  of	  our	  shores’	  (The	  Age	   6	   February	  1902:	  5).	   Le	  Couteur’s	   intelligence	   seems	   to	  have	  made	  a	  return	   on	   the	   Barton	   government’s	   investment	   and	   was	   now	   being	   used	   to	  agitate	  the	  public	  and	  cultivate	  support	  for	  British	  intervention.	  Two	  subsequent	  articles,	  based	  on	  Le	  Couteur’s	  intelligence	  reports,	  were	  published	  in	  The	  Age	  on	  8	   and	   11	   February.22	  The	   articles	   continued	   to	   attack	   French	   settlement	   and	  emphasised	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   British	   policy	   to	   have	   any	   real	   concern	   over	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Much	   of	   information	   Le	   Couteur	   collected	   reappears	   in	   the	   subsequent	   news	   paper	  accounts,	   for	   example,	   compare:	   Le	  Couteur’s	   population	  demographics,	   comments	   by	  local	   residents	   and	  Missionaries,	   disputes	   about	   land	   claims,	   the	   account	   of	   two	   crew	  members	  from	  the	  H.M.S.	  Wallaroo,	  land	  productivity,	  etc.	  	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  2/23)	  with,	  The	  
Age,	  6;	  8	  and	  11	  February	  1902.	  It	  is	  also	  curious	  to	  note	  that	  the	  particular	  phase	  ‘earth	  hunger’,	   as	   previously	   expressed	   by	  Deakin,	   reappears	   in	  The	  Age	   newspaper	   account	  again	  on	  8	  February,	  p.	  13.	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Australia’s	   security	   interests	   in	   the	   Pacific	   (The	   Age	   8	   February	   1902:	   13;	   11	  February	  1902:6).	  	  	  
	  
New	  Hebrides:	  	  An	  assessment	  Although	   there	   is	   direct	   evidence	   that	   Le	   Couteur’s	   intelligence	   reports	  were	   publicised	   in	   The	   Age	   newspaper,	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   identifying	   who	  leaked	   the	   information.	  Circumstantial	  evidence,	  does	  however	  suggests	  why	   it	  was	  done.	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  Barton	  government	  had	  a	  plan	  in	  place	  to	  use	  the	  press	   as	   a	   means	   of	   pressuring	   the	   imperial	   government	   into	   annexing	   the	  islands.	   For	   example,	   on	   2	   July	   1901,	   Captain	   Richard	   Wilson,	   an	   Australian	  resident	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  had	  written	  to	  Barton	  about	  the	  alarming	  state	  of	  affairs	  on	  the	  Island.	  Wilson	  urged	  Barton	  to	  call	  public	  attention	  to	  the	  matter	  ‘before	  it	  is	  too	  late’.	  Barton	  replied	  that	  the	  matter	  was	  under	  consideration	  but	  that	  ‘no	  good	  purpose	  will	  be	  served	  by	  raising	  discussion	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  the	  public	   press	   at	   this	   moment’	   (NAA:	   A	   35,	   2/8,	   Author’s	   emphasis).	   Despite	  Barton’s’	   reservations	   Wilson’s	   letter	   was	   published	   in	   The	   Sydney	   Morning	  
Herald	   the	   following	   day	   (Sydney	  Morning	   Herald	  3	   July	   1901:	   9).	   Le	   Couteur	  later	  wrote	  to	  Barton	  saying	   ‘I	  very	  much	  regret	  the	  publication	  of	  Mr	  Wilson’s	  letter’.	  But	  he	  added	  a	  curious	  note	  saying	  that	  ‘from	  what	  was	  intimated	  to	  me	  it	  was	   not	   to	   appear	   for	   some	   time’	   (NAA:	   A	   35,	   2/9,	   Author’s	   emphasis).	   Such	  statements	  suggest	   that	   the	  government	   intended	  using	   the	  press	   to	  agitate	  on	  the	  issue	  but	  Wilson’s	  letter	  had	  been	  released	  prematurely.	  	  	  	  	  
	  73	  
Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  direct	  evidence	  identifying	  who	  leaked	  the	  intelligence,	  there	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   the	   Barton	   government	   had	   a	   known	   reputation	   for	  disclosing	  sensitive	  information	  about	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  to	  the	  press.	  The	  most	  comprehensive	   account	   of	   such	   events	   published	   by	   Roger	   Thompson	   (1980;	  2000),	   highlights	   that	   a	   series	   of	   leaks	   to	   the	   press	   from	   the	   Australian	  government	   regarding	   issues	   on	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   had	   resulted	   in	   Britain	  considering	   Australia	   a	   bad	   security	   risk.	   As	   one	   Colonial	   Office	   memo	   noted,	  information	   regarding	   negotiations	   between	   Britain	   and	   France	   should	   not	   be	  given	  to	  Australia	  because	  it	  ‘would	  be	  published	  in	  the	  newspapers	  the	  next	  day	  and	   spoil	   everything’	   (Thompson	   1980:	   171).	   Britain	   indeed	   had	   cause	   for	  concern	  because	  there	  were	  other	  leaks	  of	  British	  foreign	  policy	  information	  to	  the	   Australian	   press.	   For	   example,	   the	   Melbourne	   Argus	   on	   9	   June	   1903	  published	   a	   confidential	   British	   memorandum,	   which	   had	   been	   forwarded	   to	  Australia	   in	   October	   1902	   (NAA:	   A	   1108,	   3).	   On	   this	   occasion,	   The	   Argus	  reprinted	  the	  classified	  memorandum	  and	  details	  of	  a	  confidential	  conversation	  between	  British	   Foreign	   Secretary,	   the	  Marquis	   of	   Lansdowne,	   and	   the	   French	  Ambassador	  over	  land	  problems	  in	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  (The	  Argus	  9	  June	  1903:	  4).	  	  	   It	  appears	  that	  the	  publication	  of	  Le	  Couteur’s	  intelligence	  reports	  in	  The	  
Age	   followed	   a	   well-­‐established	   pattern.	   But,	   perhaps,	   the	   rationale	   for	   this	  behaviour	   is	   that	   Barton	   was	   exasperated	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   British	   concern	  regarding	   Australian	   security	   interests	   in	   the	   Pacific.	   It	   appears	   the	   Barton	  government	   published	   information	   that	   would	   help	   support	   their	   policy	   goals	  and	   prompt	   the	   British	   government	   into	   taking	   action.	   Barton’s	   strategy	   and	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feelings	  about	  the	  matter	  are	  made	  clear	  in	  a	  letter	  he	  sent	  to	  Atlee	  Hunt	  on	  22	  January	  1904.	  Barton:	  Do	  you	  know,	  if	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  after	  all	  these	  years	  they	  have	  done	  and	  will	  do	  nothing	  for	  us,	  I	  should	  be	  inclined	  to	  insist	  on	  leave	  to	  publish	  the	  correspondence	   in	   its	   salient	   parts.	   The	   government	   have	   to	   consider	  their	   responsibility	   to	  people	  and	  parliament,	   and	   far	  beyond	   that,	   their	  duty	  to	  Australia	  and	  its	  public	  opinion.	  The	  Commonwealth	  has	  suffered	  obloquy	  for	  nearly	  three	  years	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  its	  apathy,	  while	  all	  the	  time	   it	   has	   been	   actively	   pushing	   the	   question.	   It	   is	   too	   much	   that	   it	  should	  continue	  to	  suffer	  abuse	  and	  to	  make	  enemies	  simply	  because	  the	  Colonial	   &	   Foreign	   offices	   are	   afraid	   to	   let	   their	   own	   wretched	  pusillanimity	  and	  shuffling	  be	  known	   to	   the	  world.	   If	   leave	   to	  publish	   is	  refused,	  I	  should	  still	  be	  inclined	  to	  publish	  a	  narrative,	  which	  would	  put	  the	  Commonwealth	  weight	  in	  Australian	  opinion.	  	  	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (Hunt	  Papers	  MS	  52,	  Series	  39,	  Item	  2112)	  	  	   Barton’s	  modus	  operandi	  seems	  fairly	  clear:	  leak	  intelligence	  to	  the	  press	  in	   order	   place	   pressure	   on	   the	   British	   government	   and	   to	   cultivate	   domestic	  support	  for	  the	  Australian	  government’s	  policy	  agenda.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  use	  of	  intelligence	   in	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   case	   is	   highly	   relevant	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  politicisation	  because	  it	  reveals	  the	  form	  in	  which	  it	  occurred:	  that	  of	  publicising	  intelligence	  in	  the	  media	  for	  political	  gain.	  But	  it	  could	  be	  concluded	  that	  the	  act	  of	  publicising	  Le	  Couteur’s	  intelligence	  was	  motivated	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  push	  Britain	  to	   acquire	   the	   islands	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   Australian	   security.	   Nevertheless,	  intelligence	  was	   politicised	   in	   order	   to	   vindicate	   the	   policy	   preferences	   of	   the	  Australian	  government.	  	  	   Indeed,	   the	   Barton	   government	   took	   full	   advantage	   of	   the	   public	   and	  political	   agitation	   the	   articles	   created.	   A	   stream	   of	   intelligence	   and	   other	  information	   was	   used	   as	   evidence	   to	   lobby	   Whitehall	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  bolstering	   Australian	   security.	   Since	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   Commonwealth,	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seventy-­‐two	   notes	   had	   been	   sent	   to	   London	   urging	   action	   on	   the	   matter	   and	  Alfred	   Deakin	   followed	   this	   up	   with	   several	   dispatches	   outlining	   Australia’s	  security	  interests	  regarding	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  3	  August	  1905:	   10).23	  	   	   Nevertheless,	   such	   remonstrations	   failed	   to	   convince	   officials	   at	  Whitehall.	  In	  secret,	  and	  without	  the	  consultation	  of	  the	  Australian	  government,	  Britain	  and	  France	  agreed	  to	  a	  joint	  Anglo-­‐French	  protectorate	  over	  the	  islands	  with	  a	  condominium	  form	  of	  administration	  (Thompson	  1980:	  183).	  This	  result	  was	  not	  in	  Australia’s	  favour.	  The	  whole	  episode	  left	  Australian	  statesmen	  bitter	  and	  with	  a	  growing	  suspicion	  that	  Britain	  had	  little	  interest	  in	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Pacific.	  	  	   Despite	   the	   domestic	   political	   capital	   delivered	   by	   Le	   Couteur,	   and	   the	  government’s	  persistent	  efforts	  to	  be	  consulted	  in	  the	  deliberations,	  this	  was	  not	  enough	   to	   persuade	   the	   British	   to	   completely	   annex	   the	   region.	   Deakin	   later	  recounted	  that	  the	  ‘surrender	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides’	  testified	  to	  ‘the	  supineness	  of	  the	   British	   Government	   and	   the	   wilful	   indifference	   of	   Downing	   Street	   to	   all	  Australian	   appeals’	   (Morning	  Post	  19	   July	   1906).	   Although	   substantial	   political	  effort	  had	  come	  to	  no	  avail,	  Le	  Couteur’s	   intelligence	  assessment	  did,	  however,	  influence	  Australian	  policy	   in	   two	  specific	  ways.	  Firstly,	  on	  the	  12	   June	  1902,	  a	  contingent	   of	   ‘new	   Australian	   settlers’	   was	   given	   lands	   to	   settle	   in	   the	   New	  Hebrides.	  The	  French	  government	  continued	  to	  protest	  (NAA:	  A	  35,	  7/30).	  	  This	  led	  to	  more	  subtle	  actions	  on	  behalf	  of	  both	  Barton	  and	  Deakin	  who	  indignantly	  started	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   as	   the	   ‘Australian	   Channel	   Islands’	   (Hall	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This	  correspondence	  is	  contained	  in	  file:	  NAA:	  A1,	  1908/9014	  ‘New	  Hebrides’	  National	  Archives	  Canberra.	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1978:	   128).	   	   Although	   the	   events	   did	   not	   unfold	   to	   the	   benefit	   of	   Australian	  security	   interests,	   the	   case	   represents	   the	   first	   instance	   of	   manipulating	  intelligence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  achieving	  uniquely	  Australian	  strategic	  goals.	  	  	  	  	  
*****	  
	  
Case	  study	  two:	  New	  Caledonia	  The	   following	   year	   (1902)	   French	   designs	   in	   the	   Pacific	   had	   again	  initiated	   another	   mission	   for	   an	   Australian	   spy.	   Yet,	   in	   this	   case,	   intelligence	  would	   not	   become	   a	   tool	   of	   political	   persuasion	   but	   rather	   a	   tool	   of	   imperial	  subversion.	   This	   episode	   highlights	   how	   intelligence	   could	   be	   a	   means	   of	  exercising	   imperial	   influence	  over	  Australian	  defence	  policy.	   Intelligence	  would	  take	   on	   an	   unmistakable	   political	   purpose.	   British	  military	   officials	   personally	  intervened	   in	   the	   intelligence	   process	   in	   order	   to	   support	   their	   own	   parochial	  aims.	   The	   surreptitious	   nature	   of	   the	   intervention	   was	   so	   secret	   that	   the	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  senior	  policy-­‐makers	  would	  never	  become	  aware	  of	   the	  events.	  Nor	  would	   they	  be	  alerted	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  an	  Australian	  military	  officer	  would	  become	   integral	   in	   the	  development	  of	  planning	  an	   invasion	  of	   a	  foreign	  nation	  using	  Australian	  troops.	  The	  use	  of	  an	  Australian	  military	  officer,	  in	   the	   extension	   of	   imperial	   policy,	   without	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Australian	  government	   serves	   to	   indicate	   the	   frustration	   Australian	   statesmen	   felt	   with	  Britain’s	  lack	  of	  sincerity	  towards	  Australia	  controlling	  its	  own	  security.	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In	   December	   1900,	   the	   Director	   of	   Intelligence	   and	   Mobilisation	   at	   the	  War	   Office	   in	   London,	   Sir	   John	   Ardagh,	   requested	   that	   a	   report	   be	   produced	  about	  local	  defences	  around	  the	  Harbour	  of	  Noumea	  in	  New	  Caledonia.	  The	  War	  Office	  had	  been	   informed	   that	   the	  French	  were	  building	  new	   fortifications	  and	  London	  demanded	  to	  know	  just	  what	  was	  going	  on.	  	  Ardagh,	  writing	  directly	  to	  Major-­‐General	   George	   French,	   Commandant	   of	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	   Forces,	  asked	  that	  an	  officer	  be	  assigned	  to	  conduct	  inquiries	  and	  furnish	  back	  to	  him	  an	  assessment.	  French	  instructed	  Captain	  Tupper	  of	  the	  Royal	  Navy	  to	  proceed	  with	  the	  mission	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	  IX:	  246).	  	  	   But	  Tupper’s	  report	  failed	  to	  please	  the	  War	  Office	  and	  the	  findings	  were	  immediately	   rejected.	   On	   11	   February	   1902,	   the	   new	   British	   Director	   of	  Intelligence,	  Sir	  William	  Nicholson	  wrote	  to	  Major-­‐General	  Edward	  T.	  Hutton,	  a	  British	  Officer	  on	  loan	  commanding	  the	  Australian	  Military	  Forces,	  complaining	  of	  Tupper’s	  report.	  	  	  The	  problem	  according	  to	  Nicholson	  was	  that	  Major	  General	  French	   had	   selected	   the	   wrong	   man	   for	   the	   job.	   ‘No	   military	   officer	   was	  specifically	  detailed	  for	  the	  duty’	  wrote	  Nicholson,	  ‘and	  our	  stock	  of	  intelligence	  consequently	   remains	  deficient	   in	  many	   important	   respects.	   I	   should	  be	  glad	   if	  you	   could	   arrange	   to	   send	   an	   officer	   to	   make	   a	   full	   report	   on	   the	   defensive	  capabilities	  of	  that	  place’	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	   IX:	  246-­‐247).	  While	  a	  case	   can	   be	   made	   suggesting	   that	   Tupper’s	   intelligence	   did	   not	   fulfil	   the	  requirements	   the	  War	  Office	  asked	   for,	   it	  might	  also	  be	  reasonably	  argued	  that	  the	   intelligence	   was	   rejected	   because	   it	   did	   not	   provide	   the	   answers	   the	  War	  Office	  wanted	  to	  hear.	  Evidence	  suggests	  the	  latter	  is	  most	  likely.	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Before	  Hutton	  took	  up	  his	  appointment	  in	  Australia,	  Joseph	  Chamberlain,	  the	  Colonial	   Secretary	   in	  London	  had	   instructed	  Hutton	   to	  use	  his	   influence	   in	  Australian	   defence	   policy	   planning	   to	   advance	   the	   interest	   of	   the	   imperial	  government.	   While	   Hutton	   was	   to	   appear	   as	   the	   servant	   of	   the	   Australian	  government,	  Chamberlain	  informed	  him	  that,	   ‘it	  must	  never	  appear	  that	  he	  was	  acting	   as	   the	   agent	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Government’.	   Hutton	  was	   instructed	   not	   to	  reveal	  his	   true	  purpose	  to	  anyone	   in	  while	   in	  Australia	  (Mordike	  1992:	  90-­‐91).	  	  Indeed,	   Hutton’s	   enthusiasm	   to	   fulfil	   this	   role	   is	   evident	   in	   how	   he	   proceeded	  with	  the	  intelligence	  mission	  in	  New	  Caledonia.	  	  	  	   Hutton	   ensured	   that	   a	  more	   appealing	   candidate	  was	   appointed	   for	   the	  assignment	  and	  one	  that	  would,	  perhaps,	  fulfil	  imperial	  interests.	  	  He	  personally	  selected	   Major	   William	   Bridges	   —	   Assistant	   Quartermaster-­‐General	   during	  Hutton’s	   command	  —	  for	   the	  mission.	  On	  24	  May	  1902,	  Bridges	   left	  Sydney	   to	  conduct	   a	   full	   military	   survey	   of	   New	   Caledonia	   and	   in	   particular	   to	   survey	  French	  defences	  around	  the	  Harbour	  of	  Noumea	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	  IX:	   249).	   However,	   Hutton	   later	   revealed	   that	   the	   true	   purpose	   of	   Bridges’	  assignment	   was	   to	   ‘report	   the	   best	   possible	   means	   for	   attacking	   the	   same	  [Noumea]	  in	  case	  of	  the	  necessity	  arising,	  and	  to	  report	  upon	  ‘the	  best	  means	  of	  seizing	  this	  French	  Colony’	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50114,	  Vol.	  XXXVII:	  189).	  Hutton	  had	   been	   instructed	   by	   imperial	   authorities	   not	   to	   reveal	   the	   plan	   because	   it	  ‘would	  attract	  political	  opposition’	  in	  Australia	  (Mordike	  2002:	  3).	  	  Subsequently,	  Bridges	  was	   to	   report	   his	   findings	   back	   to	   London	   through	   Hutton,	   and	   these	  reports	  were	  never	  made	  known	  to	  the	  Australian	  government	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1976:	  7).	  	  
	  79	  
	   Hutton	   then	  made	   secret	   arrangements	   for	   the	  mission.	   Bridges	  was	   to	  travel	   under	   the	   disguise	   of	   a	   ‘commercial	   agent’	   working	   for	   the	   Dalgety	  Company.	  Major	  Knox,	  a	  managing	  director	  of	  that	  company	  had	  helped	  Hutton	  put	   this	   story	   into	  place	   (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	   IX:	  249).	  Hutton	   then	  arranged	   for	   Bridges	   to	   be	   put	   on	   ‘sick	   leave’	   from	   his	   official	   duties	   in	   the	  Australian	  Military.	  The	  Australian	  government	  knew	  nothing	  of	  Bridges	  mission	  or	  anything	  about	  his	  cover.	  	  	   Bridges’	   assignment	   lasted	   five	   weeks	   during	   which	   he	   submitted	   a	  number	   of	   intelligence	   reports	   based	   on	   his	   initial	   observations	   to	   Hutton	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  114	  Vol.	  XXXVII:	  189).	  He	  reported	  on	  the	  position	  of	  gun	  batteries	   around	   the	   Harbour	   and	   obtained	   photographs	   of	   French	   vessels	  approaching	   Noumea.	  24	  He	   detailed	   the	   signalling	   systems	   they	   used	   and	   the	  passages	  of	  their	  approach.	  Maps	  of	  the	  island	  were	  obtained	  with	  considerable	  risk	  and	  military	  communication	  systems	  were	  identified.	  Although	  Bridges	  was	  an	   Australian	   Military	   officer,	   none	   of	   the	   intelligence	   he	   collected	   was	   ever	  presented	   to	   the	  Australian	   government	   (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1972:	  13-­‐14;	  Verney	  1985:24).	  But	  Hutton	  was	  pleased	  with	  the	  results.	  He	  nominated	  Bridges	  to	  the	  War	   Office	   for	   ‘the	   favourable	   consideration	   of	   Field	   Marshal	   Commander	   in	  Chief	   and	  Secretary	  of	   State	   for	  War’	   (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	   IX:	  261).	  Bridges	  was	  subsequently	  rewarded	   for	  his	  work	  and	  Hutton	  promoted	  him	  to	  Lieutenant	  Colonel.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Intelligence	   photographs	   taken	   by	   Bridges	   of	   vessels	   approaching	   the	   Harbour	   of	  Noumea	  —with	  annotated	  notes—	  are	  contained	   in	   the	  Hutton	  Papers	  Vol.	  XII,	  British	  Library.	  	  	  	  
	   80	  
When	   Bridges	   set	   about	   compiling	   his	   intelligence	   assessment	   Hutton	  directly	  intervened	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  tone	  and	  all	  the	  necessary	  details	  of	  it	  were	  satisfactory	  before	  it	  was	  forwarded	  to	  the	  War	  Office	  in	  London.	  The	  reason	  for	  Hutton’s	  intervention	  in	  shaping	  the	  intelligence	  might	  be	  explained	  by	  advice	  he	  had	  received	  from	  Sir	  Charles	  Dilke,	  a	  Liberal	  reformist	  politician,	  who	  aspired	  to	  become	   the	   next	   British	   Prime	  Minister.	   	  While	   Bridges	  was	   on	   assignment	   in	  Noumea,	  Dilke	  had	  privately	  written	  to	  Hutton	  on	  2	  June	  1902,	  confiding	  to	  him	  that	   ‘Australia	  would	  need	  its	  military	  force	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  undertaking	  the	  conquest	   of	  New	  Caledonia	   and	   the	  New	  Hebrides’	   (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  114	  Vol.	  XXXVII;	  Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1972:	  16).	  Hutton	  appears	  to	  have	  concurred	  with	  Dilke’s	   analysis	   and	   without	   the	   approval	   or	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Australian	  government	  he	  started	  to	  draw	  up	  contingency	  plans	  for	  an	  invasion	  of	  the	  island	  using	  Australian	   troops	   (Hall	   1978:	   129;	   Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1972:	   16).	   It	   is	   fairly	  clear	   that	   Hutton	   was	   using	   the	   information	   that	   Bridges	   had	   gathered	   in	  Noumea	  to	  formulate	  his	  own	  plans	  of	  invasion,	  as	  he	  wrote	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  War	  Office	  on	  22	  September	  1902:	  	  I	   have	   carefully	   discussed	  with	   Lieutenant	   Colonel	   Bridges	   every	   detail	  connected	  with	  Noumea	  and	  its	  approaches,	  and	  I	  have	  made	  up	  my	  mind	  
as	  to	  the	  best	  method	  of	  attack.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50	  086,	  Vol.	  IX:	  261,	  Author’s	  emphasis)	  	  	   Probably	  parochial	  interests	  motivated	  Hutton’s	  objectives.	  	  His	  intention	  was	   to	   guide	   intelligence	   subtly	   towards	   delivering	   information	   that	   would	  enable	  him	  to	  design	  plans	  of	  a	  military	   intervention	  —	  a	  scheme	  that	  was	  not	  authorised	   by,	   or	   even	   known	   of	   to	   the	   Australian	   government.	   As	   a	   British	  Officer	  Hutton	  was	  clearly	  an	  instrument	  of	  imperial	  policy	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	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influence	  Australian	  politics.	  Yet,	  Hutton	  had	  no	  responsibility	  to	  the	  Australian	  electorate	  and	   the	   consequences	  of	  his	  plans	  would	  have	   fallen	   straight	  on	   the	  Barton	  government.	  	  Thus	  Bridges’	  intelligence,	  under	  Hutton’s	  direction,	  would	  be	   used	   to	   serve	   one	   man’s	   military	   ambitions.	   Hutton	   used	   intelligence	   to	  achieve	   his	   own	   interpretation	   of	   imperial	   policy	   objectives.	   	   This	   intention	   is	  further	  evidenced	  by	  a	  statement	  Hutton	  made	   in	  a	   letter	  sent	   to,	  Vice	  Admiral	  Sir	   Cyprian	   Bridge,	   Commander	   in	   Chief	   of	   the	   Australian	   Section	   on	   26	  September	  1902.	  	  	   Hutton’s	   disregard	   for	   the	   political	   process	   or	   respect	   for	   Australian	  politicians	  is	  clear	  in	  his	  letter.	  There	  would	  be,	  ‘violent	  opposition	  to	  any	  idea	  of	  utilising	   Australian	   troops	   for	   any	   offensive-­‐defensive	   operations’	   Hutton	  declared.	   In	   his	   opinion,	   although	   there	   was	   ‘an	   instinct	   towards	   elbowing	  France	  and	  Germany	  out	  of	  Australian	  waters…	  Labor	  members	  advocating	  these	  principles’	  would	  not	  tolerate,	  even	  under	  Australian	  direction,	  the	  use	  of	   force	  to	   obtain	   it	   (Hutton	   in	   Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1972:	   17).	   Hutton	   later	   stated	   if	  Australian	   authorities	   objected	   to	   his	   defence	   plans	   he	   was	   determined	   to	  ‘initiate	  a	  Defence	  Policy	  of	  my	  own	  and	  carry	  it	  into	  effect	  at	  any	  cost	  to	  myself’	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	  50113	  Vol.	  XXXVI:	  208).	  	  	   By	  15	  June	  1903,	  he	  had	  done	  so.	  Hutton	  explained	  in	  a	  secret	  letter	  to	  the	  Director	   of	  Military	   Intelligence	   in	   London,	   Sir	  William	  Nicholson,	   that	   ‘I	   have	  completed	  a	  scheme	  for	  the	  seizure	  and	  occupation	  of	  Noumea’	  (Hutton	  Papers	  MS	   50	   086,	   Vol.	   IX:	   283).	   Despite	   the	   fervour	   of	   Hutton’s	   imperial	   aims,	   his	  scheme	   was	   never	   put	   into	   practice	   and	   later	   forgotten.	   This	   was	   probably	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because	   implementing	   the	   scheme	   would	   have	   disclosed	   the	   true	   nature	   of	  Hutton’s	  appointment	  as	  an	  agent	  of	  empire	  and	  revealed	  the	  extent	  of	  imperial	  meddling	  in	  Australian	  military	  affairs	  (Mordike	  1992:	  91).	  	  	  	   In	  May	  1904,	  further	  intrigue	  had	  made	  Hutton’s	  service	  to	  the	  Australian	  military	  untenable.	  In	  May,	  Hutton	  had	  been	  caught	  using	  a	  secret	  cypher	  code	  to	  communicate	   information	   —	   probably	   about	   the	   invasion	   plans	   of	   New	  Caledonia	   —	   to	   the	   Secretary	   of	   State	   for	   War	   in	   London	   (NAA:	   B	   168,	  1904/2278).	  When	  the	  Australian	  Minister	  of	  Defence,	  Senator	  Dawson,	  asked	  if	  the	  communication	  contained	  information	  regarding	  Australian	  defence	  matters	  Hutton	  confirmed	  that	  it	  did.	  In	  a	  military	  minute	  dated	  6	  May	  1904,	  Hutton	  told	  the	  Dawson	   that	   ‘I	   am	  not	   at	   liberty	   to	   give	   the	  Minister	   even	   confidentially	   a	  transcript	   of	   the	   code…[and	   that]	   the	   code	   in	   question	   is	   issued	   to	   General	  Officers	   Commanding	   only’.	   	   Senator	   Dawson	   demanded	   the	   Australian	  government	  had	  a	  right	  to	  know	  what	  was	   in	  the	  cablegram,	  reminding	  Hutton	  that	  he	  was	  ‘directly	  responsible	  to	  this	  government’	  (NAA:	  B	  168,	  1904/2278).	  Nevertheless,	  Hutton	  refused	  to	  hand	  over	  a	  decoded	  copy.	  The	  Australian	  Prime	  Minister,	  it	  was	  later	  revealed,	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  the	  codes	  nor	  knowledge	  of	  their	  content	  despite	  being	  billed	  for	  the	  transmissions.	  	   By	   June	   1904,	   Hutton	  was	   again	   embroiled	   in	   another	   scandal.	   On	   this	  occasion	  he	  had	  prepared	  a	  confidential	  memorandum	  on	  the	  acquisition	  of	  new	  guns	   for	   the	  Australian	  Army.	  The	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  disagreed	  with	  Hutton’s	  recommendation,	  which	   resulted	   in	   a	   squabble.	   	   The	   correspondence	   between	  Hutton	   and	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence,	   and	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   confidential	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memorandum,	  were	  subsequently	  leaked	  to	  the	  press	  and	  published	  in	  the	  Argus	  on	  23	  May	  (Argus	  May	  23,	  1904).	  The	  story	  later	  made	  its	  way	  into	  a	  number	  of	  Australian	   newspapers	   and	   was	   also	   published	   in	   England.	   The	   disclosure	   of	  sensitive	   information	   and	   internal	   bickering	   caused	  Hutton	   and	   the	   Australian	  government	   considerable	   embarrassment.	   Hutton	   was	   arraigned	   before	   a	  Departmental	  Inquiry	  on	  July	  4	  1904,	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  press	  had	  acquired	  the	  information	  (NAA:	  B	  168,	  1904/2278).	  	  	  Hutton	  protested	  his	  innocence	  arguing	  that	   the	   information	  had	  been	   leaked	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence	  to	  damage	  his	   reputation.	   The	   inquiry	   never	   found	   who	   leaked	   the	   information	   but	  suspicion	  was	  squarely	  placed	  upon	  Hutton.	  As	  a	   result	  of	  Hutton’s	  underhand	  methods,	  his	  detachment	  as	  General	  Officer	  Commanding	  the	  Australian	  Forces	  was	  later	  terminated	  in	  November	  1904.	  	  	   As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  Hutton’s	  provocations	  and	   imperial	  bias	   the	  post	  of	  General	  Officer	  Commanding	  the	  Commonwealth	  Military	  Forces	  was	  abolished	  (Mordike	   2002:6-­‐7).	   The	   Reid-­‐McLean	   government,	   which	   assumed	   office	   in	  August	  1904,	  replaced	  the	  position	  with	  a	  system	  of	  Military	  Boards.	  Appointed	  to	   serve	   on	   the	   Military	   Board	   was	   Lieutenant-­‐Colonel	   Bridges	   who	   was	  promoted	   to	   Chief	   of	   Intelligence.	   Bridges’	   loyalty	   to	   Hutton	   and	   empire	   may	  explain	  why	  he	  never	  revealed	  his	  secret	  mission	  to	  the	  Australian	  government.	  It	   may	   also	   account	   for	   the	   quick	   succession	   of	   promotion	   he	   enjoyed.	   As	  Coulthard-­‐Clark	  argues,	  such	  unwavering	  loyalty	  earned	  Bridges	  the	  contentious	  reputation	  of	  a	  ‘Hutton	  Man’	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1979	  a:	  46).	  	  	  	  
	   84	  




Case	  study	  three:	  Japan	  	  After	   1905,	  Australia’s	   pursuit	   of	   independent	   security	   intensified.	   	   Any	  firm	   conviction	   that	   British	   maritime	   supremacy	   would	   shield	   Australia	   from	  threats	   emerging	   in	   the	   Pacific	   was	   gradually	   replaced	   by	   the	   feeling	   that	  Australian	   and	   British	   defence	   interests	   had	   diverged.	   Senior	   military	   figures,	  public	   servants,	  and	   the	  press	  began	   to	  accept	   the	  necessity	  of	  an	   independent	  Australian	   defence	   policy	   (La	   Nauze	   1965:	   515-­‐516).	   They	   then	   started	   to	  advocate	   for	   it.	   	   It	   became	   clear	   that	   should	   Britain	   re-­‐direct	   its	   defence	  commitments	   to	   the	   emerging	   problems	   in	   Europe,	   Australian	   security	   needs	  would	  be	  left	  in	  a	  compromising	  position.	  This	  perception	  escalated	  throughout	  the	  years	  1905	  to	  1910.	  	  	  
	  85	  
Japan’s	   defeat	   of	   Russia	   in	   the	   battle	   of	   Tsushima	   (May	   1905)	   elevated	  Japan	   to	   the	   status	   of	   a	   great	   naval	   power	   in	   the	   Pacific.	   Australian	   political	  attitudes	   began	   to	   change	   dramatically	   after	   this	   event.	   Misgivings	   about	  Japanese	   intentions	   now	   underpinned	   Australia’s	   growing	   sense	   of	   insecurity	  (Barton	  1992:86).	  But	  the	  key	  point	  is	  that	  Britain	  did	  not	  share	  this	  perception.	  The	  renewal	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  Treaty	  in	  1905	  did	  nothing	  to	  allay	  Australian	  fears	  —	  Australian	  statesmen	  only	  foresaw	  an	  impending	  crisis.	  The	  assumption	  was	   that	   Britain	   had	   left	   Australian	   security	   dependent	   on	   the	   ‘good-­‐will’	   of	  Japan,	   Britain’s	   ally,	   to	   safeguard	   imperial	   security	   interests	   in	   the	   Pacific	  (Meaney	   1976:	   120).	   It	   was	   against	   this	   background	   that	   the	   Australian	  government	  would	  seek	  to	  intensify	   its	  own	  efforts	  of	  establishing	  a	  nationalist	  defence	  scheme	  and	  independent	  defence	  capabilities.	  	  	  	  	   The	   Japanese	   threat	   to	   Australia	   —	   however	   unlikely	   it	   appears	   in	  retrospect	  —	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  Australian	  statesmen,	  none	  more	  so	  than	  Alfred	  Deakin.	  	  From	  1903-­‐1910,	  he	  was	  instrumental	  in	  addressing	  questions	  of	  Australian	   defence	   and	   external	   policy	   both	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   as	   a	   senior	  Cabinet	  Minister.	  Sensing	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  British	  security	  umbrella,	  Deakin	  sought	   to	   establish	   a	   separate	   and	   distinct	   Australian	   naval	   policy.	   Most	  specifically,	  he	  understood	  that	  Australian	  defence	  required	  a	  locally	  controlled	  Australian	   naval	   force	   operating	   under	   the	   command	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	  (Mordike	   1992:	   169).	   	   His	   problem	   was	   that	   this	   approach	   undermined	   the	  strategic	   policy	   of	   the	  British	   authorities	   and	  was	   opposed	   by	   some	   of	   his	   top	  military	  officers.	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To	   achieve	   his	   aim	   Deakin	   recognised	   that	   implementing	   such	   a	   policy	  would	   require	   cultivating	   domestic	   political	   support	   and	   imperial	   cooperation	  from	   British	   authorities.	   Perhaps	   drawing	   from	   the	   lessons	   he	   learned	   in	   the	  Barton	   administration,	   Deakin	   understood	   that	   intelligence	   was	   one	  means	   of	  mobilising	   the	   necessary	   support.	   In	   the	   subsequent	   years	   that	   followed,	  publicity	  generated	  through	  the	  press	  indeed	  helped	  him	  achieve	  these	  political	  ambitions	   (Meaney	   1976:	   122-­‐123).	   However,	   convincing	   the	   public,	   military	  advisors,	   and	   intelligence	   officials	  who	   remained	   loyal	   to	   imperial	   policy	   lines	  would	  not	  be	  so	  easy.	  	  	  
A	  revolution	  in	  strategic	  thinking	  In	  August	   1903,	  Deakin	  wrote	   in	   the	  Morning	  Post	   that	   ‘the	   situation	   in	  regard	  to	  defence	  is	  in	  every	  aspect	  unsatisfactory’.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  complain	  that	  part	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  that	  ‘local	  experts	  do	  not	  command	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  public’	  and	   that,	   comprehending	   ‘issues	  of	  high	  naval	   strategy’	  were	   ‘naturally	  beyond	  the	   man	   in	   the	   street’	   (Morning	   Post	   5	   August	   1903).25	  	   Two	   years	   later	   he	  appealed	   directly	   to	   that	   audience.	   	   On	   12	   June	   1905,	   Deakin	   embarked	   on	   a	  campaign	   of	   public	   and	  political	   agitation	   that	   started	  with	   a	   candid	   interview	  with	   the	  Melbourne	   Herald.	   The	   speech	   again	   stressed	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   the	  Australian	   Defence	   forces	   and	   its	   lack	   of	   military	   preparedness.	   The	   article	  headlined:	  ‘The	  Defence	  of	  Australia	  —	  Her	  Supreme	  Question	  Today’,	  expressed	  Deakin’s	  sentiment	  in	  most	  sensational	  terms.	  ‘The	  clouds	  gather	  slowly,	  but	  the	  lightening	  smites	  quickly’	  the	  article	  editorialised.	  ‘It	  is	  madness	  for	  Australian’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  See	  also:	  Deakin,	  A	  (1968)	  Federated	  Australia,	  Selections	  From	  Letters	  to	  the	  Morning	  
Post	  1901-­‐1910,	  [ed.]	  La	  Nauze,	  J.	  A.,	  Melbourne	  University	  Press:	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  p.	  117.	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to	   live	   in	   a	   fools	   paradise	   of	   fancied	   security’	   	   (Melbourne	   Herald,	   12	   June	  1905:3).	  Deakin’s	  interview	  outlined	  his	  vision	  for	  a	  policy	  on	  Australian	  defence	  and	   national	   security,	   but	   he	   was	   now	   faced	   with	   the	   difficult	   task	   of	  implementing	  it.	  	  	   Intent	   on	   	   ‘awakening	   the	   public’	   to	   the	   threat	   of	   Japan	   and	   the	  vulnerability	   of	   Australian	   defences,	   Deakin	   emphasised	   that	   ‘Australia	   which	  used	  to	  depend	  largely	  on	  its	  isolation	  for	  security,	  is	  now	  within	  what	  is	  termed	  striking	   distance	   of	   no	   less	   than	   sixteen	   foreign	   naval	   stations’	   (Melbourne	  
Herald,	   12	   June	   1905:	   3).	   Undoubtedly,	   it	  was	   Japan	   and	   her	   ambitions	   in	   the	  Pacific	  that	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  Deakin’s	  mind.	  Moreover,	  Deakin’s	  comments	  were	   a	   subtle	   criticism	   of	   the	   recommendations	   made	   by	   the	   Committee	   of	  Imperial	  Defence.	  	  Imperial	  strategists	  had	  argued	  that	  the	  Australian	  contingent	  of	   the	   Imperial	   Navy	   could	   resist	   a	   challenge	   made	   by	   foreign	   cruisers	   on	   its	  coastlines	   (NAA:	   MP	   84/1,	   1856/1/5).	   The	   New	   Hebrides	   affair	   had	   possibly	  confirmed	   to	   Deakin	   that	   British	   assurances	   of	   imperial	   security	   in	   the	   Pacific	  were	  less	  than	  certain.	  As	  he	  told	  The	  Herald:	  	  	  As	   a	   fact,	   Japan	   is	   the	   nearest	   of	   all	   the	   great	   foreign	   naval	   stations	   to	  Australia.	   Japan	   at	   her	  headquarters	   is	   so	   to	   speak	  next	  door,	  while	   the	  Mother	   Country	   is	   streets	   away.	   It	   is	   very	   doubtful	   if	   we	   are	   properly	  prepared	  to	  meet	  a	  dash	  at	  our	  weak	  spots	  delivered	  by	  two	  or	  three	  fast	  cruisers.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  (Melbourne	  Herald,	  12	  June	  1905:3)	  	  Deakin	  made	   clear	   that	   Australia	  would	   be	   served	   best	   by	   preserving	   its	   own	  national	   security	   interests.	   In	   doing	   so,	   he	   maintained	   that	   the	   nation	   must	  carefully	  and	  thriftily	   invest	   in	  defence	  capabilities	  —	  particularly	  on	  the	  naval	  side	   (Melbourne	   Herald,	   12	   June	   1905:3).	   Airing	   his	   doubts	   over	   the	   policy	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recommendations	  made	  by	  the	  Committee	  of	  Imperial	  Defence,	  Deakin	  took	  aim	  at	   the	   limitations	   imperial	   policy	   vested	   in	   Australian	   security	   needs.	   ‘We	   are	  quite	  unable	  to	  take	  the	  offensive	  ourselves’	  he	  argued	  ‘the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  British	  squadron	  is	  in	  the	  China	  Sea,	  and	  consequently,	  the	  Australian	  squadron	  may	   have	   to	   perform	   its	   duties	   at	   a	   great	   distance	   from	   the	   Commonwealth’.	  Deakin	  left	  his	  audience	  with	  a	  clear	  warning,	   ‘when	  we	  are	  attacked	  it	  will	  not	  be	  with	  kid	  gloves,	  it	  will	  be	  when	  we	  least	  desire	  it	  and	  with	  remorseless	  fury’	  (Melbourne	  Herald,	  12	  June	  1905:3).	  	  	   His	  rhetoric	  was	  undoubtedly	  stirring	  and	  resonated	  with	  his	  audience	  —	  Australia’s	   isolation	  was	   its	  Achilles’	  heel.	  To	  Deakin,	  Britain	  should	  not	  be	   the	  sole	   arbiter	   for	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  dominions	   in	   the	  Pacific,	   and	   Japan	   could	  not	  be	   trusted	   to	  honour	   its	  obligations	   regarding	   the	  Anglo–Japanese	  alliance.	  According	   to	   Deakin,	   Australia	   could	   no	   longer	   reside	   in	   a	   ‘fool’s	   paradise	   of	  fancied	   security’	   (Melbourne	   Herald,	   12	   June	   1905:3).	   As	   Meaney	   argues,	   the	  statements	  made	  by	  Deakin	  in	  the	  Melbourne	  Herald	   ‘become	  the	  starting	  point	  and	   the	   guideline	   for	   a	   revolution	   in	   Australian	   strategic	   thinking’	   	   (Meaney	  1976:	   129).	   While	   the	   press,	   public,	   and	   some	   sectors	   of	   the	   public	   service	  responded	   accordingly	   to	   Deakin’s	   call	   to	   action,	   some	   of	   his	   key	   advisors	  remained	  unconvinced.	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Immediately	   following	   the	   Melbourne	   Herald	   article,	   Federal	   Treasurer	  Sir	   George	   Turner,	   requested	   the	   Chief	   of	   Intelligence,	   William	   Bridges,	   to	  provide	   an	   assessment	   of	   Deakin’s	   published	   views.26	  	   Bridges’	   response	   was	  worded	  carefully.	  He	  suggested	  that	  very	  little	  of	  Deakin’s	  speech	  should	  be	  new	  analysis	   to	   the	   government	   (NAA:	   B	   168,	   1904/184).	   This	   comment	   probably	  reflects	  Bridges’	  own	  preference	  that	  imperial	  policy	  recommendations	  need	  not	  be	   changed	   to	   fit	   Deakin’s	   analysis.	   As	   he	   wrote	   to	   the	   Treasurer,	   ‘speaking	  broadly,	  no	  exception	  can	  be	  taken	  to	  the	  statements	  referring	  to	  Defence	  and	  to	  the	   military	   forces	   in	   particular’	   (NAA:	   B	   168,	   1904/184	   Part	   4).	   But	   it	   was	  perhaps	   the	  means	   of	   achieving	   security,	   independent	   of	   Britain,	   that	   Bridges	  objected	   to	  most	   of	   all.	  On	   this	  matter,	   Bridges	   reiterated	   the	  Hutton	   imperial	  policy	   line	   to	   the	   Treasurer,	   arguing	   that	   ‘Australian	   Defences	   should	   be	  sufficient	   to	   meet	   a	   raid	   by	   four	   cruisers’	   adding	   that	   this	   issue	   had	   been	  sufficiently	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Defence.	  Bridges	  perhaps	  displayed	  his	  own	  predilection	  towards	  the	  imperial	  policy	  position	  suggesting	  that	  Australian	  policies	   were	   at	   present	   in	   accord	   with	   imperial	   recommendations.	   Thus,	   the	  Chief	   of	   Intelligence	   failed	   to	   provide	   any	   support	   or	   encouragement	   toward	  Deakin’s	  views	  (Verney	  1985:	  46).	  	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Before	  a	  General	  Staff	  was	  established,	  the	  Federal	  Treasurer	  sat	  as	  a	  member	  on	  the	  Council	   of	   Defence.	   The	   Council	   for	   Defence	   was	   the	   body	   responsible	   for	   matters	  affecting	   general	   policy	   of	   the	   naval	   and	   military	   defence	   of	   the	   Commonwealth,	  measures	  necessary	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  in	  times	  of	  war,	  and	  defence	  expenditure.	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In	   May	   1905,	   Chief	   of	   Intelligence,	   William	   Bridges,	   had	   been	   sent	   to	  London	   to	   assist	   the	   Committee	   of	   Imperial	   Defence	   in	   considering	   issues	   of	  Australian	   coastal	   defences.	  27	  The	   report	   delivered	   by	   the	   Committee	   directly	  challenged	   any	   notion	   of	   an	   independent	   Australian	   naval	   squadron.	   It	   also	  undermined	   much	   of	   the	   advice	   given	   to	   the	   Australian	   government	   by	   local	  military	  advisors.	  The	  key	   to	   imperial	   ‘blue	  water’	  defence,	   the	   report	   claimed,	  was	   the	   concentration	  of	   the	  British	  Navy.	  The	  Committee	  urged	   that	   ‘the	  best	  and,	   indeed	   only	   necessary	   defence	   for	   Australia	   can	   be	   provided	   by	   the	  Admiralty’	   (NAA:	   MP	   84/1,	   1856/1/5).	   	   Again,	   the	   Committee,	   as	   it	   had	  previously	  stated,	  argued	  that	  the	  prospect	  of	  an	  attack	  on	  Australian	  coasts	  was	  slim.	  In	  their	  opinion,	  such	  an	  attack	  would	  only	  involve	  a	  raid	  by	  three	  or	  four	  unarmoured	  cruisers	  on	  Australian	  shores.	  The	   imperial	  squadron,	   in	  any	  case,	  could	   adequately	   deal	   with	   such	   an	   attack	   (NAA:	   MP	   84/1,	   1856/1/5).	   In	  Bridges’	   view,	   the	   recommendations	   of	   the	   Imperial	   Defence	   Committee	   had	  sufficiently	  answered	  the	  question:	  an	  independent	  Australian	  naval	  policy	  was	  unnecessary.	  	  	  	  	  In	   assessing	   Deakin’s	   claim	   that	   Australian	   ports	   were	   inadequately	  defended,	  Bridges	  told	  the	  Treasurer	  that	  ‘much	  stronger	  statements	  than	  these	  were	  made	   in	  1901’.	  He	  argued	   that	   since	   that	  date	  a	  number	  of	  modern	  guns	  had	  been	  ordered	  and	  received	  (NAA:	  B	  168,	  1904/184/Part	  4).	  This	  statement	  again	  reflected	  the	  imperial	  policy	  position,	  which	  had	  recommended	  that	  ‘“blue	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  The	  Imperial	  Defence	  Committee	  was	  the	  highest	  authority	  in	  regard	  to	  imperial	  defence	  policy.	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water”	  defence	   is	   to	  suffice	   for	  Australia…there	   is	  no	  necessity	   for	  undertaking	  harbour	  defences	  of	  a	  floating	  character’	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1856/1/5).	  	  	   Bridges	  concluded	  his	  report	  by	   indicating	  that	   	   ‘full	  value’	  of	  Australian	  defences	   had	  not	   been	  obtained	  because	   of	   an	   inadequate	   ‘system	  or	   policy	   of	  defence’	   (NAA:	   B	   168,	   1904/184	   Part	   4).	   This	   comment,	   perhaps,	   indicates	  Bridges’	   own	   resentment	   at	   the	   continued	   disorganisation	   of	   the	   Australian	  forces,	  which	  his	  mentor	  Hutton	  had	  tried	  unsuccessfully	  to	   implement.	  Clearly	  evident	   in	   Bridges’	   analysis	   is	   a	   divergence	   over	   the	   means	   of	   achieving	  Australian	  defence	  rather	  than	  on	  the	  ends.	  Military	  officers,	  like	  Bridges,	  had	  on	  the	   one	   hand	   accepted	   the	   British	   assessments	   regarding	   what	   kind	   of	   attack	  Australia	  might	   face.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   they	  differed	  on	  the	  means	  of	  meeting	  this	   challenge,	   specifically	   on	   Deakin’s	   ideas	   of	   an	   independent	   naval	   policy	  (Meaney	   1976:	   138).	   It	   was	   through	   imperial	   policy	   that	   Australian	   security	  could	  be	  achieved	  not	  through	  the	  policy	  of	  a	  localised	  and	  independent	  defence	  scheme.	   And	   on	   this	   point,	   Bridges	  would	   not	   ingratiate	   himself	  with	  Deakin’s	  politics	  nor	  allow	  his	  intelligence	  department	  to	  play	  any	  part	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  	  	   The	  divergence	  of	  opinion	  between	  the	  Imperial	  Defence	  Committee	  and	  Australian	   military	   advice	   created	   a	   political	   and	   diplomatic	   problem	   for	   the	  Deakin	  government	  (Mordike	  1992:	  170).	  Politically,	  Deakin	  needed	  to	  persuade	  those	  loyal	  to	  the	  imperial	  policy	  line	  that	  his	  defence	  scheme	  would	  be	  of	  value,	  both	  strategically	  and	  economically.	  Diplomatically,	  Deakin	  understood	  that	  even	  though	   he	   desired	   an	   independent	   naval	   policy,	   in	   times	   of	   crisis,	   Australian	  defence	   would	   still	   depend	   on	   the	   Royal	   Navy,	   especially	   in	   remote	   seas	   (La	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Nauze	   1965:	   518).	   	   His	   policy	   aspirations	   would	   need	   the	   blessing	   of	   the	  Admiralty	   and	   his	   own	  military	   officers	   if	   it	   were	   to	   succeed.	   These	   problems	  created	   a	   strong	   incentive	   for	   policy-­‐makers	   like	   Deakin	   to	   attempt	   to	  manufacture	   a	   consensus	   that	   supported	   his	   policy	   plans.	   An	   important	  condition	   for	   establishing	   this	   view	   would	   be	   to	   take	   political	   advantage	   of	  claims	  about	  Japanese	  invasion	  and	  espionage	  in	  Australia.	  	  	   One	   means	   of	   cultivating	   consensus	   was	   to	   establish	   a	   system	   of	  intelligence	   exchange	   between	   Australia	   and	   other	   Commonwealth	   countries.	  Subsequently,	   Australia	   entered	   into	   its	   first	   intelligence	   sharing	   alliance,	   a	  theme	   that	   would	   prefigure	   the	   later	   Australian	   intelligence	   community.	  Between	   1905	   and	   1908,	   Australia	   began	   sharing	   intelligence	   diaries	   and	  information	  with	   New	   Zealand,	   India,	   South	   Africa	   and	   Canada	   (NAA:	  MP	   153	  /10).	  What	  can	  be	  attained	  from	  the	  historical	  record	  suggests	  that	  these	  events	  had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   solidifying	   Japan	   as	   a	   potential	   threat	   to	  Australia.	  The	  information	  obtained	  through	  sharing	  intelligence	  enhanced	  the	  perception	  of	  Japan	  as	  a	  potential	  threat	  by	  bringing	  to	  light	  claims	  of	  espionage	  throughout	  the	  Pacific.	  This	  perception	  only	  made	  the	  prospect	  of	  politicisation	  stronger.	  It	  also	   underpinned	   the	   establishment	   of	  Australia’s	   first	   intelligence	   service,	   the	  Australian	  Intelligence	  Corps.	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In	   November	   1906,	   the	   intelligence	   department	   of	   the	   Canadian	  Militia	  Headquarters	  sent	  Bridges	  a	  report	  from	  Captain	  Albright	  of	  the	  25th	  US	  Infantry.	  Albright	   reported	   in	   detail	   what	   he	   described	   as	   the	   ‘sinister	   purposes’	   of	   the	  Japanese	   in	   the	   Philippines.	   He	   reported	   that	   	   ‘there	   are	   a	   large	   number	   of	  Japanese	  now	  occupying	  the	  Northern	  portion	  of	  the	  island	  of	  Luzon’	  (NAA:	  MP	  153/10,	   1833/3/6).	   Shortly	   after	   on	   6	   November	   1906,	   the	   Sydney	   Morning	  
Herald	   and	   the	  Melbourne	  Argus	   reported	   that	  American	  officials	   had	   arrested	  Japanese	   spies	   for	   mapping	   out	   railways,	   rivers	   and	   bridges	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	  Manila	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  1906:7;	  Argus	  1906:	  5).	  	  	  	   Three	   months	   later,	   further	   reports	   came	   to	   the	   attention	   of	   the	  Intelligence	  Department	  of	  the	  Canadian	  Militia	  Headquarters.	  According	  to	  the	  reports,	   the	   Japanese	  were	   now	   engaged	   in	   a	   systematic	   survey	   of	   the	   Pacific	  Coast	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   These	   survey’s	   included	   making	   soundings	   of	  waterways	   and	   coastal	   charts	   while	   also	   collecting	   an	   ‘elaborate	   system	   of	  photographs’	   (NAA:	   MP	   153/10,	   1833/3/17).	   The	   reports	   were	   subsequently	  passed	   on	   to	   Bridges	   and	   the	   Australian	   government.	   Another	   report	   dated	   5	  February	   1907,	   stated	   that	   settlers	   on	   the	   Olympic	   Peninsula	   of	   Washington	  State	  were	  becoming	  increasingly	  concerned	  with	  the	  activities	  of	  Japanese.	  The	  report	  stated	  that	  the	  Canadian	  Intelligence	  Services:	  	  	  	  See	   occasion	   for	   alarm	   at	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   party	   of	   Japanese	   who	   are	  gathering	   data	   regarding	   the	   strategic	   points	   of	   the	   Pacific	   Coast.	   It	   is	  believed	  they	  are	  working	  for	  the	  Japanese	  government,	  and	  have	  in	  their	  possession	  maps	  and	  blueprints	  relative	   to	   the	  coastline,	  depth	  of	  water	  and	  possible	  influence	  of	  currents	  on	  vessels	  approaching	  the	  shore.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (NAA:	  MP	  153	  /10,	  1833/3/9)	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In	   an	   emerging	   pattern	   intelligence	   reports	   then	   began	   to	   appear	   in	  Australian	  newspapers.	  Under	   the	  headline:	   ‘Japanese	  Spy:	  Arrest	   in	  California’	  the	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	   and	   the	  Argus	   reported	   that	   a	   Japanese	  Officer	   had	  been	  found	  in	  San	  Diego	  with	  papers	  that	  	  ‘include	  everything	  useful	  in	  the	  event	  of	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  Pacific	  coast.	  Among	  his	  papers	  was	  a	  plan	  of	  the	  minefield	  of	  the	  Harbour	  of	   San	  Diego’	   (Argus	   15th	   July	  1907:	  7;	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	   15	  July	  1907:	  7).	  	  	   Indeed,	   the	   press	   had	   been	   particularly	   willing	   to	   inflame	   public	   fears	  over	   suspicions	   of	   Japanese	   espionage	   in	   Australia,	   while	   the	   Intelligence	  Department	   did	   little	   to	   corroborate	   the	   substance	   of	   the	   matters.	   Likewise,	  elected	  representatives	  understood	  the	  political	  advantage	  such	  alarming	  claims	  could	   produce.	   ‘Cabinet	   Ministers,	   Members	   of	   Parliament,	   the	   press	   and	   the	  Australian	  Natives	  Association	  have	  all	  been	  certain	  of	  applause	  when	  they	  have	  pointed	   to	   Japan	   as	   threatening	   our	   safety	   and	   our	   racial	   integrity’	   reflected	  Edmund	  Leolin	  Piesse,	   later	  Australian	  Director	  of	  Military	   Intelligence	   (1916–1919),	   and	   indeed	   there	   was	   much	   political	   capital	   to	   be	   enjoyed	   from	  propagating	   the	   real	  or	   supposed	   fear	  of	   Japan	   (Piesse	  Papers:	  1925).28	  Deakin	  appears	  to	  have	  capitalised	  on	  the	  timing	  of	  these	  events	  and	  in	  December	  1907,	  he	   publicly	   declared	   his	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  Australian	  naval	  flotilla	  (Meaney	  1976:	  133).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  This	  document,	  from	  the	  Piesse	  Papers,	  is	  located	  in:	  Sissons,	  D.	  C.	  S	  (1958)	  ‘Attitudes	  To	  Japan	  and	  Defence’,	  MA	  Thesis,	  University	  of	  Melbourne,	  Documentary	  Appendix	  XIV,	  pp.	  1–11.	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While	  there	  was	  much	  capital	  to	  be	  gained	  for	  politicians	  in	  agitating	  the	  public	  towards	  their	  policy	  objectives,	   it	  was	  also	  expected	  that	  political	  capital	  could	  be	  gained	  from	  an	  Intelligence	  Corps.	  On	  2	  December	  1907,	  a	  Draft–Order–in–Council	  was	  submitted	  to	  the	  government	  proposing	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps	   (NAA:	   MP	   84	   /1,	   1849/2/13).	   Recognising	   the	  potential	   value	   of	   such	   an	   outfit	   the	   Australian	   government	   authorised	   the	  functioning	   of	   the	   Corps	   almost	   immediately.	   The	   Corps	   became	   effective	   6	  December	  1907	   (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1849/2/13).	  29	  Containing	   Japanese	  espionage	  was	   the	  motivation	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	   the	  Corps,	  and	  most	  certainly,	   this	  line	  of	  inquiry	  occupied	  the	  main	  stimulus	  for	  its	  work	  in	  the	  following	  years.	  	  	   Despite	  high	  expectations	  that	  the	  Intelligence	  Corps	  would	  deliver	  work	  of	   great	   importance,	   early	   attempts	   at	   intelligence	   gathering	   were	   amateurish	  and	   proved	   to	   be	   of	   little	   use	   in	   policy	   development.	   Informed	   sources	   of	  information	  were	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  and	  the	  assessment	  and	  collation	  of	  data	  was	  equally	   poor.	   These	   first	   efforts	   at	   counter-­‐espionage	  were	   often	   provoked	   by	  alarm	   coming	   from	   the	   public	   and	   the	   press	   rather	   than	   the	   government	  requiring	   specialist	   information.	   Jurisdictional	   boundaries	   were	   blurred	   and	  state	   police	   forces	   conducted	   most	   of	   what	   can	   be	   considered	   the	   counter-­‐espionage	  function	  (Atkinson	  1964:	  231).	  While	  early	  intelligence	  gathering	  was	  ineffective	   for	   assisting	   policy	   development,	   it	   was	   however,	   more	   useful	   for	  political	  purposes.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  The	   Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps	   was	   disbanded	   in	   March	   1914	   just	   before	   the	  commencement	  of	  World	  War	  One	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1976:	  47).	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By	  	  1908,	  ‘the	  shiver	  of	  anxiety’	  about	  Japanese	  spies	  in	  Australia	  became	  pronounced.	  On	  one	  occasion,	  the	  Chief	  of	  Intelligence	  had	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  a	  militia	  officer	  stating	  that,	  for	  some	  months	  parties	  of	  Japanese	  fishermen	  were	  engaged	   in	   obtaining	   information	   on	   the	   resources	   of	   Queensland.	   This	  information,	   declared	   the	   officer,	   	   ‘would	   be	   of	   use	   in	   the	   event	   of	   military	  operations’	   (NAA	   MP	   84/1,	   1877/5/4).	   Days	   later,	   headlines	   about	   ‘Japanese	  Pseudo	  Fishermen’	  started	  appearing	  in	  the	  Australian	  press.	  The	  Brisbane	  Daily	  
Mail	  reported	  that	  Japanese	  pearl	  fishermen	  were	  making	  soundings	  of	  the	  Great	  Barrier	  Reef	  ‘in	  order	  to	  become	  cognisant	  of	  its	  passages	  and	  dangers’.	  A	  Naval	  Officer	  backed	  up	  the	  claims	  arguing	  that:	  Although	   it	   was	   not	   well	   known	   there	   were	   Japanese	   Naval	   officers	  working	  on	   the	  pearling	  boats	   and	   that	   some	  had	  been	  discovered	  with	  more	   complete	   charts	   of	   the	   Barrier	   Reef	   than	   those	   supplied	   to	   the	  British	  Admiralty.	  	   	  	  (The	  Daily	  Mail,	  28	  April	  1908)	  	   These	  activities	  were	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  Minister	  for	  Defence	  T.	  T.	  Ewing,	  and	  other	  senior	  military	  advisors.	  In	  a	  military	  minute	  dated	  5	  May	  1908,	   Captain	   Creswell,	   Director	   of	   the	   Naval	   Forces	   stated	   that	   he	   concurred	  with	  the	  allegations	  of	  spying,	  despite	  no	  formal	  inquiries	  having	  been	  made.	  He	  informed	  the	  Minister	  for	  Defence,	  ‘I	  am	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  statement	  [in	  the	  
Daily	  Mail]	  is	  correct,	  and	  probably	  vastly	  underestimates	  the	  extent	  of	  this	  work	  of	  a	  spying	  and	  prying	  order	  has	  been	  carried	  out’	   (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  Creswell’s	  motives	   for	   accepting	   the	  Daily	  Mail’s	   information	   at	   face	   value	   are	  quite	   clear.	   His	   policy	   interests,	   like	   Deakin’s,	   were	   directed	   towards	   the	  establishment	   of	   an	   Australian	   Navy	   (Mordike	   1992:	   169).	   As	   Creswell	   later	  noted	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defence,	   ‘the	  spying	  and	  survey	  work	  on	  our	  coast	  by	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foreigners	  would	  be	  impossible	  had	  we	  a	  coastal	  service	  of	  destroyers’	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  	  Creswell	  had	  come	  to	  accept	  and	  support	  the	  strategic	  picture	  that	  Deakin	  had	  cultivated.	  	  	   In	  a	  report	  submitted	  to	  the	  Council	  of	  Defence	  Creswell	  made	  clear	  that	  his	   policy	   position	   was	   in	   complete	   accord	   with	   Prime	   Minister	   Deakin’s.	  Creswell	  argued	  that	  Australia’s	  Defence	  force	  was	  ‘incredibly	  weak’,	  adding	  that	  ‘while	   world	   conditions	   have	   increased	   our	   risks,	   the	  means	   of	   meeting	   them	  have	  decreased’.	  According	  to	  Creswell,	  if	  Australia	  were	  to	  survive	  it	  would	  have	  to	   acquire	   self-­‐sufficiency	   in	   both	   land	   and	   sea	   forces.	   ‘Our	   present	   policy’,	  Creswell	   argued,	   ‘is	   without	   reason	   and	   inconsequent’	   (NAA:	   B	   173/0,	  s1905/144).	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  substance	  in	  the	  reports	  of	  Japanese	  espionage	  in	  Queensland	   the	   notion	   that	   they	  were	   taking	   place	  would	   again	   help	  mobilise	  support	   for	   Deakin’s	   policy	   of	   an	   Australian	   Naval	   squadron	   under	   Australian	  control.	  	  	  	   Allegations	  of	  Japanese	  espionage	  in	  North	  Queensland	  persisted	  and	  the	  Military	  Board	  instructed	  the	  Chief	  of	  Intelligence	  William	  Bridges	  to	  investigate.	  However,	  Bridges,	  rather	  than	  allocate	  the	  task	  to	  the	  newly	  formed	  Intelligence	  Corps,	  decided	  to	  refer	  the	  matter	  to	  W.	  G.	  Cahill	  the	  Queensland	  Commissioner	  of	  Police.	   Cahill	   had	  enquiries	  made	  by	   the	  officer	   in	   charge	  of	   each	  and	  every	  police	   district	   in	   the	   state	   of	   Queensland.	   He	   delivered	   two	   intelligence	  assessments	  on	  8	  and	  28	  July	  1908	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  The	  reports	  were	  then	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  and	  Prime	  Minister	  Deakin.	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In	   assessing	   the	   activities	   of	   Japanese	   pearl	   fishermen	   on	   the	   Great	  Barrier	  Reef,	  the	  police	  report	  emphasised	  that:	  There	   is	   no	   truth	   in	   the	   rumours,	   which,	   they	   [police]	   report	   are	  circulated	   solely	   by	   the	   European	   Bêche-­‐de-­‐mer30	  fishermen,	   who	   are	  very	   jealous	   of	   and	   hostile	   to	   the	   Japanese	   fishermen.	   The	   Inspector	   of	  Police	   is	   of	   the	   opinion	   that	   there	   is	   no	   foundation	   for	   the	   rumour	  contained	  in	  the	  article	  in	  question.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4)	  	  	  Cahill’s	  report	  noted	  that	  while	  Japanese	  frequently	  moved	  throughout	  the	  State	  of	  Queensland,	  he	  could	  find	  no	  information	  tending	  to	  prove	  the	  suspicion	  that	  Japanese	  were	   engaging	   in	   espionage.	   Although	  Bridges	  was	   satisfied	  with	   the	  analysis	   Cahill	   delivered,	   Deakin	   and	   his	   most	   senior	   political	   and	   military	  advisors	   rejected	   the	   findings	   outright.	   	   Attlee	   Hunt,	   Secretary	   to	   the	   Prime	  Minister,	  T.	  T.	  Ewing	  the	  Minister	  for	  Defence,	  Joseph	  Cook,	  and	  Captain	  Creswell	  saw	  no	   reason	   to	  discredit	   the	   allegations	   contained	   in	   the	  media	   reports.	  The	  government	  continued	  to	  argue	  that	  espionage	  would	  be	  the	  prime	  duty	  of	  such	  men	   (Atkinson	   1964:	   232;	   Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1976:	   26).	   	   These	   strongly	   held	  convictions	  were	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  informed	  by	  a	  subsequent	  report	  delivered	  directly	   to,	   Atlee	   Hunt,	   and	   Deakin	   by	   the	   Acting	   Chief	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Queensland	  Government.	  	  	   On	  18	  July	  1908,	  Chief	  Secretary	  Barlow	  wrote	  to	  Deakin	  arguing	  that	  ‘in	  my	   opinion	   the	   matter	   has	   hitherto	   pursued	   the	   wrong	   channels	   of	  communication’.	   Barlow	   protested	   that	   Deakin,	   not	   the	   Military	   Board	   should	  have	  instigated	  the	  inquiry.	  	  This	  is	  likely	  because	  the	  Queensland	  government	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  inquiry	  were	  not	  aware	  of	  the	  investigations	  despite	  having	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Bêche-­‐de-­‐mer	  is	  otherwise	  known	  as	  sea	  cucumber.	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police	  force	  used	  to	  conduct	  the	  operation.	  Deakin	  wrote	  back	  to	  Barlow	  on	  28	  July	   stating	   that	   ‘I	   agree	   with	   your	   view	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   channels	   of	  correspondence’	  and	  assured	  him	  that	  it	  would	  not	  happen	  again.	  	  By	  14	  August,	  Barlow	   submitted	   a	   new	   report	   to	   Deakin,	   which	   made	   a	   strikingly	   different	  assessment	  of	  the	  situation	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  	  	   This	   assessment	   reported	   that	   two	   well-­‐educated	   Japanese	   men	   were	  known	   to	   be	   in	   the	   vicinity	   of	  Mackay,	   Townsville,	   Cairns	   and	   Brisbane	   at	   the	  time	  in	  question.	  They	  had	  been	  observed	  making	  inquiries	  into	  the	  condition	  of	  Australian	   sugar	   mills	   and	   the	   surrounding	   rivers.	   The	   report	   noted	   that	   this	  should	  be	   reported,	   as	   these	  men	  were	  known	   to	  be	   commercial	   agents	   of	   the	  Japanese	  government.	  The	  officer	   in	  charge	  of	   this	   inquiry,	   Inspector	  Galbraith,	  stated	  that	  these	  men	  possessed	  travel	  papers	  signed	  by	  the	  Japanese	  consul	  in	  Honolulu.	  It	  was	  also	  reported	  by	  the	  police	  that	  both	  men	  had	  taken	  numerous	  pictures	  of	  surrounding	  rivers	  and	  subsequently	  left	  the	  area	  in	  a	  hurry	  the	  next	  day	  by	  fishing	  boat	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  While	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Police	  and	  the	  Collector	  of	  Customs	  knew	  of	   this,	   it	  was	  not	  deemed	  relevant	  by	  Cahill	   or	  Bridges	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  first	  intelligence	  assessment.	  Of	  course,	  Deakin	  and	  his	  supporters	  found	  the	  second	  report	  more	  appealing.	  	  	   The	  new	  revised	  intelligence	  report	  provided	  ample	  political	  opportunity	  for	   those	   with	   aspirations	   of	   a	   national	   defence	   scheme.	   Captain	   Creswell	   for	  example,	  capitalised	  on	  the	  situation	  asserting	  that	  if	  there	  was	  a	  local	  navy	  such	  activity	  could	  not	   take	  place.	   	  Other	  military	  advisors	  recommended	   legislation	  could	  remedy	  the	  problem	  by	  enabling	   the	  government	   to	  prosecute	  (NAA:	  MP	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84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  Crimes	  Bill	  —	  then	  in	   preparation	   —	   make	   unlawful	   soundings	   of	   waterways	   a	   criminal	   offence.	  	  Lieutenant	   John	   Gillett	   Fearnley,	   of	   the	   Royal	   Navy	   used	   the	   situation	   to	   put	  forward	  his	  own	  criticisms	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  imperial	  policy	  and	  supplied	  his	  own	  political	  recommendations.	  Fearnley:	  Unfortunately	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Empire	  is	  now	  such	  that	  no	  matter	  what	  stress	  we	  were	   in,	   England	   could	   not	   dispatch	   an	   effective	   force	   to	   our	  assistance…hitherto	   we	   have	   relied	   upon	   the	   British	   Department	   for	  Intelligence,	  but	   I	  would	   respectfully	   submit	   that	  Australia’s	   interests	   in	  Japan’s	  movement	   is	  greater	  and	  more	  vital	   than	  that	  of	  Great	  Britain	  …	  we	   may	   be	   pardoned	   if	   we	   seek	   information	   first	   hand	   in	   the	   case	   of	  Japan.	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/5)	  	  	  	   In	   light	   of	   these	   claims,	   Fearnley	   advised	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence	   that	  Japanese	  men	  employed	   in	   the	  pearling	   industry	  on	  Thursday	   Island	  had	  been	  working	  for	  the	  Japanese	  intelligence	  department.	  He	  reminded	  the	  Minister	  that	  ‘although	  espionage	   is	  a	  customary	   thing	  between	  nations,	   it	   is	  only	  carried	  on	  between	  potential	  enemies’	  (NAA:	  MP	  84/1,	  1877/5/5).	  He	  urged	  the	  Minister	  to	  create	  an	  Australian	  Secret	  Service	  to	  collect	  first-­‐hand	  information	  on	  Japan.	  To	  many	   policy-­‐makers,	   who	   now	   accepted	   Japan	   as	   serious	   threat	   to	   Australia,	  these	  claims	  of	  spying	  only	  vindicated	  their	  suspicions	  that	  Japan	  was	  intent	  on	  invasion.	   Furthermore,	   this	   confirmed	   Australian	   suspicions	   that	   the	   British	  Navy	  had	  no	  interest	  or	  capacity	  to	  limit	  such	  activity.	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Others	   like	   Bridges	   and	   Cahill	   adopted	   a	   less	   alarmist	   view	   and	   were	  more	   reserved	   in	   their	   assessment	   of	   Japanese	   intentions.	   Their	   inquiries	  presented	   plausible	   arguments	   about	   the	   intentions	   of	   Japanese	   fishermen.	  Police	  noted	   that	   the	  underlying	  motives	  behind	  reports	  of	   Japanese	  espionage	  arose	   from	  disgruntled	  Australian	   fishermen	   jealous	  of	   Japanese	  encroachment	  into	  their	  waters.	  From	  the	  outset	  Bridges	  had	  disputed	  the	  claims	  of	  espionage	  suggesting	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  that	  he	  had	  doubted	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  reports	   even	   before	   an	   investigation	   had	   been	   conducted	   (NAA:	   MP	   84/1,	  1877/5/4).	  Given	  the	  racial	  sentiment	  aroused	  by	  the	  Immigrations	  Restrictions	  
Act	   1901	   (Cwlth),	   and	   the	   contempt	   towards	   Japan	   inflamed	   by	   the	   press,	  arriving	  at	   such	   conclusions	  appears	   to	  be	   sound.	  What	   is	   surprising,	   and	  puts	  Bridges’	  assessment	  in	  doubt,	  is	  why	  such	  important	  information	  was	  left	  out	  of	  the	  initial	  reports.	  	  	  Questions	  arise	  as	  to	  whether	  Bridges	  and	  the	  Queensland	  Police	  aimed	  to	  thwart	   Deakin’s	   policy	   aspirations	   or	   whether	   the	   intelligence	   they	   delivered	  was	   just	   incomplete.	   Evidence	   suggests	   that	   on	   both	   sides	   information	   was	  selectively	  chosen	  or	   ‘cherry-­‐picked’	   to	  support	   the	  arguments	  of	  each	  party.	   It	  appears	   that	   intelligence	   became	   tangled	  within	   the	   politics	   of	   defence	   policy-­‐making	   and	   resulted	   in	   shaping	   policy	   decisions.	   In	   terms	   of	   outcomes,	   one	  consequence	  did	  become	  apparent.	   	  Section	  83	  of	   the	  Crimes	  Act	  1914	  included	  the	   making	   of	   unauthorised	   sounding	   and	   hydrographical	   surveys	   in	   all	  territorial	  waters	  a	  criminal	  offence	  (Crimes	  Act	  1914,	  Section	  83).	  The	  inclusion	  of	   Section	   83	   in	   the	   passage	   of	   the	  Crimes	  Act	   indicates	   the	   level	   of	   suspicion	  aroused	   by	   such	   activity	   and	   the	   inability	   of	   the	   government	   to	   address	   such	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issues	  through	  formal	  channels.31	  Fearnley’s	  suggestions	  of	  an	  Australian	  Secret	  Service	  were	  however	  declined	  by	  the	  government.	  	  	  
The	  Japanese	  crisis:	  An	  assessment	  It	  might	  reasonably	  be	  argued	  that	  political	  conditions	  underpinned	  how	  intelligence	  became	  politicised	   in	   the	   above	   case.	   For	   example,	   intelligence	   fell	  short	  of	  maintaining	  any	  sense	  of	  political	  objectivity	   in	  assessing	   the	  situation	  and	   Bridges’	   personal	   views	   seem	   to	   have	   clouded	   his	   assessment	   of	   the	  investigation	   from	   the	   outset.	   His	   analysis	   emphasised	   the	   subjective.	   Bridges’	  interpretation	   of	   Japanese	   intentions	   appears	   to	   be	   one	   aligned	   with	   his	   own	  preference	   for	   imperial	   policy	   recommendations.	   In	   this	   sense,	   he	   maintained	  the	   imperial	   policy	   position	   and	   his	   commitment	   to	   this	   position	   may	   have	  suppressed	   an	   alternative	   analysis	   of	   the	   situation.	   Indeed,	   Bridges	   was	   an	  officer	   who	   ‘was	   sympathetic	   to	   the	   imperial	   view’	   and	   was	   imbued	   with	  Hutton’s	   imperial	   ideas.	   He	   remained	   loyal	   to	   the	   Empire,	   opposing	   Deakin’s	  Defence	  Bill	  right	  to	  the	  end	  (Mordike	  1992:	  172–173).	  On	  29	  September	  1908,	  just	  as	  the	  Defence	  Bill	  was	  presented	  to	  parliament,	  Bridges	  penned	  a	  letter	  to	  Hutton.	  ‘We	  can	  only	  hope	  that	  it	  [Defence	  Bill]	  will	  not	  pass,	  if	  it	  does,	  farewell	  to	  any	  effective	  military	   forces	   in	  Australia…	  but	   the	  mischief	  will	  be	  done	  and	  our	  existing	  forces	  destroyed’.	  Bridges	  closed	  the	  letter	  ruefully,	  explaining	  that	  ‘military	   opinion	   is	   of	   no	  weight	   against	   the	   popular	   view’	   (Hutton	   Papers	  MS	  50089,	  Vol.	  XII:	  64–65).	  32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Before	  amendments	  to	  the	  Crimes	  Act	  1914,	  it	  was	  not	  illegal	  for	  foreigners	  to	  conduct	  this	  type	  of	  information	  gathering.	  	  32	  Bridges	   career	   spanned	   thirty	   years	   of	   service.	   He	   was	   promoted	   to	   Chief	   of	   the	  General	  Staff	   in	  1909.	  He	  later	  became	  Commander	  of	  the	  Australian	  Imperial	  Forces…	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Ultimately,	  Bridges’	  hopes	  were	  only	  partly	  met.	  The	  Deakin	  government	  fell	   before	   the	  Defence	  Bill	   could	   be	   passed	   in	   parliament	   and	   it	  would	   not	   be	  until	   Deakin’s	   third	   and	   final	   term	   as	   Prime	   Minister,	   that	   his	   long	   held	  aspirations	   of	   a	   local	   naval	   force	   would	   be	   realised.	   Begrudgingly,	   the	   British	  Admiralty	  finally	  acquiesced,	  and	  Joseph	  Cook,	  the	  Defence	  Minister,	  introduced	  the	  Bill	   to	   the	  Australian	  Parliament	   in	  September	  1909.	  The	  British	  Admiralty	  agreed	   to	   cooperate	   and	  pledged	   to	   help	   establish	   a	   ‘Pacific	   Fleet’	   in	  which	   an	  Australian	   naval	   force	   would	   have	   some	   autonomy	   in	   its	   own	   naval	   affairs	  (Meaney	  1976:	  195).	  	  	   It	   appears	   —	   from	   the	   evidence	   available	   —	   that	   the	   Australian	  government’s	   intention	   was	   to	   use	   intelligence	   to	   strengthen	   support	   for	   its	  policy	   ambitions.	   Political	   assumptions	   determined	   what	   the	   threat	   was	   and	  intelligence	  was	  politicised	  to	   justify	  the	  premise.	  Deakin	  had	  publicly	  declared	  his	  intention	  to	  develop	  an	  Australian	  naval	  defence	  policy	  that	  could	  protect	  its	  own	   coastlines	   and	   coastal	   trade.	   He	   anticipated	   Whitehall	   would	   reject	   this.	  Intelligence	   information	   helped	   establish	   the	   wisdom	   of	   his	   policy	   choices.	   In	  bringing	   to	   reality	   his	   nationalist	   defence	  policy	   ambitions,	  Deakin,	   on	   the	  one	  hand	   enjoyed	   considerable	   support	   from	   the	  public	   and	   the	  press.	   In	  pursuing	  his	  goal	  he	  had	  attentive	  allies	  ranging	  from	  the	  Director	  of	  Naval	  Forces	  such	  as	  Creswell,	   the	  Minister	   of	   Defence	   T.	   T.	   Ewing,	   and	  Atlee	  Hunt	   the	   Secretary	   of	  External	  Affairs.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  and	  received	  a	  Knighthood.	  Bridges	  died	  from	  wounds	  received	  at	  Gallipoli	  on	  May	  18,	  1915	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1979	  a:	  187;	  Mordike	  1992:	  172).	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On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Deakin	   faced	   considerable	   opposition	   from	   imperial	  loyalists	   such	   as	   Bridges	   and	   Hutton	   and	   the	   imperial	   authorities	   in	   London.	  British	  authorities	  had	  continually	  received	  demands	   for	  an	  Australian	  voice	   in	  imperial	   policy	   without	   enthusiasm	   and	   had	   consistently	   ignored	   Australian	  concerns.	   This	   left	   Australian	   statesmen	   with	   the	   sense	   that	   Australia	   was	  exposed	   and	   strategically	   isolated.	   	   Japan’s	   rise	   as	   a	   power	   in	   the	   Pacific	  exacerbated	   these	   fears	   of	   isolation,	   but	   they	  were	   also	   capitalised	   on.	   Deakin	  actively	  sought	  to	  manifest	  Japan	  as	  a	  menace	  to	  Australia	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  an	  independent	  defence	  policy.	  Bridges	   and	  other	  military	  planners,	   however,	   did	  not	   accept	   such	   alarmist	   conditions	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   defence	   planning	   (Meaney	  1976:	   156).	   	   	   Bridges,	   likewise,	   had	   made	   known	   his	   opposition	   to	   an	  independent	  Australian	  defence	  policy	  and	  for	  the	  most	  part	  refused	  to	  play	  such	  partisan	  politics.	  	   Deakin	   sought	   to	   provide	   Australia	   with	   a	   greater	   voice	   in	   imperial	  defence	   planning,	   understanding	   that	   imperial	   and	   Australian	   policy	   interests	  were	  not	  congruent.	   In	  doing	  so,	   intelligence	  became	  just	  one	  means	  of	  helping	  achieving	   these	   goals.	   	   This	   is	   perhaps	   not	   uncommon	   when	   intelligence	  intersects	  with	  policy.	  As	  one	  writer	  observed,	  history	  shows	  that	  what	  political	  leaders	  decide	  intelligence	  tends	  to	  seek	  to	  justify	  (Kissinger	  1994:	  303).	  	  In	  this	  case,	   when	   intelligence	   did	   not	   deliver	   according	   to	   policy	   objectives	   it	   was	  ignored	   and	   rejected.	   Alternatively,	  when	   it	   did	   conform	   to	   those	   objectives	   it	  was	  used	  to	  justify	  already	  resolved	  political	  questions.	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Conclusion	  and	  preliminary	  findings	  It	   is	   possible	   to	   extricate	   conclusions	   from	   the	   aforementioned	   studies	  which	   suggests	   that	   intelligence	   was	   politicised	   in	   this	   era	   because	   Australia	  political	   leaders	   felt	   so	   uncertain	   about	   Australia’s	   place	   in	   an	   increasingly	  unstable	  geopolitical	   environment.	  Geographic	   isolation	  underpinned	   fears	  and	  heightened	  a	  sense	  of	  vulnerability.	  Australia’s	  response	  was	  one	  concerned	  with	  its	   own	   immediate	   security	   needs,	   which	   insisted	   the	   Empire	   listen	   to	   its	  demands.	   Australian	   political	   leaders	   felt	   both	   isolated	   from,	   and	   neglected	   by	  Britain	   in	   resolving	   distinctly	   local	   security	   questions.	   Australian	   statesmen	  sought	   to	   remedy	   these	   problems	  by	   any	  means	  possible.	   Intelligence	  was	   but	  one	  resource	  among	  many	  that	  could	  help	  achieve	  these	  goals.	  	  	   A	  comparison	  of	  each	  case	  study	  reveals	  both	  differences	  and	  similarities.	  The	   first	  difference	   involves	   the	   forms	  of	  politicisation	   that	  occurred.	  The	  New	  Hebrides	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  how	  intelligence	  was	  used	  as	  a	  coercive	  resource	  to	   advance	   the	   political	   and	   policy	   agenda	   of	   the	   Barton	   government.	   In	   this	  instance,	   intelligence	   became	  politicised	   because	   it	  was	   ‘publicised’	   in	  The	  Age	  newspaper	  to	  achieve	  this	  aim.	  Given	  the	  context	  surrounding	  this	  case,	  it	  could	  be	   concluded	   that	   Le	   Couteur’s	   intelligence	   mission	   was	   one	   not	   intended	   to	  enhance	  policy	  development,	  but	  one	  intended	  to	  vindicate	  an	  established	  policy	  position,	  that	  of	  imperial	  annexation	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  Australian	  defences.	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The	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   occurring	   in	   the	   Japanese	   case	  were	   subtler.	  Although	   there	   is	   evidence	   indicating	   that	   the	   Deakin	   government	   ‘cherry-­‐picked’	  intelligence	  that	  was	  favourable	  to	  their	  policy	  aspirations,	  there	  is	  also	  evidence	  suggesting	  that	  Bridges	  and	  the	  Queensland	  Police	  neglected	  to	  report	  important	   facts	   regarding	   Japanese	   espionage	   to	   the	   government.	   It	   appears	  Deakin	  and	  some	  of	  his	  senior	  advisors	  only	  accepted	  intelligence	  that	  suggested	  Japanese	   espionage	  was	   a	   potential	   act	   of	   foreign	   aggression	   and	   a	   prelude	   to	  invasion.	   Here,	   intelligence	   that	   supported	   this	   position	   was	   accepted	   and	  intelligence	   that	   did	   not	   was	   rejected.	   In	   other	   words,	   intelligence	   was	   used	  selectively	  to	  build	  support	  for	  an	  independent	  defence	  scheme	  and	  for	  creating	  a	   national	   consensus.	   Intelligence	   helped	   establish	   the	   credibility	   for,	   and	  rationality	  behind,	  these	  policy	  ambitions.	  	  	  	   The	   New	   Caledonia	   case	   represents	   a	   clearer	   example	   of	   direct	  politicisation.	  	  	  The	  factors	  set	  forth	  in	  the	  Hutton	  case	  show	  that	  intelligence	  was	  used	   to	   plan	   a	   military	   invasion	   of	   a	   foreign	   country	   using	   Australian	   troops	  without	   the	   Australian	   government	   ever	   becoming	   cognisant	   of	   the	   operation.	  The	  case	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  unauthorised	  operation	  and	  direct	  politicisation	  of	  the	  intelligence	  process.	  It	  was	  unauthorised	  because	  the	  decision	  to	  conduct	  the	  operation	   was	   made	   by	   military	   officers	   of	   a	   foreign	   government	   without	   the	  knowledge	   or	   consent	   of	   the	   Australian	   government.	   And,	   it	   was	   direct	  politicisation	   for	   two	   reasons.	   First,	   Hutton	   appointed	   a	   pliant	   Australian	  intelligence	   officer	   to	   collect	   the	   intelligence,	   and	   second,	   because	   that	  information	  was	  used	   for	   the	  strategic	  purposes	  of	  another	  government.	  These	  plans	   stood	   in	   direct	   opposition	   to	   the	   foreign	   policy	   pursued	   by	   the	   Barton–
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Deakin	   government.	   It	   demonstrates	   how	   an	   Australian	   intelligence	   operation	  was	  used	  to	  help	  achieve	  the	  political	  objectives	  of	  a	  foreign	  government.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   A	   second	   difference	   presented	   in	   each	   case	   is	   the	   source	   from	   where	  politicisation	  eventuated.	  In	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  and	  Japanese	  cases,	  the	  initiative	  to	   use	   intelligence	   to	   achieve	   a	   political	   aim	   appears	   to	   have	   originated	   from	  political	   leaders	   (Barton	   and	   Deakin).	   In	   the	   New	   Caledonia	   case,	   no	   political	  participation	  took	  place,	  but	   it	  was	  a	  military	  leader	  (Hutton)	  who	  initiated	  the	  manipulation	   of	   intelligence	   for	   a	   political	   purpose.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   evidence	  indicates	  that	  although	  political	  leaders	  can	  manipulate	  intelligence	  to	  achieve	  a	  desired	  policy	  outcome,	  others	  such	  as	  military	  leaders	  can	  also	  engage	  in	  such	  a	  practice.	   A	   critical	   factor	   here	   is	   that	   political	   behaviour	   is	   not	   an	   isolated	  condition	  contributing	  toward	  politicisation.	  Military	  leaders	  and	  possibly	  other	  levels	  of	  bureaucracy	  can	  cause	  intelligence	  to	  become	  politicised.	  	  	  	   There	   is	   one	   similarity	   running	   through	   each	   of	   the	   cases.	   In	   all	   cases,	  intelligence	  was	  misused	  to	  achieve	  a	  strategic	  policy	  aim.	  In	  the	  New	  Hebrides	  case	   Barton	   used	   intelligence	   as	   a	  means	   of	  mobilising	   support	   for	   an	   already	  established	  policy	  decision	  —	  that	  of	  imperial	  annexation	  of	  the	  New	  Hebrides.	  It	  was	  subsequently	  publicised	   in	  order	   to	  persuade	  and	  build	  public	   support	   for	  the	   decision.	   In	   the	   New	   Caledonia	   case,	   Hutton	   used	   intelligence	   to	   gather	  information	  so	  that	  he	  could	  implement	  his	  own	  plans	  of	  invading	  the	  island.	  In	  the	  Japanese	  case,	  Deakin	  only	  used	  intelligence	  that	  validated	  his	  policy	  aim	  of	  creating	  an	  independent	  Australian	  Navy.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  strategic	  factors	  provide	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Chapter	  Three	  
Loyalty	  and	  allegiance:	  Australian	  intelligence,	  




I	  look	  around	  today	  and	  see	  the	  Party	  to	  which	  I	  have	  devoted	  my	  life	  hopeless,	  
irrevocably	  divided:	  its	  organisation	  broken:	  its	  future	  uncertain:	  its	  machinery	  
captured	  by	  Syndicalists	  of	  the	  IWW	  type	  plus	  the	  Sinn	  Feiners	  who	  foam	  at	  the	  
mouth	  whenever	  my	  name	  is	  mentioned.	  What	  an	  unholy	  alliance…33	  (William	  Hughes,	  Prime	  Minister)	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  While	   attending	   the	   Paris	   Peace	   Conference	   in	   1919,	   Prime	   Minister	  William	  Morris	  Hughes	  remarked	  that	   ‘the	  best	  way	  to	  govern	  Australia	  was	  to	  have	  Sir	  Robert	  Garran34	  at	  his	  elbow,	  with	  a	  fountain	  pen	  and	  a	  blank	  sheet	  of	  paper,	  and	   the	  War	  Precautions	  Act’	   (Eggleston	  Papers,	  Series	  107,	   Item	  16).	  35	  The	   comment	   represents	   Hughes’	   autocratic	   style	   of	   leadership	   during	   the	  conscription	   controversies	   of	  World	  War	  One	   and	   reveals	   the	  power	   vested	   in	  the	  executive	  of	  his	  government	  to	  use	  the	  law	  as	  an	  instrument	  of	  his	  political	  desires.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  W.	  M.	  Hughes	  to	  Andrew	  Bonar	  Law,	  6	  November	  1916	  (Bonar	  Law	  Papers	  M	  1123,	  Box	  53,	  Folder	  4,	  Item	  15).	  	  	  34	  Robert	  Garran	  (later	  Sir)	  was	  the	  Solicitor	  General.	  	  	  35	  This	   statement	   appears	   in	   ‘Confidential	   Notes	   on	   Australian	   Politics’,	   Chapter	   5,	  located	   in	   the	   Eggleston	   Papers,	   Series	   107,	   Item	   16,	   Noel	   Butlin	   Archives	   Centre,	  Australian	  National	  University:	  Canberra.	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For	  the	  previous	  five	  years,	  the	  Hughes	  government	  had	  been	  embroiled	  in	  a	  bitter	  conflict	  with	  radicals,	  trade	  unions,	  Irish	  nationalists,	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  over	   implementing	   the	  policy	  of	   compulsory	  overseas	  military	  service.	   Twice	   the	   issue	   of	   conscription	  was	   put	   to	   the	   Australian	   people	   in	   a	  referendum.	  But	  twice	  it	  was	  defeated.	  The	  Hughes	  government	  saw	  this	  defeat	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement.	  If,	  as	  the	  government	  assumed,	  Australians	   had	   rejected	   conscription,	   it	   was	   because	   disloyal	   agitators	   had	  misled	   them.	   Based	   on	   this	   assumption,	   national	   security	   legislation	   was	  consistently	   expanded	   and	   the	   intelligence	   services	   were	   given	   wide-­‐ranging	  powers	   to	   suppress	   opposition	   and	   dissent.	   Protest	   groups	   were	   denounced.	  Activists	  were	  labelled	  traitors.	  Hughes’	  Labor	  Party	  colleagues	  were	  spied	  upon.	  All	   were	   represented	   as	   subversive	   and	   thereby	   a	   threat	   to	   national	   security.	  They,	  in	  turn,	  became	  the	  objects	  of	  political	  surveillance	  and	  subject	  to	  thorough	  scrutiny.	  	  As	  this	  chapter	  demonstrates,	  the	  government	  had	  no	  misgivings	  about	  using	  its	  intelligence	  services	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  extensive	  national	  security	  legislation	  to	  cut	  down	  those	  who	  challenged	  its	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  Concentrating	   on	   these	   events,	   this	   chapter	   surveys	   how	   the	   Hughes	  government	  reacted	  to	  a	  small	  but	  well	  organised	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement.	  It	  describes	   how	  Australia’s	   first	   civil	   intelligence	   agency,	   the	   Counter	   Espionage	  Bureau,	   along	   with	   Military	   Intelligence,	   the	   Censor’s	   Office36	  and	   state	   police	  forces	  were	  used	  by	  the	  government	  to	  assail	   its	  political	  opponents	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  (1914–1918).	  The	  chapter	  first	  outlines	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Approximately	   twenty	   members	   of	   the	   Censors	   Office	   were	   ex-­‐members	   of	   the	  Australian	  Intelligence	  Corps.	  See:	  	  Coulthard-­‐Clark,	  C	  (1976)	  p.	  53	  and	  Scott,	  E	  (1989)	  p.	  62.	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Counter	   Espionage	   Bureau	   and	   its	   role	   in	   the	   conscription	   campaigns.	   It	   then	  focuses	  on	  several	  instances	  of	  when	  the	  government	  politicised	  the	  intelligence	  services	  to	  repress	  opposition	  and	  to	  advance	  its	  own	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  The	   chapter	   argues	   that	   three	   factors	   help	   explain	   why	   this	   situation	  arose.	  The	  first	  is	  excessive	  ministerial	  control.	  As	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Attorney	  General,	   Hughes	   exercised	   almost	   complete	   authority	   over	   the	   direction	   and	  control	   of	   the	   intelligence	   bureaucracy.	   	   Second,	   supported	   by	   the	   War	  





The	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  The	  Australian	  intelligence	  community,	  as	  formally	  constituted,	  emerged	  largely	  as	  a	   response	   to	   the	  First	  World	  War.	  With	   the	  advent	  of	  War	   in	  1914,	  political	   leaders	   looked	  to	   their	   intelligence	  community	   for	  advice	  and	  demand	  for	   their	   services	   grew	   (Cain	  2001:	   117).	  While	   the	   focus	  of	   the	   services	  work	  was	   initially	   intended	   to	   detect	   instances	   of	   foreign	   espionage	   and	   identify	  enemy	   aliens,	   domestic	   political	   issues	   drew	   the	   services	   into	   monitoring	  internal	   political	   enemies,	   specifically	   individuals	   and	   groups	   opposed	   to	   the	  governments	   war	   policies.	   The	  most	   politically	   expedient	   of	   these	   intelligence	  services	  was	  the	  newly	  created	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau.	  	  	   On	  5	  August	  1915,	  Andrew	  Bonar	  Law,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  wrote	   a	   private	   memo	   regarding	   ‘a	   matter	   of	   considerable	   importance’	   to	   Sir	  Ronald	   Munro	   Ferguson	   (Lord	   Novar),	   the	   Australian	   Governor	   General.	   The	  memo	   contained	   a	   ‘Secret	   Memorandum’	   regarding	   counter	   espionage.	   Law	  urged	  Munro	   Ferguson	   to	   discuss	  with	   the	   Australian	   Prime	  Minister,	   Andrew	  Fisher,	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Australian	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  in	  order	  to	  coordinate	  and	  collate	  information	  with	  London	  (Novar	  Papers	  MS	  696,	  Series	  6,	  Item	  1337).	  Either	  through	  mishandling	  or	  indifference,	  no	  action	  was	  taken	  and	  for	  three	  months	  the	  matter	  remained	  dormant.37	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Hughes	   claims	   it	  was	  on	  his	  advice	   that	  Prime	  Minister,	  Andrew	  Fisher,	   created	   the	  CEB;	   see	   ‘War	   Cabinet	   Agendum,	   Internal	   Security,	   Memorandum	   by	   the	   Attorney	  General’	   in	   NAA:	   A	   12383,	   A/2/1	   Attachment	   2.	   Other	   evidence	   suggests	   that	   Fisher	  never	   received	   the	  memo	   from	  Bonar	  Law;	   see	  memo	  dated	  14	   January	  1916,	  George	  Steward	  to	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  Department,	  NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  298.	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Bonar	  Law	  had	  to	  nudge	  the	  Australian	  government	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  his	  request.	  On	  26	  November	  1915,	  the	  matter	  was	  finally	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	   the	   new	   Prime	   Minister,	   William	   Morris	   Hughes.	   Bonar	   Law	   reiterated	   to	  Hughes	  that	  some	  effort	  was	  required	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Australian	  government	  to	  ‘defeat	   the	   activities	   of	   enemy	   agents’.	   He	   requested	   a	   ‘suitable	   officer’	   be	  appointed	   to	   liaise	   with	   Lieutenant-­‐Colonel	   Vernon	   Kell,	   head	   of	   the	   British	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  in	  London,	  on	  matters	  regarding	  wartime	  intelligence	  (NAA:	   A	   3932,	   SC	   298).	   	   Hughes	   appointed	   Major	   George	   Steward,	   Official	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Governor	  General,	  as	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  liaison	  with	  Kell	  in	  London.	  The	  Australian	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  (Herein	  CEB)	  with	  Steward	  as	  its	  Director	  was	  established	  at	  Government	  House,	  Melbourne,	  shortly	  after	  on	  14	  January	  1916	  (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	  Series	  21,	  Item	  2).	  38	  	  	  But	   there	  was	   no	   parliamentary	   discussion	   on	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	  Bureau	   and	   subsequently	   no	   parliamentary	   oversight	   was	   implemented.	  Moreover,	   Steward	   identified	   a	   crucial	   problem	   regarding	   the	   status	   of	   the	  Bureau:	   it	   had	   no	   formal	   Executive	   Council	   approval.	   It	   would	   remain	  institutionally	  invisible	  for	  another	  year.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Exact	  dates	  regarding	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  CEB	  differ,	  for	  example,	  compare	  with	  NA:	  KV	  1/15.	  	  	  39	  See:	  NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  298	  for	  Steward’s	  requests	  to	  have	  the	  Bureau	  approved	  by	  the	  Executive	  Council.	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Modelled	  closely	  on	  its	  British	  equivalent	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  CEB	  was	  to:	  	  Undertake	   the	  widest	  possible	   interchange	  with	   the	  British	  Government	  of	   confidential	   intelligence,	   bearing	   especially	   upon	   the	   activities	   of	  hostile	  secret	  service	  agents	  throughout	  the	  Empire,	  both	  in	  time	  of	  war	  and	  peace.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  CP	  46/2,	  24)	  	  Outlining	  the	  Bureau’s	  duties,	  Major	  Steward	  explained	  to	  his	  staff	  that	  the	  work	  of	   the	   CEB	   would	   comprise	   the	   prevention	   and	   detection	   of	   espionage,	   the	  control	  and	  examination	  of	  travellers	  passing	  through	  sea	  ports,	  the	  compilation	  and	   exchange	   of	   records	   with	   Britain	   and	   the	   indexing,	   filing,	   and	   custody	   of	  internal	  documents	  (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	  Series	  21,	  Item	  4).	  	  	  	  	   The	  CEB	   initially	   focused	  on	   its	   stated	   responsibilities,	   concentrating	  on	  the	  activities	  of	  Japanese,	  German,	  and	  Austro–Hungarian	  enemy	  aliens	  and	  the	  surveillance	  of	  foreign	  agents	  in	  Australia	  (NA:	  KV	  1/15).	  By	  late	  1916,	  under	  the	  lead	   of	   the	   Hughes	   government	   the	   straightforward	   objectives	   of	   the	   CEB	  became	  clouded	  by	  the	  growing	  political	  debate	  about	  conscription	  (Hall	  1978:	  13).	   It	  was	  during	   this	   campaign	   that	   the	  CEB,	  along	  with	  Military	   Intelligence,	  began	  to	  change	  its	  focus.	  It	  started	  accumulating	  large	  amounts	  of	  information	  on	   the	   government’s	   newfound	   internal	   political	   enemies	   like	   industrial	   Trade	  Unions	   and	   its	   associated	   labour	   movements,	   Irish	   Nationals,	   and	   state	   and	  federal	  Labor	  parliamentarians.	  	  	   *****	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Surveillance	  and	  conscription	  	  The	  issue	  of	  conscription,	  or	  compulsory	  overseas	  military	  service,	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War	  had	  absorbed	  the	  government	  of	  William	  Hughes	  in	  a	  bitter	  and	  divisive	  political	  conflict.	  40	  The	  war	  had	  inflicted	  high	  casualty	  rates	  on	  the	  allied	  Imperial	  Forces,	  and	  the	  British	  Army	  Council	  requested	  from	  Hughes	  that	  the	   five	   Australian	   divisions	   in	   Europe	   be	  maintained	   at	   full	   strength	   (Hughes	  1917:6).	  Yet,	   the	  policy	  of	  compulsory	  military	  service	  had	  not	  arisen	  out	  of	  an	  inadequate	  voluntary	  recruiting	  system.	  Sir	  Ernest	  Scott’s	  analysis	  of	  official	  war	  statistics	   shows	   that	   between	   August	   1914	   and	   December	   1915	   voluntary	  enlistment	   numbers	   steadily	   increased.41	  It	   was	   only	   in	   early	   1916	   that	   the	  number	  of	  voluntary	  enlistments	  began	  to	  diminish.	  For	  Prime	  Minister	  Hughes,	  the	   dwindling	   number	   of	   volunteers	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   anti-­‐conscription	  movements	  (Cain	  2008:	  10).	  Such	  dissent	  would	  need	  to	  be	  contained	  in	  order	  to	  answer	   the	   Empire’s	   call.	   	   A	   comprehensive	   examination	   of	   the	   surveillance	  conducted	   on	   all	   anti-­‐conscription	   groups	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   chapter,	  however,	   the	   following	   discussion	   focuses	   on	   cases	   apposite	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  politicized	  intelligence.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Compulsory	  military	  service	  within	  Australia	  had	  been	  introduced	  in	  1911	  for	  all	  men	  aged	   18	   to	   60.	   Hughes	   sought	   an	   amendment	   that	   would	   extend	   this	   requirement	   to	  include	  overseas	  service.	  See	  National	  Archives	  of	  Australia:	  Conscription	  referendums	  fact	  sheet:	  	  http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/fact-­‐sheets/fs161.aspx	  	  	  41	  Aug	  –	  Dec	  1914:	   total	   enlistment	  =	  52,	  561;	   Jan	  –	  Dec	  1915:	   total	   enlistment	  =	  165,	  912;	  Jan	  –	  Dec	  1916:	  total	  enlistment	  =	  124,260;	  Jan	  –	  Dec	  1917:	  Total	  enlistment	  =	  45,	  101;	   Jan	  –	  Dec	  1918:	   total	  enlistment	  =	  28,	  283.	  Taken	   from:	  Scott,	  E	   (1989)	  Australia	  
During	  the	  War,	  pp.	  871–872.	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The	   first	   indication	   of	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  Hughes	  was	   prepared	   to	   use	  intelligence	   to	   fulfil	   his	   policy	   objectives	   and	   thwart	   the	   anti-­‐conscription	  movement	  occurred	  shortly	  after	  he	  became	  Prime	  Minister.	  In	  November	  1915,	  Adele	   Pankhurst	   and	   Cecilia	   Johns	   of	   the	   No	   Conscription	   Fellowship	   visited	  Brisbane	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  recruit	  new	  members	   for	   the	  Australian	  Peace	  Alliance	  and	  The	  Women’s	  Peace	  Army.	  	  Military	  Intelligence	  and	  the	  CEB	  sent	  officers	  to	  make	   transcripts	   of	   their	   speeches	   and	   monitor	   their	   activities,	   while	   the	  censor’s	  office	  prevented	  any	  publication	  of	  their	  lectures	  in	  the	  press.	  Director	  of	   Military	   Intelligence,	   Major	   Edmund	   Piesse,	   forwarded	   to	   Attorney	   General	  Hughes,	   all	   intelligence	   collected	   on	   the	   two	   women	   during	   their	   visit.	   The	  reports	  describe	  that	   the	  two	  women	  were	  singing	  anti-­‐conscription	  songs	  and	  agitating	  against	  recruitment	  and	  the	  war.	  Indeed,	  some	  of	  Pankhurst	  and	  Johns’	  comments	  caught	  the	  ear	  of	  the	  censor,	  specifically	  a	  song	  titled	  ‘I	  didn’t	  raise	  my	  son	  to	  be	  a	  soldier’	  which	  had	  been	  recited	  during	  the	  meetings.	  An	  instruction	  was	  ordered	  in	  December	  1915	  that	  any	  printed	  verses	  of	  the	  song	  were	  strictly	  forbidden	   and	   any	   further	   recitation	   of	   it	   was	   prohibited.	   R.	   J.	   Ross,	   who	   had	  printed	   lyrics	   of	   the	   song,	   was	   ordered	   to	   hand	   over	   all	   copies	   to	   Military	  Intelligence	  for	  destruction	  (NAA:	  BP	  4/1,	  66/4/605).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   On	  13	   January	  1916,	  Hughes	   issued	  an	  order	   for	  Military	   Intelligence	   to	  search	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  No	  Conscription	  Fellowship	  in	  Melbourne	  with	  a	  view	  to	  ascertaining	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  Victorian	  Socialist	  Party	  and	  seizing	  any	  anti-­‐conscription	  material.	   Minutes	   from	   Socialist	   Party	  meetings	   and	   a	   list	   of	  financial	   contributors	   were	   found	   along	   with	   a	   variety	   of	   anti-­‐conscription	  pamphlets.	  This	  material	  was	  submitted	  to	  Hughes	  with	  a	  recommendation	  from	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Harold	   Jones	   of	   Military	   Intelligence	   that	   ‘the	   leading	   exponents	   of	   the	  propaganda’	   be	   prosecuted	   under	   the	   War	   Precautions	   Act	   (NAA:	   B	   741,	  V/3426).	  	  	   Shortly	   after,	   future	   Prime	   Minister	   John	   Curtin	   authored	   a	   pamphlet	  titled:	   ‘The	   Australian	   Trades	   Union	   Anti-­‐Conscription	   Congress	   Manifesto	  Number	  2’,	  which	  stated	  that	  conscription	  was	  a	  ‘despotic	  and	  unlawful	  act’	  that	  did	  not	  have	  the	   ‘sanction	  of	  parliament’	  and	  was	   ‘in	  open	  defiance	  of	   the	   law’.	  The	   manifesto	   was	   distributed	   to	   100	   000	   members	   and	   ‘called	   upon	   trades	  unionists	  of	   the	  Commonwealth’	   to	  hold	   ‘simultaneous	   stop	  work	  meetings	   for	  24	   hours	   duration’	   in	   protest	   of	   conscription	   (Curtin	   Papers,	   Item:	   JCPML	  00398/7).42	  Minister	  for	  Defence,	  George	  Pearce,	  ordered	  the	  censor	  to	  ‘prevent	  circulation	  and	  publication	  of	  the	  Manifesto’	  (NAA:	  MP	  390/8,	  1916,	  Vol.	  2).	  He	  then	  authorised	  Military	  Intelligence	  to	  raid	  the	  Union’s	  premises	  and	  seize	  the	  Manifesto	   along	   with	   all	   anti-­‐conscription	   material.	   Several	   affiliated	   trade	  unions	   condemned	   the	   raids	   as	   unlawful	   and	   demanded	   Pearce’s	   resignation	  (The	  Argus	  10	  August	  1916:	  6).	  	  	  Director	   of	   Military	   Intelligence,	   Edmund	   Piesse,	   sought	   recourse	   to	  Crown	  Solicitor,	  Gordon	  H.	  Castle,	  to	  obtain	  his	  opinion	  regarding	  the	  legality	  of	  the	   pamphlets	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   prosecution.	   Castle	   reported	   that	   under	   a	  new	  regulation	  recently	  added	  to	  the	  War	  Precautions	  Act	  —	  section	  28	  AA	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Copies	  of	  the	  Manifesto	  can	  be	  found	  in	  two	  locations	  (1)	  in	  Australian	  Archive	  File:	  MP	  401/1,	  CL355	  along	  with	  material	  on	  the	  prosecution	  of	  Anderson	  and	  Holland,	  and	  (2)	  the	  electronic	  research	  archives	  of	  the	  John	  Curtin	  Memorial	  Library,	  Curtain	  University,	  Perth,	  Western	  Australia.	  See:	  http://espace.library.curtin.edu.au/R?func=dbin-­‐jump-­‐full&local_base=era01jcpml&object_id=85475	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War	   Precautions	   Regulations	  —	   there	   was	   enough	   evidence	   to	   prosecute	   the	  printer	   and	   the	   person	   procuring	   the	   printing	   because	   the	   pamphlets	   had	   not	  been	   submitted	   to	   the	   censor	   before	   publication.43	  Pearce	   then	   endorsed	   the	  prosecution	   and	   subsequently,	  Norman	  Anderson,	   and	  Frederick	  Holland	  were	  charged	   for	   an	   offence	   against	   Regulation	   28	   AA	   and	   issued	   a	   substantial	   fine	  (NAA:	  MP	  16/1,	  1915/3/1790	  A).	  	  	  These	  initial	  raids	  on	  the	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	   extent	   to	   which,	   the	   work	   of	   the	   intelligence	   community	   had	   become	  conflated	  with	  the	  partisan	  politics	  of	  the	  Hughes	  government.	  For	  example,	  the	  anti	  and	  pro-­‐conscriptionist	  movements	  received	  completely	  different	  treatment	  by	   the	   government	   and	   security	   services.	   Pamphlets	   distributed	   by	   the	   pro-­‐conscription	   campaign,	   no	   matter	   how	   deceptive	   or	   divisive,	   were	   never	  subjected	   to	   censorship	   (Meaney	   2009:220).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   activities	   of	   the	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement	   were	   on	  most	   occasions	   under	   surveillance,	   their	  literature	   and	  pamphlets	   seized	   and	  destroyed,	   and	   their	  mail	   intercepted	   and	  censored	   (Oliver	   1990:	   61).	   This	   double	   standard	   continued	   throughout	   the	  campaign	  and	  the	  intelligence	  services	  were	  directed	  to	  pursue	  the	  government’s	  partisan	  interests	  and	  suppress	  its	  political	  enemies.	  	  	  	   During	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  1916,	  members	  of	  the	  Industrial	  Workers	  of	  the	  World	  (Herein	  IWW)	  a	  Marxist	  inspired	  organisation	  created	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	   established	   in	   Australia	   since	   1907	   became	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   intelligence	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Pearce	  approved	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Section	  28	  AA	  to	  the	  War	  Precautions	  Act	  only	  four	  days	  after	  the	  raids	  took	  place,	  see:	  The	  Argus	  10	  August	  1916:	  6.	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services	  attention	  (NA:	  KV	  1/15).	  Several	  members	  were	  implicated	  on	  a	  number	  of	   charges	   ranging	   from	  sedition,	   forgery	   and	  arson,	   to	   infiltrating	   the	  military	  (Cain	   1983:10–11).	   Shortly	   after	   in	   August	   1916,	   four	   men	   were	   charged	   in	  Sydney	  with	  printing	  and	  distributing	  £25	  000	  worth	  of	  high	  quality	   forged	  £5	  pound	   notes.	   Three	   of	   the	   men	   were	   directly	   connected	   to	   the	   IWW	   and	  committed	   to	   stand	   trail.	  They	  were	   later	   convicted	  and	   sentenced	   to	  between	  three	  to	  seven	  years	  in	  prison	  (Turner	  1965:	  124–5).	  	  	   In	   the	   same	   week,	   IWW	   premises	   in	   Sydney	   were	   raided	   and	   a	   large	  quantity	  of	  alleged	  seditious	  material	  seized.	  Four	  men	  were	  arrested	  on	  charges	  of	   treason.	  As	   the	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	   noted	   the	   charges	   read	   that	   the	  men	  ‘feloniously	  and	  wickedly	  did	  compass,	  imagine,	  invent,	  devise	  or	  intend	  to	  levy	  war	   against	   the	   King	   within	   his	   Majesty’s	   dominions’	   (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  September	  25,	  1916:	  10).	  In	  the	  next	  two	  weeks,	  eight	  men	  with	  connections	  to	  the	   IWW	  were	  arrested	   in	   Sydney	  on	   the	   same	  charges	   (Turner	  1965:	  124–5).	  These	  events	  tended	  to	  justify	  Hughes’	  suspicions	  that	  the	  IWW	  was	  engaged	  in	  a	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  government.	  	  	   In	   September	   1916,	   a	   series	   of	   fires	   had	   engulfed	   business	   premises	  around	  Sydney.	  The	  setting	  of	   these	   fires	  was	   linked	  to	   twelve	  members	  of	   the	  IWW.	  The	   ‘twelve’	  —	  as	   the	  group	  became	  known	  —	  were	  brought	  before	   the	  Central	   Criminal	   Court	   on	   20	   November	   1916	   on	   ‘three	   counts	   of	   conspiracy:	  conspiracy	   to	   commit	   arson,	   conspiracy	   to	   defeat	   the	   ends	   of	   justice	   and	  seditious	   conspiracy’	   (Rushton	  1973:	   54).	   The	   trial	   itself	  was	   a	   highly	   political	  event.	  The	  King’s	  Counsel,	  Ernest	  Lamb,	  reminded	  the	  jury	  from	  the	  outset	  that	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‘while	   Mr	   Hughes	   was	   illuminating	   the	   minds	   of	   patriots,	   the	   blazing	   co-­‐operative	   building	  was	   illuminating	   the	   skies	   over	   Sydney’.	   As	   the	  prosecution	  argued,	   ‘these	   twelve	   men	   had	   conspired	   to	   burn	   down	   Sydney’.	   The	   Judge,	  Justice	  Robert	  Pring,	  was	  hardly	  impartial	  and	  held	  a	  similar	  view.	  He	  described	  the	  IWW	  during	  the	  trial	  as	  ‘an	  organisation	  of	  criminals	  of	  the	  very	  worst	  type,	  and	   a	  hot	  bed	  of	   crime’;	   he	  was	  overheard	   in	  his	   chambers	   alarmed	  about	   the	  ‘coming	  revolution’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  116).	  The	  counsel	  for	   the	  defence	  during	   the	   trial	  had	   to	  withdraw	   from	  the	  case	  because	  he	  had	  been	   appointed	   Minister	   for	   Public	   Instruction	   in	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	  government	  	  (Turner	  1965:	  127).	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  jury	  found	  all	  twelve	  men	  guilty	  and	  they	  were	  sentenced	  to	  terms	  of	  five,	  ten	  and	  fifteen	  years	  hard	  labour.	  
44	  The	  charges	  of	   treason,	  which	  consequently	  carried	  a	  possible	  death	  penalty,	  were	   downgraded	   to	   seditious	   conspiracy	   and	   conspiracy	   to	   commit	   arson	  (Rushton	  1973:	  54).	  	  	   This	  historical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  these	  early	  attempts	  to	  immobilise	  the	   anti-­‐conscription	   movement	   were	   driven	   by	   the	   policy	   interests	   of	   the	  Hughes	   government,	   and	   consequently	   the	   intelligence	   services	   responded	   by	  collecting	  information	  that	  would	  be	  of	  greatest	  value	  to	  promote	  these	  interests.	  By	   October	   1916,	   archival	   documents	   show	   that	   Military	   Intelligence,	   the	  Censors	   Office,	   and	   the	   CEB	   began	   to	   accrue	   information	   that	  would	   vindicate	  Hughes’	  policy	  choices.	  For	  example,	  they	  began	  intercepting	  mail	  and	  compiling	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  A	   Royal	   Commission	   conducted	   by	   Justice,	   Norman	   Kirkwood	   Ewing,	   in	   June	   1920	  found	  that	  six	  of	  the	  men	  had	  been	  wrongfully	  convicted.	  Subsequently,	  on	  3	  August	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Cabinet	  recommended	   that	   ten	  of	   the	  men	  be	   immediately	  released.	  For	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  the	  trial	  see:	  Turner,	  I	  (1967)	  Sydney’s	  Burning,	  pp.	  228–231.	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dossiers	  on	  prominent	  members	  of	  the	  IWW	  establishing	  their	  connections	  with	  anti-­‐conscription	   groups	   like	   the	   No	   Conscription	   Fellowship	   and	   the	   Labor	  Party	   (NAA:	   MP	   95/1,	   20/9/1916	   to	   18/4/1017;	   MP	   95/1,	   15/12/1916	   to	  15/2/1917;	  MP	  16/1,	  1915/3/1790	  A).	  	  	  	   Hughes	   had	   the	   political	   acumen	   to	   know	   that	   intelligence	   could	   be	   a	  persuasive	  public	  relations	  device	  and	  he	  used	  it	  to	  discredit	  his	  opponents.	  He	  began	   using	   the	   seized	  material	   to	   persuade	   the	   public	   that	   the	   IWW	   and	   the	  Labor	  Party	  were	  collaborating	  to	  destroy	  the	  success	  of	  the	  conscription	  policy.	  When	  the	  intelligence	  services	  raided	  the	  homes	  of	  the	  IWW	  men,	  letters	  from	  a	  prominent	   Labor	   politician	   were	   found	   in	   their	   possession.	   Hughes	   began	  reading	  the	  letters	  aloud	  at	  his	  campaign	  meetings	  to	  substantiate	  his	  argument	  that	   Labor	   was	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   IWW	   (Turner	   1967:	   47).	   To	   an	  audience	   in	   Hobart	   on	   12	   October	   1916,	   Hughes	   gleefully	   quoted	   one	   of	   the	  seized	   letters	   written	   by	   Labor	   politician	   Frank	   Anstey	   to	   Tom	   Barker,	   a	  notorious	  member	  of	  the	  IWW	  that	  had	  been	  convicted	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  for	  breaches	  of	  the	  War	  Precautions	  Act.45	  It	  read	  in	  part:	   ‘My	  Dear	  Barker,	  I	  am	  with	  you	  to	  the	  hilt.	  I	  wish	  you	  could	  send	  me	  a	  copy	  of	  those	  [anti-­‐conscription]	  posters.	  Good	  luck	  to	  you’.	  According	  to	  Hughes,	  the	  letter	  showed	  that	  members	  of	   the	   Labor	   Party	   were	   in	   a	   close	   relationship	   with	   the	   IWW	   and	   both	   were	  intent	  on	  sabotaging	  the	  government’s	  policy	  (The	  Age	  13	  October	  1916:	  6).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  On	   31	   May	   1917,	   Major	   Steward	   of	   the	   SIB	   asked	   Sydney	   Police	   to	   collect	   any	  information	   on	   Barker	   in	   order	   to	   prosecute	   him	   under	   the	  Unlawful	   Association	  Act.	  Steward	   said	   that	   if	   Barker	   could	   be	   prosecuted	   he	   would	   then	   have	   no	   trouble	  arranging	   for	   his	   deportation,	   because	   he	   was	   not	   born	   in	   Australia.	   	   	   On	   31	   August	  1917,	   Barker	   was	   charged	   with	   being	   a	   member	   of	   an	   unlawful	   association	   and	  sentenced	  to	  six	  moths	  imprisonment.	  On	  9	  July	  1918,	  along	  with	  five	  other	  men,	  Barker	  was	  deported	  to	  Chile	  (NAA:	  A	  6126,	  70).	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   Speaking	   in	  Bendigo	  on	  17	  October,	  Hughes	  adopted	  the	  same	  tactic.	  On	  this	   occasion,	   he	   read	   a	   letter	   seized	   by	   the	   CEB	   that	   was	   penned	   by	   activist	  Adela	   Pankhurst	   to	  Tom	  Barker	   of	   the	   IWW.	   In	   the	   letter,	   Pankhurst	   admitted	  that	   the	   IWW	   had	   ‘forced	   the	   Labor	   Party	   into	   the	   anti-­‐conscription	   camp’.46	  Hughes	  proceeded	  to	  rely	  upon	  the	  letter	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  IWW	  was	  ‘a	  gang	  of	  criminals	   that	  had	   led	  the	  Labor	  Party	   into	  a	   fight	  against	  conscription’	   (The	  
Argus	  18	  October	  1916:	  9–10).	  For	  Hughes	  the	  letters	  perhaps	  served	  as	  a	  clear	  indication	   of	   the	   type	   of	   characters	   the	   Labor	   Party	   was	   associating	   with.	  Forgery,	  arson,	  sabotage	  and	  treason	  underpinned	  the	  ideology	  of	  the	  IWW,	  and	  Hughes	   used	   information	   seized	   by	   the	   intelligence	   services	   to	   link	   the	   Labor	  Party	   to	   the	   same	  allegations.	  The	   raids	   conducted	  by	   the	   intelligence	   services	  had	  returned	  to	  Hughes	  a	  wealth	  of	  political	  capital,	  the	  problem	  however,	  is	  that	  Hughes	  was	  relying	  on	  intelligence	  to	  vindicate	  and	  defend	  his	  policy.	  	  	  	  	   Although	   Hughes	   had	   no	   scruples	   about	   pursuing	   this	   tactic,	   evidence	  suggests	  he	  was	  aware	  that	  if	  such	  behaviour	  became	  public	  knowledge	  it	  would	  damage	  the	  standing	  of	  the	  government.	  Measures	  were	  put	  into	  place	  to	  cover-­‐up	  the	  government’s	  improprieties.	  For	  instance	  on	  17	  October	  1916,	  under	  the	  
War	   Precautions	   Act,	   the	   CEB	   in	   collaboration	   with	   police	   were	   instructed	   to	  conduct	   raids	   on	   IWW	   premises	   across	   Melbourne,	   Sydney,	   and	   Perth	   (Cain	  1983:	   13).	   Major	   Steward	   ordered	   that	   the	   homes	   and	   clubrooms	   of	   IWW	  members	   were	   to	   be	   raided	   in	   order	   to	   locate	   ‘treasonable	   literature	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Adela	  Pankhurst	  was	  jailed	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  and	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  charges	  under	  the	  War	  Precautions	  Act	  for	  her	  outspoken	  views	  on	  Hughes	  and	  conscription.	  See:	  NAA:	  A	  456,	  W	  26/148/239	  Part	  1	  and	  2.	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correspondence’	  but	  also	  to	  look	  for	  material	  that	  may	  identify	  the	  sources	  from	  which	   the	   IWW	  were	   receiving	   funds	   (NAA:	   B	   741,	   V	   /237;	   V	   /266;	   V	   /291).	  Meanwhile,	   the	   government	   worked	   behind	   the	   scenes	   to	   conceal	   its	  involvement	   in	   the	  raids.	  On	   the	  same	  day	  as	   the	  raids,	   the	  Censors	  Office	  was	  instructed	   ‘to	   be	   particularly	   careful	   to	   prevent	   publication	   of	   any	   reports	   of	  searches	  of	  IWW	  premises	  or	  persons’	  in	  the	  press	  (NAA:	  MP	  390/8,	  1916,	  Vol.	  2).	  The	  reason	  for	  the	  operation	  and	  the	  prevention	  of	  any	  publicity	  regarding	  it	  is	  fairly	  clear:	  	  it	  was	  not	  only	  an	  attempt	  to	  muzzle	  an	  opposition	  group	  but	  also	  a	  means	  of	  using	  the	  Censor’s	  Office	  to	  conceal	  the	  government’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  operations.	  	  	   The	  government	  and	  the	  intelligence	  services	  continued	  to	  act	  in	  concert.	  On	   Steward’s	   advice,	   Hughes	   introduced	   the	   Unlawful	   Association	   Act	   1916	  (Cwlth)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  IWW	  a	  prohibited	  organisation	  (Meaney	  1979:21).	  Collectively,	   the	   War	   Precautions	   Act	   1914	   and	   the	   Unlawful	   Associations	   Act	  
1916	   provided	   the	   CEB	   with	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   powers	   to	   further	   monitor	   and	  suppress	  political	  dissent.	  As	  historian	  Frank	  Cain	  points	  out	   this	  was	   the	   first	  instance	   in	  Australian	  history	  where	  a	  political	  organisation	  had	  been	  officially	  prohibited	   (Cain	   1983:	   21).	   The	   effect	   this	   legislation	   had	   on	   the	   intelligence	  services	  was	  significant	  because	  it	  diverted	  their	  activities	  toward	  a	  political	  end.	  Rather	  than	  producing	  neutral	  advice	  to	  help	  inform	  national	  security	  policy,	  the	  intelligence	   services	   produced	   political	   capital	   to	   help	   Hughes	   achieve	   a	  predetermined	  political	  objective.	  Most	  notably,	   the	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  had	   changed	   from	   an	   organisation	   designed	   to	   uncover	   foreign	   espionage	   in	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protection	   of	   the	   Empire,	   to	   one	   that	   directly	   served	   the	   domestic	   political	  interests	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  his	  policy	  agenda.	  	  	  	  Secret	   intelligence	   was	   used	   against	   almost	   anyone	   that	   opposed	   the	  government’s	   position,	   including	   Hughes’	   own	   Labor	   Party	   colleagues.	   For	  example,	  Thomas	  J.	  Ryan,	  the	  Labor	  Premier	  of	  Queensland,	  had	  actively	  fought	  Hughes	  against	  conscription	  and	  censorship.	  This	  aroused	  a	  deep	  distrust	  of	  the	  Ryan	   government	   that	   also	   manifest	   in	   the	   intelligence	   services.	   Ryan	   was	  subsequently	  labelled	  a	  subversive	  and	  placed	  under	  surveillance	  (Meaney	  1979:	  21).	   Under	   Hughes’	   instruction,	   Military	   Intelligence	   devoted	   significant	  attention	   to	   Ryan	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   where	   his	   political	   loyalties	   lay.	   In	  delivering	  a	  dossier	  titled	  ‘the	  real	  facts	  concerning	  Hon.	  T.	  J.	  Ryan’	  the	  partisan	  objectives	   of	   the	   intelligence	   service	   become	   quite	   clear.	   ‘It	   may	   be	   hard	   to	  believe	   the	   content	   of	   the	   attached	   dossier	   are	   true’	   the	   introduction	   to	   the	  report	   stated.	   ‘While	   Mr	   Ryan	   has	   cunningly	   refrained	   from	   making	   disloyal	  statements	   he	   must	   be	   judged	   by	   the	   company	   he	   keeps.	   There	   is	   very	   little	  doubt’	  the	  dossier	  states	  that	  ‘the	  Queensland	  Labor	  Party,	  through	  its	  Executive	  contains	   a	   very	   important	   disloyal	   section	   with	   which	   the	   Premier	   has	  continually	  associated	  for	  a	  period	  of	  nine	  years,	  and	  from	  which	  he	  has	  accepted	  dictation’	  (NAA:	  B	  197,	  2021/1/270).	  	  	   The	  details	  contained	  in	  the	  dossiers	  prepared	  by	  the	  Military	  Intelligence	  show	   the	   amount	   of	   surveillance	   conducted	   on	   Queensland	   Labor	   politicians	  throughout	  1916–17.	  Indeed,	  the	  assessments	  produced	  by	  Military	  Intelligence	  underpinned	  the	  government’s	  belief	   that	  Queensland	  had	  become	  a	  refuge	   for	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IWW	   members	   retreating	   from	   other	   states	   (Cain	   1983:22).	   One	   assessment	  noted	  Premier	  Ryan’s	  attitude	  toward	  conscription	  from	  every	  public	  utterance	  he	   had	   made	   since	   he	   entered	   politics	   in	   1903.	   Every	   Queensland	   politician’s	  association	  with	  the	  IWW,	  Peace	  Movements,	  and	  the	  Anti-­‐Conscription	  League	  were	   listed	   in	   meticulous	   detail.	   The	   report	   made	   clear	   its	   assessment	   of	   the	  labour	  movement	  in	  Queensland	  stating	  that	  	  ‘During	  the	  conscription	  campaign	  the	  Queensland	   labour	  movement	   showed	   a	   distinctly	   friendly	   feeling	   towards	  the	   IWW	  and	  anti-­‐conscription’	   (NAA:	  B	  197,	  2021/1/270).	   	  Because	  Ryan	  had	  opposed	  Hughes’	  policy	  of	   conscription	  he	  was	   touted	  as	  disloyal,	   subjected	   to	  political	   surveillance,	   and	   deemed	   a	   risk	   to	   Australian	   national	   security.	  Subsequently,	   Ryan,	   and	   the	  Queensland	  Treasurer,	   E.	   G.	   Theodore,	  were	   later	  charged	   with	   conspiracy	   when	   they	   tried	   to	   distribute	   a	   pamphlet	   titled	  ‘Conscription	  the	  Death	  of	  Unionism’	  and	  printed	  in	  the	  official	  Hansard	  matters	  related	   to	   the	  War	  without	   the	   permission	   of	   the	   government	   censor	   (NAA:	   A	  456,	  W	  26/217).	  	  	   But	   the	   political	   use	   of	   intelligence	   to	   stifle	   opposition	   on	   conscription	  had	  limited	  success.	  On	  28	  October	  1916,	  conscription	  was	  defeated	  at	  the	  polls	  by	   a	   small	  margin.	  47	  	   The	   political	   cost	   of	   the	   campaign	  was	   high	   and	  Hughes	  took	   the	  defeat	  badly.	  He	  blamed	  his	  detractors,	   in	   their	  various	   forms,	   for	   the	  result.	  Hughes	  confided	  in	  a	  letter	  to,	  Andrew	  Bonar	  Law,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  that	  ‘I	  am	  sorry	  we	  did	  not	  win.	  We	  should	  have	  done	  so	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  official	  labour	  organisations	  being	  against	  us,	  but	  the	  selfish	  vote,	  the	  shirker	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  The	  official	  result	  for	  the	  first	  plebiscite	  was:	  1	  087	  557	  (48.39	  %) for,	  and,	  1	  160	  033	  (51.61	  %)	  against.	  Handbook	  of	  the	  42	  Parliament,	  Part	  5,	  Referendums	  and	  Plebiscites:	  410.	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vote,	  and	  the	  Irish	  vote	  were	  too	  much	  for	  us’	  (Bonar	  Law	  Papers	  M	  1123,	  Box	  53,	   Folder	   4,	   Item	   15).	   The	   bitterness	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   conscription	  campaign	  fractured	  the	  Labor	  Party	  into	  two	  opposing	  segments:	  those	  who	  had	  supported	   conscription	   and	   those	   who	   had	   not.	   Four	   government	   Ministers	  resigned	   from	   office	   and	   on	   13	   November	   1916	   Hughes	   and	   his	   fellow	  conscriptionists	  were	  expelled	  from	  the	  Labor	  government.	  Defiant,	  Hughes	  and	  a	  loyal	  cohort	  establish	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  or	  what	  they	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘Win	  the	  War	  administration’	  	  (Meaney	  2009:	  183).	  	  	   The	   expulsion	   of	   Hughes	   and	   his	   fellow	   conscriptionists	   only	   served	   to	  confirm	  their	  suspicions	  that	  the	  Left	  were	  now	  under	  the	  control	  of	  subversive	  factions.	   ‘The	  Junta’,	  as	  Hughes	  told	  the	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  had	   ‘written	  its	  own	  epitaph’.	  He	  added	  that	  words	  of	   indignation	  and	  protest	  were	  inadequate	  to	  describe	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  in	  expelling	  members	  who	  supported	  conscription	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  December	  7	  1916:	  6).	  	  On	  5	  May	  1917,	  the	  new	  Nationalist	   Party	  was	   elected	   to	   form	   government	  with	   Hughes	   as	   Prime	  Minister	  and	  Attorney	  General.	  Given	  the	  ‘Win	  the	  War’	  platform	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	   had	   committed	   to	   it	   was	   perhaps	   inevitable	   that	   the	   government	  would	  again	  pursue	  a	  policy	  of	  conscription.	  Under	  mounting	  pressure	  from	  within	  his	  own	  party,	  Hughes	  planned	  another	  referendum	  on	  the	  issue	  that	  took	  place	  on	  20	  December	  1917	  (Meaney	  2009:	  219).	   	   In	   turn,	  Hughes	  continued	   to	  employ	  the	  intelligence	  services	  to	  control	  any	  opposition.	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Referendum	  two:	  	  extended	  legislation	  and	  extended	  surveillance	  Hughes’	   new	   electoral	   success	   provided	   him	   with	   the	   opportunity	   to	  expand	   the	   scope	   of	   his	   political	   surveillance	   machinery	   and	   the	   tasks	   it	  performed	  (Cain	  1983:	  19).	  Any	  professional	  distance	  between	  intelligence	  and	  politics	  evaporated.	  On	  2	  February	  1917,	  Major	  Steward	  of	  the	  CEB	  wrote	  to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   stating	   ‘I	   understand	   that	   in	   the	   future	   I	   shall	   look	   to	   you	   for	  direction’	   (NAA:	   A	   3932,	   SC	   298).	   The	   institutional	   boundaries	   between	  intelligence	   and	   policy-­‐making	   became	   increasingly	   blurred	   and	   a	   direct	   and	  personal	  relationship	  between	  Steward	  and	  Hughes	  solidified.	  In	  the	  same	  letter,	  Steward	   complained	   that	   the	   Bureau	   had	   suffered	   from	   understaffing.	   He	  requested	  further	  resources	  be	  provided	  which	  could	  help	  expand	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  Bureau.	  	  Steward	  offered	  several	  new	  suggestions	  that	  would	  help	  the	  CEB	  in	  their	  activities	  to	  which	  Hughes	  and	  the	  government	  complied	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  298).	  	   	  The	   full	   ambit	   of	   the	   Bureau’s	   new	   requirements	   was	   established	   in	   a	  series	   of	   Executive	   Minutes	   beginning	   on	   12	   February	   1917	   (NAA:	   A	   1573,	  1917/17).	   	   In	   addition	   to	   its	   counter	   espionage	   function,	   the	   Bureau	  was	   now	  given	  the	  responsibility	  of	   investigating	  cases	  of	  sedition.	  To	  achieve	  these	  new	  objectives	  the	  administrative	  reach	  of	  the	  Bureau	  was	  also	  extended	  and	  several	  new	  branches	  were	  established	  in	  each	  state	  (NAA:	  MP	  1049/1,	  1916/014).	  On	  15	   February,	   Steward	   recommended,	   Harold	   Edward	   Jones,	   of	   Military	  Intelligence	   be	   appointed	   as	   the	  Bureau’s	  Assistant	  Director	   along	  with	  R.	   J.	   L.	  Conrad	   as	   Special	   Duty	   Officer.	   By	   29	   October,	   Hughes	   had	   approved	   the	  appointment	   of	   several	   additional	   staff	   to	   the	   Bureau	   and	   a	   number	   of	   new	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special	  agents	  were	  attached	  in	  each	  state	  (NAA:	  A	  1573,	  1917/17).	  As	  Director,	  Steward	  was	  granted	  an	  additional	  allowance	  to	  his	  salary	  of	  £	  200	  per	  year	  to	  which	  he	  noted	  ‘I	  can	  only	  say	  that	  in	  my	  opinion,	  it	  is	  money	  well	  spent’	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	   SC	   298).	   Accompanying	   these	   administrative	   changes,	   and	   upon	   direct	  instructions	   from	   London,	   Major	   Steward	   informed	   Senator	   Pearce	   that	   the	  Bureau	  would	  be	  renamed:	  In	   receipt	   of	   secret	   information	   from	   Imperial	   authorities	   that	   on	   and	  after	   this	  date	   [23	   January	  1917]	  our	  branch	  of	   the	  organisation	  will	  be	  know	  as	  “Australia	  S.I.B”	  (Special	  Intelligence	  Bureau).	  	  	   	   	   	   (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	  Series	  21,	  Item	  64)	  	   The	   government	   moved	   to	   further	   expand	   its	   security	   legislation	   by	  prohibiting	  any	  personal	  association	  with	  alleged	  disloyal	  groups.	  In	  parliament	  on	   18	   July	   1917,	   Hughes	   ‘declared	   war’	   on	   the	   IWW.	   He	   moved	   a	   motion	   to	  introduce	  a	  Bill	  that	  would	  amend	  the	  Unlawful	  Associations	  Act	  1916	  that	  would	  enable	   the	   government	   to	   ‘deal’	  more	   effectively	  with	   the	   IWW.	   	   The	   Bill	   was	  passed	   in	   the	   Senate	   one	   week	   later	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   18	   July	   1917:	  232;	  House	  of	  Representatives	  26	  July	  1917:24).	  The	  new	  amendment	  gave	  the	  government	   considerable	   power	   to	   declare	   anyone	   who	   continued	   to	   be	   a	  member	  of	  an	  unlawful	  association	  guilty	  of	  an	  offence	  and	  anyone	  who	  printed	  material	   on	   behalf	   of	   a	   proscribed	   association	   was	   subject	   to	   six-­‐months	  imprisonment.	   The	   Act	   further	   added	   that	   any	   person	   convicted	   of	   such	   an	  offence	   that	   is	   not	   a	   natural	   born	   Australian	   was	   now	   subject	   to	   deportation	  	  (Unlawful	  Associations	  Act	  1916–17:	  Section	  3	  a).	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But	  the	  amended	  legislation	  also	  furnished	  the	  intelligence	  services	  with	  additional	  sweeping	  powers,	  ones	  that	  involved	  detention	  and	  deportation.	  The	  Bureau	   could	   now	   seize	   the	   property	   of	   organisations	   that	   were	   deemed	  unlawful,	  charge	  and	   imprison	  their	  members,	  and	  confiscate	  any	  material	   that	  dissented	   against	   the	   government’s	   position.	   In	   addition,	   the	   collection	   of	  evidence,	   and	   more	   significantly	   the	   arrangement	   for	   deportation	   of	   those	   in	  question,	  became	  a	  function	  of	  intelligence.	  The	  CEB	  effortlessly	  adopted	  its	  new	  role,	   and	   in	   this	   sense,	   law	   enforcement	   became	   an	   intelligence	   function	   (Cain	  1979:	   208).	   Accordingly,	   almost	   all	   forms	   of	   resistance	   to	   the	   war	   and	   the	  conscription	  policy	  now	  became	  illegal.	  	  	   Just	  as	  Hughes	  employed	  the	  intelligence	  service	  to	  conduct	  surveillance	  on	   Queensland	   Premier	   J.	   T.	   Ryan	   during	   the	   first	   campaign,	   he	   now	   used	   the	  services	   to	   collect	   information	  on	  other	  members	  of	   the	  Labor	  Party	   critical	  of	  conscription.	   James	   Howard	   Catts,	   was	   one	   Labor	   member	   that	   drew	   such	  attention.	  Catts	  had	  joined	  the	  Labor	  Party	  in	  1898,	  and	  in	  1906,	  he	  was	  elected	  Labor	  Member	  for	  Cook	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  —	  a	  seat	  he	  retained	  for	  another	  seventeen	  years	  (Catts	  1953:	  xvi).	   In	  1914,	  Catts	  was	  made	  Director	  of	  the	  Voluntary	  Recruitment	  where	  he	  raised	  more	  recruits	  than	  the	  government	  could	  manage.	  He	  complained	  to	  the	  government	  that	  men	  sat	  idle	  in	  the	  camps	  and	  were	  without	   the	  necessary	  uniforms,	   guns,	   tents	  and	  other	   requirements.	  Catts	   also	   advised	   Hughes	   that	   conscription	   was	   unnecessary	   and	   would	   be	  anathema	   to	   Australians	  who	   revelled	   in	   being	   a	   voluntary	   army	   (Catts	   1953:	  74).	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But	  Catts	  had	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services.	  In	  1916,	  the	   Attorney	   General’s	   department	   instructed,	   Harold	   Jones,	   of	   Military	  Intelligence	   to	   conduct	   an	   investigation	   into	   Catts.	   Allegations	   from	   the	   Anti-­‐German	  League	  had	  suggested	  that	  Catts	  was	  actually	  a	  ‘German	  posing	  under	  an	  English	  name’	  and	   that	  he	  was	  not	  a	  naturalised	  citizen	  and	   thereby	  subject	   to	  deportation.	  The	  League	  suggested	  that	  Catts’	  had	  assumed	  a	   false	   identity	  and	  his	   real	   name	   was	   either	   ‘Katzenalbion’	   or	   possibly	   ‘Kreitzling’	   and	   that	   his	  parents	   were	   German	   immigrants.	   After	   a	   lengthy	   investigation,	   Jones	   later	  reported	   that	   the	   allegations	   against	   Catts	   were	   false	   and	   a	   case	   of	   mistaken	  identity	  (NAA:	  MP	  16/1,	  1917/60).	  	  	  But	   this	   was	   not	   the	   only	   time	   the	   government	   had	   the	   intelligence	  services	   investigate	   Catts.	   On	   15	   January	   1918,	   Catts	   moved	   a	   no	   confidence	  motion	   against	   the	   Hughes	   government	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives.	   He	  delivered	  a	  scathing	  criticism	  of	  the	  government’s	  war	  policies	  accusing	  Hughes	  of	  lying	  to	  the	  Australian	  people,	  fabricating	  a	  story	  about	  an	  attack	  in	  Warwick,	  abusing	   censorship	   for	   partisan	   gain	   and	   rigging	   the	   election	   on	   conscription.	  Objection	   was	   taken	   to	   Catts	   remarks	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   he	   was	   using	   his	  position	  in	  parliament	  to	   ‘help	  our	  enemies	  and	  injure	  our	  friends’	  and	  that	  his	  conduct	  ‘amounts	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  treason’.	  	  The	  Speaker	  ruled	  Catts	  out	  of	  order	  and	  forbid	   him	   to	   proceed	   —	   but	   Catts	   persisted	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   15	  January	  1918:	  2958	  –	  2964).	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On	   18	   January,	   Catts	   again	   scolded	   the	  Hughes	   government	   about	   their	  abuse	  of	  censorship.	  He	  informed	  parliament	  that	  when	  he	  held	  a	  meeting	  with	  his	   constituents	   to	   discuss	   the	   facts	   about	   conscription	   	   ‘I	   found	   that	   the	  government	   had	   two	   detectives	   present	   at	   the	  meeting	   in	   plain-­‐clothes	   taking	  shorthand	   notes	   of	   every	   word	   I	   said’	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   18	   January	  1918:	  3252).	  But	  such	  tactics	  did	  not	  intimidate	  Catts,	  and	  he	  was	  determined	  to	  make	  known	   the	  government’s	   improprieties.	   In	   late	   January,	  he	  ordered	   from	  the	   government	   printer	   5000	   copies	   of	   the	   speech	   he	   had	   been	   forbidden	   to	  finish	   in	   parliament	   on	   15	   January.	   The	   pamphlet	   titled	   ‘Labor	   and	   the	   War’,	  proceeded	  to	  attack	  the	  government	  and	  labelled	  Hughes	  a	   	   ‘would-­‐be	  dictator’	  who	   had	   ‘abused	   censorship	   in	   a	   most	   shockingly	   partisan	   manner’;	   had	  ‘manipulated	  the	  newspapers’,	  and	  had	  ‘polluted	  the	  ballot	  box’	  on	  conscription	  (Catts	  Papers	  MS	  658,	  Series	  1,	  Folder	  1).	  Catts	   intended	   to	  have	   the	  pamphlet	  tabled	   in	  parliament,	  but	   the	  government	   immediately	   intervened	  and	  stopped	  the	  printing	  of	  the	  speech.	  	  	   On	   27	   February,	   Minister	   for	   Defence,	   George	   Pearce,	   wrote	   to	   the	  Director	   of	   Military	   Intelligence,	   Edmund	   Piesse,	   instructing	   him	   to	   send	   an	  intelligence	  officer	  to	  prevent	  any	  further	  printing	  of	  the	  speech	  and	  to	  ‘seize	  any	  copies	  of	  the	  pamphlet’.	  Lieutenant	  C.	  A.	  Lempriere,	  an	  intelligence	  officer	  of	  the	  3rd	  Military	  District	   accompanied	  by	  Police	  Constable,	  Nicholas	  Rowe,	   entered	  Parliament	   House	   and	   seized	   five	   packages	   of	   the	   documents	   from	   the	   Labor	  Party	   chambers.	   All	   copies	   of	   the	   pamphlets	   were	   then	   destroyed	   (NAA:	   MP	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16/1,	   1918/262).48	  Hughes	   then	   set	   about	   prosecuting	   Catts	   under	   the	   War	  
Precautions	  Act	  for	  making	  statements	  likely	  to	  prejudice	  His	  Majesty’s	  relations	  with	  a	   foreign	  power	  and	  for	  not	  submitting	  the	  documents	   to	   the	  government	  censor	   for	  approval	   (Argus	   4	  April	  1918:	  9).	  Catts	   appeared	  before	   the	  Sydney	  City	  Court	  on	  9	  April	  1918,	  but	   the	  Magistrate	  dismissed	  all	   charges	   (Argus	   10	  April	  1918:	  10).	  Nevertheless,	  Catts’	  vocal	  opposition	  to	  conscription	  landed	  him	  in	   trouble	   on	   numerous	   other	   occasions.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   war	   Catts	   was	  prosecuted	  seven	  times	  under	  the	  War	  Precautions	  Act	  because	  of	  his	  statements	  against	  the	  government	  and	  the	  policy	  of	  conscription	  (Catts	  1953:77).	  	  	  	   Although	   a	   significant	   expansion	   of	   security	   legislation	   had	   already	  provided	   the	   intelligence	  services	  with	  considerable	  power	  to	  stifle	  opposition,	  Hughes	   took	   measures	   further.	   In	   1917,	   he	   reached	   out	   to	   commercial	  businesses	  imploring	  their	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state’s	  cause.	  The	  government	  had	  come	  to	  believe	   that	  money	  was	  being	  circulated	   to	  prop	  up	  anti-­‐war	  groups	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  ‘disaffecting	  the	  community	  during	  the	  war’	  and	  agitating	  against	  the	  second	   conscription	   referenda.	   Despite	   a	   Special	   Intelligence	   Bureau	   (Herein	  SIB)	  report	  issued	  on	  16	  November	  1917	  stating	  that	  it	  had	  no	  evidence	  of	  such	  activity,	   Hughes	   issued	   a	   secret	   memo	   on	   7	   December	   1917	   to	   all	   banks	  operating	  in	  the	  Commonwealth	  asking	  them	  to	  assist	  the	  government	  in	  matters	  of	  security.	  Hughes	  stated	  that	  ‘It	  has	  been	  decided’	  to:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Two	  copies	  of	  the	  pamphlet	  still	  exist.	  One	  copy	  is	  located	  in	  the	  papers	  of	  James	  and	  Dorothy	  Catts	  MS	  658,	  Series	  1,	  Folder	  1,	  at	  the	  Australian	  National	  Library	  and	  another	  is	  located	  in	  Australian	  Archives	  File:	  MP	  16/1,	  1917/60.	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Request	  all	  banks	  carrying	  on	  business	  within	  the	  Commonwealth	  to	  (a)	  institute	   as	   completely	   as	   possible	   a	   systematic	   and	   secret	   observation	  upon	  all	  transactions,	  and	  (b)	  furnish	  a	  report	  of	  any	  case	  of	  suspicion	  to	  Sir	  Robert	  Garran	  Commonwealth	  Solicitor	  General,	  Melbourne.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  B	  741,	  V/62	  A)	  	  	   This	   move	   drew	   private	   businesses	   into	   the	   government’s	   surveillance	  machinery.	   Banks	  were	   effectively	   used	   to	  monitor	   and	   suppress	   any	   financial	  assistance	   that	   might	   in	   any	   way	   help	   opposition	   groups	   and	   individuals	  influence	  the	  conscription	  campaign.	  Such	  information	  was	  then	  passed	  onto	  the	  government.	  But	  the	  effect	  of	  extending	  the	  security	  legislation	  not	  only	  started	  to	  blur	  the	  boundaries	  between	  public	  and	  private	  enterprise,	  it	  now	  encouraged	  companies	  to	  spy	  on	  their	  customers	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  helping	  the	  government	  succeed	  with	  its	  policy	  ambitions.	  	  	   The	   expansion	   of	   the	   government	   surveillance	   apparatus	   and	   security	  legislation	   into	  nearly	  every	  corner	  of	  Australian	  society	  provided	  Hughes	  with	  exceptional	  power	  to	  control	  political	  opposition	  to	  his	  policy	  aims.	  As	  Australian	  statesman,	  Herbert	  V.	  Evatt,	  later	  wrote	  with	  little	  exaggeration	  ‘Hughes	  himself	  was	  practicably	  able	  to	  govern	  Australia	  with	  a	  fountain	  pen’…	  his	  ‘position	  was	  almost	  that	  of	  a	  dictator’	  (Evatt	  1942:	  368).	  Indeed,	  Hughes’	  success	  in	  quashing	  opposition	   to	  his	  policy	  goals	   is	  evidenced	  by	   the	  rapid	  decline	  of	   the	   IWW.	  As	  Major	  Steward	  indicated	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Frank	  Hall,	  assistant	  to	  Vernon	  Kell	  head	  of	  MI5,	   ‘we	   absolutely	   killed	   the	   IWW.	   Every	   one	   of	   its	   leaders	   is	   in	   gaol,	  mostly	  with	  from	  10	  to	  15	  years	  hard	  labour	  to	  serve.	  The	  few	  that	  are	  left	  are	  mortally	  scared.	  	  The	  IWW	  is	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past’	  (NAA:	  A	  8911,	  240).	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It	   is	   likely	   that	   Hughes	   fully	   recognised	   the	   value	   that	   the	   intelligence	  services	   had	   provided	   in	   suppressing	   opposition	   to	   his	   policy	   goals	   and	  facilitating	   his	   political	   argument.	   In	   other	  words,	   politicising	   intelligence	  was	  part	   of	   a	   broader	   political	   strategy	   to	   promote	   conscription	   and	   persuade	   the	  public	  toward	  that	  position,	  but	  also	  to	  discredit	  opposition	  groups.	  This	  perhaps	  explains	  why	  Hughes	  pursued	  the	  same	  tactic	  during	  the	  second	  campaign.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  foci	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	  would	  again	  be	  directed	  toward	  anti-­‐conscription	  groups,	  which	  Hughes	  blamed	  for	  the	  defeat	  of	   the	  first	  campaign.	  But	  their	  surveillance	  would	  now	  include	  dissident	  Irish	  Catholic	  groups,	  which	  Hughes	   suspected	   were	   cooperating	   with	   the	   IWW	   against	   the	   government’s	  policy	  agenda	  (Booker	  1980:	  215).	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  prospect	  of	  success	  in	  the	  second	  campaign	  the	  intelligence	  services,	  following	  Hughes	  lead,	  would	  now	  attempt	  to	  limit	  their	  influence.	  	  	   *****	  	  
Ecclesiastic	  antagonists:	  The	  deadliest	  enemies	  of	  Australia	  Surveillance	   of	   ‘Irish	   agitators’,	   as	  Major	   Steward	   referred	   to	   them,	   had	  been	   established	   in	   Australia	   since	   November	   1916	   when	   the	   SIB	   began	  monitoring	   the	   activities	   of	   Jim	   Larkin	   of	   the	  Dublin	   Transport	  Union	   (NA:	  KV	  1/16).	   But	   surveillance	   efforts	   were	   increased	   when	   the	   Central	   Bureau	   in	  London	  intercepted	  a	  letter	  indicating	  that	  Sinn	  Fein	  was	  now	  rapidly	  developing	  throughout	  Commonwealth	  countries	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  417).	  The	  writer	  of	   the	  intercepted	  letter	  appeared	  to	  have	  travelled	  to	  Australia	  the	  previous	  year	  and	  noted	   that	   he	   had	  made	   a	   number	   of	   contacts	   during	   his	   visit.	  Major	   Steward	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informed	   Hughes	   that	   one	   of	   these	   contacts,	   Maurice	   Dalton,	   had	   now	   been	  placed	   under	   constant	   observation.	   The	   SIB	   traced	  Dalton’s	   home	   address	   and	  started	   intercepting	   his	   mail.	   In	   one	   intercepted	   letter,	   Dalton	   outlined	   how	  members	   of	   the	   Irish	   National	   Association	   could	   obtain	   guns	   and	   weapons	  through	  his	  contacts	  in	  Sydney.	  The	  SIB	  avidly	  pursued	  these	  links.	  It	  uncovered	  further	   correspondence,	   which	   urged	  members	   of	   Irish	   groups	   in	   Australia	   to	  join	  forces	  in	  order	  to	  strengthen	  their	  status	  and	  influence	  against	  conscription.	  The	  letter	  noted	  that	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  disparate	  Irish	  groups	  in	  Australia	  would	   not	   be	   possible	   without	   the	   aid	   of	   one	   of	   the	   most	   out	   spoken	   anti-­‐conscription	   voices,	   Dr	   Daniel	   Mannix,	   the	   Coadjutor-­‐Archbishop	   and	   later	  Archbishop	  of	  Melbourne	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  417).	  	  	  	   Upon	   receiving	   this	   information,	   Major	   Steward	   wrote	   to	   Hughes	   on	   3	  November	   1917	   informing	   him	   that	   the	   SIB	   was	   ‘now	   in	   possession	   of	   actual	  evidence	   that	   the	  Sinn	  Fein	  movement	   is	   rapidly	  developing	   in	  Melbourne	  and	  Sydney’.	   Steward	   immediately	   initiated	   close	   surveillance	   of	   Irish	   associations.	  But	   in	   doing	   so,	   Steward	   became	   increasingly	   aligned	   with	   the	   government’s	  objectives	   and	   crossed	   over	   into	   acting	   as	   part	   of	   the	   government’s	   policy-­‐making	  apparatus.	  For	  example,	  he	  urged	  the	  government	  to	  adopt	  a	  policy	  that	  would	   allow	   the	   SIB	   to	   conduct	   raids	   on	   all	   headquarters	   of	   the	   Irish	  National	  Association.	  49	  Steward	  then	  intimated	  to	  Hughes	  that	  he	  saw	  no	  reason	  why	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Steward	   made	   other	   policy	   recommendations.	   In	   May	   1916,	   he	   recommended	   the	  compulsory	  registration	  of	  aliens	   throughout	   the	  Commonwealth,	   the	   tracking	  of	   their	  movements,	  and	  the	  submission	  of	  passports	  to	  the	  CIB	  (NA:	  KV:	  1/15;	  KV	  1/16).	  On	  28	  August	   1917,	   he	   recommended	   that,	   ‘an	   amended	   regulation	   be	   passed,	   under	   which	  customs	   officers	   become	   a	   “proscribed	   authority”	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   Unlawful	  
Associations	  Act’	  because	  customs	  officers	  had	  found	  shipping	  routes	  were	  being	  used	  to	  distribute	  large	  quantities	  of	  Direct	  Action,	  the	  official	  magazine	  produced	  by	  the	  IWW…	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Irish	  National	  Association	  should	  not	  be	  deemed	  an	  unlawful	  association	  arguing	  that	   the	   subject	  matter	   contained	   in	   the	   letters	   clearly	   ‘points	   to	   treason’.	   One	  week	  later	  Steward	  suggested	  that	  Hughes	  could	  use	  the	  collected	  intelligence	  ‘to	  show	  the	  people	  how	  terribly	  sinister	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  are	  the	  activities	  of	  these	  rebels’	   (NAA:	   A	   3932,	   SC	   417).	   As	   a	   result,	   Steward’s	   assessments	   strongly	  inferred	  that	  Irish	  associations	  were	  now	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  conscription	  policy.	  This	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politicisation	  because	  Steward	  found	  a	  potential	  threat	  to	   the	  success	  of	   the	  government’s	  policy	  and	  recommended	  a	  course	  of	  action	  that	   incorporated	   and	   conformed	   to	   the	   government’s	   policy	   preferences.	   In	  doing	  so,	  Steward	  was	  providing	  intelligence	  support	  to	  the	  government’s	  policy	  of	  conscription.	  	  	   His	   recommendation	   appears	   to	   have	   enjoyed	   some	   success.	   On	   16	  November	  1917,	  Major	  Steward	  issued	  a	  secret	  memorandum	  to	  the	  various	  SIB	  state	   branches	   stating	   that	   the	   Sinn	   Fein	   organisation	   was	   deemed	   a	   serious	  political	   force	   in	   Australia.	   He	   then	   instructed	   his	   colleagues	   that	  all	  members	  and	  persons	  associated	  with	   the	  organisation	  should	  be	  keenly	  monitored.	  The	  memorandum	   concluded	   in	   alarming	   terms.	   Steward	   reminded	   his	   fellow	  officers	   that,	   ‘our	   work	   at	   this	   moment	   has	   cast	   very	   serious	   responsibilities	  upon	  us,	   and	  nothing	   short	  of	   a	  devoted	  and	  untiring	  attention	   to	   this	  difficult	  demand	   is	   required	   of	   us	   all’	   (NAA:	   B	   741,	   62	   A).	   In	   the	  midst	   of	   the	   second	  conscription	  campaign,	  Irish	  Catholic	  groups	  now	  became	  the	  government’s	  chief	  antagonist.	   They	   were	   consequently	   subjected	   to	   thorough	   scrutiny	   by	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Solicitor	  General,	  Sir	  Robert	  Garran,	  accepted	  the	  recommendation	  on	  31	  August	  1917	  (NAA:	  A	  456,	  W	  26/148/182).	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intelligence	  services.	  The	  SIB,	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  state	  police	  forces,	  Military	  Intelligence,	  and	  the	  intelligence	  section	  of	  the	  Censors	  Office	  investigated	  these	  groups	  and	  their	  opposition	  to	  the	  government’s	  war	  policies.	  	  	   Irish	  Nationalist	  groups	   in	  Australia	  had	  arisen	   in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  forms	  throughout	  the	  various	  states.	  The	  Hibernian	  Australasian	  Catholic	  Benefit	  Society,	   the	   Catholic	   Federation,	   the	   Irish	   National	   Association	   and	   the	   Young	  Ireland	   Society	   for	   example,	   attracted	   a	   substantial	   following	  but	   these	   groups	  lacked	  a	  single	  point	  of	  focus	  that	  could	  express	  their	  specific	  social	  and	  political	  concerns.	   In	   turn,	   these	  associations	   tended	   to	   look	   to	   the	  Clergy	   for	  direction.	  Archbishop,	  Dr	  Daniel	  Mannix,	  stepped	  in	  to	  this	  role	  with	  flair	  and	  became	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  forces	  rallying	  against	  compulsion.	  	  	   To	  his	  supporters	  Mannix	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  hero	  of	   the	  Irish	  cause	  and	  the	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement,	  but	  more	  that	  he	  became	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  right	  to	   vindicate	   free	   speech	   in	   an	   increasingly	   oppressive	   environment	   (Meaney	  2009:	  207–209).	  For	  Hughes	  and	  the	  pro-­‐conscription	  element,	  the	  Archbishop’s	  interventions	   against	   conscription	  were	   almost	   indistinguishable	   from	   treason.	  Mannix	  was	  identified	  with	  everything	  anti-­‐British	  and	  therein	  assumed	  the	  role	  of	  protagonist	  against	  conscription,	  which	  the	  IWW	  had	  occupied	  during	  the	  first	  referendum	  campaign	  (Fitzhardinge	  1979:	  286).	  His	  ‘disloyal	  utterances’	  against	  conscription	  and	  criticism	  of	  the	  disenfranchisement	  of	  Australian	  Irish	  Catholics	  then	   became	   part	   of	   the	   supposed	   conspiracy	   to	   undermine	   the	   government’s	  political	  objectives.	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On	   a	   number	   of	   occasions,	  Mannix	   spoke	   out	   about	   anti-­‐conscription	   in	  Australia	  linking	  it	  with	  the	  Sinn	  Fein	  movement	  in	  Ireland.	  On	  6	  November	  1917	  he	  addressed	  an	  estimated	  audience	  of	  100	  000	  anti-­‐conscription	  demonstrators	  at	  the	  Richmond	  Racecourse	  in	  Melbourne.	  50	  At	  this	  meeting,	  he	  said	  that	  ‘there	  is	  a	  faction	  here,	  as	  there	  was	  in	  Ireland,	  which	  for	  political	  purposes	  would	  be	  glad	   to	   stifle	   every	   opinion	   but	   their	   own’	   (Argus	   6	   November	   1917:6).	   A	  statement	  clearly	  directed	  at	  Hughes,	  censorship,	  and	  the	  continued	  suppression	  of	  political	  opposition	  to	  the	  government.	  But	  Mannix	  probably	  understood	  that	  as	  a	  leading	  figure	  of	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  he	  was	  in	  a	  unique	  position.	  For	  the	   Catholic	   Church	   could	   hardly	   be	   deemed	   a	   subversive	   organisation	   and	   it	  would	   have	   been	   politically	   explosive	   for	   the	   government	   to	   charge	   an	  Archbishop	  with	  acts	  of	  seditious	  speech	  or	  subverting	  the	  war	  effort.	  	  	   At	   Richmond,	  Mannix	   declared	   to	   the	   crowd	   that	   he	   knew	   ‘it	   would	   be	  said	  that	  he	  was	  seditious	  and	  disloyal’,	  but	  nevertheless	  he	  told	  them	  ‘you	  are	  Sinn	  Feiners	   and	   the	  more	   luck	   to	   you’.	  He	   asked	   them	   to	   consider	  when	   they	  voted	  on	  conscription	  to	  put	  	  ‘Australia	  first,	  Empire	  second.	  First,	  settle	  Ireland’s	  wrongs’	  said	  the	  Archbishop	  ‘and	  then	  we	  will	  talk	  about	  going	  to	  the	  rescue	  of	  Belgium’.	   	   He	   continued	   his	   speech	   stating	   that	   	   ‘Australians	   as	   Sinn	   Feiners	  could	   sympathise	   with	   those	   in	   Ireland’	   adding	   that	   ‘we	   were	   determined	   to	  wrest	   the	   government	   of	   the	   country	   from	   English	   hands’	   (Argus	   6	   November	  1917:6).	  	  	  Here	  Mannix	  cleverly	  played	  on	  the	  much-­‐abused	  concept	  of	  loyalty.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Approximate	  numbers	  are	  disputed.	  The	  Argus	  reported	  60	  000,	  Ebsworth	  (1977)	  and	  Meaney	  (2009)	  estimated	  crowds	  of	  up	  to	  100	  000.	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   In	   Warwick	   Queensland	   on	   29	   November,	   Hughes	   attempted	   to	   rebut	  Mannix’s	   statement	   by	   using	   a	   similar	   rhetorical	   argument.	   	   He	   implored	   the	  raucous	  crowd	  to	  ‘put	  Australia	  first,	  and	  if	  you	  do	  that’	  he	  argued	  	   ‘you	  will	  be	  for	  Empire’.	   ‘Show	  that	  you	  are	  loyal	  to	  Australia	  and	  Empire…cast	  your	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  government’.	  Hughes	  then	  turned	  his	  attention	  to	  Mannix:	  	  There	   is	  a	  man	  today	  who	  is	   the	  real	   front	  of	  offending,	  a	  man	  to	  whom	  every	  German	  in	  the	  country	   looks	  to,	  whom	  every	  Sinn	  Feiner	   looks	  to,	  whom	  every	  IWW	  man	  looks	  to	  who	  is	  the	  real	  leader	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  the	   government’s	   proposals.	  His	   name	   is	  Mannix.	   If	   you	   follow	  him	   you	  range	  yourselves	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  deadly	  enemies	  of	  Australia.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  (Argus	  30	  November	  1917:6)	  	   The	   audience	   clearly	   did	   not	   appreciate	   Hughes’	   statement.	   During	   his	  short	   appearance,	   he	   was	   pelted	   with	   abuse.	   Eggs	   were	   thrown	   at	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   and	   an	   ugly	   scene	   unfolded.	   Conscriptionists	   clashed	   with	   anti-­‐conscriptionists.	   Scuffles	   broke	   out,	   and	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   caught	   up	   in	   the	  mêlée	  emerged	  from	  the	  hostile	  crowd	  bloodied	  and	  bruised.	  Hughes	  demanded	  the	   culprits	   be	   arrested.	   	   Senior	   Sargent	   Kenny,	   a	   Catholic	   member	   of	   the	  Queensland	  Police	   force,	  who	  was	  at	   the	  scene	  said	  he	  would	  arrest	   the	  men	   if	  Hughes	  would	   lay	   a	   charge	   under	  Queensland	   Law.	  Hughes	   responded	   that	   he	  was	  a	  representative	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	  whose	   laws	  superseded	  state	   laws.	  Kenny	  declared	   that	   he	  would	  only	   recognise	   the	  Laws	  of	  Queensland	   and	  not	  the	  Commonwealth.	   Shortly	  after	   the	   incident,	  Hughes	  wrote	   to	   the	  Premier	  of	  Queensland,	   T.	   J.	   Ryan,	   demanding	   Kenny’s	   suspension	   otherwise	   the	  Commonwealth	  would	   take	   steps	   to	   enforce	   its	   own	   laws.	   Ryan	   responded	   by	  arguing	   that	   Queensland	   was	   enforcing	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   and	  would	  continue	  to	  do	  so	  without	  interference	  by	  the	  federal	  government.	  Senior	  Sargent	   Kenny,	   on	   Ryan’s	   approval,	   was	   later	   exonerated	   and	   no	   punishment	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was	  applied	  (Argus	  30	  November	  1917:	  6;	  Fitzhardinge	  1979:	  292;	  Booker	  1980:	  216).	  	  	   The	   whole	   incident	   only	   reinforced	   Hughes’	   belief	   that	   the	   Queensland	  government	  had	  become	  a	  sanctuary	  for	  the	  IWW	  and	  Irish	  dissidents	  who	  were	  under	   the	  protection	  of	  Premier	  Ryan	  and	  Dr	  Mannix.	  As	  Major	  Steward	  of	   the	  SIB	   later	   reflected,	   the	   Warwick	   incident	   confirmed	   to	   Hughes	   that	   the	  Queensland	   Police	   Force	   was	   incapable	   of	   ‘impartially	   discharging	   its	   duties’	  (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	  Series	  21,	  Item	  96).	  Hughes	  believed	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Queensland	  was	  one	  of	   ‘latent	   rebellion’,	  where	  under	   the	   influence	  of	  Ryan	  and	  Mannix	   ‘the	   IWW	  and	   Sinn	   Fein	   run	   the	   show’.	  He	  wrote	   to	   the	  Governor	  General	  Munro	   Ferguson	   that	   	   ‘[Queensland]	   police	   is	   honeycombed	  with	   Sinn	  Feiners	  and	  the	  IWW.	  They	  will	  not	  only	  not	  enforce	  our	  laws	  but	  openly	  resist	  them’	   (Hughes	   in	   Fitzhardinge	   1979:	   294).	   Nevertheless,	   Hughes	  opportunistically	  capitalised	  on	  the	  events	  that	  unfolded	  in	  Warwick	  and	  he	  used	  the	  situation	  as	  a	  potent	  justification	  to	  extend	  the	  state	  security	  apparatus	  even	  further.	   In	   an	   Executive	   meeting	   attended	   only	   by	   Hughes	   and	   two	   other	  government	   officials	   (Senators	   Edward	   Millen	   and	   William	   Webster)	   he	  established	  the	  Commonwealth	  Police	  Force.	  	  	   Major	   Steward,	   however,	   had	   originally	   suggested	   the	   idea	   for	   a	  Commonwealth	   Police	   Force	   in	   October	   1916	   to	   help	   support	   the	  work	   of	   the	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau	  but	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  sidelined	  the	  idea.	  Various	  State	   Governments	   had	   also	   opposed	   such	   an	   agency	   arguing	   that	   they	   had	  always	   assisted	   the	   Commonwealth	  when	   requested.	   The	  West	   Australian	   and	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New	  South	  Wales	  Police	   forces	  objected	   to	   the	   idea	  because	   they	  believed	   that	  the	   Commonwealth	   was	   creating	   small	   secret	   service	   units	   within	   their	   own	  departments.	   Other	   state	   police	   forces	   complained	   because	   as	   they	   suggested	  this	  would	  create	  ‘an	  unnecessary	  amount	  of	  work,	  interfere	  with	  efficiency	  and	  result	  in	  duplication	  of	  investigations’	  (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	  Series	  21,	  Items	  108–109).	   But	   after	   the	   Warwick	   incident,	   Hughes	   now	   had	   a	   political	   and	  personal	  justification	  to	  establish	  a	  police	  force	  that	  could	  counter	  the	  situation	  in	  Queensland.	  	  	  	  	   Without	   any	   further	   consultation	   with	   the	   State	   governments,	   Hughes	  made	   an	   executive	   decision	   to	   bring	   the	   Commonwealth	   Police	   into	   existence.	  The	   establishment	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   Police,	   in	   the	   face	   of	   substantial	  opposition,	  is	  perhaps	  further	  evidence	  of	  the	  executive	  authority	  Hughes	  had	  in	  controlling	  matters	   of	   national	   security.	   As	   one	   historian	   has	   observed	   ‘at	   the	  stroke	  of	  a	  pen	  he	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  Commonwealth	  Police	  Force	  without	  the	   least	   consideration	   to	   its	  manning,	   finances	   or	   legal	   authority’	   (Cain	   2008:	  23).	  Hughes	  created	  yet	  another	  arm	  of	  government	  that	  would	  loyally	  serve	  his	  interests.	  	  	   Throughout	   the	   second	   referendum	   campaign,	   Mannix	   continued	   to	  agitate	  the	  Irish	  Catholic	  community	  urging	  them	  to	  vote	  against	  conscription	  in	  the	  upcoming	  vote.	  Hughes	  and	  the	  SIB,	  in	  response,	  stepped	  up	  the	  surveillance	  (Meaney	   2009:	   224).	   	   Subsequently,	   an	   array	   of	   intelligence	   dossiers	   was	  prepared	  on	  Mannix	  and	  associated	  Irish	  groups.	  	  Archival	  documents	  show	  that	  the	   SIB	   had	   instructed	   the	   censor’s	   office	   to	   ‘scrutinize’	   all	   correspondence	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relating	  to	  Mannix	  and	  that	  a	  surveillance	  device	  had	  been	  placed	  on	  his	  private	  telephone.	  The	  same	  documents	   reveal	   that	   the	  SIB	   informed	   the	  Deputy	  Chief	  Censor	  to	  ‘report	  on	  the	  IWW,	  Pacifists	  or	  kindred	  spirits,	  members	  of	  the	  Irish	  Societies’	  and	  ‘any	  persons	  who	  might	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  Bureau’	  (NAA:	  B	  741,	  V/280).	  	  	  A	   concerning	   aspect	   relating	   to	   the	   surveillance	  of	   the	   Irish	   groups	  was	  not	   the	  amount	  of	  surveillance	  conducted	  on	  them,	  but	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  the	  intelligence	   community	   had	   bent	   to	   Hughes’	   political	   objectives,	   the	   pro-­‐conscription	   cause,	   and	   anti-­‐Irish	   views.	   For	   instance,	   one	   report	   prepared	   by	  the	   Perth	   Branch	   of	   SIB	   said	   that	   the	   ‘Young	   Ireland	   Society	   is	   a	   menace’.	   It	  recommended	  that	  steps	  be	  taken	  to	  ‘put	  it	  out	  of	  action	  before	  it	  becomes	  more	  audacious’	   (NAA:	   A	   8911,	   221).	   Another	   SIB	   report	   dated	   21	   November	   1917	  stated	   that	   approximately	   4000	   Sinn	   Feiners	   in	  Western	  Australia	   intended	   to	  rebel	   if	   the	   conscription	  vote	  passed	   (Hughes	  Papers	  MS	  1538,	   Series	  21,	   Item	  85).	   And	   by	   6	   December	   the	   SIB	   found	   evidence	   of	   links	   between	   Sinn	   Fein,	  Germany,	  and	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  (NAA:	  A	  8911,	  221).	  	  	  	  While	  the	  intelligence	  services	  were	  prepared	  to	  act	  and	  mount	  raids	  on	  a	  number	  of	   Irish	  associations	   loosely	  associated	  with	  Mannix,	  Hughes	  had	  some	  concerns	   about	  how	   to	  deal	  with	  him	   (NAA:	  A	  3932,	   SC	  417).	  Because	  Mannix	  was	   the	   representative	   of	   a	   major	   Christian	   Church,	   the	   government	   was	  sensitive	  as	  to	  what	  action	  they	  could	  take	  against	  him.	  Hughes	  understood	  that	  he	   could	  not	  deal	  with	  Mannix	   in	   the	   same	  manner	   that	  he	  had	  dealt	  with	   the	  IWW	   and	   the	   trade	   unions	   (Meaney	   2009:	   222).	   For	   example,	   to	   arrest	   and	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prosecute	  Mannix	  would	  not	  be	  inconsequential	  for	  Hughes	  or	  the	  government;	  it	  would	  only	  damage	  the	  success	  of	  the	  conscription	  campaign	  at	  the	  next	  ballot.	  But	   such	   reservations	   about	   suppressing	  Mannix	   caused	   a	   significant	   reaction	  from	  within	  the	  SIB.	  As	  Major	  Steward	  complained:	  That	   Mannix	   should	   have	   been	   allowed	   to	   act	   as	   he	   did	   during	   the	  referendum	   campaign	   without	   being	   stopped	   by	   the	   authorities	   will	  constitute	   for	   one	   of	   the	  most	   inexplicable	   things	  with	  which	   I	   have,	   or	  ever	  shall,	  come	  in	  contact.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  8911,	  240)	  	  Hughes	  had	   indeed	   contemplated	  deporting	  Mannix,	   but	   he	   ultimately	   decided	  against	  the	  move.	  Instead,	  Hughes	  pursued	  another	  course	  of	  action.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	   called	  on	   the	  British	  government	   to	  appeal	   to	   the	  Vatican	   in	   the	  hope	  that	   they	   could	   exercise	   some	   control	   over	   their	   Archbishop.	   Walter	   H.	   Long,	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   the	  Colonies	   in	  London,	  wrote	  to	  Count	  de	  Salis,	  Britain’s	  representative	   in	  Rome,	  asking	  that	  he	  bring	  this	  matter	  to	  the	  attention	  of	   the	  Cardinal	   Secretary	   of	   State	   at	   the	  Vatican.	   Long	   suggested	   that	   de	   Salis	   should	  inform	  the	  Secretary	  that:	  Dr	   Mannix	   is	   the	   subject	   of	   strong	   suspicion	   to	   the	   Commonwealth	  Government…and	   decidedly	   unpopular	   in	   Australia.	   Dr	   Mannix	   has	  adopted	  an	  anti-­‐British	  attitude	  and	  you	  should	  express	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  Vatican	  may	   find	   it	   possible	   to	   take	   some	   action,	  which	  will	   induce	   the	  Archbishop	  to	  moderate	  his	  utterances.	  Otherwise	  the	  Government	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  may	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  take	  action	  against	  him.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (NAA:	  	  A	   1606,	   F	   42/1	   Attachment	   1)	   	   	   	   	   	  But	  by	  the	  time	  the	  matter	  had	  been	  dealt	  with	  by	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church,	   the	  referendum	   had	   already	   been	   decided.	   On	   20	   December	   1917,	   the	   second	  referendum	  on	  compulsory	  military	  enlistment	  was	  defeated	  with	  a	  resounding	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  51	  The	   result	   of	   the	   second	   referenda	   held	   on	   20	   December	   1917	   was:	   1	   015	   595	  (46.2%)	  for,	  and	  1	  181796	  (53.7%)	  against.	  See:	  Handbook	  of	  the	  42nd	  Parliament,	  Part	  5,	  Referendums	  and	  Plebiscites:	  411.	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Severing	  the	  ties	  that	  bind	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   There	   is	   compelling	   evidence	   that	   the	   partisan	   political	   activities	   of	   the	  intelligence	  services	  during	  both	  referenda	  campaigns	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  (NA:	  KV	   1/15).	   For	   example,	   Governor	   General,	   Ronald	   Munro	   Ferguson,	   was	  concerned	   about	   how	   intelligence	   had	   been	   used	   by	   Hughes	   to	   suppress	  opposition.	   He	   was	   also	   concerned	   about	   the	   relationship	   that	   had	   formed	  between	  the	  two	  men.	  In	  April	  1917,	  Munro	  Ferguson	  decided	  that	  Steward	  had	  become	   too	   politically	   aligned	   with	   Hughes.	   Writing	   to	   Walter	   Long,	   Munro	  Ferguson	   expressed	   objections	   to	   the	   relationship	   because	   Steward	   had	   been	  ‘accustomed	   to	   act	   virtually	   as	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   secretary’	   adding	   that	  Steward	  was	  inclined	  to	  act	  as	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  ‘secret	  agent’	  (Long	  Papers52	  M	   1114,	   Section	   947/625,	   Item	   96).53	  	   He	   considered	   that	   control	   of	   the	   SIB	  might	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   out	   of	   Steward’s	   hands	   and	   his	   relationship	   to	   the	  Governor	   General	   severed.	   Munro	   Ferguson	   feared	   that	   if	   the	   government’s	  abuse	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	  became	  known	  the	  impartiality	  of	  the	  Governor	  General	  and	  the	  neutrality	  of	  the	  Crown	  would	  be	  severely	  undermined	  (Novar	  Papers	  MS	  696,	  Series	  4,	  Item	  904).	  	  	  	   But	  it	  was	  not	  until	  28	  September	  1917,	  that	  Munro	  Ferguson	  decided	  to	  act.	  He	  wrote	   to	  Hughes	   suggesting	   that	   ‘he	   [Steward]	   should	  be	   relieved	   from	  Counter	  Espionage’.	  Munro	  Ferguson	   stated	   that	   the	   SIB	  had	   ‘gone	  beyond	   the	  original	  purpose	  of	  drawing	  together	  confidential	  and	  secret	  information	  relating	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Documents	   in	   the	   Long	   Papers	   are	   not	   clearly	   referenced.	   In	   order	   to	   identify	   each	  document	   cited,	   herein,	   the	   date	   of	   each	   correspondence	   is	   included	   in	   a	   footnote	  citation.	  	  	  53	  Munro	  Ferguson	  to	  Long,	  letter	  dated	  31	  March	  1918.	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to	   enemy	   agents’.	   But	   he	   told	  Hughes	   that	   Steward	   had	   been	   overworked	   and	  underpaid	   rather	   than	   the	   truth	   of	   his	   thought	   that	   Steward	   had	   become	   too	  aligned	  with	  the	  government’s	  view.	  ‘The	  continuance	  of	  his	  work,	  in	  my	  opinion’	  Ferguson	  explained	   ‘over-­‐burdens	  him.	  His	  other	  duties	  being	   far	   too	  heavy	   to	  admit	  his	  doing	   justice	   to	  his	  work-­‐	  despite	  unremitting	  devotion	  to	  his	  duties’	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	  SC	  435).	  	  	   Munro	   Ferguson,	   however,	   had	   expressed	   his	   concerns	   in	  much	   clearer	  terms	   to	   the	   British	   Colonial	   Secretary,	   Andrew	   Bonar	   Law.	   Regarding	   the	  conduct	  of	  Major	  Steward,	  he	  wrote	  that	  his	  behaviour	  ‘has	  sometime	  caused	  me	  uneasiness’.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that:	  	  	  	  	  	  My	  very	  able	  Official	  Secretary,	  Major	  Steward,	  has	  gradually	  become	  the	  head	   of	   the	   secret	   service.	   He	   has	   been	   engaged	   in	   unravelling	   of	   the	  schemes	  of	   the	   IWW	  and	   following	   the	  doings	  of	   various	  malefactors	  of	  this	  type…	  My	  “pet”	  name	  for	  him	  is	  “Pickle	  the	  Spy!”	  In	  the	  course	  of	  this	  business,	  Detectives,	  Informers	  and	  such	  like	  persons	  attend	  at	  his	  office,	  which	  is	  situated	  in	  Government	  House,	  and	  I	  cannot	  say	  that	  I	  view	  the	  unavoidable	  consequence	  of	  his	  work	  with	  complacency…	  A	  good	  many	  of	  his	  secret	  investigations,	  from	  which	  M.P.’s	  do	  not	  escape!	  are	  undertaken	  under	   the	   direct	   instructions	   of	   the	   P.M.	   or	   the	  M.	   for	   D.	   The	   P.M.	   is	   in	  constant	   touch	   with	   him	   and	   extends	   to	   him	   a	   greater	   measure	   of	  confidence	  that	  to	  anyone	  else.	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Novar	  Papers,	  MS	  696,	  Series	  4,	  Items	  901,902,	  903)	  	  	  Munro	  Ferguson	  informed	  Bonar	  Law	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  Major	  Steward’s	  conduct	  ‘he	  has	  enemies,	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  is	  Sir	  G.	  Strickland,	  who	  has	  a	  secret	  service	  of	   his	   own’	   (Novar	   Papers	   MS	   696,	   Series	   4,	   Items	   903–904).	   In	   light	   of	   the	  Governor	  General’s	  misgivings,	  he	   instructed	  Hughes	  to	  remove	  Steward	  as	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  SIB	  and	  to	  find	  new	  premises	  from	  which	  the	  SIB	  could	  operate.	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On	  13	  December	  1917,	  only	  days	  before	   the	   conscription	  vote,	  Harold	  Edward	  Jones,	   was	   promoted	   to	   replace	   Steward	   as	   Director	   of	   the	   Bureau.	   Munro	  Ferguson	  later	  informed	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  the	  Colonies	  that	  ‘I	  have	  put	  an	  end	  to	  Sir	  George	  Steward’s	  official	  connection	  with	  the	  secret	  service	  by	  Minute	  to	   the	   Prime	   Minister’	   (Long	   Papers	   M	   1114,	   Section	   947/625,	   Item	   96).54	  	  However,	  as	  Steward	  held	  the	  code	  to	  the	  official	  Colonial	  cypher	  it	  was	  arranged	  that	   he	   could	   remain	   in	   Bureau	   for	   the	   sole	   purposes	   of	   coding	   and	   decoding	  messages	  between	  Australia	  and	  London	  (NA:	  KV	  1/15).	  	  	   But	   Steward	   continued	   to	   function	   in	   a	   semi-­‐official	   capacity	   and	   his	  influence	   on	   the	   Bureau’s	   activities	   would	   continue	   unabated	   (NA:	   KV	   1/15).	  	  Although	  he	  had	  been	  officially	  relieved	  from	  his	  post,	  he	  tenaciously	  continued	  to	   pursue	   his	   foes	   and	   assist	   the	   Prime	  Minister.	   In	  March	   1918,	   Steward	  was	  caught	   passing	   secret	   information	   to	   Hughes	   that	   would	   help	   suppress	   an	  upcoming	   demonstration	   by	   Sinn	   Fein.	   When	   two	   detectives	   called	   on	   the	  Governor	   General’s	   office,	   to	   collect	   a	   letter	   sent	   by	   Steward	   through	   official	  channels,	  Munro	  Ferguson	  became	  aware	   that	  Steward’s	   ‘severance	   from	  these	  duties	  was	  not	  as	  complete	  as	  I	  was	  assured	  it	  was	  to	  be’.	  	  	  The	  Governor	  General	  called	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  attention	  but	  Hughes	  assured	  him	  that	  he	  new	  nothing	  of	   the	   situation.	  When	  asked	   to	  explain	  his	   involvement	   in	   the	  matter	  Steward	  replied	  that	  he	  merely	  ‘consulted’	  with	  SIB	  Director	  Harold	  Jones	  on	   the	   issue.	   Unimpressed	   Munro	   Ferguson	   declared	   ‘I	   have	   now	   ruled	   that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Munro	  Ferguson	  to	  Long,	  letter	  dated	  31	  March	  1918.	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“consultation”	  must	   also	   cease’	   (Long	   Papers	  M	   1114,	   Section	   947/	   625,	   Item	  96).55	  	  Authorities	   in	  London	  were	   also	   concerned	  about	   the	   situation.	   ‘Do	  you	  understand’	   wrote	   Secretary	   of	   State	   Walter	   Long	   in	   a	   message	   to	   Munro	  Ferguson	  that	  ‘Letters	  continue	  to	  be	  received	  from	  the	  SIB	  signed	  in	  Steward’s	  name’	  (Long	  Papers	  M	  1114	  Section	  947/627,	  Item	  98).56	  Puzzled	  by	  the	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  Bureau,	  Frank	  Hall,	  of	  MI5	  cabled	  the	  Colonial	  Office	  stating	  that	  ‘I	  am	  afraid	  we	  are	  still	  in	  the	  dark	  as	  to	  how	  the	  organisation	  is	  being	  run	  and	  who	  is	  actually	   in	  charge’	   (Long	  Papers	  M	  1114	  Section	  947/627,	   Item	  99).57	  It	  was	  Steward’s	  health	  that	  would	  be	  the	  only	  thing	  to	  detract	  him	  from	  his	  unrelenting	  commitment	   to	  his	  work.	  After	  a	  bout	  of	   spinal	  neuritis,	   Steward	  stepped	  back	  from	   his	   duties	   and	   was	   forced	   to	   take	   a	   vacation	   in	   Hawaii	   (Cain	   1983:	   35).	  	  That	   Steward	  would	  not	   give	  up	  his	  duties	  willingly	   and	   continued	   to	  help	   the	  prime	  minister	  after	  his	  recuperation	   is	   further	  evidence	  by	  his	  role	   in	  shaping	  the	   wider	   Australian	   intelligence	   community.	   Most	   specifically	   in	   matters	  regarding	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   ‘Citizens	   Bureau	   of	   Intelligence	   and	  Propaganda’	  otherwise	  known	  as	  the	  Australian	  Protective	  League	  (NAA:	  B	  197,	  1851/2/43).	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  Munro	  Ferguson	  to	  Long,	  letter	  dated	  31	  March	  1918.	  	  	  56	  Long	  to	  Munro	  Ferguson,	  cypher	  telegram	  dated	  6	  August	  1918.	  	  57	  Frank	  Hall	  to	  H.	  F.	  Batterbee,	  letter	  dated	  14	  August	  1918.	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Putting	  private	  eyes	  to	  public	  use:	  The	  Australian	  Protective	  League	  By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   second	   referendum	   campaign,	   it	   was	   clear	   that	   the	  activities	   of	   the	   intelligence	   services	   had	   become	   conflated	   with	   the	   political	  objectives	  of	  the	  Hughes	  government.	  Organisations	  such	  as	  the	  SIB	  and	  Military	  Intelligence	   had	   strayed	   from	   uncovering	   foreign	   espionage	   and	   protecting	  military	  secrets	  to	  that	  of	  destroying	  any	  political	  opposition	  to	  the	  government	  and	  discrediting	   the	   standing	   of	   the	   anti-­‐conscription	  movement.	  Although	   the	  ties	   were	   severed	   between	   Steward	   and	   Hughes,	   the	   government	   and	   the	  intelligence	  services	   remained	   tied	   through	   the	  common	  bond	  of	   loyalty	   to	   the	  cause.	  	  Due	   to	   the	   success	   enjoyed	   by	   anti-­‐conscription	   figures	   such	   as	  Mannix	  and	  Ryan,	  radical	  trade	  unions	  and	  the	  IWW,	  Hughes	  and	  his	  supporters	  closed	  ranks	   against	   these	   alleged	   conspirators.	   They	   sought	   recourse	   to	   alternative	  measures	   that	   could	   counter	   ongoing	   disloyalty	   and	   suppress	   political	  opposition.	  If	  the	  surveillance	  apparatus	  of	  the	  state	  were	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  suppress	  these	  groups	  then	  the	  government	  would	  call	  upon	  its	  loyal	  citizens	  to	  create	   an	   alternative	   organisation	   to	   solve	   the	   problem.	   Hughes	   and	   the	  government	   set	   about	   establishing	   a	   private	   intelligence	   bureau,	   which	  would	  marshal	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  community	  in	  order	  to	   inflict	  retribution	  on	  those	  disloyal	   elements.	   Intelligence	  was	   essentially	   outsourced.	   The	   private	   eyes	   of	  the	  community	  were	  set	  to	  public	  use.	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One	   of	   the	   most	   overlooked	   forms	   of	   politicisation,	   according	   to	   Olav	  Riste,	  is	  the	  politically	  motivated	  creation	  of	  intelligence	  bodies	  independent	  and	  external	   to	   the	   usual	   state	   security	   apparatus	   (Riste	   2009:	   181).	   The	   specific	  purpose	  of	  these	  ‘alternative	  networks’,	  Scott	  Lucas,	  suggests	  is	  often	  to	  provide	  the	  right	  intelligence	  to	  the	  right	  policy	  official,	  and	  as,	  Maria	  Ryan,	  argues	  to	  find	  the	  right	  data	  to	  support	  that	  policy	  (Lucas	  2011:207;	  Ryan	  2006:	  287)58.	   	  This	  appears	   to	   have	  been	   the	  purpose	   of	   the	  Australian	  Protective	   League	   (Herein	  APL)	  an	  organisation	  whose	  board	  was	  stacked	  with	  a	  coterie	  of	  private	  citizens	  drawn	  from	  either	  Protestant,	  pro-­‐conscription	  or	  assorted	  loyalty	  associations,	  and	   predisposed	   to	   achieving	   the	   government’s	   war	   aims.	   The	   Hughes	  government’s	   use	   of	   outsourcing	   its	   intelligence	   machinery	   may	   not	   at	   first	  glance	  appear	  as	  a	  case	  of	  politicisation.	  But	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  League’s	  composition	   and	   its	   intentions	   reveals	   specific	   characteristics	   that	   exemplify	  why	  the	  League	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  politically	  contaminated	  or	  politicised.	  	  	   First,	  the	  League	  was	  a	  politically	  motivated	  private	  intelligence	  collection	  body	   operating	   outside	   of	   the	   usual	   parliamentary	   regulations	   and	   oversight	  mechanisms.	  It	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  scrutiny	  or	  oversight	  by	  a	  responsible	  minister	  through	   parliament	   and	   was	   not	   subject	   to	   any	   legislative	   guidelines	   for	   its	  conduct.	  But	  also,	   the	  League	  was	  never	   intended	  to	   investigate	  anything	  other	  than	   the	   disloyal	   behaviour	   of	   groups	   and	   individuals	   who	   opposed	   the	  government’s	  policy.	  The	  League	  was	  a	  voluntary	  citizens	   force,	  which	  acted	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Riste,	  Scott	  and	  Ryan	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  new	  occurrence	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  cite	   a	   number	   of	   relevant	   examples.	   See:	   Ryan,	   M	   (2006)	   ‘Filling	   in	   the	   Unknowns:	  Hypothesis–based	   Intelligence	   and	   the	   Rumsfeld	   Commission’;	   Rist,	   O	   (2009)	   ‘The	  Intelligence	  –	  Policy-­‐maker	  Relationship	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Politicization’,	  and	  Scott,	  L	  (2011)	  ‘Recognising	  Politicization:	  The	  CIA	  and	  the	  Path	  to	  the	  2003	  War	  in	  Iraq’.	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an	   auxiliary	   capacity	   to	   supplement	   the	   SIB	   by	   providing	   ‘prompt	   and	   reliable	  reports	   of	   all	   disloyal	   or	   hostile	   activities’	   within	   the	   Commonwealth	   to	   the	  intelligence	  services	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  9).	  The	  founders	  of	  the	  League	  had	  hoped	  that	  it	  would	  be	  the	  ‘nation’s	  premier	  anti-­‐radical	  force’	  —	   an	   association	   secretly	   sanctioned	   by	   the	   government	   but	   implemented	   by	  loyal	  citizens	  that	  were	  responsible	  to	  no	  higher	  authority	  (Fisher	  2011:	  142).	  	  	  An	  essential	  feature	  of	  the	  League	  was	  that	  its	  members	  believed	  disloyal	  agitators	   were	   undermining	   the	   war	   effort.	   This	   disturbing	   trend	   was	   to	   be	  countered	  by	  the	  League	  whose	  purpose	  was	  to	  unearth	  evidence	  of	  subversive	  individuals	   and	   groups,	   monitor	   their	   activities,	   and	   provide	   the	   government	  with	  evidence	  to	  prosecute	  them.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  the	  League	  was	  not	   to	  better	   inform	  the	  government	  on	  policy	  development,	  but	   rather	   to	  provide	   the	   government	   with	   the	   necessary	   information	   that	   would	   help	  rationalise,	   promote	   and	   strengthen	   its	   own	   policy	   position.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	  intelligence	   collected	   by	   the	   League	   could	   only	   result	   in	   a	   forgone	   conclusion:	  that	   of	   reaffirming	   the	   government’s	   belief	   in	   a	   link	   between	   Irish	   Nationals,	  unions,	   and	   the	   Labor	   Party	   and	   that	   of	   disloyalty	   and	   subversion	   toward	   the	  war	  effort.	  	  	   Another	  characteristic	  demonstrating	  why	  the	  League	  can	  be	  considered	  politicised	   is	   the	   stacking	   of	   the	   League’s	   board	   and	   staff	  with	   sympathetic	   or	  like-­‐minded	  figures.	  This	  process	  ensured	  that	  the	  intelligence	  produced	  would	  inevitably	   satisfy	   the	  government’s	  policy	  agenda.	  This	   form	  of	  politicisation	   is	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commonly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  ‘politicisation	  by	  appointment’	  (Mulgan	  2007:	  571;	  Rovner	  2013:	  58).	  	  	  	  The	   events	   surrounding	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   League	   are	   perhaps	  further	   evidence	   of	   the	   highly	   politicised	   environment	   created	   by	   the	  government	   over	   loyalty	   to	   the	   state	   and	   issues	   of	   social	   control.	   As	   Meaney	  argues	   the	   League	   ‘tested	   the	   full	   meaning	   of	   nationalism…one	   half	   of	   the	  country	  with	   the	  backing	  of	   the	   state	  was	   to	  be	   set	   against	   the	  other’.	   Citizens	  were	   implored	   to	  spy	  on	  each	  other,	   ‘businesses	  on	   their	  clients,	  employers	  on	  their	  employees	  and	  neighbours	  on	  neighbours’	  all	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  supporting	  the	  government’s	  aims	  and	  suppressing	  political	  opposition	  (Meaney	  2009:	  236).	  Australian	  authorities	  had	  no	  reservations	  about	  creating	  an	  extra-­‐bureaucratic	  intelligence	  mechanism	  to	  achieve	  these	  goals.	  	  	   The	  idea	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  APL	  had	  been	  instigated	  in	  1917.	  Former	  Australian	   Intelligence	   Corps	   officer,	   Robert	   Charles	   Dunlop	   Elliot,	   —	   under	  Hughes’	  instructions	  —	  was	  seconded	  to	  the	  United	  States	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Australian	  Defence	  Department.	  Hughes	  arranged	  for	  Elliot	  to	  be	  introduced	  and	   meet	   with	   members	   of	   the	   ‘Citizens	   Section	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Secret	  Service’59	  in	   Washington	   D.C.	   to	   inquire	   into	   the	   activities	   and	   organisational	  structure	  of	   the	  American	  League	   (NAA:	  B	  197,	  1851/2/43).	  Elliot	  was	  greatly	  impressed	  with	  the	  League	  and	  how	  it	  operated,	  the	  quality	  of	   its	  staff,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Nick	  Fisher	  suggests	  that	  this	  reflects	  Elliot	  and	  Hughes’	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	   structure	   of	   the	   American	   intelligence	   services	   because	   there	   was	   no	  United	   States	   Secret	   Service	   at	   this	   time.	   Although	   there	   is	   confusion	   as	   to	   which	  intelligence	   service	   the	   reference	   refers	   to,	   it	   is	   possible	   Elliot	   was	   seconded	   to	   the	  United	  States,	  Department	  of	  Justice,	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation,	  the	  forerunner	  of	  the	  FBI,	  which	  was	  established	  on	  1908.	  	  See	  Fisher,	  N	  (2001)	  ‘The	  Savage	  Within’,	  p.	  351	  –	  53.	  	  
	   154	  
League’s	   own	   self-­‐governing	   ‘internal	   probity	   structures	   and	   procedures’.	   So	  impressed	   was	   Elliot	   with	   the	   American	   League	   that	   he	   described	   it	   as	   being	  responsible	   for	   the	   ‘quietness	   of	   the	   German	   and	   Irish	   sympathizers	   of	   the	  Central	   powers’	   (NAA:	   B	   197,	   1851/2/43).	   Upon	   his	   return	   to	   Australia,	   Elliot	  submitted	   a	   proposal	   to	   George	   Pearce,	   Minister	   for	   Defence,	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	  an	  Australian	  organisation	  based	  on	  the	  same	  principles	  of	  the	  American	  Protection	  League.	  	  	  Elliot’s	   report	   was,	   however,	   somewhat	   politicised	   as	   well.	   Elliot	   had	  selectively	   chosen	   information	   that	  would	   support	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   League	  and	   present	   it	   in	   a	   flattering	   light.	   But	   he	   neglected	   to	   report	   on	   the	   negative	  aspects	  of	  the	  American	  League.	  For	  instance,	  Elliot	  did	  not	  mention	  the	  endemic	  corruption	   that	   had	   plagued	   the	   League	   since	   its	   inception.	   Nor	   did	   he	   inform	  Minister	   Pearce	   of	   the	   problems	   regarding	   discipline,	   political	   intrigue,	   and	  ineptitude	  that	  occurred	  on	  a	  regular	  basis	  (Moore	  1989:	  23).	  Based	  on	  Elliot’s	  sugar-­‐coated	  report,	  Cabinet	  referred	  the	  matter	  for	  consideration	  to	  Australia’s	  supreme	   defence	   planning	   body,	   the	   Council	   of	   Defence.	   	   On	   1	  May	   1918,	   the	  Council	  of	  Defence	  evaluated	  Elliot’s	  report	  and	  contemplated	  the	  ‘Formation	  of	  an	  Australian	  Protective	  League	  along	  the	  same	  line	  as	  the	  American	  Protective	  League’	  (NAA:	  A	  9787,	  2).	  	  	  	   At	   this	  meeting	   Acting	   Prime	  Minister	  Watt60	  informed	   the	   Council	   that	  the	   League	   would	   deal	   in	   matters	   of	   intelligence	   regarding	   those	   of	   a	   ‘Naval,	  military	  and	  political	  nature’	  (NAA:	  A	  9787,	  2).	  	  Captain	  Thring,	  Director	  of	  Naval	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Hughes	  was	  attending	  the	  Imperial	  War	  Conference	  in	  London.	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Intelligence,	  informed	  the	  Council	  that	  the	  navy	  would	  welcome	  the	  development	  of	   such	   an	   organisation	   and	   he	  was	   anxious	   to	   get	   the	   scheme	   into	   operation.	  Thring	   suggested	   that	   doctors	   and	   bankers	   could	   be	   enlisted	   to	   report	   on	   the	  activities	  of	  people	   in	   all	   districts.	  The	  Council	   agreed,	   and	   it	  was	  decided	   that	  Acting	   Prime	   Minister	   Watt	   would	   arrange	   to	   invite	   a	   number	   of	   leading	  businessmen	   to	   meet	   with	   him	   later	   in	   the	   month	   to	   discuss	   establishing	   the	  League.	  	  	   Perhaps,	   most	   importantly	   in	   terms	   of	   politicisation	   and	   the	   League’s	  partisan	   intentions,	   was	   the	   recruitment	   of	   community	   members	   who	   were	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  government’s	  stance	  on	  the	  war.	  On	  29	  May	  1918,	  Watt	  met	   with	   a	   range	   of	   business	   leaders	   including	   academics,	   bankers,	   doctors,	  engineers,	  solicitors,	  insurance	  providers	  and	  city	  aldermen	  urging	  them	  to	  join	  the	  government’s	  new	  citizens	  bureau	  of	  intelligence	  (NAA:	  A	  9787,	  2).	  In	  theory	  the	  preliminary	  APL	  constitution,	  which	  was	  determined	  by	  Steward	  and	  Piesse,	  was	  to	  be	  ‘wholly	  non-­‐partisan	  in	  character’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	   6).	   	   In	   reality,	   the	   group	   was	   hand	   picked	   and	   the	   board	   stacked	   with	  sixteen	   men	   representing	   wealthy	   interest	   groups	   all	   of	   whom	   supported	   the	  government’s	   views.	   The	   controlling	   body	   was	   to	   be	   filled	   with	   conservative	  elites	   and	   totally	   comprised	   of	   loyalists,	   Protestants,	   and	   patriots	   who	   were	  committed	  to	  helping	  the	  government	  achieve	  its	  political	  goals.	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Political	  supporters	  of	  the	  League	  were	  also	  drawn	  from	  the	  conservative	  side	  of	  politics.	  Among	  those	  invited	  to	  join	  were	  Herbert	  Brookes,	  the	  son	  in-­‐law	  of	  Alfred	  Deakin,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Loyalty	  League	  and	  co-­‐founder	  of	  the	  Victorian	  Protestant	  Federation.	  	  R.	  D.	  Elliot	  a	  former	  intelligence	  officer	  and	  Country	  Party	  Senator,	   was	   also	   invited,	   along	   with	   the	   Lord	   Mayor	   of	   Melbourne,	   W.	   W.	  Cabena,	   an	   ardent	   Protestant	   and	   Vice	   President	   of	   the	   Citizens	   Loyalist	  Committee	  (NAA:	  A	  9787,	  2;	  Rivett	  1965:	  63).	  The	  League	  was	  highly	  selective	  of	  those	   who	   were	   invited	   to	   join	   its	   ranks	   in	   order	   to	   preserve	   its	   integrity.	  ‘Propose	   to	   use	   men’	   Brookes	   recommended	   to	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence,	  ‘recruited	   from	   masons,	   Loyalty	   Leagues,	   soldiers	   and	   sailors,	   as	   vigilantes’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  48).	  	  	   Sectarian	   and	   ideological	   prejudice	   certainly	   affected	   the	   League’s	  membership.	  Loyalty	  to	  the	  League’s	  cause,	  according	  to	  Brookes,	  could	  certainly	  be	  compromised	  by	  the	  religious	  and	  political	  affiliations	  of	  its	  members.	  	  As	  he	  confided	   to	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence,	   if	   any	   Roman	   Catholics	   in	   the	   Cabinet	  became	   aware	   of	   the	   League	   ‘they	   would	   at	   once	   suspect	   it	   and	   have	   it	  investigated’	   or	   worse	   they	   would	   ‘ensure	   that	   R	   C	   [Roman	   Catholic]	  organisations	   are	   admitted	   to	   the	   Defence	   League	   with	   what	   results	   you	   can	  expect’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Items	  35–36).	  Given	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  League,	  its	  political	  values,	  and	  Hughes’	  lingering	  problems	  with	  the	  Labor	  Party,	  it	   is	  also	  not	  surprising	  that	  no	  members	  of	  any	  union	  or	  the	  Labor	  Party	  were	  invited	   to	  attend	   the	  meeting	  regarding	   the	   formation	  of	   the	  Protective	  League	  (Meaney	  2009:	  231).	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Apart	  from	  demonstrating	  the	  League’s	  political	  and	  religious	  disposition,	  during	   the	   meeting	   that	   took	   place	   on	   29	   May	   1918,	   the	   group’s	   ideas	   about	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state	  also	  become	  quite	  pronounced.	  The	  government’s	  intelligence	  network,	   the	  Minister	   for	  Defence,	  George	  Pearce,	  argued	  had	  come	  to	  rely	   too	  ‘heavily	   on	   official	   channels	   of	   communication’	  which	   he	   suggested	   ‘were	   very	  limited’.	   Pearce	   wanted	   the	   government	   to	   again	   extend	   their	   surveillance	  framework	  and	  reach	  out	  to	  commercial	  businesses	  by	  linking	  up	  private	  ‘bodies	  throughout	  the	  Commonwealth’.	  Pearce	  recommended	  that	  an	  Australian	  League	  would	  be	  the	  best	  method	  of	  joining	  together	  ‘a	  network	  of	  intelligence	  capable	  of	  bringing	  to	  notice	  anything	  of	  a	  suspicious	  character’	  to	  the	  government	  (NAA:	  B	  197,	  1851/2/43).	  	  	  General	   Legge,	   Chief	   of	   the	   General	   Staff,	   concurred.	   He	   suggested	   that	  ‘the	   only	   thing	   to	   do	   was	   to	   get	   everybody	   loyal	   to	   organize’.	   Legge	   even	  suggested	   that	   ‘women	  and	  children’	  should	  be	   included	   in	   the	  activities	  of	   the	  League.	  Archibald	  Strong61,	  Professor	  of	  English	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Melbourne,	  suggested	  that	  ‘the	  enemies	  within	  our	  gates’	  had	  been	  operating	  for	  far	  too	  long	  which	  he	  argued	  had	  ‘produced	  a	  lamentable	  effect’.	  Strong	  argued	  that	  since	  the	  last	  referendum	  campaign	  ‘these	  enemies’	  had	  worked	  incessantly	  to	  ‘wreck	  the	  war	  organisation	  in	  Australia’.	  He	  suggested	  ‘you	  had	  to	  hit	  these	  extremist	  hard’	  and	   that	   the	   only	  way	   to	   overcome	   ‘Bolshevism’	  was	   ‘by	   organising	   a	   counter	  wave’.	  Morrice	  Williams,	  a	  representative	  attending	  the	  meeting	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Bank	   of	   London,	   moved	   that	   ‘a	   Citizens	   Bureaux	   [sic]	   of	   Intelligence	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  Strong	  was	   later	   appointed	   Chief	   Commonwealth	   Censor	   of	   cinematograph	   films	   in	  the	  Hughes	  government.	  Edgeloe,	  V.	  A	  (1990)	  Australian	  Dictionary	  of	  Biography.	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Propaganda	  be	  established’.	  The	  motion	  was	  carried	  unanimously.	  Acting	  Prime	  Minister	   Watt	   added	   that	   all	   members	   of	   the	   League	   could	   ‘come	   to	   the	  government	  for	  whatever	  they	  wanted,	  and	  the	  government	  would	  give	  it’	  (NAA:	  B	  197,	  1851/2/43).	  	  	  	   A	   preliminary	   plan	   for	   establishing	   the	   principles	   underpinning	   the	  charter	  of	  the	  APL	  was	  undertaken	  by	  Herbert	  Brookes,	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  the	  League’s	  establishment.	  It	  becomes	  quite	  clear	  that	  Brookes’	  loyalties	  firmly	  coincided	  with	   the	   government,	   but	   also,	   reflected	   his	   personal	   vision	   of	  what	  loyalty	   to	   the	   state	   entailed.	   On	   28	   October	   1918,	   Brookes	   outlined	   five	  recommendations,	  which	   he	   believed	  would	   serve	   as	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   League’s	  organisational	  structure.	  First,	  he	  opposed	  any	  publicity	  surrounding	  the	  League.	  ‘It	  would	  be	  fatal	  to	  its	  efficiency’	  he	  argued	  ‘to	  make	  it	  public	  property’	  (Brookes	  Papers	   MS	   1924,	   Series	   17,	   Item	   39).	   The	   League	   must	   remain	   a	   completely	  secret	  association	  and	  unknown	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  	  	   Second,	   Brookes	   wanted	   complete	   personal	   autonomy	   in	   selecting	   the	  members	  appointed	  to	  the	  League.	   ‘I	  would	  hesitate	  to	  form	  any	  committee’	  he	  urged	  that	   ‘I	  did	  not	  have	  a	  hand	  in	  selecting’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	   Item	   40).	   His	   third	   recommendation	   suggested	   that	   the	   League	   should	   be	  headed	   by	   a	   ‘secret	   centre	   of	   three’	   comprising	   the	  Minister	   of	  Defence	   as	   the	  Chairman,	  ‘a	  permanent	  departmental	  head	  who	  shall	  control	  the	  Federal	  Police’	  and	   in	   addition	   ‘an	   individual	   whose	   services	   will	   be	   voluntary	   but	   has	   had	  experience	   in	   running	   organisations	   and	   association	   work	   in	   many	   spheres’.	  Brookes	  also	  recommended	  three	  of	  his	  own	  choices	  —	  and	  personal	  friends	  —	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to	  head	  branches	  in	  Tasmania,	  South	  Australia,	  and	  New	  South	  Wales	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  42).	  	  	  	   The	   fourth	   recommendation	   Brookes	   put	   forward	   was	   that	   because	   a	  minister	   ‘from	   the	   very	   nature	   of	   his	   profession’	   was	   ‘biased	   by	   political	  considerations’	   the	   League’s	   Board	   should	   be	   able	   to	   decide	   ‘whether	   or	   not	  cases	   for	  prosecution	  should	  or	  should	  not	  be	  withdrawn’	   (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	   Item	  46).	  Here	  Brookes	  possibly	  assumed	  that	  private	  citizens	  were	  in	  a	  more	  ‘objective’	  position	  to	  determine	  who	  was	  a	  loyal	  citizen	  than	  the	  government.	  Consequently,	  under	  Brookes’	  plan	  the	  League’s	  investigations	  and	  secret	   units	   would	   be	   headed	   by	   leading	   businessmen.	   It	   would	   only	   be	   after	  consultation	  with	  these	  citizens	  that	  the	  SIB	  would	  then	  be	  permitted	  to	  arrest,	  detain,	  and	  prosecute	  suspects	  (Fisher	  2011:	  144).	  	  	   Finally,	  Brookes	  recommended	  that	  if	  it	  ever	  became	  necessary	  to	  make	  a	  formal	  announcement	  about	   the	  League	   to	  completely	  deceive	  both	  parliament	  and	  the	  public.	  He	  suggested	  the	  League	  should	  explain	  that	  their	  activities	  were	  designed	  to	  ‘counter	  German	  post-­‐war	  secret	  trade	  methods’	  by	  ‘focusing	  on	  the	  other	  enemies	  in	  our	  midst’.	  This	  explanation,	  Brookes	  argued,	  ‘would	  also	  afford	  a	   justification	   for	   countering	   the	   expenditure	   of	   the	   Department	   if	   it	   were	  necessary’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  47).	  	  	   	  	  
	   160	  
Before	   the	   ink	  was	  dry	  on	  Brookes’	   report,	   and	  despite	   the	  government	  not	  having	  decided	  on	  League’s	  constitution,	  Brookes	  set	  to	  work	  organising	  the	  League’s	  initial	  activities.	  Of	  his	  own	  volition,	  he	  installed	  secret	  agents	  to	  gather	  information	   for	   the	   League	   at	   Trades	   Hall	   Melbourne,	   the	   One	   Big	   Union,	   the	  Transport	  Workers	  Union,	  the	  Victorian	  Railways	  Union,	  and	  the	  Victorian	  Police	  Department	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  48).	  Brookes,	  at	  his	  own	  expense	  paid	  M.	  H.	  Ellis,	  the	  brother	  of	  Queensland	  Premier	  T.	  J.	  Ryan’s	  personal	  secretary,	   to	   assemble	   material	   on	   the	   Australian	   Labor	   Party	   and	   report	   on	  what	  he	  described	  as	  the	  ‘enemies	  in	  our	  midst’	  (Brookes	  Papers	  MS	  1924,	  Series	  1,	   Item	   6219;	   Moore	   1989:	   27).	   Such	   actions	   had	   most	   likely	   raised	   serious	  questions	  about	  Brookes’	  tendency	  to	  assume	  total	  autonomy	  over	  the	  League’s	  activities.	  	  	   Apprehensive	   about	   the	   amount	   of	   authority	   the	   Brookes	   plan	   would	  place	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  civilians	  and,	  perhaps,	  more	  than	  that,	  understanding	  that	  the	  government	  would	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  ‘vigilantly’	  voluntary	  arm,	   Watt	   referred	   the	   matter	   to	   Major	   Steward	   and	   the	   Director	   of	   Military	  Intelligence,	  Major	  Piesse,	  for	  revision.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  29	  November	  1918,	  that	  Piesse	   and	   Steward	   delivered	   a	   revised	   charter	   for	   the	   League,	   which	   they	  renamed	   ‘A	   Federal	   Investigation	   Department’	   and	   which	   in	   Piesse’s	   words	  proposed	   ‘a	   compromise	   between	   differing	   views’	   (Brookes	   Papers	   MS	   1924,	  Series	  17,	  Item	  2).	  It	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  this	  plan	  was,	  however,	  more	  palatable	  to	  the	  government	  and	  even	  more	  pliable	  for	  obtaining	  its	  policy	  objectives.	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The	   Piesse–Steward	   plan	   reflected	   their	   own	   predisposition	   towards	  bureaucratic	   control	   of	   the	   intelligence	   machinery	   and	   they	   sought	   to	   place	  authority	  back	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  intelligence	  agencies.	  The	  League,	  Steward	  and	  Piesse	   advised,	   should	   not	   be	   a	   completely	   voluntary	   organisation,	   but	   would	  instead	   be	   comprised	   of	   existing	   members	   of	   the	   SIB,	   Military	   and	   Naval	  Intelligence	   and	   the	   Commonwealth	   Police.	   	   The	   citizens	   voluntary	   arm	  would	  only	   ‘operate	   in	  alliance	  with	  a	  public	  department’	   to	   supplement	   the	  League’s	  activities.	  This	   recommendation	  directly	   contradicted	  Brookes	  plan	  of	   a	  purely	  civilian	   League.	   Such	   recommendations,	   however,	  were	   probably	   not	   based	   on	  ethical	   considerations,	   but	   were	   more	   likely	   motivated	   by	   purely	   parochial	  interests.	  The	  adoption	  of	  this	  recommendation,	  as	  Piesse	  had	  framed	  it,	  would	  ‘allow	   the	   government	   to	   openly	   come	   to	   parliament	   for	   funds’,	   whereas	   the	  voluntary	   scheme	   outlined	   by	   Brookes	  would	   have	   the	   League	   raising	   its	   own	  revenue	   (Brookes	   Papers	   MS	   1924,	   Series	   17,	   Item	   5).	   Essentially,	   Piesse	   and	  Steward	  realised	  that	  the	  Brookes	  plan	  would	  secure	  his	  autonomy	  in	  controlling	  the	  League	  because	  he	  would	  not	  need	  financial	  assistance	  from	  the	  government.	  The	   Piesse–Steward	   plan,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   reversed	   this	   arrangement	   and	  reflected	   the	   ‘intelligence	   chiefs	   determination	   to	   keep	   close	   control	   of	   the	  League’	  by	  securing	  it	  to	  the	  intelligence	  bureaucracy	  which	  they	  had	  significant	  control	  over	  (Meaney	  2009:	  234).	  	  	   Brookes	  was	  unhappy	  with	   the	  plan	  Steward	  and	  Piesse	  delivered	  most	  likely	   because	   it	   revised	  what	   he	   considered	   to	   be	   the	   essence	   of	   the	   League,	  which	   in	   his	   terms	   was	   a	   ‘self	   governing,	   self	   determining	   organisation’.	  Moreover,	   such	  revisions	  completely	   took	  control	  of	   the	  League	  out	  of	  his	  own	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hands.	   Brookes	   argued	   to	   the	  Minister	   of	   Defence	   that	   unless	   the	   League	  was	  completely	  voluntary	  it	  would	  only	  attract	  members	   ‘who	  are	  willing	  to	  submit	  to	   the	   tyranny	  of	   the	  Director	  and	  Co’,	  people	  which	  he	  described	  as	   	   ‘a	  servile	  and	  woolly	   type’	   (Brookes	   Papers	  MS	   1924,	   Series	   17,	   Item	   28).	   According	   to	  Brookes’	   vision,	   the	   League	   should	   be	   completely	   free	   from	   political	   pressure,	  where	  a	  select	  and	  privileged	  group	  of	  private	  citizens,	  sanctioned	  and	  protected	  by	  the	  government,	  were	  free	  to	  police	  and	  persecute	  their	  fellow	  citizens	  based	  on	   their	   own	   definition	   of	   dissent	   and	   subversion.	   Essentially	   what	   Brookes	  proposed	   was	   a	   form	   of	   bourgeois	   vigilantism,	   or	   as	   Meaney	   describes	   it,	   a	  ‘secret	  society	  given	  greater	  authority	  to	  act	  than	  the	  government…	  a	  secret	  state	  existing	   within	   the	   constitutional	   state’	   (Meaney	   2009:	   235).	   Understandably,	  the	  Minister	   of	   Defence	  was	   concerned	  with	   Brookes’	   dogmatic	   ideas	   and	  was	  cautious	  as	  to	  how	  he	  should	  proceed.	  By	  now	  the	  development	  of	  the	  League’s	  charter	   had	   became	   a	   protracted	   battle	   between	   Brookes	   and	   the	   intelligence	  chiefs	  about	  who	  was	  better	  positioned	  to	  act	  as	  the	  guardian	  of	  the	  Australian	  national	  interest.	  	  	   Despite	  the	  enthusiasm	  to	  get	  the	  League	  up	  and	  running,	  with	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Armistice	  in	  November	  1918,	  the	  war	  ended	  and	  the	  League	  had	  achieved	  nothing.	  This,	  coupled	  with	  the	  impasse	  over	  the	  constitution	  between	  Brookes,	  Piesse	  and	  Steward,	  meant	  that	  the	  League	  had	  failed	  materialise.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  27	  September	  1921	  that	  the	  Acting	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Defence,	  informed	  General	  Brudenell	  White,	  Chief	  of	  the	  General	  Staff	  that,	  ‘this	  matter	  now	  appears	  to	  be	  dead’.	  White	   responded	  by	   indicating	   that	   the	  Council	  of	  Defence	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  ‘propose	  any	  further	  action’	  (NAA:	  B	  197,	  1851/2/43).	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   The	  government’s	  most	  secret	  and	  ambitious	  intelligence	  plan	  of	  the	  war,	  a	   citizens	   vigilantly	   counter-­‐revolutionary	   force,	   failed	   to	   produce	   any	   results.	  Nevertheless,	   that	   the	   proposal	   was	   seriously	   considered	   reveals	   the	  determination	   of	   the	   government	   to	   rid	   the	   nation	   of	   its	   internal	   political	  enemies	   and	   keep	   a	   handle	   on	   issues	   of	   social	   control.	   The	  whole	   idea	   for	   the	  League	  was	   not	   based	   on	   hard	   evidence	   that	   a	   revolution	  was	   under	  way	   but	  rather	   on	   the	   irrational	   judgment	   that	   the	   government	   could	   not	   trust	   the	  majority	  of	   its	   citizens	   to	   support	   their	  war	  policies.	  The	  League,	   in	   this	   sense,	  became	   a	   symbol	   of	   the	   governments	   ‘hysteria	   about	   loyalty’,	   demand	   for	  absolute	  patriotism,	  and	  an	  exemplar	  of	  the	  use	  to	  which	  intelligence	  could	  serve	  partisan	  goals	  (Meaney	  2009:	  236).	  	  	  
Conclusion	  and	  preliminary	  findings	  This	   chapter	   traced	   the	   use	   and	   politicisation	   of	   intelligence	   by	   the	  Hughes	  government	  during	  the	  conscription	  campaigns	  of	  World	  War	  One.	  These	  campaigns	   exposed	   many	   hidden	   tensions	   that	   lay	   just	   below	   the	   surface	   of	  Australian	  society.	  All	  of	  which	  must	  be	  balanced	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  political	  conditions	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  As	  was	  argued	  in	  the	  previous	   chapter	   intelligence	   services	   are	   not	   immune	   to	   these	   political	  conditions	  and	  undoubtedly	   their	  actions	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  political	  context	   in	  which	   they	   operate.	   Nevertheless,	   Hughes	   appropriated	   these	   conditions	   as	   a	  potent	  justification	  to	  use	  intelligence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  social	  and	  political	  control.	  The	  conscription	  campaigns	  pulled	  strongly	  on	  already	  fraying	  social	  conditions	  brought	   on	   by	   the	   war	   and	   resulted	   in	   a	   thoroughly	   polarising	   environment	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where	  loyalty	  to	  the	  state	  was	  demanded.	  In	  this	  framing,	  anyone	  who	  opposed	  conscription	  could	  not	  be	  loyal	  and	  thus	  must	  be	  against	  the	  government	  and	  the	  national	   interest.	   Such	   binary	   attitudes	   pervaded	   the	   national	   security	  establishment	  and	  led	  the	  intelligence	  services	  to	  pursue	  the	  partisan	  interests	  of	  the	  government,	  which	  was	  to	  persecute	  the	  nations	  ‘internal	  political	  enemies’.	  	  	  	  	   A	  strong	  undercurrent	  running	   through	  the	  anti-­‐conscription	  movement	  was	   the	   deeply	   held	   belief	   that	   conscription	   was	   a	   means	   of	   exploiting	   the	  working	  class	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  capitalism.	  For	  many,	  specifically	  the	  IWW,	  this	  was	  the	  government’s	  hidden	  agenda.	  Their	  reaction	  was	  one	  likely	  based	  more	  on	   obtaining	   social	   and	   economic	   equality	   than	   one	   based	   purely	   on	   Imperial	  hatred	   and	   national	   disloyalty.	   While	   there	   is,	   perhaps,	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	  unions	   and	   the	   IWW	   played	   a	   central	   role	   in	   securing	   the	   no	   vote	   in	   both	  campaigns,	   in	  a	   liberal	  democracy,	  with	   its	  emphasis	  on	  the	   importance	  of	   free	  speech	   and	   free	   public	   debate,	   these	   groups	   and	   individuals	   were	   expressing	  their	   right	   to	   question	   the	   government’s	   motives.	   	   Despite	   the	   majority	   of	   its	  members	   never	   threatening	   national	   security,	   and	   only	   a	   small	   minority	   ever	  committing	   a	   crime,	   these	   opposition	   groups	   were	   deemed	   unlawful	   because	  they	  opposed	  the	  government’s	  agenda.	  62	  	  Subsequently,	  they	  were	  placed	  under	  surveillance	  by	  the	  intelligence	  services.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62 	  Frank	   Cain	   and	   P.	   J.	   Rushton	   estimated	   that	   the	   maximum	   number	   of	   IWW	  memberships	   throughout	   Australia	   never	   amounted	   to	   more	   than	   2000,	   See	   Cain,	   F	  (1979)	   ‘The	   Origins	   of	   Political	   Surveillance	   1916–1932’,	   PhD	   Thesis,	   Monash	  University.	  p.	  183.	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That	   the	   intelligence	   services	   took	   so	   willingly,	   enthusiastically,	   and	  unreservedly	   to	   this	   task	  was,	   perhaps,	   the	   result	   of	   two	   factors:	   a	   lack	   of	   bi-­‐partisan	  oversight	  of	  intelligence	  services	  conduct	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  professionalism.	  Both	  factors	  played	  a	  role	  in	  the	  intelligence	  services	  partisan	  conduct.	  As	  Prime	  Minister	   and	   Attorney	   General	   in	   a	   war	   government,	   Hughes	   had	   almost	  complete	   control	   over	   the	   intelligence	   services.	   Under	   these	   conditions,	   there	  was	   a	   clear	   lack	   of	   bi-­‐partisan	   oversight,	   which	   explains	   why	   the	   Hughes	  government	   could	   so	   easily	   use	   intelligence	   to	   suppress	   its	   political	   enemies	  without	  interference.	  But	  a	  lack	  of	  professionalism	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	   explains	   why	   they	   were	   so	   willing	   to	   facilitate	   the	   government’s	  objectives.	  A	  cursory	  examination	  of	  their	  activities	  reveals	  that	  their	  focus	  was	  on	   the	   government’s	   political	   opponents	   and	   not	   necessarily	   on	   threats	   to	  national	  security.	  This	   is	   further	  exemplified	   in	   their	  neglect	   to	  examine	   in	  any	  detail	   the	   activities	   of	   the	   pro-­‐conscription	   movement.	   Taken	   together	   both	  factors	  show	  how	  politicisation	  occurred	  and	  explain	  how	  intelligence	  became	  a	  means	  of	  soliciting	  the	  entrapment	  of	  the	  government’s	  political	  opponents.	  The	  implication	   being	   that	   intelligence	   was	   a	   political	   device	   used	   to	   eliminate	  political	  opposition	  and	  thus	  highly	  politicised.	  	  	   Personal	   factors	   also	   seem	   to	   have	   affected	   relations	   between	   the	  government	  and	  the	  intelligence	  services,	  specifically	  between	  Hughes	  and	  Major	  Steward.	  Traditionalist	  theory,	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  one,	  offers	  an	  explanation	  as	  to	  how	  politicisation	  can	  occur	  when	  intelligence	  and	  political	  leaders	  interact	  too	  closely.	  Close	  proximity	  and	  interaction	  between	  intelligence	  and	  politics	  can	  reduce	   the	  appearance	  of	  objectivity	  and	   impartiality,	   especially	  when	  political	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and	  intelligence	  leaders	  become	  attached	  to	  the	  success	  of	  a	  policy	  deliberation	  (Handel	  1987:	  12).	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  Hughes	  and	  Steward	  was,	  indeed,	  a	   bond	   fused	   by	   mutual	   ideological	   and	   political	   beliefs.	   They	   shared	   similar	  political	   attitudes	   and	   never	   challenged	   each	   other’s	   social	   or	   political	  assumptions.	  As	  a	  result,	  intelligence	  and	  politics	  became	  closely	  aligned.	  	  	  A	   clear	   inference	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   this	   relationship	   is	   that	   it	  simultaneously	   constrained	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   SIB	   and	   coloured	   its	   results.	  Steward	  and	  the	  SIB	  never	  challenged	  the	  political	  objectives	  that	  motivated	  the	  Bureau	  nor	  was	  any	  attempt	  made	  to	  examine	  the	  dubious	  activities	  of	  Loyalty	  Leagues	   and	   pro-­‐conscription	   groups.	   As	   the	   Governor	   General,	   Sir	   Ronald	  Munro	  Ferguson,	  rightly	  observed	  Steward	  had	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  Hughes	  and	  he	  often	  acted	  as	  the	  prime	  minister’s	  personal	  secret	  agent.	  For	  this	  reason,	  Munro	  Ferguson	  recommended	  that	  Steward	  be	  removed	   from	  the	  Bureau	  and	  ordered	   the	   relationship	   to	   be	   terminated.	   This	   appears	   not	   to	   have	   worked.	  Steward	   continued	   to	   help	   the	   government	   and	   played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   Australian	   Defence	   League.	   Ultimately,	   the	   close	  relationship	  between	  Steward	  and	  Hughes	  was	  to	  bring	  intelligence	  very	  close	  to	  the	  political	  objectives	  Hughes	  sought	  to	  implement.	  	  	   During	   both	   conscription	   campaigns,	   social	   conditions	   played	   a	   role	   in	  how	  intelligence	  became	  politicised.	  For	  example,	  Archbishop	  Mannix	  became	  a	  symbol	   of	   the	   Irish	   movement	   and	   an	   antagonist	   to	   the	   government	   and	   on	  several	   occasions	   he	   spoke	   out	   against	   conscription.	   To	   a	   large	   number	   of	  Australian	   Irish	   Catholics	   and	   anti-­‐conscriptionists,	   Mannix	   was	   a	   voice	   of	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reason.	   But	   to	   Hughes	   and	   the	   intelligence	   services	   Mannix	   epitomised	   those	  subversive	   and	   disloyal	   agitators	   such	   as	   Sinn	   Fein	   and	   the	   IWW,	   which	   he	  believed	  were	  intent	  on	  destroying	  his	  policy	  goals.	  The	  government	  responded	  to	   this	   threat	   by	   using	   intelligence	   to	   control	   dissenting	   opinion.	   But	   because	  Mannix	   was	   an	   Archbishop	   of	   a	   Christian	   Church,	   the	   government	   and	   the	  intelligence	  services	  could	  not	  easily	  silence	  him.	  Hughes	  then	  sought	  recourse	  to	  the	   British	   government	   and	   the	   highest	   levels	   of	   the	   Catholic	   Church	   at	   the	  Vatican,	  in	  order	  to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  Mannix’s	  activities.	  Such	  behaviour	  is	  perhaps	  further	   evidence	   of	   the	   extreme	   lengths	   they	   were	   willing	   to	   go	   in	   order	   to	  control	   free	  speech	  and	  suppress	  all	   forms	  of	  political	  dissent.	  Moreover,	   these	  events	   show	   how	   social	   conditions	   can	   be	   responsible	   for	   giving	   rise	   to	  conditions	  under	  which	  intelligence	  can	  become	  politicised.	  	  	  	  	   These	  issues	  of	  social	  control,	  wrapped	  up	  in	  contested	  notions	  of	  loyalty,	  were	   perhaps	   brought	   to	   a	   head	   when	   the	   government	   considered	   the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Australian	  Protective	  League.	  The	  stacking	  of	  this	  politically	  motivated	   private	   intelligence	   organisation	   with	   an	   elite	   group	   of	   privileged	  citizens	  all	  committed	  to	  the	  governments	  war	  aims,	   is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  both	  politicising	   intelligence	   by	   appointment	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   external	  politically	  motivated	  intelligence	  service.	  Moreover,	  it	  reflected	  the	  government’s	  binary	   views	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   loyalty	   to	   the	   state	   and	   the	   use	   of	  external	  measures	  to	   facilitate	  a	  government	  objective.	  The	  basis	  of	   the	  League	  was	  built	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  a	  large	  section	  of	  the	  community	  was	  disloyal	  and	   could	   not	   be	   trusted.	   Such	   assumptions	   were	   not	   based	   on	   evidence	   but	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  arbitrary	  notions	  of	  loyalty,	  nationalism,	  and	  patriotic	  duty.	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Systems	  error:	  Intelligence	  inquiries,	  
politicisation,	  and	  administrative	  ruination	  	  
(1940	  –	  1948)	  
	  
	  
‘It	  would	  be	  a	  sheer	  over-­‐statement	  to	  say	  that	  our	  security	  organisation	  is	  
equipped	  either	  in	  structure	  or	  personnel,	  to	  measure	  up	  to	  the	  new	  tests	  with	  
which	  it	  will	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  deal’.63	  (Minister	  for	  the	  Army,	  Frank	  Forde	  1942)	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  During	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  when	  the	  Australian	  military	  was	  fighting	  in	   Europe,	  North	  Africa,	   and	   the	   Pacific,	   there	  was	   an	   intelligence	   battle	   being	  fought	  at	  home.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  battle	  against	  espionage	  or	  foreign	  spies,	  but	  rather	  a	   bureaucratic	   struggle	   over	   the	   administration	   and	   control	   of	   the	   intelligence	  services.	   Indeed,	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   community	  during	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   could	   be	   described	   as	   a	   period	   of	   sustained	  turbulence,	  underpinned	  by	  bureaucratic	   rivalries	  and	  periods	  of	  politicisation.	  Consequently,	   the	   security	   intelligence	   services	   limped	   through	   the	   War	  bedevilled	  by	  a	  series	  of	  administrative	  problems.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63 	  Secret	   memo,	   Frank	   Forde	   to	   H.	   V.	   Evatt,	   5	   March	   1942	   (NAA:	   MP	   729/6,	  15/403/199).	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By	   the	  start	  of	   the	  Second	  World	  War,	   the	  Australian	  government	  had	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  security	  intelligence	  organisations,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  centralised	  or	  coordinated	   authority	   to	   deal	   with	   intelligence	   matters	   at	   the	   national	   or	  international	  level	  (Lamidey	  1970:	  48).64	  Each	  organisation	  performed	  an	  array	  of	   civil	   and	   military	   intelligence	   functions.	   Some	   were	   passive	   to	   the	   political	  command	   of	   their	   masters	   while	   others	   opposed	   their	   authority.	   None	   of	   the	  services	   could	   collaborate	   effectively	   and	   there	   was	   little	   cooperation	   or	  collegiality.	   As	   one	   report	   from	   1942	   noted,	   ‘personal	   interests	   and	   friction	  between	   certain	   departments	   have	   retarded	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Security	  Service’	   (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  Most	   certainly,	   these	  conditions	  contributed	  to	  many	  of	  the	  problems	  the	  services	  encountered.	  	  	  At	   this	   time,	   the	   Australian	   government	   still	   had	   no	   formal	   policy	   or	  working	  definitions	  regarding	  intelligence	  and	  how	  it	  should	  function.	  Nor	  could	  the	  various	  government	  departments	  responsible	  for	  their	  administration	  agree	  on	  their	  proper	  location,	  control,	  and	  objectives	  (Templeton	  1979:	  169).	  Against	  this	   backdrop	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   intelligence	   services	   operated	  became	  intensely	  personalised.	  In	  the	  early	  1940s,	  the	  War	  Cabinet	  attempted	  to	  resolve	  these	  administrative	  difficulties.	  Several	  inquiries	  were	  held.	  But	  instead	  of	  resolving	  the	  problems,	  the	  inquiries	  only	  brought	  politics	  more	  centrally	  into	  the	  equation	  and	  exacerbated	  conflict.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  These	  agencies	  included:	  	  (1) The	  Directorate	  of	  Naval	  Intelligence	  (2) The	  Directorate	  of	  Air	  Intelligence	  (3) The	  Directorate	  of	  Military	  Intelligence	  (Army)	  (4) Security	  Service	  (5) The	  Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Branch	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199)	  
	  171	  
This	   chapter	   studies	   the	   conflict	   that	   arose	   over	   the	   administrative	  control	  of	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	  services	  during	   the	  Second	  World	  War	  by	  focusing	  on	  how	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry	  between	  government	  departments	  and	  the	  intelligence	   services	   led	   to	   administrative	   atrophy.	   My	   argument	   is	   that	   the	  administrative	   behaviour	   and	   institutional	   culture	   of	   government	   at	   this	   time	  created	  a	  highly	  politicising	  environment.	  To	  develop	  this	  argument,	  the	  chapter	  proceeds	  in	  three	  steps.	  First,	   it	  describes	  the	  events	  that	   led	  to	  two	  significant	  inquiries	   designed	   to	   fix	   the	   maladministration	   of	   the	   Australian	   Security	  Service.	  Here	  the	  discussion	  examines	  why	  these	  inquiries	  were	  met	  with	  fierce	  resistance	  and	  intervention	  by	  the	  Australian	  military.	  Next,	  the	  chapter	  looks	  at	  where	  this	  resistance	  originated	  from,	  what	  it	  was	  designed	  to	  achieve,	  and	  how	  this	  intervention	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politicisation.	  	  	   Second,	   the	   chapter	   presents	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   two	   inquiries	   under	  discussion.	   It	   describes	   how	   partisan	   political	   interests	   and	   interdepartmental	  rivalry	  stifled	  the	  investigations,	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  politicised	  outcome.	  Finally,	  the	   chapter	   offers	   an	   analysis	   of	   the	   causes	   and	   conditions	   that	   underpin	   the	  politicisation	  of	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  bureaucracy	  during	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  	  	  What	  follows	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  how	  political	  interests	  can	  seep	  into	   an	   intelligence	  bureaucracy	   and	   result	   in	   a	  politicised	   intelligence	   service.	  	  The	   underlying	   thesis	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   if	   an	   intelligence	   agency	   is	  established,	  organised	  and	  administered	  with	  partisan	  objectives	  in	  mind,	  it	  will	  inevitably	   be	   vulnerable	   to	   politicisation.	   In	   short,	   if	   the	   administration	   of	   an	  intelligence	   service	   is	   politicised	   this	   will	   inevitably	   produce	   a	   politicised	  intelligence	  service.	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Divergent	  voices:	  establishing	  the	  Security	  Service	  In	  February	  1941,	  after	  a	  series	  of	  negotiations	  dating	  back	  to	  1936,	  the	  War	  Cabinet	  approved	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	   ‘Defence	  Security	  Bureau’	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  Department.	  Known	  as	  the	  Security	  Service,	  this	  agency	  operated	   under	   the	   administrative	   control	   of	   the	   Attorney	   General,	   but	  conformed	   to	   the	   operational	   control	   of	   the	   Chiefs	   of	   Staff	   in	   the	   Defence	  Department.	   In	  short,	   it	   served	   two	  quite	  different	  masters.	   	  On	  5	  March	  1941,	  Eric	  Edwin	  Longfield	  Lloyd	  was	  appointed	  Director	  of	   the	  Security	  Service,	  but	  Lloyd	  was	  given	  no	  written	  charter	  outlining	  the	  powers	  and	  authority	  vested	  in	  the	  new	  Service	  	  (NAA:	  A	  5954,	  805/2;	  Lamidey	  1970:	  49).	  Consequently,	  when	  the	  Service	  became	  operational	  on	  31	  March,	  it	  immediately	  met	  obstructionism	  in	  its	  development,	  staff	  appointments,	  and	  other	  political	  difficulties	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199).	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  would	  never	  function	  as	  intended.	  	  	  	  	   	  Securing	   competent	   staff	   to	   the	   Service	   also	   presented	   significant	  problems.	   The	   Attorney	   General’s	   department	   was	   reluctant	   to	   cooperate	   in	  confirming	   staff	   appointments	   in	   the	   central	   and	   state	   branches.	   Director	  Longfield	   Lloyd	   turned	   to	   the	   army	   to	   obtain	   personnel	   and	   he	   appointed	   a	  number	   of	   former	   Military	   Intelligence	   staff.	   Except	   for	   South	   Australia,	   all	  Directors	  of	   the	  State	  branches	  were	  army	  officers	  and	  most	  of	   these	  branches	  operated	  within	  the	  Army’s	  Intelligence	  section	  of	  the	  General	  Staff	  (Coulthard-­‐Clark	   1979	   b:	   24).	   Although	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   department	   refused	   to	  appoint	   any	   civilian	   staff,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   it	   complained	   about	   the	  ‘militarisation’	   of	   the	   Security	   Service.	   Consequently,	   the	   Service	   remained	  without	   civilian	   staff	   for	   several	   months.	   It	   became	   clear	   that	   administrative	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assistance	   from	   the	   Attorney	   General	   would	   not	   be	   forthcoming	   (Templeton	  1979:	  180–181).	  	  	  	  	   The	   already	   existing	   intelligence	   services	   were	   reluctant	   to	   cooperate	  with	   the	   new	   Security	   Service.	   For	   example,	   the	   navy	   had	   little	   faith	   in	   the	  abilities	  of	  the	  Service	  and	  distrusted	  the	  army’s	  dominating	  influence.	  It	  tended	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  Naval	  Security	  Services	  for	  information.	  Although	  it	  was	  intended	  that	  naval	   security	   files	  would	  be	  handed	  over	   to	   the	  Security	  Service	  upon	   its	  commencement,	   the	   navy	   later	   refused	   to	   relinquish	   any	   of	   their	   own	  responsibilities	   and	   no	   Naval	   Intelligence	   files	   were	   handed	   over.	   In	   August	  1941,	  the	  navy	  then	  withdrew	  its	  officer	   from	  the	  Security	  Service	  and	  severed	  all	   relations	   (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	   2).	   	   	   	   The	   air	   force,	   for	   similar	  reasons,	  continued	  to	  rely	  upon	  its	  own	  Directorate	  of	  Intelligence	  and	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  Security	  Service	  (Cain	  1983:	  280).	  	  	   Harold	   Jones,	   Director	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   Investigation	   Branch	  (herein	  CIB),	  was	  also	  uncooperative.	  He	  sought	  to	  protect	  the	  Branch’s	  area	  of	  interest.	  No	  CIB	  security	  files	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  new	  Security	  Service.	  Later	  the	  army	  attempted	  to	  assume	  more	  of	  the	  Branch’s	  functions.	   It	  requested	  the	  Dominions	   Office	   in	   London	   that	   all	   security	   and	   intelligence	   communications	  should	   now	   be	   directed	   through	   the	   Security	   Service,	   not	   the	   CIB.	   But	   Jones	  refused	   to	   hand	   over	   the	   cipher	   codes	   for	   the	   transmission	   of	   the	  communications.	   Sir	   George	   Knowles,	   on	   the	   advice	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	  stepped	   in	   and	   informed	   the	   army	   that	   Jones	  would	   indeed	   remain	   the	   liaison	  between	  Australia	  and	  London	  (Cain	  1983:	  279).	  Jones	  was	  sceptical	  of	  the	  Army	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Enter	  the	  inquisitors	  Lieutenant-­‐Colonel	   John	   Mawhood’s	   presence	   in	   Australia	   is	   steeped	   in	  mystery	  and	  controversy.	   	  He	  arrived	  in	  December	  1940,	  with	  the	  full	  approval	  of	   the	   War	   Office	   and	   MI5	   as	   part	   of	   the	   British	   Military	   Mission	   104,	   which	  appears	   to	   have	   been	   part	   of	   the	   Special	   Operations	   Executive	   (Andrew	  1989:	  221).	   After	   a	   six-­‐week	   visit	   to	   New	   Zealand,	   where	   he	   carried	   out	   training	  exercises	  in	  paramilitary	  activities	  with	  the	  armed	  forces	  and	  helped	  to	  organise	  the	  Central	  Security	  Intelligence	  Bureau,	  Mawhood	  moved	  on	  to	  Australia	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  29/401/477).	  In	  Australia,	  his	  objective	  was	  to	  establish	  a	  school	  for	  psychological	  and	  guerrilla	  warfare	  aimed	  at	   countering	   fifth	  column	  activities.	  Lieutenant	  Colonel	  M.	  Percival,	  Director	  of	  Military	  Intelligence	  in	  London,	  stated	  on	   9	   October	   1940	   that	   Mawhood	   was	   to	   be	   placed	   at	   the	   disposal	   of	   the	  Australian	  General	  Staff	  in	  order	  to:	  	  	   (a) Initiate	   defensive	   action	   against	   enemy	   fifth	   column	   and	   paramilitary	  activities	  in	  Australia	  and	  her	  dependencies.	  	  (b) 	  Initiate	   offensive	   action	   by	   organising	   a	   fifth	   column	   of	   its	   own	   and	  paramilitary	  activities	  in	  territories	  occupied	  by	  the	  enemy.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  MP	  742/1,	  M/7/168)	  	  	  	  Seconded	  to	  Army	  Headquarters	  in	  Melbourne,	  his	  objectives	  were	  kept	  strictly	  on	  a	  need–to–know	  basis.	  Brudenell	  White,	  Chief	  of	  the	  Australian	  General	  Staff	  was	   briefed	   on	   Mawhood’s	   assignment	   in	   June	   1940,	   but	   Cabinet	   was	   not	  informed	  until	   January	  1941	   (NAA:	  A	  1608,	  G	  39/2/1).	  This	   secrecy	   invariably	  caused	   confusion.	  When	   Brudenell	  White	   was	   killed	   in	   an	   air	   crash	   in	   August	  1941,	   his	   successor,	   Vernon	   Sturdee,	   did	   not	   know	   of	   Mawhood’s	   objectives.	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Thus,	  the	  army	  knew	  little	  of	  what	  Mawhood’s	  mission	  was	  intended	  to	  achieve	  	  (Winter	  1995:	  72).	  	  	   While	  Mawhood’s	  service	  in	  Australia	  began	  on	  a	  paramilitary	  footing,	   it	  ended	  serving	  a	  political	   function.	  He	  possessed	  an	   intimate	  knowledge	  of	  MI5	  security	  and	  political	  operations	  and	  at	   the	  request	  of,	  Harold	   Jones,	  Mawhood	  met	  with	  cabinet	  ministers	  and	  the	  prime	  minister	   in	   June	  1941.	  After	  meeting	  with	   Mawhood,	   Prime	   Minister	   Robert	   Menzies	   later	   reported	   that	   he	   had	  ‘greatly	   impressed’	   him.	   Menzies	   recommended	   that	   Mawhood’s	   services	   be	  utilised	   further	   (NAA:	   MP	   729/6,	   15/403/95).	   	   Attorney	   General	   William	  Hughes,	   and	   the	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   Department	   Sir	   George	  Knowles,	   concurred.	  Exactly	  what	  Mawhood	   discussed	  with	   the	   government	   is	  not	  disclosed	  in	  the	  archival	  sources	  but	  he	  seems	  to	  have	  quickly	  earned	  their	  trust	  and	  confidence	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  29/401/477).	  	  	   But	  Mawhood	  did	  not	  impress	  the	  army.	  His	  bona	  fides	  were	  immediately	  questioned	   and	   army	   authorities	   declared	   him	   fraudulent.	   ‘I	   regard	  Mawhood	  totally	   unfitted	   for	   any	   employment	   in	   connection	   with	   Security	   Service	  Organisation’	  Lieutenant–General	  Vernon	  Sturdee	  wrote	   to	   the	  Deputy	  Chief	  of	  the	   General	   Staff,	   John	   Northcott,	   on	   11	   July	   1941.	   ‘I	   flatly	   refuse	   to	   permit	  Mawhood	   to	   investigate	   Army	   Intelligence	   a	   subject	   of	   which	   he	   has	   no	  knowledge’.	   	   Sturdee	   instructed	   Northcott	   to	   cable	   the	   War	   Office	   in	   London	  demanding	   that	  Mawhood	   be	   recalled	   (NAA:	  MP	   742/1,	  M/7/168).	   But	   a	  War	  Cabinet	   minute	   reveals	   that	   Sturdee’s	   cablegram	   did	   not	   have	   ministerial	  
	  177	  
approval	   and	   his	   actions	   ‘contravened	   instructions	   relating	   to	   the	   channel	   of	  communications	  for	  government	  matters’	  (NAA:	  A	  5954,	  806/1).	  	  	  	  It	   appears	   that	   the	   army	   was	   desperate	   to	   find	   anything	   that	   might	  incriminate	  Mawhood,	   presumably	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   shut	   down	   his	   inquiry.	   In	  Melbourne,	   plain-­‐clothed	   Army	   Intelligence	   officers	   followed	   him	   closely	   and	  tapped	   his	   residential	   telephone.	   Such	   a	   tactic,	   one	   usually	   employed	   to	  investigate	   cases	  of	   espionage,	   sabotage,	  or	   subversive	  activity	  —	  an	  executive	  action	  —	  most	  likely	  had	  no	  executive	  approval.	  Mawhood’s	  military	  record	  was	  given	   a	   thorough	   examination	   and	   his	   background	   scrutinised.	   Yet,	   no	  incriminating	  evidence	  could	  be	  found	  (Cain	  1983:	  285;	  Canberra	  Times	  25	  June	  1978:	   16).	   Director	   of	   the	   Security	   Service,	   Longfield	   Lloyd,	   made	   repeated	  claims	   to	   the	   government	   that	   the	  man	   representing	   himself	   as	  Mawhood	  was	  not	  in	  fact	  his	  true	  identity.	  He	  told	  Sir	  George	  Knowles	  that	  ‘Mawhood	  may	  have	  been	  pushed	  off	  the	  boat	  on	  his	  way	  out’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  Menzies	  was	  forced	  to	  check	  on	  Mawhood’s	  identity	  and	  verify	  his	  background.	  The	  War	  Office	  cabled	  back	  a	  report	  through	  the	  Australian	  High	  Commissioner,	  S.	  M.	  Bruce,	  on	  22	   July	  1941.	  The	   report	   stated	   that	  although	  Mawhood	  was	   ‘a	  man	  of	   great	   keenness	   and	  energy’	   he	  was	   ‘rather	  heavy-­‐footed	   and	   lacking	   in	  tact’.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  War	  Office	  suggested	  that	  he	  probably	  did	  not	  have	  the	  experience	  to	  conduct	  such	  an	  inquiry.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  War	  Office	  informed	  the	  Australian	  government	   that	   they	  would	   ‘be	  hard	  put	   to	  send	  another	  man’	  and	  because	  of	  this,	  there	  could	  be	  no	  harm	  in	  asking	  for	  Mawhood’s	  views	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	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But	   the	   army	   showed	   open	   contempt	   for	   Mawhood	   and	   it	   used	  underhanded	   methods	   to	   try	   and	   dispose	   of	   him.	   	   Without	   the	   consent	   or	  knowledge	  of	  the	  government,	  Army	  Headquarters	   in	  Melbourne	  sent	  a	  private	  message	   to	   the	   War	   Office	   in	   London	   complaining	   that	   ‘Mawhood’s	   presence	  here	  is	  a	  continual	  disturbing	  factor	  and	  a	  source	  of	  embarrassment,	  request	  you	  recall	   Mawhood	   at	   once’.	   The	   War	   Office	   replied	   somewhat	   confused	   and	  apologetic	  announcing	  that	  he	  would	  be	  recalled	  to	  London	   immediately	  (NAA:	  MP	  742/1,	  M/7/168).	  The	  army	  then	  began	  preparations	  for	  his	  departure.	  His	  passage	  back	  to	  England	  was	  booked	  for	  3	  September	  1941,	  but	  none	  of	  this	  was	  known	   to	   or	   authorised	   by	   the	   Australian	   government	   (NAA:	   MP	   729/6,	  29/401/477).	  	   Despite	  the	  army’s	  protests	  and	  the	  War	  Office’s	  unfavourable	  remarks	  on	  Mawhood’s	   abilities,	   Hughes	   and	   Knowles	   pushed	   back.	   They	   seemed	  determined	  to	  retain	  his	  services.	  On	  2	  September	  1941,	  Prime	  Minister	  Menzies	  informed	   the	  Minister	   for	   the	  Army,	   Percy	   Spender,	   that	  Mawhood	  was	   not	   to	  return	  to	  London	  —	  instead	  he	  was	  to	  remain	  in	  Australia	  for	  three	  months	  and	  be	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  29/401/477).	  In	  this	  regard,	   Mawhood	   seems	   to	   have	   enjoyed	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	   patronage	   and	  political	  protection.	  However,	  sustained	  pressure	  from	  the	  army	  did	  have	  some	  success	  and	   the	  War	  Cabinet	  bent	   to	  some	  of	   their	  demands.	  Mawhood’s	   remit	  was	   significantly	   diluted.	   He	   was	   now	   to	   be	   assisted	   in	   his	   inquiry	   by	   the	  Victorian	   Commissioner	   of	   Police,	   Alexander	   Duncan.	   	   The	   army	   had	   deemed	  Duncan	  a	  more	  acceptable	  appointment	  for	  the	  investigation.	  More	  importantly,	  on	  24	  September	  1941,	   the	  Director	  of	  Military	   Intelligence	  was	   informed	   that	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there	   would	   be	   no	   inquiry	   into	   operational	   intelligence	   of	   the	   military.	   The	  inquiry	  would	  focus	  on	  ‘security	  matters	  only’	  (NAA:	  MP	  742/1,	  M/7/168).	  	  
	  
Preliminary	  insights	  All	  of	  this	  suggests	  that	  competing	  interests	  between	  political	  leaders	  and	  public	   servants	   (the	   army)	   created	   an	   environment	  where	   politicisation	   could	  take	  place.	  Three	  features	  distinguish	  why	  such	  an	  environment	  was	  conducive	  to	  politicisation.	  First,	  each	  party	  sought	  to	  manipulate	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  of	  the	  inquiry	  to	  their	  advantage.	  Second,	  neither	  of	  the	  investigators	  appointed	  to	  conduct	   the	   investigation	   were	   apolitical	   bureaucrats.	   Mawhood,	   for	   instance	  was	  appointed	  at	  the	  pleasure	  of	  the	  government,	  while	  Duncan	  was	  appointed	  at	   the	   request	   of	   the	   army.	   Both	   served	   to	   deliver	   findings	   responsive	   to	   the	  interests	  of	  their	  patrons.	  And	  finally,	  all	  parties	  attempted	  to	  control	  the	  subject	  matter	  that	  would	  be	  investigated.	  	  	  Another	  factor	  worth	  noting	  is	  that	  the	  army,	  an	  apparent	  apolitical	  body,	  could	  wield	  significant	  power	  —	  enough	  to	  influence	  the	  terms	  of	  reference	  of	  a	  formal	  government	   inquiry.	  There	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  military	  officials	  acted	  above	   democratically	   elected	   representatives	   of	   government	   and	   assumed	  political	   roles.	   For	   example,	   the	   army	   appealed	   directly	   to	   the	   War	   Office	   in	  London	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   Mawhood	   without	   the	   knowledge	   or	   consent	   of	   the	  Australian	   government.	   As	   Frank	   Cain	   rightly	   argues	   this	   ‘amounted	   to	   a	  countermanding	   of	   the	   of	   the	   government’s	   decision	   to	   hold	   the	   investigation’	  (Cain	   1983:	   285).	   The	   army,	   for	   their	   own	   benefit,	   directly	   intervened	   in	   the	  domestic	   politics	   of	   government	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   discrediting	   Mawhood	   and	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stopping	  his	  inquiry.	  That	  Duncan	  was	  then	  instructed	  to	  assist	  Mawhood	  can	  be	  viewed	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   intervention	   and	   a	   result	   of	   pressure	   exerted	  onto	  the	  government	  by	  the	  army.	  	   Taken	  together	  these	  factors	  show	  that	  the	  inquiry	  took	  place	  in	  a	  highly	  politicised	   environment	   driven	   by	   personal	   and	   bureaucratic	   politics.	   The	  inquiry’s	   objectives	   were	   purposefully	   shifted	   from	   addressing	   the	  maladministration	  of	  the	  Intelligence	  Services	  to	  political	  point	  scoring.	  This	  was	  a	  planned	  strategy	  to	  achieve	  particular	  partisan	  goals	  and	  an	  attempt	  to	  thwart	  other	  parties	  from	  achieving	  their	  objectives.	  According	  to	  intelligence	  historian,	  Glenn	  P.	  Hastedt,	  this	  behaviour	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	  form	  of	  ‘soft	  politicization’,	  where	  ‘victory	  is	  achieved	  not	  by	  imposing	  an	  outcome	  but	  by	  shaping	  the	  ideas,	  voices,	  rules,	  and	  settings’	  (Hastedt	  2013:10).	  Among	  the	  many	  divergent	  voices,	  the	  army’s	  was	  the	  most	  commanding.	  	  	   Perhaps,	   the	   relevant	   question	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   these	   events	   is	   why	  would	   the	   army	   want	   to	   obstruct	   a	   formal	   government	   inquiry	   into	   the	  maladministration	  of	  the	  Security	  Service	  and	  Military	  Intelligence.	  And,	  why	  did	  they	  attempt	   to	  shape	   the	   ideas,	  voices,	   rules	  and	  settings	  of	   the	   investigation?	  The	  more	  interesting	  question	  is	  what	  exactly	  were	  they	  so	  determined	  to	  hide?	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Speculative	  answers	  can	  be	   found	  by	  examining	   the	   rise	  of	  a	  number	  of	  secretive	  armies	  that	  had	  scheming	  political	  ambitions.	  	  It	  is	  possible,	  though	  not	  certain	  that	  the	  military,	  and	  sympathetic	  elements	  within	  the	  government,	  had	  established	   dubious	   connections	   with	   a	   number	   of	   right	   wing	   paramilitary	  groups	  such	  as	   the	  Old	  Guard,	   the	  New	  Guard,	  and	  the	  White	  Army.	  Examining	  the	   relationship	   between	   these	   bodies	   and	   Military	   Intelligence	   provides	   a	  glimpse	  into	  why	  the	  army	  had	  so	  fervently	  contested	  Mawhood’s	  investigation.	  Archival	   documents	   and	   secondary	   sources	   provide	   some	   insight	   into	   why	  Mawhood’s	   inquiry	   into	   military	   intelligence	   may	   have	   been	   a	   catalyst	   for	  politicising	  the	  inquiry.	  	  	  
*****	  
	  
The	  New	  Guard	  Formed	  in	  February	  1931,	  the	  New	  Guard	  was	  a	  right	  wing	  militant	  group	  fiercely	  loyal	  to	  the	  empire	  and	  staunchly	  anti-­‐communist.	  At	  its	  peak	  the	  Guard	  had	   about	   36	   000	   members,	   most	   of	   which	   were	   ex-­‐Australian	   Imperial	  Servicemen	  (Moore	  2010:	  204).	  A	  police	  report	  on	  the	  New	  Guard,	  presented	  to	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Legislative	  Assembly	  on	  23	  December	  1931,	   listed	   forty-­‐three	   military	   officers	   and	   an	   extensive	   membership	   of	   ex-­‐military	   personnel	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2,	  Volume	  1).	   In	  May	  1932,	  Senator	   James	  Dunn,	  alleged	   that	   ‘it	  had	  been	  definitely	  established…	  that	  seventeen	  members	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Parliament	  are	  members	  of	  this	  organisation’	  (Senate	  19	  May	  1932:	  1084).	  It	  is	  fairly	  clear	  that	  the	  New	  Guard,	  indeed,	  had	  political	  motivations.	  For	  instance,	  in	  early	   1932,	   it	   had	   come	   close	   to	   overthrowing	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	   Labor	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government	  of	   J.	  T.	  Lang.	  Later	   in	  March	  1932,	  Longfield	  Lloyd,	  Director	  of	   the	  Security	  Service,	  reported	  that	  reliable	  sources	  had	  informed	  him	  that	  a	  section	  of	   the	   New	   Guard	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Bulldog	   Drummonds’	   ‘had	   been	   ordered	   to	  kidnap	  the	  entire	  NSW	  Cabinet’	   (NAA:	  A	  367,	  C	  94121).65	  It	   is	  possible	   that	   the	  New	  Guard	  not	  only	  had	  intimate	  connections	  with	  New	  South	  Wales	  Police	  and	  Military	  Intelligence	  but	  also	  received	  some	  measure	  of	  political	  protection	  from	  them.	  	  	   On	   19	   March	   1932,	   Francis	   De	   Groot,	   of	   the	   New	   Guard	   joined	   the	  Governor	   General’s	   entourage	   at	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Sydney	   Harbour	   Bridge.	  Mounted	  on	  horseback	  and	   in	   army	  uniform	  he	   slashed	   the	   ceremonial	   ribbon	  thereby	   pre-­‐empting	   Premier	   J.	   T.	   Lang’s	   official	   opening	   ceremony.	   De	   Groot	  declared	   the	   bridge	   open	   ‘on	   behalf	   of	   decent	   and	   loyal	   citizens	   of	  New	   South	  Wales’	  —	  he	  was	  arrested	  but	  only	  briefly	  incarcerated	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  21	   March	   1932:	   15).66	  De	   Groot’s	   actions	   were	   a	   vivid	   demonstration	   of	   the	  political	  intentions	  of	  the	  New	  Guard	  and	  his	  brief	  arrest	  was,	  perhaps,	  a	  signal	  of	  the	   federal	   government’s	   tolerance	   toward	   their	   politics.	   	   	   De	   Groot	   also	  reportedly	  acted	  as	  a	   conduit	  between	   the	  Attorney	  General,	   John	  Latham,	  and	  Eric	   Campbell	   —	   Chief	   Commander	   of	   the	   New	   Guard	   —	   in	   order	   to	   pass	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  These	  same	  allegations,	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  statutory	  declarations	  confirming	  the	  Guard’s	   intentions	  —	   supplied	   by	   former	  members—	  were	   aired	   in	   the	   Senate	   on	   19	  May	  1932.	  This	  was	  quickly	  shut	  down	  by	  Senator	  George	  Pearce	  and	  then	  ruled	  out	  of	  order	  by	  the	  Speaker.	  See:	  Senate	  19	  May	  1932:	  	  1080-­‐1086.	  	  	  66	  De	   Groot	   was	   charged	   with	   offensive	   behavior,	   malicious	   damage,	   and	   uttering	  threatening	  words	  to	  a	  police	  officer.	  The	  latter	  two	  charges	  were	  dropped,	  but	  he	  was	  convicted	   of	   offensive	   behavior	   and	   fined	   £	   5.	   See:	   Evans,	   R.	  W	   (2005)	   ‘William	   John	  Mackay	  and	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Police	  Force	  1910	  –	  1948:	  A	  Study	  of	  Police	  Power’,	  PhD	  Thesis,	  Monash	  University,	  p.	  168-­‐169.	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information	  to	  the	  CIB.67	  Between	  1932	  and	  1937,	  archival	  documents	  show	  that	  Campbell	  was	   receiving	   correspondence	   on	   Fascism	   and	   anti-­‐Bolshevism	   from	  Dr	  R.	  Asmis,	  German	  Consul	  General	  in	  Sydney	  (NAA:	  A	  6122/2/Volume	  1;	  NAA:	  A	   12393,	   799).	   	   Campbell	   was	  most	   likely	   supplying	   translations	   of	   Goebbels’	  speeches	  and	  related	  information	  from	  this	  channel	  through	  to	  Attorney	  General	  Latham	   (Winter	   1995:	   24).	   But,	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   stronger	   links	   between	  Campbell	  and	  the	  government.	  	  	  	   	  Evidence	   indicates	   that	   personal	   connections	   between	   the	   New	   Guard,	  the	  military,	   and	   parts	   of	   the	   government	   extended	   deeper	   than	   these	   formal	  connections.	  For	  example,	  in	  The	  Intrigue	  Master,	  Barbara	  Winter’s	  biography	  of	  Director	   of	   Naval	   Intelligence,	   Rupert	   Long,	   identifies	   that	   De	   Groot	   attended	  Long’s	  wedding	  as	  a	  personal	  guest	  in	  August	  1937	  (Winter	  1995:	  29).	  Also,	  Eric	  Campbell	   had	   written	   twice	   to	   Prime	   Minister,	   Joseph	   Lyons,	   offering	   the	  services	  of	   the	  New	  Guard	   to	   the	   government.	   	   ‘In	   case	  of	   emergency	   the	  New	  Guard	   will	   unreservedly	   place	   its	   entire	   resources	   at	   the	   disposal	   and	   under	  control	  of	  Commonwealth	  Government’,	  Campbell	  wrote	  to	  Lyons	  on	  the	  6	  April	  1932.	   ‘Organised	   units	   under	   known	   commanders	  will	   be	   ready	   on	   two	   hours	  notice,	   day	   or	   night’.	   Lyons	   replied	   the	   following	   day,	   but	   he	   did	   not	   reject	  Campbell’s	  offer	  outright,	  rather	  he	  suggested	  it	  was	  not	  necessary.	  ‘We	  welcome	  at	  all	  times	  the	  cooperation	  of	  all	  sections	  of	  the	  community	  in	  maintaining	  law	  and	   order’	   but	   on	   this	   occasion	   Lyons	   said	   he	   did	   not	   foresee	   any	   emergency	  arising	  (Lyons	  Papers	  MS	  4581,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  4).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  De	  Groot	  may	  have	  even	  been	  an	  undercover	  agent	  placed	  within	  the	  New	  Guard	  by	  one	  of	  the	  security	  services.	  There	  is,	  however,	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  this.	  See	  Andrew	  Moore	  (2010)	  ‘Loyal	  Lieutenant	  or	  Spy’	  p.	  205.	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On	  5	  May	  1932,	  Campbell	  again	  wrote	  to	  Lyons	  this	  time	  to	  congratulate	  him	  on	  the	  success	  of	  his	   ‘policy	  regarding	  the	  suppression	  of	  communism	  and	  the	   deportation	   of	   communists’.	   Lyons	  wrote	   back	   to	   Campbell	   on	   14	   January	  1932	  thanking	  him	  for	  his	  correspondence.	  On	  this	  occasion,	  Campbell’s	  offer	  of	  service	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  accepted.	  Lyons	  told	  Campbell	  that	  he	  had	  shown	  his	  letter	   to	   the	   Attorney	   General	   who	   had	   requested	   that	   if	   Campbell	   had	   ‘any	  information,	   which	  would	   assist	   in	   the	   prosecution	   of	   offenders	   [communists]	  the	  Attorney	  General	  would	  be	  very	  glad	  if	  you	  could	  communicate	   it	   to	  him	  at	  the	  earliest	  possible	  moment’	  (NAA:	  CP	  30/3,	  13).	  Given	  this,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	  the	   government	   had	   intended	   to	   use	   the	   New	   Guard,	   perhaps,	   as	   a	   means	   of	  outsourcing	  the	  intelligence	  gathering	  functions	  that	  were	  too	  politically	  dirty.	  	  	  It	   appears	   that	   the	   government	  may	  have	   tolerated	   the	  New	  Guard,	   but	  only	   if	   it	   was	   politically	   expedient.	   	   If	   it	   could	   supply	   some	   form	   of	   political	  capital,	  such	  as	  information	  leading	  to	  the	  arrest	  of	  Communists,	  the	  New	  Guard	  might	  even	  be	  useful.	  However,	   if	   it	   caused	  political	  problems,	   the	  government	  tended	   to	  disassociate	   itself	   from	   the	  Guard.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	  government’s	  position	  is	  both	  telling	  and	  contradictory.	  On	  11	  March	  1932,	  Director	  of	  the	  CIB	  Harold	   Jones	   wrote	   to	   the	   Acting	   Attorney	   General	   urging	   that	   some	   form	   of	  official	   action	   be	   taken	   against	   the	   Guard.	   He	   recommended	   that	   the	   Prime	  Minister	  under	  Section	  27	  (1)	  of	  the	  Crimes	  Act	  (Cwlth)	  immediately	  prohibit	  the	  New	  Guard	  in	  all	  states	  and	  territories	  (NAA:	  A	  367,	  C	  94121).	  However,	  rather	  than	  prohibit	  the	  New	  Guard	  under	   law,	  Lyons	  placed	  a	  small	  statement	   in	  The	  
Argus	  newspaper	  the	  next	  day	  appealing	  to	  ‘all	  law	  abiding	  citizens’	  to	  cooperate	  with	  authorities	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  ‘peace	  of	  the	  community’	  (The	  Argus	  12	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March	   1932:23).	   	   Jones’	   recommendation	   seems	   to	   have	   had	  minimal	   impact.	  Given	   the	   federal	   government’s	   previous	   history	   in	   dealing	   with	   potentially	  ‘subversive’	   political	   groups	   and	   subversive	   associations,	   the	   New	   Guard	   was	  never	  declared	  criminal	  or	  a	   threat	   to	  national	  security.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   the	  IWW	   had	   been	   officially	   declared	   unlawful	   and	   members	   of	   its	   organisation	  harassed	  and	  imprisoned	  on	  far	  less	  incriminating	  evidence.	  Political	  bias	  in	  this	  case	   is	   clear.	   Right	   wing	   groups	   were	   deemed	   less	   radical	   and	   no	   threat	   to	  security.	  They	  were	  at	  times	  possibly	  even	  useful.	  	  	   This	   double	   standard,	   however,	   could	   not	   be	   sustained.	   In	   May	   1932,	  these	  matters	  were	   forced	   to	   the	  surface	  when	  New	  South	  Wales	  Police	  raided	  New	   Guard	   premises	   in	   Sydney.	   Documents	   seized	   in	   the	   raids	   were	   highly	  embarrassing	   because	   they	   appeared	   to	   confirm	   the	   allegations	   of	   collusion	  between	  the	  New	  Guard	  and	  the	  military	  (Egan	  1981:	  26).	  These	  allegations	  then	  started	  to	  circulate	  in	  the	  press.	  For	  example,	   in	  May	  1932,	  the	  Sydney	  Morning	  
Herald	  reported	  that	  police	  had	  uncovered	  military	  reports	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  the	   Intelligence	   Branch	   of	   the	   New	   Guard,	   which	   provided	   details	   about	   the	  transfer	  of	  arms	  and	  munitions	   from	  Victoria	  Barracks	   to	  Garden	   Island.	  Other	  information	  such	  as	   the	  military	  code	  names	  given	   to	  rifles,	  machine	  guns,	  and	  assorted	   firearms,	   were	   also	   discovered	   in	   their	   possession	   along	   with	  information	   regarding	   military	   troop	   movements	   and	   plans	   of	   the	   Victoria	  Barracks.	   The	   documents	   revealed	   that	   the	   Guard	   had	   ‘full	   knowledge	   of	   the	  federal	  government’s	  military	  wireless	  systems’	  (The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  12	  May	  1932:	  10;	  Amos	  1976:	  47).	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Questions	  were	  raised	  in	  the	  Senate	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  the	  same	  day.	  J.	  A	  Beasley,	  Labor	  Member	  for	  West	  Sydney,	  argued	  that	  the	  Defence	  Department	   ‘was	   in	   sympathy	  with	   the	  aims	  and	  objectives’	  of	   the	  New	  Guard,	  adding	  that	  the	  New	  Guard	  had	  been	  assured	  of	  ‘assistance	  and	  support	  from	  the	  Defence	  Department’.	  He	  wanted	  to	  know	  ‘who	  allowed	  secret	  information	  to	  be	  placed	  at	   the	  disposal	  of	   the	  organisation?’	   (NAA:	  B	  1535,	  812/1/23;	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  12	   May	   1932:670–71).	   	   The	   government	   firmly	   disputed	   the	  allegations.	  Prime	  Minister	  Lyons	  argued	  the	  whole	  affair	  was	  a	  ‘frame	  up’,	  which	  amounted	   to	   little	  more	   than	   ‘political	  propaganda’.	  He	  said	   that	   ‘the	  people	  of	  Australia	   will,	   I	   am	   sure,	   require	   more	   convincing	   evidence	   than	   has	   been	  adduced	   up	   to	   date	   before	   they	   will	   condemn	   either	   this	   Government,	   the	  Defence	   Department,	   or	   the	   organisation	   which	   has	   been	   attacked’.	   Lyons	  announced	   that	   the	   government	   would	   conduct	   a	   ‘close	   and	   exhaustive	  examination’	  through	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  to	  investigate	  the	  allegations.	  Beasley	  simply	  replied	  that	  ‘the	  prime	  minister	  will	  get	  all	  he	  wants	  from	  such	  an	  inquiry.	  He	  is	  up	  to	  his	  neck	  in	  it’	  (House	  of	  Representatives,	  12	  May	  1932:	  674).	  	  	   Rather	   tellingly,	   and	   as	   Beasley	   had	   anticipated,	   the	   Royal	   Commission	  never	   eventuated.68	  Instead,	   the	   Defence	   Department	   was	   commissioned	   to	  investigate	   itself	   behind	   closed	   doors.	   This	   inquiry	  was	   led	   by	   one	   of	   its	  most	  senior	   officers,	  Major	  General	   Julius	  H.	   Bruche,	   Australian	   Chief	   of	   the	  General	  Staff.	  Bruche	  submitted	  his	  reported	  on	  7	  June	  1932,	  and	  even	  though	  the	  report	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  exact	  reasons	  given	  by	  the	  Lyons	  government	  as	  to	  why	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  would	  not	  be	  held	  are	  difficult	   to	  determine.	  L.	   J.	  Egan	  argued	  that	   financial	  considerations	  were	  the	  primary	  reason	   why	   Lyons	   abandoned	   the	   idea.	   However,	   Lyons	   himself	   said	   in	   May	   1932,	   that	   an	  investigation	   of	   the	  New	  Guard	  was	  not	   necessary,	   but	   in	  August	   he	   said	   that	   an	   investigation	  should	  be	  a	  State	  not	  a	  Commonwealth	  matter.	  Compare:	  Egan,	  L.	   J	  (1981)	  p.	  27,	  with	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  20	  May	  1932:	  1125	  and	  31	  August	  1932:	  54-­‐55.	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was	   not	   tabled	   in	   parliament	   it	   was	   made	   public	   several	   months	   later	   in	   the	  
Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  (Egan,	  1981:	  27).	  Bruche	  reported	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  of	   collusion	   or	   misconduct.	   In	   many	   respects,	   Bruche’s	   findings	   merely	   echo	  Lyon’s	   claim	   that	   the	   whole	   affair	   was	   a	   frame-­‐up	   reporting	   almost	   anodyne	  conclusions.	  In	  short,	  Bruche	  stated	  that:	  No	  evidence	  that	  information	  of	  a	  confidential	  character	  referring	  to	  any	  Defence	  matter	  has	  been	  communicated	  to	  or	  obtained	  by	  the	  New	  Guard	  from	  any	  officer	  of	  the	  Department.	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  B	  1535,	  812/1/23)	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  Although	   Bruche	   found	   no	   evidence	   of	   official	   collusion,	   he	   left	   some	  important	   questions	   unasked.	   For	   instance,	   Bruche	   noted	   that	   the	   New	   Guard	  had	  actively	  recruited	  members	  of	  the	  militia	  forces	  and	  it	  was	  possible	  that	  such	  personnel,	  motivated	  by	  ‘the	  best	  of	  intentions’,	  had	  joined	  the	  New	  Guard.	  While	  Bruche	  acknowledged	  that	  militia	  forces	  were	  involved	  with	  the	  New	  Guard,	  he	  sidestepped	  the	   issue	  of	   investigating	  the	   involvement	  of	  any	  militia	  personnel.	  	  Perhaps	   more	   revealing,	   he	   stated	   that	   his	   inquiry	   had	   been	   restricted	   to	  investigating	  the	  conduct	  of	  military	  officers	  only	  while	  on	  duty.	  When	  acting	  ‘in	  their	   civil	   capacity’	   he	   pointed	   out	   that	  members	   of	   the	   armed	   forces	  were	   ‘at	  liberty	   to	   engage	   in	   any	   activity	   they	   desire.	   They	   are	   free	   to	   join	   any	   type	   of	  organisation	  be	  it	  political	  or	  otherwise’	  (NAA:	  B	  1535,	  812/1/23).	  Such	  findings	  hardly	   absolve	   the	   Defence	   Department	   of	   colluding	   with	   the	   New	   Guard	   and	  leave	  important	  questions	  unanswered.	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That	  Bruche’s	  inquiry	  stopped	  short	  of	  examining	  the	  conduct	  of	  military	  personnel	  outside	  of	  ‘business	  hours’,	  and	  militia	  personnel,	  indicates	  a	  selective	  interpretation	  and	  articulation	  of	  the	  issue.	  As	  Bruche	  noted,	  a	  wide	  and	  probing	  investigation	   did	   not	   take	   place	   and	   thereby,	   certain	   questions	   and	   evidence	  were	   suppressed.	   So	  while	   the	   government	   did	   not	   encourage	  Bruche	   to	   draw	  conclusions	  favourable	  to	  it,	  an	  investigatory	  barrier	  was	  placed	  on	  his	  inquiries	  and	   issues	   addressed	   selectively.	   In	   the	   Bruche	   inquiry,	   political	  manipulation	  entered	  first	  by	  the	  government	  allowing	  the	  Defence	  Department	  to	  investigate	  itself	  and	  then	  partly	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  questions	  asked,	  or	  not	  asked	  by	  Bruche.	  It	   suggests	  a	  bureaucracy	   intent	  on	  protecting	   information	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  subtle	  manipulation.	   Further	   evidence	  of	   complicity	   can	  be	   seen	   in	   a	   comment	  later	  made	  by	   the	  Director	  of	   the	  Commonwealth	   Investigation	  Branch,	  Harold	  Jones.	  He	  stated	  that:	  	  When	   the	  New	  Guard	   raised	   its	  Fascist	  head	   in	  New	  South	  Wales,	   there	  was	  an	  organisation	  in	  existence	  supported	  by	  army	  officers	  and	  the	  then	  Commissioner	  of	  Police	  because	  they	  regarded	  the	  Labor	  government	  as	  disloyal.	  The	  Investigation	  Branch	  was	  instructed	  to	  inquire	  into	  this	  body	  known	  as	  the	  League	  of	  National	  Safety.69	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2)	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Jones	  did	  not	  state	  what	  action,	  if	  any,	  followed	  from	  these	  inquiries.	  But	  according	   to	   Jones,	   the	   investigations	  provoked	  bitter	   resentment	  between	   the	  Army	  and	  the	  civilian	  intelligence	  services.	  So,	  although	  the	  CIB	  had	  kept	  tabs	  on	  these	  groups,	  no	  action	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  taken	  to	  shut	  them	  down.	  In	  the	  end,	  ‘what	   remains’	   as	   historian	   L.	   J.	   Egan	  points	   out	   ‘is	   that	   the	   investigations	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  League	  of	  National	  Safety	  (LNS)	  was	  probably	  a	  branch	  of	  the	   White	   Guard	   and	   that	   the	   two	   organisations	   had	   merged	   in	   the	   1930s.	   See	  Coulthard-­‐Clark	  (1996)	  p.	  173.	  Archival	  document	  NAA:	  A	  396,	  D	  585,	  compiled	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	   Investigation	   Branch	   and	   later	   registered	   by	   ASIO	   in	   1992,	   also	  supports	  this.	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denial	  of	  collusion	  was	  made	  by	  an	  organisation	  which	  had	  a	  vested	  interest	   in	  absolving	   itself	   of	   complicity’	   (Egan	   1981:	   28).	   Even	   though	   the	   civilian	  intelligence	  services	  knew	  of	  the	  spurious	  connections	  between	  the	  military	  and	  the	   paramilitary	   groups	   the	   Bruche	   inquiry	   was	   shaped	   in	   such	   a	   way	   as	   to	  protect	   the	   military	   from	   further	   public	   embarrassment.	   Again,	   elements	   of	  politicisation	  in	  various	  forms	  become	  apparent.	  	  	  	  
Honourable	  gentlemen?	  The	  Old	  Guard	  and	  the	  White	  Guard	  On	  28	  July	  1931,	  Ernest	  Crutchley,	  the	  British	  representative	  in	  Australia,	  wrote	  to	  the	  British	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Dominion	  Affairs	  informing	  him	  of	   the	   political	   situation	   regarding	   the	   government	   of	   J.	   T.	   Lang	   in	   New	   South	  Wales.	  Aspects	  of	  Crutchley’s	  letter	  are	  revealing.	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  of	  danger	  of	  public	  safety,	  though	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  loud	  talk	  and	  sensational	  rumours,	  but	  the	  secret	  organisation	  referred	  to	   in	  my	  dispatch	  of	  April	  22nd	   to	   the	  Assistant	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  has	  developed	  well.	  It	  numbers	  5000	  in	  Sydney	  and	  18	  000	  in	  the	  Country	  and	  is	  working	  secretly	  with	  the	  police.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NA:	  DO	  35/400/4,	  Author’s	  emphasis)	  70	  	   	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  Crutchley’s	  reference	  to	  a	  secret	  organisation	  working	  with	  the	  police	  was	  that	  of	  the	  Old	  Guard.	  The	  Old	  Guard	  was	  an	  organisation	  formed	  in	  1930	  by	  C.	  L.	  A.	  Abbott,	  ex-­‐Australian	  Imperial	  Forces	  officer	  and	  Minister	  for	  Home	   Affairs	   in	   the	   Bruce–Page	   government,	   along	   with	   a	   number	   of	   high-­‐ranking	   army	   officers	   (Cain:	   1983:	   221).	   It	   was	   established	   with	   the	   grand	  ambition	  of	   taking	  over	   the	  running	  of	   the	  New	  South	  Wales	  government	   if,	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70 	  This	   record	   is	   located	   in	   the	   British	   National	   Archives,	   Dominions	   Office	  Correspondence.	   The	   mentioned	   dispatch	   of,	   April	   22nd,	   could	   not	   be	   found	   in	   the	  records	  by	  the	  author.	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when	  Premier	   J.	  T.	   Lang	  was	   removed.	   It	   too,	  held	  deeply	  anti-­‐left	  wing	  views,	  despised	   the	   Lang	   Labor	   government,	   and	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   endorsed	   to	  some	  extent	  by	  the	  Lyons	  government	  (Moore	  1989:	  188).	  The	  Old	  Guard,	  unlike	  the	  New	  Guard,	  did	  not	  seek	   the	  spotlight	  and	   tended	   to	  conceal	   its	   identity.	   It	  operated	  under	  various	  guises	  such	  as:	  ‘The	  Gillespie–Goldfinch	  Committee’;	  the	  ‘Country	  Defence	  Organization’;	   ‘The	  Movement’;	   ‘X	  Force’	  or	  as	  the	  intelligence	  services	   referred	   to	   them	   the	   ‘Silent	   Organization’	   or	   the	   ‘Silent	   Body’	   	   (Cain	  1983:	  221;	  Moore	  1989:1;	  NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2	  Volume	  1).	  	   The	   Old	   Guard	   was	   organised	   along	   a	   similar	   militant	   organisational	  structure	   to	   the	  New	  Guard	  and	  could	   reportedly	  mobilise	  30	  000	  members	  at	  short	  notice.	  One	  historian	  has	   suggested	   that	   the	   foundation	  of	   the	  Old	  Guard	  was	   ‘directly	   encouraged,	   if	   not,	   organised’	   by	   a	   similar	   Melbourne	   based	  organisation	   known	   as	   the	   White	   Guard	   or	   White	   Army.	   This	   appears	   to	   be	  corroborated	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Branch,	  Harold	  Jones.	   Evidently	   the	   White	   Guard	   seems	   to	   have	   had	   links	   with	   high-­‐ranking	  Australian	  army	  officers,	   and	  was	  deemed	  by	  Crutchley	  as	   ‘a	   source	  of	  danger’	  (NA:	   DO	   35/400/4).	   	   Jones	   later	   confirmed	   that	   a	   number	   of	   military	   officers	  such	  as	  General	  Sir	  Brudenell	  White,	  Chief	  of	  the	  General	  Staff,	  Brigadier	  General	  H.	  W.	  Lloyd,	  and	  Warrant	  Officer	  H.	  H.	  Downey,	  were	  known	  to	  be	  members	  of	  this	   association	   (Lyons	  Papers	  MS	  4851,	   Box	   1,	   Folder	   4;	  NAA:	  A	   369,	  D	   585).	  	  Further	  inquiries	  conducted	  by	  the	  Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Branch	  in	  April	  1931	  reported	  that	  Eric	  Harrison,	  Commanding	  Officer	  Duntroon,	  Major	  Sproat,	  and	   Major	   Ebeling	   had	   also	   been	   identified	   as	   members	   (NAA:	   A	   395,	   NN).	  Historian,	   Keith	   Amos,	   in	   his	   biography	  The	  New	  Guard	  Movement	   cites	  Major	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General	  Sir	  Thomas	  Blamey,	  Victoria’s	  Chief	  of	  Police	  and	  Commander	  of	  the	  10th	  Infantry	   Brigade	   as	   another	   prominent	   member.	   	   Both	   of	   these	   organisations	  were	   know	   to	   have	   Fascist	   political	   views	   and	   consequently	   wider	   links	   with	  Fascist	  movements	  in	  Britain	  	  (Amos	  1976:	  16;	  Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1996:169).	  	  It	  is	  likely	   that	   the	   military	   did	   not	   want	   these	   links	   to	   be	   revealed	   through	   the	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan	  inquiry.	  	  	  	  	   The	   Old	   Guard	   had	   well-­‐established	   links	   to	   the	   Defence	   department,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  too,	  had	  good	  reason	  to	  obfuscate	  an	  investigation	  into	  Military	  Intelligence.	   A	   number	   of	   staff	   officers	   were	   known	   to	   have	   attended	   early	  meetings	   of	   the	   Old	   Guard	   in	   Sydney.	   For	   example,	   Army	   Brigadier	   Francis	  Heritage,	  regularly	  attended	  Old	  Guard	  meetings	  at	  Abbott’s	  home,	  while	  Colonel	  H.	   D.	   K.	   McCartney,	   Major	  W.	   J.	   R.	   Scott,	   and	   G.	   F.	  Wooten	   were	   known	   to	   be	  involved	  with	   the	  Old	  Guard	  at	   the	  organisational	   level	   (Coulthard-­‐Clark	  1996:	  172).	  	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  Old	  Guard	  formed	  a	  link	  between	  the	  military	  and	  the	  civil	  militia	  forces	  to	  serve	  as	  part	  of	  the	  governments	  ‘Internal	  Security	  Scheme’	  (Moore	   1989:	   189).	   These	   forces	   were	   to	   be	   deployed	   in	   the	   instance	   of	   civil	  unrest	  and	  provide	  support	  to	  the	  army.	  While	  the	  intelligence	  services	  knew	  full	  well	  of	  the	  Old	  Guard,	  the	  White	  Guard,	  their	  ideology	  and	  political	  motivations,	  there	   is	   a	   clear	   disinclination	   to	   collect	   and	   disseminate	   intelligence	   on	   them	  (Cain	  1990:	  2;	  Cain	  1994:	  14).	  For	  example,	  only	  a	  few	  intelligence	  reports	  in	  the	  Australian	  Archives	  exist	  assessing	  their	  activities.	  	  	  	   	  
	   192	  
The	   few	   reports	   that	   are	   available	   suggest	   that	   the	   intelligence	   services	  advocated	   their	   services	   in	   assisting	   the	   military.	   For	   example,	   Major	   (later	  Brigadier)	   Combes	   of	  Military	   Intelligence	   in	   one	   report	   assessed	   that	   the	   Old	  Guard,	   ‘would	  cause	  no	  trouble	  of	  any	  kind’.	  He	  added	  that	  the	  Old	  Guard	  in	  an	  emergency	  would	   actually	   ‘be	   very	   useful	   in	   shortening	   the	   time	   necessary	   to	  raise	   Special	   Forces’	   (Combes	   in	   Moore	   1989:	   190).	   Two	   reports	   indicate	   the	  Commonwealth	   Investigation	   Branch	   also	   showed	   similar	   favour	   towards	   the	  Old	  Guard.	  Harold	   Jones	  wrote	   to	  Longfield	  Lloyd	  on	  11	  February	  1932	  asking	  him	  ‘what	  would	  be	  the	  extent	  of	  support	  available	  to	  the	  Commonwealth	  as	  an	  adjunct	   to	   a	   Peace	   Force	   by	   the	   C.	   D.	   O.	   [Country	   Defence	   Organisation]’.	  Longfield	   Lloyd	   replied	   on	   15	   February	   stating	   that	   the	   Sydney	   branch	   of	   the	  Silent	  Organisation	  ‘is	  perfectly	  suitable	  for	  support	  of	  the	  governmental	  arm.	  It	  is	   unconditionally	   available,	   and	   contains	   the	   best	   elements	   in	   the	   community’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2,	  Volume	  1).	  	  	   While	  the	  military	  and	  intelligence	  services	  did	  not	  officially	  condone	  the	  paramilitary	   activities	   of	   these	   secret	   armies,	   circumstantial	   evidence	   suggests	  that	   they	   tolerated	   and	   even	   used	   their	   services	   in	   an	   unofficial	   capacity.	  Furthermore,	  much	  of	   the	   information	  regarding	   these	  organisations,	  and	   their	  links	   to	   defence,	   was	   deliberately	   kept	   out	   of	   reach	   from	   both	   Mawhood	   and	  Duncan	  in	  their	  inquiries.	  The	  full	  extent	  of	  the	  political	  ambitions	  these	  invisible	  armies	   held	   is	   difficult	   to	   judge	   with	   full	   assurance.	   Yet,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	  conclude,	  based	  on	   the	  available	  evidence,	   that	   there	  were	   links	  between	   them	  and	   the	  military,	   the	  government	  and	   the	   Intelligence	  Services.	  This	   is	  perhaps	  made	  more	   evident	   given	   that	   both	   Mawhood	   and	   Duncan	   were	   forbidden	   to	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The	  Mawhood	  report:	  An	  assessment	  Before	  he	  began	  his	  inquiry,	  Mawhood	  had	  questioned	  the	  capabilities	  of	  Military	  Intelligence.	  On	  18	  October	  1941,	  he	  delivered	  a	  scathing	  report	  to	  the	  Attorney	  General	  reflecting	  this	  opinion.	  ‘I	  am	  most	  unfavourably	  impressed	  and	  disturbed	   by	   what	   I	   have	   seen	   and	   learned	   during	   my	   stay’	   he	   reported.	  Mawhood	   was	   disturbed	   by	   what	   he	   said	   were	   three	   key	   weaknesses:	   policy,	  personnel	  and	  training.	  He	  found	  there	  was	  ‘no	  clearly	  defined	  policy	  regarding	  intelligence’,	   and	   ‘no	   proper	   conception	   of	   what	   military	   intelligence	   really	  means’.	   He	   found	   the	   intelligence	   community	   seemed	   to	   be	   one	   of	   ‘haphazard	  growth’	  with	  little	  attempt	  to	  ‘look	  at	  intelligence	  as	  it	  might	  concern	  Australia	  or	  to	  determine	  what	  was	  necessary	   to	  plan	   to	  get	   it’.	  These	  defects,	   according	   to	  Mawhood,	   were	   the	   result	   of	   ‘a	   lack	   of	   proper	   direction’.	   He	   chastised	   the	  Director	  of	  Military	   Intelligence,	  Colonel	   James	  Chapman,	   stating	   ‘quite	  bluntly,	  he	   has	   not	   the	   personality,	   intellect,	   education,	   or	   training	   for	   this	   important	  post’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  	  	  	   Mawhood’s	   report	  scolded	  Australian	  Military	   Intelligence	   for	  having	  no	  clear	   rationale	   underpinning	   the	   selection	   of	   its	   staff.	   He	   found	   none	   of	   the	  officers	  within	  the	  Military	  Intelligence	  bureaucracy	  to	  be	  of	  a	  sufficient	  calibre	  and	  many	  did	  not	  possess	  ‘the	  intelligence,	  personality	  nor	  knowledge	  requisite	  for	  the	  task’.	  He	  remarked	  bitterly	  that:	  	  Good	   intelligence	   demands	   an	   alert	   and	   vigorous	   brain,	   and	   I	   feel	   sure	  that	  no	  one	  could	  claim	  that	  Military	  Intelligence	  at	  Army	  Headquarters	  is	  remarkable	  in	  that	  direction.	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2)	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He	  reported	  that	  the	  grounds	  for	  selecting	  intelligence	  staff	  amounted	  to	  little	  more	   than	   nepotism	  because	   ‘the	   appointment	   of	   such	  men	   could	   not	   be	  justified	   by	   considerations	   other	   than	   those	   of	   personal	   favour’.	   Mawhood’s	  comments	  suggest	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  Military	  Intelligence	  had	  become	  one	  that	  was	  intensely	  personalised,	  and	  politicised	  by	  appointment.	  It	  indicates	  that	  the	  Military	  Intelligence	  bureaucracy	  favoured	  such	  conditions	  because	  it	  protected	  and	  promoted	  their	  individual	  interests.	  Mawhood	  was	  suspicious	  that	  Brigadier	  Combes,	   had	   ‘surrounded	   himself	   with	   henchmen	   of	   the	   calibre	   of	   Longfield	  Lloyd’	   and	   all	   of	   whom	   had	   subsequently	   been	   promoted	   to	   the	   rank	   of	  Lieutenant	  Colonel.	  ‘Such	  an	  attitude’	  he	  argued	  ‘placed	  self	  interest	  before	  duty’.	  	  	  Mawhood	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  these	  appointments	  to	  which	  he	  suggested	  many	  had	  dubious	  political	   backgrounds	  of	   their	   own,	   a	   comment	  perhaps	   reflecting	  the	   involvement	   of	   army	   personnel	   with	   the	   aforementioned	   secret	  paramilitaries.	  What	   exactly	   they	  were	  up	   to	  he	   could	  not	  be	   sure,	   but	  he	  was	  ‘convinced	  from	  reliable	  and	  independent	  sources’	  that	  an	  investigation	  into	  the	  antecedents	  of	  these	  men	  would	  ‘produce	  remarkable	  disclosures’.	  On	  this	  point,	  Mawhood	  made	  clear	  that	  ‘it	  should	  be	  borne	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  men	  at	  one	  time	  were	  active	  members	  of	   the	  New	  Guard’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  Because	  Mawhood	  had	  not	  been	  permitted	   to	   investigate	  Army	   Intelligence,	  he	  could	  not	  investigate	  and	  report	  fully	  on	  these	  allegations.	  	   With	   regard	   to	   internal	   security	   measures,	   Mawhood	   found	   that	   there	  was	   ‘no	   controlled	   attempt	   at	   counter	   espionage’.	   In	   1941,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	  inquiry,	  he	  noted	  there	  were	  five	  intelligence	  organisations	  in	  operation,	  ‘each	  of	  which	  was	  self	  contained	  and	  none	  would	  cooperate	  with	  the	  other.	  I	  would	  be	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very	   surprised’	  he	  added	   ‘if	  Military	   Intelligence	   could	  produce	  a	   list	  of	   enemy	  agents	   operating	   in	  Australia’.	   	  Mawhood	   then	   cited	   two	   specific	   cases	   of	   such	  ineptitude	  were	  evidence	  of	  foreign	  espionage	  had	  been	  discovered	  in	  Australia	  but	  had	   failed	   to	  be	  exploited	  or	  prosecuted.	  Moreover,	  he	  pointed	   to	  evidence	  that	  suggested	  the	  army	  had	  suppressed	  such	   information	   in	  order	  to	  cover	  up	  its	   own	   incompetence.	  The	   first	   case	  he	  noted	   regarded	  a	   visit	   to	  Australia	  by,	  Major	   Sie	   Hashida,	   an	   Officer	   of	   the	   Japanese	   Army	   Imperial	   General	   Staff,	  Political	  Branch,	  in	  January	  1941.71	  	  
	  
An	  unguarded	  moment:	  Major	  Sieyure	  Hashida	  Major	  Sieyure	  [Sie]	  Hashida	  had	  toured	  Australia	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  the	  federal	   government	   on	   the	   provision	   of	   investigating	   wool,	   metals,	   and	   other	  industries	   in	  relation	  to	   Japanese	  military	  requirements	  (NAA:	  A	  367,	  C65663).	  On	  14	  January	  1941,	   the	  Japanese	  Consul	  General,	  Mr	  M.	  Akiyama,	  had	  assured	  Minster	   for	  External	  Affairs,	  Percy	  Spender,	   that	  Hashida	  was	  a	  member	  of	   the	  Japanese	  Department	  of	  Supply.	  The	  Australian	  government	  was	  not	  aware	  that	  he	   represented	   the	   Political	   Branch	   of	   the	   Japanese	   Army.	   During	   his	   visit	  Hashida	  had	  restrictions	  placed	  on	  where	  he	  could	  travel	  and	  what	  facilities	  he	  could	   inspect.	   Nevertheless,	   he	  was	   provided	  with	   ‘a	  map	   indicating	   the	   areas	  which	   from	   a	   security	   point	   of	   view	   it	   be	   inconvenient	   for	   him	   to	   visit’	   thus,	  providing	  him	  with	  valuable	   information.	  Hashida	  accumulated	  a	   large	  amount	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  It	   is	  possible	   that	  Mawhood	  raised	  the	  Hashida	  case	  as	  a	  criticism	  of	  both	  Alexander	  Duncan	  and	  William	  Mackay,	   because	   they	  had	   facilitated	  Hashida’s	   travel	   arrangements	   and	  kept	  him	  under	   surveillance	   but	   did	   not	   question	   or	   detain	   him.	   See	   translation	   of	   Hashida’s	   diary:	   16	  January,	  7	  February,	  12	  February	  and	  21	  February	  (NAA:	  A	  367,	  C	  65663).	  	  	  For	  another	  overview	  of	  Hashida’s	  activities	  in	  Australia	  see:	  Billet,	  B	  (2004)	  ‘Major	  Sei	  Hashida’s	  Visit’,	  Sabretache,	  Vol.	  XLV,	  No.	  4,	  December,	  pp.	  47-­‐49.	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Publicising	  incompetence	  	  Mawhood	  cited	  another	  case	  of	  incompetence	  regarding	  the	  publicisation	  of	   intelligence	  material,	  which	  he	  described	  as	   ‘highlighting	   the	   irresponsibility	  of	  the	  man	  at	  the	  head	  of	  this	  Department	  [Military	  Intelligence]’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	   Attachment	   2).	   On	   13	   October	   1941,	   an	   article	   sponsored	   by	   Military	  Intelligence	  was	  published	   in	  The	  Argus	   newspaper.	  The	  article	   revealed	  much	  about	   the	   internal	   structure	   of	  Military	   Intelligence	   providing	   a	   fairly	   detailed	  account	   of	   each	   department	   and	   the	   functions	   it	   performed.	   Furthermore,	   the	  article	   identified	   methods	   whereby	   information	   could	   be	   obtained	   from	   open	  sources	   such	   as	   newspapers	   and	   journals	   that	   revealed	   the	   strength	   of	   the	  Australian	  Imperial	  Forces	  (AIF)	  abroad.	  	  From	   newspapers	   and	   journal	   articles	   we	   were	   able	   to	   work	   out	   the	  entire	  details	  of	  the	  AIF	  abroad	  and	  the	  complete	  Australian	  battle	  order,	  the	  names	  and	  strengths	  of	  units	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  even	  the	  names	  of	  the	  battalions	  and	  company	  commanders.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (The	  Argus	  13	  October	  1941:	  3)	  	   In	   the	   article,	   Military	   Intelligence	   also	   attacked	   its	   counterpart	  organisation	  the	  Royal	  Australian	  Air	  Force	  (RAAF).	  Military	  Intelligence	  alleged	  that	  one	  million	  rounds	  of	  small	  arms	  ammunitions	  consigned	  to	  the	  RAAF	  had	  mysteriously	   disappeared	   (The	   Argus	   13	   October	   1941:	   3).	   Minister	   for	   Air,	  Arthur	  Drakeford,	  then	  ordered	  an	  investigation	  but	  found	  that	  no	  ammunition	  had	   ever	   been	   misplaced	   or	   stolen.	   Drakeford	   was	   then	   forced	   to	   publish	   a	  correction	   announcing	   the	   ‘miss-­‐statement’	   on	   behalf	   of	   Military	   Intelligence	  (The	  Argus	  18	  October	  1941:	  5).	  The	  episode	  highlights	  a	  crucial	  point.	  Military	  Intelligence	  had	  underestimated	  real	   threats	   to	  national	  security	  such	  as	  Major	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Hashida	  and	  had	  then	  embarrassed	  itself	  by	  making	  inaccurate	  public	  statements	  about	  its	  counterpart	  service.	  Noting	  these	  cases,	  Mawhood	  suggested	  that	  they	  represent	   ‘the	   total	   lack	   of	   responsibility	   which	   permeates	   all	   Military	  Intelligence	   activities’.	   He	   added	   that	   Ministers	   had	   to	   suffer	   ‘public	  embarrassment	   on	   a	   number	   of	   occasions’	   because	   intelligence	   officers	   were	  ‘oblivious’	   to	   one	   of	   the	   fundamentals	   of	   intelligence	  work	   to	   “Be	   sure	   of	   your	  
facts”’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2,	  emphasis	  in	  original).	  	  	  	  	   Based	   on	   these	   deficiencies	   Mawhood	   concluded	   that	   the	   security	  services	  had	  become	  little	  more	  than	  	  ‘financial	  and	  administrative	  burden.	  It	  had	  not’,	   he	   said,	   ‘advanced	   the	   Security	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   in	   any	   degree	  whatsoever’.	   According	   to	   Mawhood,	   the	   Security	   Service	   had	   ‘started	   on	   the	  wrong	  foot’	  because	  its	  Director	  General	  Longfield	  Lloyd	  was	  the	  wrong	  man	  for	  the	   position	   who	   had	   neither	   the	   ‘personality	   nor	   knowledge’	   for	   the	   job.	  Moreover,	   his	   ‘whole	   attitude	   was	   hostile	   to	   all	   except	   the	   small	   army	   clique	  which	   he	   represented’.	   Mawhood	   recommended	   the	   nomination	   of	   a	   ‘neutral	  head’	  to	  be	  appointed	  as	  Director	  General	  of	  Security	  in	  order	  to	  coordinate	  the	  civil	   and	  Military	   Intelligence	  organisations.	  He	  nominated	  Commander	  Rupert	  Long,	   Director	   of	   Naval	   Intelligence,	   for	   the	   position.	   ‘This	   move’	   Mawhood	  suggested	   ‘would	  cut	   the	  ground	   from	  warring	   factions’	   (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	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The	   conclusions	   reached	   by	   Mawhood	   show	   that	   at	   a	   time	   when	  Australian	  national	   security	  needed	   its	   intelligence	  agencies	  most,	   the	  agencies	  were	  in	  a	  state	  of	  atrophy.	  Their	  decline	  was	  due	  to	  forty	  years	  of	   inter-­‐service	  rivalry,	  bureaucratic	  disorganisation,	  and	  lack	  of	  government	  direction.	  Many	  of	  these	   problems	   can,	   perhaps,	   be	   viewed	   as	   the	   long-­‐term	   consequences	   of	   a	  highly	  politicised	   intelligence	  bureaucracy.	  Perhaps	  one	  of	   the	  main	   limitations	  of	   Mawhood’s	   report	   is	   that	   it	   implied	   Military	   Intelligence	   was	   completely	  incompetent	   rather	   than	   highlighting	   the	   maladministration	   of	   its	   activities.	  Indeed,	  this	  was	  from	  the	  outset	  the	  initial	  task	  of	  his	  investigation.	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  Duncan	  report:	  An	  assessment	  Alexander	  Duncan’s	  report	  was	  submitted	  to	  Cabinet	  on	  7	  January	  1942.	  It	  was	  equally	   critical	   of	   the	   intelligence	   services	  but	   it	   had	  a	  different	   focus.72	  Duncan’s	   report	   highlighted	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Branch	  of	   the	  Attorney	  Generals	  Department	  rather	   than	  Military	  Intelligence.	   From	   the	   start,	  Duncan	  noted	   that	   ‘personal	   interests	   and	   friction	  between	  certain	  Departments’	  had	  hindered	  his	   investigation.	   In	  his	  view,	  such	  conditions	  had	  become	  intolerable	  and	  ‘retarded	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Security	  Service’,	  a	  situation,	  which	  he	  said	  ‘I	  am	  at	  a	  loss	  to	  explain’.	  As	  a	  result,	  Duncan	  was	   forced	   to	   qualify	   his	   findings	   by	   emphasising	   that	   ‘my	   investigations	   have	  been	  made	  rather	  difficult	  on	  account	  of	  this	  atmosphere’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72	  The	   federal	   government	   changed	   twice	   during	   the	   course	   of	   Duncan’s	   inquiry,	   first	   to	   the	  Fadden	  government	  on	  29	  August,	  and	  second,	  to	  the	  Curtin	  government	  on	  7	  October.	  This	  point	  is	  raised	  by	  Ball	  and	  Horner	  (1998)	  in	  Breaking	  the	  Codes,	  p.	  25.	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Duncan	  found	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  intelligence	  services	  and	   inter-­‐service	   rivalries	   had	   become	   an	   almost	   pathological	   condition.	   His	  investigations	   uncovered	   thirty-­‐seven	   instances	   of	   where	   the	   CIB,	   police,	   and	  Military	  Intelligence	  had	  investigated	  the	  same	  case.	  The	  result	  was	  unnecessary	  duplication	  and	  significant	  delay.	  In	  such	  cases,	  each	  agency	  had	  closely	  guarded	  crucial	  information	  and	  files	  were	  not	  passed	  on	  to	  the	  relevant	  departments.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  he	  noted	  that	   files	  had	  been	  endlessly	  passed	  around	  between	  departments	   because	   none	   of	   them	   actually	   wanted	   to	   take	   responsibility	   for	  making	   a	   decision.	   On	   the	   rare	   occasion	   when	   cooperation	   had	   occurred,	   he	  found	   that	   the	   assessments	   often	   produced	   contradictory	   findings.	   Duncan	  concluded	  that	  because	  of	  these	  shortcomings	  the	  intelligence	  services	  had	  never	  functioned	   as	   they	   were	   intended	   (NAA:	   A	   12383,	   A/2/1	   Attachment	   2,	   see	  appendix	  A,	  B,	  C	  and	  D	  for	  the	  cases	  identified).	  	   As	  for	  the	  Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Branch,	  Duncan	  could	  only	  offer	  a	  criticism	  of	  their	  reluctance	  to	  cooperate	  with	  his	  investigations.	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  he	  declined	  to	  make	  any	   firm	  recommendations	  on	   its	   future.	  He	  described	  the	  CIB	  as	   ‘not	  keen	   to	   cooperate’	   and	  complained	   that	  he	  was	  not	  able	   to	  get	  any	  relevant	   information	   from	   the	   CIB’s	   Director,	   Harold	   Jones,	   nor	   from	   the	  Attorney	   General.	   This	   suggests	   that	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   Department	   was	  keen	  to	  keep	  a	  tight	  hold	  on	  anything	  that	  might	  undermine	  its	  own	  intelligence	  service.	   As	   Duncan	   explained,	   ‘I	   had	   to	   ask	   many	   questions	   and	   nothing	   was	  volunteered’.	  In	  regard	  to	  his	  dealings	  with	  the	  CIB	  he	  wrote	  that	  	  ‘I	  have	  always	  been	   treated	   in	   an	   evasive	   or	  misleading	  way.	   This	   is	   in	   direct	   contrast	   to	   the	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ready	  assistance	  and	   information	  supplied	  by	  all	  other	  Departments	  contacted’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  	  	  	   Duncan’s	   report	   and	   subsequent	   recommendations	   caused	   more	  problems	  than	  they	  solved	  (Ball	  &	  Horner	  1998).	  Although	  he	  did	  focus	  more	  on	  administrative	  reform,	  Duncan	  tended	  to	  view	  the	  role	  of	  intelligence	  as	  a	  police	  function.	   He	   recommended	   that	   State	   branches	   of	   the	   Security	   Service	   be	  abolished	  and	  replaced	  by	  the	  Chief	  of	  Police	  in	  each	  state.	  He	  argued	  that	  police	  investigators	  were	  the	  most	  suitable	  and	  best	  trained	  for	  conducting	  intelligence	  work.	   This,	   however,	   would	   have	   decentralised	   the	   national	   intelligence	  bureaucracy	   and	   possibly	   enhanced	   inefficiency.	   Moreover,	   it	   would	   have	  expanded	   intelligence	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   policing	   and	   prosecution,	   rather	   than	  collection	   and	   assessment	   of	   information	   to	   inform	   policy.	   Duncan’s	   views	   of	  intelligence	   as	   a	   police	   function	   are	   further	   evident	   in	   his	   recommendation	   of	  William	   John	   Mackay,73	  NSW	   Police	   Commissioner,	   to	   the	   position	   of	   Director	  General	  of	  Security	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  	  	  	   This	  recommendation	  was	  received	  with	  a	  good	  measure	  of	  criticism.	  For	  example,	   Longfield	   Lloyd	   disagreed	   that	   police	   should	   be	   an	   instrument	   of	  national	   security.	  He	   reminded	  Duncan	   that	   ‘the	  Commonwealth	   is	   responsible	  for	  security	  and	  defence’	  adding	  that	  ‘State	  Police	  are	  not	  sufficient	  because	  they	  are	   not	   au	   fait	  with	   strategical	   [sic]	   conditions’	   (NAA:	  MP	   729/6,	   15/403/76).	  	  After	   reviewing	   Duncan’s	   findings	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  For	  an	  insightful	  and	  detailed	  study	  on	  William	  John	  Mackay’s	  career	  see:	  Evans,	  R.	  W,	  (2005)	   ‘William	   John	  Mackay	   and	   the	   New	   South	  Wales	   Police	   Force	   1910	   –	   1948:	   A	  Study	  of	  Police	  Power’,	  PhD	  Thesis,	  Monash	  University.	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Department,	  George	  Knowles,	  argued	  that,	  ‘Mr	  Duncan	  appears	  to	  have	  taken	  the	  army	  view	  of	  various	  controversial	  matters	  without	  investigating	  the	  other	  side’.	  Director	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   Investigation	   Branch,	   Harold	   Jones,	   scrutinised	  the	   report	   pointing	   out	   that	   Duncan’s	   findings	  were	   ‘very	  misleading	   in	  many	  instances’	   and	   on	   other	   matters	   ‘was	   ignorant	   of	   the	   facts’	   	   	   (NAA:	   A	   12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	  	  	  	  	   Due	   to	   the	   vested	   political	   interests	   of	   various	   parties	   involved,	   the	  implementation	   of	   Duncan’s	   recommendations	   were	   further	   obstructed.	  	  Director	   of	   Military	   Intelligence,	   Colonel	   Caleb	   G.	   Roberts,	   for	   example,	  maintained	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  a	  Director	  General	  of	  Security.	  He	  preferred	  an	  organisational	  structure	  where	  the	  army	  would	  maintain	  full	  executive	  powers.	  Probably,	   this	   was	   because	   Roberts	   had	   misgivings	   about	   Duncan’s	  recommendation	   of	   appointing	   Police	   Commissioner,	   William	   Mackay,	   to	   the	  position	   of	   Director	   General	   of	   Security.	   On	   4	   March	   1942,	   Roberts	   informed	  Lieutenant	   General	   Sturdee	   that	   Mackay	   was	   not	   a	   suitable	   candidate	   for	   the	  position.	  Sturdee	  then	  made	  his	  own	  recommendation	  to	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defence	  suggesting	  Brigadier	  Combes	  would	  be	  the	  most	  suitable	  appointment	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	   15/403/76).	   As	   the	   infighting	   continued,	   the	   army	   applied	   further	  pressure	   on	   the	   government	   so	   that	   it	   could	   maintain	   control	   over	   the	   state	  security	  apparatus.	  	  	  Amid	   the	   tumult	   surrounding	   the	  Mawhood	   and	  Duncan	   inquiries,	   John	  Charles	  Kevin,	   from	   the	  Department	   of	   the	  Army	   tended	   yet	   another	   report	   to	  government.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  Security	  Services	  had	  ‘failed	  to	  go	  into	  the	  higher	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fights’.	   Kevin	   suggested	   that	   the	   services	   had	   focused	   too	   much	   attention	   on	  ‘communists,	  Italians	  and	  refugees’	  without	  giving	  enough	  attention	  to	  the	  ‘Nazi	  virus.	  No	  check’	  on	  such	  cases	  he	  pointed	  out	  had	  ever	  been	  made.	  According	  to	  Kevin	  the	  intelligence	  services	  were	  focused	  on	  the	  wrong	  issue.	  ‘I	  start	  from	  the	  fact’	  Kevin	  argued	  that:	  (a) Not	  one	  enemy	  agent	  has	  been	  caught.	  (b) Not	  one	  case	  of	  espionage	  has	  been	  uncovered	  in	  Australia.	  	  	  From	  this	  it	  follows	  either:	  (1) That	  Australia	  is	  free	  from	  espionage,	  or	  alternatively	  (2) That	  enemy	  agents	  are	  active	  here	  but	  that	  our	  security	  system	  has	  failed	  to	  cope	  with	  them.	  If	   (1)	   is	   true,	   then	   Australia	   is	   the	   only	   belligerent	   to	   have	   escaped	   the	  enemy’s	  attention.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199)	  	  He	   went	   on	   to	   argue	   that	   it	   was	   highly	   unlikely	   that	   Australia	   had	   escaped	  penetration	  form	  enemy	  agents.	  ‘I	  believe	  there	  is	  an	  espionage	  ring	  in	  Australia	  directed	   by	   aliens,	   rightly	   or	   wrongly	   carrying	   “friendly	   passports”’	   (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199).	  Kevin	  recommended	  a	  centralised	  approach	  to	  intelligence	  and	   security	   coordination	   based	   on	   the	   British	   and	   American	   model.	   The	  ‘persistent	  habit’	  of	  decentralising	  intelligence	  had	  resulted	  in	  over	  ‘expenditure	  and	   delays’	   where	   each	   State	   Director	   had	   been	   preoccupied	   with	   ‘empire	  building’.	  A	   simplification	  of	   the	   security	  bureaucracy	  was	   essential	   to	   address	  these	   inefficiencies.	  Based	  on	  Kevin’s	   recommendations	  Minister	   for	   the	  Army,	  Frank	  Forde,	  wrote	  to	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  Herbert	  V.	  Evatt,	  on	  5	  March	  1942,	  highlighting	   the	   merits	   of	   Kevin’s	   proposal.	   Forde	   indicated	   that	   Duncan’s	  recommendations	  ‘tended	  to	  maintain	  the	  existing	  complexity	  and,	  indeed,	  adds	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to	  it’.	  This	  argument	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  accepted	  by	  Evatt	  who	  later	  agreed	  to	  Kevin’s	  proposal	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199).	  
	  
The	  compromise	  The	   government	   now	   possessed	   an	   assortment	   of	   recommendations	   on	  how	  to	  improve	  the	  Security	  Service.	  The	  War	  Cabinet	  met	  on	  9	  March	  1942,	  to	  address	   the	   issue.	   Forde	   opened	   the	   meeting	   by	   stating	   that	   ‘in	   view	   of	   our	  serious	  defence	  situation,	  time	  did	  not	  permit	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Duncan	  report’.	  The	  question	  of	  course	  becomes	  what	  had	  all	  this	  been	  in	  aid	  of?	  Forde	  recognised	  that,	   ‘security	  in	  Australia	  is	  at	  a	  low	  ebb.	  The	  organisations	  dealing	  with	  counter	  espionage	  are	  unwilling,	  slow	  moving	  and	  cumbersome’.	  He	  added	  that	   the	   current	   agencies	   were	   ‘altogether	   incapable	   of	   combating	   enemy	  activity’	   and	   our	   own	   espionage	   capabilities	   were	   ‘non-­‐existent.	   The	   only	  solution’	  Forde	  said	  was	  ‘the	  immediate	  creation	  of	  an	  efficient,	  unhampered	  and	  quick	   moving	   organisation’	   (NAA:	   A	   2676,	   1986;	   emphasis	   in	   original).	   Like	  many	  of	  the	  previous	  bureaucratic	  decisions,	  this	  was	  a	  compromise	  between	  the	  opposing	  factions.	  	   The	   compromise,	   indeed,	   reflected	   the	  many	   views	   and	   vested	   political	  interests	   of	   each	   party	   involved.	   Some	   of	   the	   Duncan,	   Mawhood,	   and	   Kevin,	  recommendations	   were	   implemented	   although	   significantly	   diluted.	   The	   end	  result	  was	  more	  a	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  Security	  Service	  than	  an	  overhaul	  of	   its	  administration	  and	  effectiveness.	  The	  Security	  Service	  was	  revamped,	  rebadged,	  and	  creatively	  renamed	  the	  Commonwealth	  Security	  Service	  (CSS).	  On	  17	  March	  1942,	   Forde	   informed	   NSW	   Police	   Commissioner	   Mackay,	   that	   he	   had	   been	  
	   206	  
selected	   as	   Director	   General	   of	   Security	   for	   a	   six-­‐month	   provisional	   period.	  Longfield	   Lloyd	   was	   subsequently	   demoted	   to	   Director.	   The	   compromise	  attempted	  to	  satisfy	  all,	  but	  really	  satisfied	  none.	  	  	   Mackay	   was	   provided	   with	   a	   charter	   of	   his	   requirements	   and	  responsibilities,	  which	  outlined	  that	  civil	  security	  was	  to	  be	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General,	   however,	   in	  his	   absence	   the	  Minister	   for	  Army	  was	   then	  permitted	  to	  take	  over	  control	  on	  his	  behalf.	  The	  framework	  for	  the	  organisation	  was	   to	   be	   designed	   by	  Mackay	   but	   approved	   by	   the	  Minister	   for	   the	   Army,	   as	  were	  all	  nominations	  of	  principal	  senior	  staff.	  Here	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  the	  army	  and	  its	  Minister	  would	  attempt	  to	  maintain	  control	  over	  who	  was	  appointed	  to	  senior	  security	  positions.	  Other	  personnel	   for	  the	  revamped	  Service	  were	  to	  be	  absorbed	  from	  the	  navy,	  army,	  air	  force,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  fighting	  services.	  In	  a	  striking	  move,	  however,	  Cabinet	  did	  take	  notice	  of	  Kevin’s	  recommendation	  regarding	   international	  cooperation.	   	  On	  2	  April	  1942,	   the	  overseas	  connection	  was	   formally	   established	   when	   Cabinet	   decided	   that	   there	   would	   now	   be	  representatives	  of	  MI5,	  and	  the	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  (FBI)	  attached	  to	  Security	   Service	   Headquarters	   (NAA:	   MP	   729/6,	   15/403/199).	   Thus,	   the	  American	   connection	   to	   Australian	   civil	   intelligence	   organisations	   had	   been	  cemented.	  	  	  	   The	   administration	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	   Security	   Service	   was	  confounded	   by	   further	   obstructionism	   and	   continued	   bureaucratic	   rivalries.	  Mackay	  continued	  to	  urge	  for	  a	  decentralised	  intelligence	  service.	  He	  wanted	  all	  State	  Commissioners	  of	  Police	   to	  be	  appointed	  as	  Deputy	  Directors	  of	  Security.	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This	  would	  have	  given	  Police	  Commissioners	  a	   large	  amount	  of	   autonomy,	  but	  also	  would	   have	  moved	   the	   police	   into	   the	   field	   of	   national	   security	   (Lamidey	  1970	   50).	  Moreover,	   this	   directly	   contradicted	   the	   Defence	  Minister’s	   plans	   to	  maintain	  some	  control	  over	  who	  was	  appointed	  to	  senior	  positions.	  The	  military	  also	   disputed	   this	   arrangement.	   Director	   of	   Naval	   Intelligence,	   Rupert	   Long,	  appropriately	   argued	   that	   if	   Security	   was	   placed	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   police	   ‘an	  unscrupulous	  government	  could	  impose	  Gestapo-­‐style	  control	  over	  the	  country’.	  Forde	   ultimately	   agreed	   with	   Long.	   ‘I	   cannot	   agree	   with	   this	   [MacKay’s]	  interpretation	   of	   my	   ruling’	   he	   informed	   MacKay	   on	   9	   April	   1942.	   	   ‘State	  representatives	   of	   the	   Director	   General	   were	   to	   be	   federal	   officers	   not	   State	  Commissioners	   of	   Police…	   I	   am	   attaching	   to	   this	   letter	   a	   diagram	   showing	   the	  positions	  as	  I	  desire	  it’	  (NAA:	  A	  12383,	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2).	  	   Mackay	   quarrelled	   with	   Forde	   about	   where	   the	   Service’s	   headquarters	  should	   be	   located.	   Mackay	   had	   proposed	   Sydney,	   whereas	   Forde	   argued	   for	  Canberra	  —	  ultimately	  Forde	  had	  his	  way	   (Ball	  &	  Horner	  1998:	  34).	  Problems	  continued	   between	   the	   Attorney	   General	   and	   the	   Defence	   Department	   over	  budget	  allocations	  and	  use	  of	  personnel	  for	  the	  Security	  Service.	  ‘My	  own	  view	  is	  that	  the	  recent	  reorganisation	  of	  the	  security	  service	  was	  on	  too	  expansive	  and	  too	  expensive	  a	   scale’,	  Evatt	   informed	  Forde	  on	  24	  August	  1942.	   In	   turn,	  Evatt	  probably	  on	  the	  advice	  of	  Sir	  George	  Knowles,	  halved	  the	  budget	  for	  the	  security	  service	  from	  £250,	  000	  to	  £100	  000	  (NAA:	  MP	  729/6,	  15/403/199).	  Such	  a	  move	  can	   only	   be	   viewed	   as	   a	   deliberate	   bottleneck	  designed	   to	   obstruct	   operations	  and	   hamstring	   the	   ability	   to	   employ	   appropriate	   staff.	   Mackay	   was	   effectively	  being	  thwarted	  through	  bureaucratic	  obstructionism.	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  When	  Mackay	  was	  listed	  as	  the	  Acting	  Director	  General	  of	  Security	  in	  the	  
Government	  Gazette	   he	   became	   infuriated	  with	  what	   he	   described	   as	   Knowles’	  ‘tactics	  of	   irritation	  and	   interference	   in	  matters	  of	   the	  Security	  Service’.	   	  On	  22	  May	   1942,	   Mackay	   lodged	   a	   formal	   complaint	   with	   the	  Minister	   for	   the	   Army	  regarding	   his	   treatment.	   Mackay	   complained	   that	   this	   was	   the	   result	   of	   ‘the	  recurrence	   of	   a	   personal	   feud	   which	   is	   most	   galling	   to	   me	   and	   particularly	  disturbing	  to	  my	  contentment’.	  He	  ended	  the	  letter	  by	  saying	  that	  ‘I	  am	  satisfied	  that	   it	   is	   impossible	   for	  me	   to	   work	   in	   conjunction	   with	   Sir	   George	   Knowles’.	  Knowles	   was	   forced	   to	   correct	   the	   publication	   in	   the	   Gazette	   but	   said	   he	  ‘resented	  the	  suggestion	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  a	  personal	  feud	  on	  my	  part’	  	  (NAA:	  MP	  508/1,	  175/701/1646).	  	   In	   the	   end,	   MacKay	   found	   his	   position	   as	   Director	   General	   of	   Security	  untenable.	   When	   his	   six-­‐month	   term	   expired	   on	   21	   September	   1942,	   he	  announced	   that	   he	   would	   not	   seek	   reappointment.	   	   Only	   two	   days	   later,	  Brigadier	  William	  Simpson,	  an	  officer	  of	  the	  Australian	  Imperial	  Forces,	  assumed	  the	   position	   of	   Director	   General	   of	   Security	   (Ball	   &	   Horner	   1998:	   35).	   The	  military	  would	  now	  maintain	  control	  over	  the	  Security	  Service.	  Under	  Simpson’s	  leadership,	  the	  intelligence	  services	  largely	  returned	  to	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  surveillance	   of	   communists,	   their	   affiliated	   associations,	   and	   the	   ‘ethnic	   left’.74	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  74	  One	   implication	   to	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   Security	   Service’s	   preoccupation	   with	   monitoring	  communist	  and	  subversive	  groups	   in	   the	  community	   is	   that	  very	   little	  attention	  was	  placed	  on	  vetting	  employees	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  Security	  Services.	  Justice	  Hope,	  noted	  in	  his	  Fourth	  Report	   of	   the	   Royal	   Commission	   on	   Intelligence	   and	   Security	   (1977)	   that	   between	   1943	   and	  1954	   Soviet	   intelligence	   agents	   operating	   in	   Australia	   had	   successfully	   acquired	   classified	  information.	   Likewise,	   the	   Petrov	   Report	   also	   noted	   that	   security	   arrangements	   in	   the…	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  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  were	  particularly	  inadequate	  (Royal	  Commission	  on	  Intelligence	  and	  Security	  1977,	  Volume	  1:	  21–22).	  	  	  	  	  75	  	   Charles	  C.F.	   Spry	  was	  not	   appointed	  Director	  General	   of	  ASIO	  until	   6	   July	  1950	   (Templeton	  1979:	  364).	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Conclusion	  and	  preliminary	  findings	  Some	   conclusions	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   events	   discussed	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapter.	   Each	   form	   of	   politicisation	   that	   has	   been	   described	   can	   be	  considered	   to	   have	   several	   different	   causes	   and	   conditions.	   This	   section	  of	   the	  chapter	   will	   focus	   on	   presenting	   a	   preliminary	   analysis	   of	   three	   conditions	   of	  politicisation	  derived	  from	  the	  empirical	  evidence.	  	  
	   The	   first	   condition	   identified	   is	   the	   subtle	   intervention	   of	   an	   apparent	  apolitical	  body,	  such	  as	  the	  military,	  to	  shape	  the	  political	  affairs	  of	  government.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan	  inquiries	  constituted	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  soft	   politicisation.	   Senior	   public	   servants,	   such	   as	   military	   commanders,	  indirectly	   manipulated	   a	   formal	   governmental	   inquiry	   by	   shaping	   the	   rules,	  setting	  and	  parameters	  of	  the	  investigation	  so	  that	  it	  would	  deliver	  a	  convenient	  result.	   To	   some	   degree,	   this	   also	   reflected	   an	   increasing	   tendency	   of	   the	  administrative	   bureaucracy	   to	   slowly	   creep	   into	   the	   political	   sphere	   of	  government.	  Undoubtedly,	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  clear	  policy	  direction	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  government	   fostered	   these	   developments.	   All	   parties	   were,	   however,	   active	  participants	   searching	   for	   a	   means	   of	   influencing	   the	   inquiries	   for	   their	   own	  benefit.	  Little	  was	  achieved	  to	  advance	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  Security	  Service.	  Recommendations	  were	  a	  compromise	  of	  views	  and	  only	  partially	  implemented.	  To	  some	  extent,	  each	  party	  involved	  must	  share	  responsibility	  for	  this	  outcome.	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In	   this	   context,	   soft	   politicisation	  might	   be	   understood	   as	   an	   embedded	  condition	   contained	  within	   the	   relationship	   between	  policy-­‐makers	   and	   public	  servants	   at	   this	   time.	  This	   extended	   to	  both	  Duncan	   and	  Mawhood	  who,	  when	  they	  entered	  the	  administrative	  system,	  became	  subject	  to	  this	  pressure.	  Yet,	  it	  is	  still	   difficult	   to	   judge	   exactly	   why	   the	   government	   chose	   each	   of	   these	  appointments.	  It	  is	  equally	  difficult	  to	  conclude	  that	  Mawhood	  was	  appointed	  to	  investigate	   the	   Security	   Service	   based	   on	   the	   merits	   of	   his	   abilities.	   This	   is	  especially	  the	  case	  given	  Britain’s	  recommendation	  not	  to	  use	  Mawhood	  for	  such	  an	   investigation.	   There	   are	   two	  possible	   explanations	   as	   to	  why	   this	   occurred.	  First,	   both	  Mawhood	   and	  Duncan	  were	  malleable	   and	   could	   be	   relied	   upon	   to	  conform	   to	   the	   desires	   of	   their	   political	   masters.	   Second,	   as	   Jacqueline	  Templeton	   has	   pointed	   out,	   both	   Mawhood	   and	   Duncan	   were	   being	   used	   as	  ‘weapons	   of	   attack’	   to	   represent	   the	   views	   of	   the	   respective	   political	   sponsors	  (Templeton	   1979:	   186).	   They	   became	   an	   instrument	   of	   partisan	   politics	   and	  representative	  of	   certain	  political	  views.	   In	  either	  case,	   this	  points	   to	  a	   form	  of	  political	  favouritism	  and	  soft	  politicisation	  as	  outlined	  earlier	  by	  Glen	  Hastedt	  —	  an	  attempt	   to	  shape	   the	  rules	  and	  settings	  of	   the	   inquiries	   that	  would	   favour	  a	  certain	   outcome.	   	   It	   is	   also	   apparent	   that	   elements	   of	   politicisation	   by	  appointment,	   a	   theme	   outlined	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   are	   evident	   in	   the	  appointment	  of	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan.	  	  	   	  The	  most	  stunning	  aspect	  of	  the	  inquiries	  is	  how	  influenced	  they	  were	  by	  an	  ingrained	  culture	  of	  inter-­‐service	  rivalry.	  Addressing	  the	  maladministration	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	  became	  subordinate	  to	  achieving	  political	  goals.	  This	  is	  surprising	   given	   that	   Military	   Intelligence	   should	   serve	   the	   interests	   of	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government	  and	  not	  their	  own	  political	  objectives.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  safe	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  military	  exerted	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  political	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  not	  to	  allow	  Mawhood	  or	  Duncan	  to	  investigate	  their	  intelligence	  operations.	  As	  this	   chapter	   has	   described,	   such	   actions	  would	  probably	  have	   revealed	   a	   close	  association	   between	   the	   military	   and	   a	   number	   of	   secret	   paramilitary	  organisations.	  Overall,	  while	  the	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan	  inquiries	  may	  not	  strictly	  be	  the	  politicisation	  of	  an	  intelligence	  product,	  an	  analysis	  of	  these	  cases	  reveals	  wider	  implications.	  	  	   Military	   Intelligence,	   and	   more	   specifically	   Army	   Intelligence,	   had	  assumed	   almost	   complete	   autonomy	   to	   conduct	   operations	   free	   from	  government	  intervention.	  Over	  time,	  a	  culture	  of	  autonomy	  had	  developed	  which	  had	   a	   negative	   impact	   on	   their	   willingness	   to	   be	   subservient	   to	   political	  direction.	  When	   conditions	  were	   imposed	   to	   restrain	   this	   autonomy	   the	   army	  pushed	   back	   to	   protect	   their	   interests.	   In	   this	   context,	   the	   politicisation	   that	  occurred	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   result	   of	   a	   wider	   culture	   of	   weak	   administrative	  control	   and	   oversight.	   It	   is	   a	   clear	   example	   of	   administrative	   politicisation	   or	  what	  Rovner	  refers	  to	  as	  bureaucratic	  parochialism	  (Rovner	  2011:	  207).	  	  	  
	   The	   lack	   of	   any	   clear	   policy	   direction	   from	   the	   government	   almost	  certainly	  exacerbated	  this	  problem.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  policy	  neglect,	  the	  intelligence	  services	  were	  free	  to	  serve	  either	  the	  interest	  of	  their	  directors,	  or	  alternatively,	  the	  politics	  of	  their	  masters.	  The	  intelligence	  services	  thereby	  became	  intensely	  personalised	   organisations.	   The	   legacy	   of	   this	   problem	   can	   be	   dated	   back	   to	  1901,	  which	  carried	  on	  unabated	  throughout	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  Mawhood	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and	   Duncan	   called	   for	   vigorous	   organisational	   solutions	   to	   improve	   policy	  direction	   and	   coordination	   of	   the	   intelligence	   bureaucracy.	   	   However,	   each	  solution	   they	   proposed	   was	   largely	   politically	   expedient.	   	   Although	   their	  recommendations	   were	   not	   totally	   rejected,	   they	   were	   only	   partially	  implemented.	   Reform	   was	   only	   acceptable	   if	   it	   conformed	   to	   the	   partisan	  interests	   of	   each	   party	   concerned.	   It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	  longer	  the	  intelligence	  services	  operated	  without	  any	  clear	  policy	  direction,	  the	  more	  attached	  they	  became	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  their	  political	  masters	  and	  free	  to	  serve	   their	   self-­‐interests.	   	  This	  opened	   the	  door	   for	  politicisation	   to	  occur	  —	  a	  condition	  that	  would	  remain	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  	  	  Considering	   these	   findings,	   it	   appears	   that	   the	   intelligence	   function	  became	   little	  more	   than	   a	   political	  weapon	   serving	   the	   interests	   of	   those	  who	  controlled	   or	   ran	   the	   agencies.	   Political	   advantage	   was	   sought	   at	   every	  opportunity	  to	  maintain	  this	  control.	  The	  collective	  effect	  of	  these	  circumstances	  impeded	  objectivity	  and	  political	  neutrality	  giving	  rise	  to	  politicisation.	  It	  seems	  reasonable	  to	  suggest	  that	  because	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  policy	  direction	  the	  intelligence	  community	   did	   not	   serve	   the	   national	   interest	   through	   informing	   policy	  development,	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  society	  through	  security,	  but	  rather	  it	  served	  the	  political	  interests	  of	  its	  patrons.	  Although	  the	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan	  inquiry	  was	  intended	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  they	  were	  not	  fully	  resolved.	  	  	   What	   can	  be	   seen	   throughout	   the	   inquiries	   is	   an	   attempt	  on	   the	  part	   of	  both	   the	   military	   and	   the	   government	   to	   reassert	   control	   over	   their	   personal	  intelligence	   fiefdoms,	  while	   they	  were	  undergoing	  change.	  This	  was	  potentially	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at	   the	   cost	   of	   good	   decision-­‐making.	   In	   the	   end	   very	   little	   was	   achieved	   and	  intelligence	   returned	   to	   its	   focus	   on	   left	  wing	   groups	  while	   devoting	   relatively	  minor	  attention	  to	  those	  groups	  associated	  with	  right	  wing	  politics.	  	  	  The	   institutional	   culture	  of	   autonomy	   that	  had	  been	  allowed	   to	  develop	  within	   military	   intelligence	   made	   it	   averse	   to	   collegiality	   and	   administrative	  reform.	  It	  sought	  to	  protect	  its	  own	  interests.	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  army	  flexing	  its	  political	  muscle	  and	  exerting	  pressure	  on	  the	  government.	  This	  is	  also	  evident	  in	  the	   events	   surrounding	   the	   Bruche	   inquiry.	   Although	   there	   is	   little	   conclusive	  evidence	   to	   link	   the	   military	   with	   the	   New	   Guard,	   there	   is	   fairly	   substantial	  circumstantial	  evidence	   to	  show	  that	  a	  number	  of	  senior	  military	  officers	  were	  involved	   with	   secret	   paramilitary	   armies.	   A	   deliberate	   effort	   was	   made	   to	  conceal	  this	  information	  for	  parochial	  interests	  rather	  than	  national	  interests.	  	  	   For	  example,	  what	  began	  as	  a	  Royal	  Commission	  to	  investigate	  allegations	  of	  collusion	  between	  the	  New	  Guard	  and	  the	  military	  quickly	  became	  an	  internal	  investigation.	  This	  suggests	  elements	  within	  the	  army	  were	  concerned	  with	  what	  Mawhood’s	  inquiry	  might	  reveal.	  That	  the	  army	  was	  charged	  with	  investigating	  itself	   during	   the	   Bruche	   inquiry	   also	   raises	   important	   questions	   regarding	   the	  independence	   of	   the	   investigation.	   The	   allegations	   Bruche	   was	   charged	   with	  investigating	   were	   never	   rigorously	   probed	   or	   independently	   scrutinised.	  Moreover,	  his	  conclusions	  were	  so	  anodyne	  that	  nothing	  damaging	  to	  the	  army	  was	  presented.	  Important	  questions	  were	  purposefully	  left	  unasked.	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It	   may	   be	   too	   simple,	   however,	   to	   overplay	   the	   role	   of	   the	   army	   in	  obstructing	   and	   politicising	   the	   government	   inquiries	   under	   discussion.	   These	  considerations	   must	   be	   balanced	   with	   conditions	   also	   imposed	   by	   the	  government.	   That	   the	   army	   was	   unsuccessful	   in	   completely	   shutting	   down	  Mawhood’s	  investigations	  suggests	  that	  he	  enjoyed	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  political	  protection	   from	   the	   Australian	   government.	   This	   favouritism	   likely	   stemmed	  from	   Attorney	   General	  William	   Hughes	   and	   his	   secretary	   Sir	   George	   Knowles.	  Hughes	   had	   argued,	   perhaps	   quite	   rightly,	   that	   the	   army	   was	   biased	   against	  Mawhood	  from	  the	  outset	  (Cain	  1983:	  285).	  But	  official	  documents	  indicate	  that	  Hughes	  was	  also	  attempting	  to	  shape	  the	  political	  agenda.	  This	  is	  made	  clear	  in	  a	  statement	   by,	   Sir	   George	   Knowles,	   which	   reveals	   Hughes	   had	   no	   intention	   of	  relying	   on	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   Duncan	   report.	   Archival	   documents	   show	   that	  Hughes	   had	   informed	   Mawhood	   before	   he	   began	   his	   inquiry	   that	   ‘if	   in	   any	  respect,	  Mawhood	  disagreed	  with	  Duncan’s	  views	  he	  (Mawhood)	  should	  submit	  direct	   to	   him	   a	   separate	   report	   thereon’	   (NAA:	   MP	   729/6,	   29/401/477).	   It	   is	  likely	  that	  Hughes	  knew	  exactly	  what	  Mawhood	  would	  find.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Mawhood	  findings	  would	  provide	  a	  justification	  for	  Hughes	  policy	  desires.	  	  	   Perhaps	  the	  message	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  these	  events	  is	  that	  the	  Mawhood	  and	  Duncan	   inquiries	   took	   place	   in	   a	   divisive	   political	   atmosphere.	   They	  were	  never	  intended	  to	  be	  independent	  and	  objective	  investigations	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	   probing	   their	   maladministration	   and	   recommending	   adjustments.	  Rather,	   they	   were	   the	   projection	   of	   parochial	   political	   attitudes	   and	   vested	  interests	   —	   a	   means	   of	   political	   point	   scoring.	   Ultimately,	   what	   might	   be	  concluded	   from	   these	   events	   is	   that	   such	   vested	   political	   interests	   resulted	   in	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politicising	   the	   inquiries,	  which	  only	  worked	  against	   improving	   the	  design	  and	  administration	   of	   the	   intelligence	   services.	   Politicisation	   fostered	   inefficiency	  and	  exacerbated	  tension	  between	  departments.	  	  	  	  	  	   On	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   findings	   presented	   in	   the	   case	   under	   discussion,	   it	  becomes	  apparent	   that	  policy-­‐makers,	   the	  military,	  senior	  bureaucrats,	  and	  the	  intelligence	   services,	   were	   all	   motivated	   by	   parochial	   considerations	   and	  intentions.	  The	  most	  predominant	  factor	  is	  that	  each	  sought	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  interests,	   expand	   their	   own	   autonomy,	   and	   achieve	   certain	   partisan	   goals.	   The	  goal	   of	   policy-­‐makers	   seems	   to	   have	   been	   to	   attain	   civil	   control	   over	   the	  intelligence	  function.	  This	  can	  be	  contrasted	  against	  the	  military’s	  desire	  to	  keep	  its	   own	   foothold	   in	   conducting	   intelligence	   operations	  within	   the	   civil	   sphere,	  and	   to	   conceal	   its	   associations	   with	   secret	   paramilitary	   groups.	   Mawhood	  appears	  to	  have	  served	  the	  interests	  of	  policy-­‐makers,	  while	  Duncan	  and	  Kevin	  seem	   to	   have	   served	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   military.	   From	   this	   perspective	   the	  struggle	   was	   over	   who	   would	   control	   and	   shape	   domestic	   polices	   regarding	  intelligence.	  Ultimately	  these	  actions	  were	  motivated	  by	  politics	  and	  resulted	  in	  politicisation	   rather	   than	   administrative	   reform.	   In	   the	   end,	   very	   little	   was	  achieved	   to	   advance	   the	   security	  of	   the	   country.	  A	   culture	  of	  politicisation	  had	  become	   manifest	   and	   ingrained.	   Many	   of	   the	   improprieties	   that	   beset	   the	  Australian	   Intelligence	   Community	   during	   World	   War	   Two	   would	   remain	  unresolved.	  	  As	  the	  next	  chapter	  shows,	  the	  legacy	  of	  these	  improprieties	  would	  be	  the	  inheritance	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War.	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Chapter	  Five	  




Lionel	  Murphy:	  Can	  you	  see	  any	  dangers	  in	  a	  Minister	  like	  the	  Attorney	  
General,	  having	  complete	  control,	  final	  control	  of	  a	  security	  intelligence	  
organisation?	  
	  
Senator	  McLelland:	  Not	  at	  all.76	  
	  
Introduction	  The	   previous	   chapter	   identified	   that	   a	   lack	   of	   political	   control	   over	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	   services	   led	   to	   their	   politicisation	   during	   the	   Second	  World	  War.	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  opposite	  occurred	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	   Cold	  War	   (1949–1972)	  when	   partisan	   political	   interests	   dominated	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   services	   and	   the	   federal	  government.	   This	   chapter	   will	   show	   that	   prime	   ministers,	   ministers,	   and	  parliamentarians,	   requested	   and	   received	   intelligence	   material	   that	   was	   then	  used	  to	  support	  and	  justify	  their	  own	  political	  goals.	  On	  several	  occasions,	  secret	  intelligence	   material	   found	   its	   way	   into	   parliamentary	   speeches	   and	   political	  debates.	   Here	   intelligence	   was	   used	   as	   a	   substitute	   for	   reasoned	   political	  argument.	   Moreover,	   intelligence	   material	   became	   a	   partisan	   weapon	   used	   to	  smear	  political	  opposition	  and	   to	   substantiate	   the	  alleged	   subversive	  nature	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Transcript	  of	  interview,	  This	  Day	  Tonight,	  19	  March	  1973,	  Fraser	  Papers	  M	  2007.0019,	  Box	  2.	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communism,	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement,	   and	   political	   dissent	   in	   general.77	  The	  following	   chapter	   identifies	   that	   senior	   staff	   of	   the	   Australian	   Security	  Intelligence	   Organisation	   (ASIO)	   rather	   than	   being	   wilfully	   complicit	   often	  resisted	  the	  practice	  but	  their	  resistance	  was	  largely	  ineffectual.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	   is	   to	   offer	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   the	   political	   use	   of	   intelligence	   in	  parliamentary	   debates	   was	   enabled,	   why	   ASIO	   resistance	   was	   ineffective,	   and	  then	  to	  explain	  how	  this	  resulted	  in	  politicisation.	  	  	  	  	  
Accountability	  and	  control,	  matters	  On	   2	   March	   1949,	   Prime	   Minister	   Joseph	   (Ben)	   Chifley	   announced	   the	  creation	   of	   the	   Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation.	   The	   organisation	  was	   born	   in	   an	   atmosphere	   of	   Cold	   War,	   which	   to	   many	   Western	   states	  generated	  a	   firm	  conviction	   that	   communism	  was	  a	   threat	   to	  national	   security.	  Archival	  documents	  show	  that	  ASIO’s	  creation	  was,	   indeed,	  a	  response	  to	  fears,	  —	   both	   real	   and	   imagined	  —	   that	   communists	   had	   penetrated	   the	   Australian	  public	   service,	   which	   thereby	   threatened	   defence	   and	   security	   relations	   with	  allied	   countries	   such	   as	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Great	   Britain	   (NA:	   KV/4/450;	  KV/4/451;	   KV/4/452).	   Thus,	   as	   some	   contend,	   it	   appears	   that	   ASIO’s	   purpose	  was	  to	  pursue	  communists	  (Cain	  2009:	  134).	  Given	  the	  potential	  for	  an	  anti-­‐left	  wing	   bias	   Prime	   Minister	   Chifley	   appointed	   Supreme	   Court	   Judge	   Justice	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  This	   is	  not	   to	   suggest	   that	  Communism,	  and	  elements	  of	   the	  peace	  movement,	  were	  not	  a	  legitimate	  security	  concern.	  There	  is	  little	  doubt	  that	  such	  groups	  often	  exploited	  their	   right	   to	   dissent	   as	   a	   political	   strategy	   and	   tactic	   to	   destabilise	   the	   government.	  	  	  The	  point	  is	  rather	  to	  show	  that	  political	  leaders	  used	  intelligence	  in	  public	  speeches	  for	  partisan	   political	   advantage.	   This	   was	   done	   by	   publicly	   smearing	   reputations	   and	   by	  linking	   dissent	  with	   subversion,	   it	   was	   not	   done	   to	   enhance	   national	   security.	   Such	   a	  tactic	  was	  politically	  advantageous	  for	  the	  government	  because	  it	  brought	  into	  question	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  motivations	  of	  those	  who	  opposed	  government	  policies.	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Geoffrey	  Reed	  78	  as	  Director	  General	  of	  Security	  to	  avoid	  such	  a	  possibility.	  	  The	  understanding	   that	   ASIO	   should	   maintain	   a	   standard	   of	   non-­‐partisanship	   was	  clearly	  stated	  in	  a	  ten–point	  Directive	  titled	  	  ‘the	  establishment	  and	  maintenance	  of	   a	   security	   service’	  which	  Chifley	   issued	   to	  Reed	  only	  days	   later.	   Point	   six	   of	  that	   directive	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   the	   context	   of	   this	   chapter.	   It	   reads	   in	  part:	   It	  is	  essential	  that	  the	  Security	  Service	  should	  be	  kept	  absolutely	  free	  from	  any	  political	  bias	  or	  influence	  and	  nothing	  should	  be	  done	  that	  might	  lend	  colour	   to	   any	   suggestion	   that	   it	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   interests	   of	   any	  particular	  section	  of	   the	  community,	  or	  with	  any	  matters	  other	   than	   the	  defence	  of	  the	  Commonwealth.	  You	  will	  impress	  upon	  your	  staff	  that	  they	  have	   no	   connection	   whatever	   with	   any	   matters	   of	   a	   party	   political	  character	  and	  they	  must	  avoid	  any	  action	  which	  could	  be	  so	  construed.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  7452,	  A	  48)	  	   The	   directives	   given	   to	   Reed	  were	   intended	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   political	  views	   of	   ASIO	   personnel	   would	   not	   colour	   their	   analysis,	   and	   its	   domestic	  security	  function	  would	  not	  serve	  any	  specific	  partisan	  political	  interests,	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence	  void	  the	  edict	  of	  political	  neutrality.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  period	  under	  discussion,	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  ASIO’s	  political	  masters	  did	  not	  strictly	  abide	  by	  this	  principle.	  On	  several	  occasions	  intelligence	  advice	  was	  misappropriated	   for	   political	   gain	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   using	   intelligence	  information	  as	  a	  means	  of	  vindicating	  and	  justifying	  political	  arguments	  became	  normalised.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  Justice	  Geoffrey	  Sandalford	  Reed	  was	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO	  from	  March	  1949	  to	  	  	  June	  1950.	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Indeed,	  using	  intelligence	  advice	  to	  substantiate	  a	  political	  argument	  can	  be	   a	   real	   temptation	   for	   politicians	   when	   seeking	   to	   persuade	   an	   audience.	   A	  number	   of	   scholars	   have	   observed	   that	   this	   not	   only	   results	   in	   politicising	   the	  debate	  but	  also	  the	  intelligence	  organisation	  itself.	  For	  example,	  Rovner’s	  study	  of	  politicised	  intelligence	  in	  the	  United	  States	  suggests	  that	  using	  intelligence	  to	  persuade	  an	  audience	  tends	  to	  create	  a	  perception	  that	  intelligence	  agencies	  are	  aligned	   with	   the	   policy	   objectives	   of	   certain	   political	   parties	   or	   politicians	  (Rovner	  2008:	  396).	  That	  is,	  the	  perceived	  objectivity	  or	  political	  neutrality	  of	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	  is	  diminished	  when	  political	  leaders	  publicly	  use	  secret	  intelligence	  to	  support	  or	  justify	  a	  policy	  positions.	  	  	  British	  historian	  Ken	  Robertson	  tends	  to	  support	  this	  idea.	  He	  argues	  that	  ‘bringing	   intelligence	   into	  current	  political	  debates	  has	  the	  result	  of	  politicising	  the	  intelligence	  service	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  undesirable’.	  According	  to	  Robertson,	  this	  is	   because	   the	   mantel	   of	   political	   independence	   is	   removed	   and	   intelligence	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  public	  process	  for	  creating	  policy	  consensus	  (Robertson	  1987:	  267).	   Academic	   literature	   on	   this	   subject	   offers	   various	   recommendations	   for	  dealing	   with	   the	   problem	   most	   of	   which	   centres	   on	   maintaining	   a	   balance	  between	  ministerial	  control	  and	  agency	  autonomy.	  In	  short,	  getting	  the	  balance	  right	  matters.	  	  	  	   For	   example,	   British	   historian,	   Ian	   Leigh,	   acknowledges	   there	   is	   a	   clear	  need	   to	   balance	   accountability	   with	   control.	   Leigh,	   however,	   recognises	   that	  accountability	  and	  control	  also	  bring	  two	  opposing	  dangers.	  	  Either	  too	  much	  or	  too	   little	   control	   can	   result	   in	   politicisation.	  He	   identified	   that	   political	   leaders	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who	   exert	   too	  much	   control	   over	   an	   intelligence	   service	  might	   be	   tempted	   to	  abuse	  the	  extensive	  capabilities	  of	  intelligence	  organisations	  to	  serve	  a	  domestic	  party	   political	   agenda.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Leigh	   identified	   that	   too	   little	  ministerial	   control	   could	   result	   in	  an	   intelligence	   service	  becoming	   ‘a	   law	  unto	  themself’.	   His	   response	   was	   to	   recommend	   a	   framework	   of	   well-­‐calibrated	  accountability	  mechanisms	  that	  insulate	  intelligence	  organisations	  from	  political	  abuse	  without	   isolating	   them	  from	  executive	  governance	  (Leigh	  2005:	  6).	   Such	  findings	   point	   out	   that	   there	   is	   a	   delicate	   balance	   between	   ensuring	   proper	  governmental	  control	  of	  an	  intelligence	  service	  without	  opening	  the	  service	  up	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  political	  manipulation.	  	  
	  While	  this	  theme	  is	  reflected	  within	  the	  Australian	  context,	  the	  academic	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  is	  somewhat	  contentious.	  Jennifer	  Hocking’s	  (2004)	  Terror	  
Laws	   for	   instance	   briefly	   examined	   the	   issue	   of	   ministerial	   control	   and	  accountability	   of	   ASIO.	   Hocking	   argues	   that	   ‘sweeping	   exemptions	   from	  ministerial	  control’	  allowed	  ASIO	  to	  influence	  aspects	  of	  government	  policy	  that	  were	  not	  within	  their	  legitimate	  domain	  (Hocking	  2004:	  53).	  Frank	  Cain	  (1994)	  took	  a	  similar	  position.	   	  He	  analysed	  several	   instances	  of	  what	  he	  called	  ASIO’s	  ‘corporate	   independence’	   concluding	   that,	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   such	   malpractice	  resulted	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  government	  supervision	  (Cain	  1994:	  214).	  	  	  	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   thorough	   account	   of	   how	   issues	   pertaining	   to	  accountability	  and	  control	  can	  result	  in	  politicisation	  is	  David	  McKnight’s	  (2008)	  excellent	  article	  on	  ASIO	  government	  relations	  entitled	   ‘Partisan	  Improprieties:	  Ministerial	   Control	   and	   Australia’s	   Security	   Agencies’.	   McKnight	   acknowledges	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the	   twin	   dangers	   of	   control	   and	   accountability	   but	   arrives	   at	   a	   different	  conclusion	  to	  Hocking	  and	  Cain.	  He	  points	  out	  that	  if	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	  is	   given	   too	   much	   autonomy	   it	   runs	   the	   risk	   of	   developing	   its	   own	   agenda,	  whereas	   an	   organisation	  with	   excessive	  ministerial	   control	   can	   drive	   it	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  the	  governing	  party’s	  partisan	  interests	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  708).	  The	  most	   significant	   finding	   of	   McKnight’s	   research	   indicates	   that	   the	   latter,	   too	  much	   political	   control	   was	   the	   primary	   cause	   of	   politicisation	  within	   the	   time	  frame	  of	  his	  study	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  721).	  While	  McKnight	  describes	   in	  detail	  various	  aspects	  of	  when	  ASIO	  intelligence	  material	  was	  by	  used	  by	  politicians	  for	  political	   gain,	   some	  elements	  were	   left	   untreated.	  The	   elements	  not	   treated	  by	  McKnight	   are	   discussed	   here	   in	   more	   detail	   and	   constitute	   in	   the	   following	  chapter.	  	  	   *****	  	  
Robert	  Menzies	  (1946	  –	  1951)	  In	   1946,	   as	   Leader	   of	   the	   Opposition,	   Robert	   Menzies	   argued	   that	   ‘we	  must	   be	   extremely	   reluctant	   to	   put	   a	   ban	   on	   the	   Communist	   Party.	   The	  Communist	   Party	   must	   be	   brought	   into	   the	   open	   and	   met	   by	   strength	   of	  argument	  against	  it’	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  18	  February	  1946:	  4).	  By	  1949,	  his	  attitude	  had	  changed.	  During	  the	  federal	  election	  campaign	  of	  that	  year	  Menzies	  drew	  on	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  period	  to	  great	  effect.	   ‘Our	  attitude	  has	   been	   one	   of	   great	   tolerance’	   he	   stated	   in	   an	   opposition	   policy	   speech	  delivered	  in	  November	  1949.	  ‘The	  day	  has	  gone	  by	  for	  treating	  communism	  as	  a	  legitimate	   political	   philosophy.	   The	   communist’s	   are	   the	   most	   unscrupulous	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opponents	   of	   religion,	   of	   civilised	   government,	   of	   law	   and	   order,	   of	   national	  security’.	  He	   then	  proudly	  declared	   that	   ‘if	  elected	  we	  shall	  outlaw	   it’	   (Menzies	  1949:	  14–15).	  Menzies	  was	  elected,	  and	  he	  proceeded	  to	  outlaw	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia.	  Having	  made	  clear	  his	  policy	  commitment,	  Menzies	  required	  hard	  evidence	  to	  ensure	  public	  support	  for	  it.	  This	  required	  information,	  and	  the	  government	   turned	   to	   the	  newly	   established	   intelligence	   service	  —	  ASIO	  —	   to	  get	  it.	  	  	   On	   27	   March	   1950,	   during	   the	   preparation	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	  Dissolution	  Bill,	  Solicitor	  General	  Kenneth	  Baily	  informed	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO	  Justice	  Geoffrey	  Reed	  that	  ‘the	  government	  desires	  information	  with	  regard	  to	  certain	  persons	  who	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	   leading	  communists’.	  Bailey	  explained	  that	  the	  information	  was	  of	  great	  urgency	  and	  he	  told	  Reed	  that	  the	  ‘utility	  of	  the	  information,	  from	  the	  governments	  point	  of	  view,	  depends	  on	  its	  availability	  by	  12	   April	   at	   least’.	   Baily	   sent	   ASIO	   a	   list	   of	   fifty-­‐three	   persons	   suspected	   to	   be	  current	  members	   of	   the	   Central	   Executive	   of	   the	   Australian	   Communist	   Party,	  which	  also	  included	  the	  names	  of	  fourteen	  Trade	  Union	  leaders.79	  He	  then	  asked	  ASIO	   to	   check	   the	   life	   history	   of	   these	   persons,	   provide	   evidence	   of	   their	  membership	  in	  the	  CPA,	  and	  to	  detail	  their	  subversive	  activity	  (NAA:	  M	  1509,	  7).	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  79	  It	   is	  possible	  that	  the	  Commonwealth	  Investigation	  Service	  obtained	  this	   list	  when	  it	  raided	  Communist	  Party	  premises	   in	  Sydney	  during	   July	  1949.	  These	  documents	  were	  then	  later	  passed	  to	  ASIO	  after	  it	  was	  established,	  see:	  Swan,	  B,	  	  ‘History	  of	  ASIO	  Volume	  1’	  NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2022,	  National	  Archives	  page:	  112.	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Director	  General	  Reed	  responded	  to	  the	  request	  on	  1	  March	  1950.	  He	  first	  provided	  a	  detailed	  eleven-­‐page	  assessment	  outlining	  the	  CPA’s	  influence	  on	  the	  trade	  union	  movement.	  Reed	  claimed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  evidence	  to	  show	   that	   the	   most	   important	   organisational	   task	   of	   the	   CPA,	   throughout	   the	  world,	   was	   total	   control	   of	   the	   trade	   unions.	   The	   ASIO	   dossier	   identified	   that	  eleven	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party’s	   Central	   Committee	   are	   Australian	  trade	   union	   officials.	   Accompanying	   the	   ASIO	   dossier	   Reed	   also	   attached	   a	  twenty-­‐five-­‐page	   list	   identifying	   scores	  of	  people	  as	   communists	  who	  occupied	  high	   positions	   in	   various	   trade	   unions	   throughout	   the	   country.	   	   This	   list	   was	  precisely	  what	   the	   government	   sought	   and	   it	   was	   passed	   onto	  Menzies	   on	   13	  March	  1950	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1428).	  	  	  	  On	  27	  April	  1950,	  Menzies	  stood	  before	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  to	  deliver	   the	   second	   reading	   of	   a	   Bill	   that	   would	   outlaw	   and	   dissolve	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia.80	  In	  this	  speech	  Menzies	  drew	  on	  the	  intelligence	  ASIO	  had	  earlier	  provided	  to	  underscore	  the	  influence	  the	  Communist	  Party	  had	  in	  the	  trade	  union	  movement.	  He	  declared	  to	  the	  House	  that	   ‘the	  importance	  of	  the	  Australian	  Communist	   is	   not	  numerical	   but	  positional.	   It	   is	   the	  position	  he	  holds	  that	  counts’.	  Menzies	  then	  proceeded	  to	  expose	  them:	  ‘let	  us	  have	  a	  look	  at	  their	   names’	   he	   suggested,	   ‘and	   jobs	   they	   hold	   in	   order	   to	   see	   how	   this	  comparatively	  small	  handful	  of	  men	  have	  gotten	  into	  positions	  from	  which	  they	  can	   do	   damage	   to	   this	   great	   and	   beloved	   country	   of	   ours’	   (House	   of	  Representatives,	  27	  April	  1950:	  1996–7).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  The	   Communist	   Party	   Dissolution	   Bill	   was	   passed	   on	   19	   October	   1950,	   but	   after	   a	  challenge	  by	  several	  unions,	  the	  Act	  was	  subsequently	  declared	  unconstitutional	  by	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  March	  1951.	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During	  the	  reading	  of	  the	  Bill,	  Menzies	  read	  the	  names	  of	  fifty-­‐three	  trade	  union	  officials	   connected	   to	   the	  CPA	   into	   the	   official	  Hansard	   and	   aloud	   to	   the	  House.	  All	   of	   this	   information	  was	   taken	   from	   the	  dossier	  ASIO	  prepared	   on	  1	  March	  1950	  (NAA:	  M	  1509,	  7).	  81	  	  While	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  document	  can	  be	  defended	   as	   within	   the	   prerogatives	   and	   duties	   of	   ASIO	   to	   inform	   the	  government	   on	   security	  matters,	   it	  was	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   information	  was	  used	   by	   the	   government	   to	   justify	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   policy	   decision	   that	  intelligence	  was	  misused	   for	   a	   political	   purpose.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  problem	  was	  that	  Menzies	   invoked	  intelligence	  as	  a	  potent	   justification	  for	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	   CPA	   by	   using	   it	   to	   substantiate	   connections	   between	   communism	   and	   the	  trade	  unions.	  The	  intention	  was	  clearly	  to	  use	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  intelligence	  as	  a	  tool	   of	   influence	   to	   reinforce	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   necessity	   of	   the	   Communist	  Dissolution	  Bill.	  	  	  However,	   the	   information	  Menzies	  cited	  on	   trade	  union	  officials	  was	   for	  the	  most	  part	  erroneous.	  While	  certainly	  embarrassing	  for	  the	  government	  this	  also	  reflected	  badly	  on	  ASIO.	  To	  the	  delight	  of	  the	  opposition,	  Menzies	  was	  forced	  to	  correct	  much	  of	  his	  statement.	  Only	  days	  later	  on	  9	  May,	  he	  told	  the	  House	  that	  some	   of	   the	   names	   quoted	   were	   not	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   at	   all.	  Suspicious	   of	   how	   such	   detailed	   information	   could	   have	   been	   obtained,	   the	  opposition	   proceeded	   to	   press	   Menzies	   for	   an	   explanation.	   John	   Rosevear,	  Federal	  Member	  for	  Dally,	  asked	  whether	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  got	  the	  information	  from	   the	   Security	   Service?	   ‘If	   so’	   Rosevear	   inquired,	   ‘will	   he	   have	   that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  The	   document	   containing	   the	   list	   of	   Trade	   Union	   Officials	   is	   contained	   in	   National	  Archives	   of	   Australia	   File	   NAA:	   M	   1509,7	   entitled:	   Australian	   Communist	   Party:	  Influence	  in	  the	  Trade	  Union	  Movement	  –	  Appendix,	  held	  in	  Canberra.	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organisation	  overhauled	  as	   it	  may	  quite	  conceivably	  make	   the	  same	  mistake	   in	  the	  future’.	  Menzies	  replied	  that	  he	  would	  not	  disclose	  his	  sources	  of	  information	  (House	  of	  Representatives,	  9	  May	  1950:	  2242).	  	  The	  episode	   immediately	  cast	  doubt	  over	  ASIO’s	  credibility	  and	  political	  neutrality,	  however,	  on	  23	  May	  1950,	  ASIO’s	  Director	  General	  made	  his	  feelings	  clear.	  Reed	   informed	  Bailey	   that	   the	   information	  ASIO	  had	   supplied	  was	  never	  intended	  to	  be	  put	  to	  such	  a	  public	  purpose.	  He	  said	  that:	  It	  may	  be	  pointed	  out	  that	  when	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  [ASIO]	  Bulletin	  was	  handed	  over	   it	  was	  not	  anticipated	   that	   it	  would	  be	  used	   for	  any	  other	  purpose	  than	   to	   inform	   the	   Minister	   to	   whom	   it	   was	   delivered	   of	   what	   ASIO	  considered	   to	  be	   the	   extent	   of	   influence	  of	   the	  Communist	  Party	   on	   the	  Trade	  Union	  Movement.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1428)	  	  	   These	   events	   highlight	   two	   important	   factors	   regarding	   the	   use	   of	  intelligence	   in	   political	   debate.	   One,	   the	   government	   could	   demand	   from	   their	  intelligence	  services	  detailed	  information	  on	  private	  citizens	  which	  could	  in	  turn	  be	  used	   in	  parliament	   to	  denigrate	   those	  persons.	  The	  problem	  was	   that	  when	  this	   information	   was	   aired	   in	   public	   it	   implied	   that	   ASIO	   supported	   the	  government’s	  political	  agenda.	  But	  as	  Director	  General	  Reed	  pointed	  out,	   there	  was	   never	   any	   intention	   that	   ASIO’s	   information	   should	   be	   used	   for	   such	   a	  political	   purpose.	   This	   raises	   a	   second	   point	   regarding	   the	   political	   use	   of	  intelligence	   information.	   The	   incumbent	   government	   did	   not	   need	   to	   explain	  how,	  or	  from	  where	  the	  information	  was	  obtained.	  From	  the	  opposition’s	  point	  of	   view,	   this	   had	   clear	   partisan	   intentions.	   Those	  privileged	  with	   access	   to	   the	  intelligence	   information	   could	   now	   use	   it	   to	   smear	   their	   political	   foe	   but	   the	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veracity	  of	  such	  information	  could	  neither	  be	  substantiated	  nor	  evaluated	  by	  the	  Opposition.82	  	  	  These	   circumstances	   made	   it	   almost	   impossible	   to	   establish	   a	   trustful	  relationship	   between	   the	   government	   and	   the	   opposition	   in	   regard	   to	   the	  intelligence	   function.	   Similarly,	   the	   accused	   had	   no	   right	   of	   reply.	   The	   use	   of	  intelligence	   under	   such	   conditions	   was	   essentially	   a	   means	   of	   immobilising	  political	   opposition.	   Consequently	   rather	   than	   solidifying	   the	   necessity	   of	  banning	  the	  Communist	  Party	   this	  event	  probably	  confirmed	  to	   the	  opposition,	  and	  possibly	  the	  wider	  community,	  the	  underhanded	  tactics	  the	  government	  was	  prepared	   to	  use	   to	  get	   the	   legislation	  passed.	   It	   is	  not	   surprising	   that	   although	  the	  Communist	  Dissolution	  Bill	  was	  passed	  in	  October	  1950,	  it	  was	  immediately	  challenged	  in	  the	  High	  Court	  by	  several	  trade	  unions.	  The	  Act	  was	  subsequently	  declared	  unconstitutional	  in	  March	  1951.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Legislation	   requiring	   the	   Director	   General	   of	   ASIO	   to	   formally	   brief	   the	   Leaders	   of	   the	  Opposition	  on	  security	  matters	  was	  not	  enacted	  until	  the	  Australian	  Security	  Intelligence	  Act	  was	  amended	  in	  1979.	  A	  later	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  Harvey	  Barnett,	  described	  these	  amendments	  to	   the	   Act	   as	   ‘the	   most	   enlightened	   and	   important…development	   of	   a	   true	   bi-­‐partisanship	   in	  intelligence	  matters’	  which	   brought	   Australia	   into	   line	  with	  most	   other	   democracies	   	   (Barnett	  1988:105).	  For	  further	  information	  see	  Frank	  Cain	  1994:	  262;	  and	  Australian	  Security	  Intelligence	  
Act	  1979	  (Cwth)	  part	  3	  (21)	  Function	  and	  Powers.	  	  Charles	  Spry	  explained	  in	  1961	  that	  prior	  to	  his	  appointment	  as	  Director	  General,	  ASIO	  did	  not	  consult	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  at	  all.	  He	  noted	  that	  during	  his	  tenure	  consultation	  with	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  only	  occurred	  sporadically,	  and	  was	  cut	  off	  altogether	  during	  the	  Petrov	  affair	  in	  1954.	  In	  1960,	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition,	  Arthur	  Calwell,	  indicated	  that	  he	  would	  like	  to	  have	  some	  consultation	  with	  ASIO	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2429	  -­‐	  Advice	  to	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition,	  Appendix	  A,	  16	  May	  1961).	  Calwell	  met	  with	  Spry	  and	  the	  Assistant	  Director	  of	  ASIO	  briefly	  on	  several	  occasions	  throughout	  1960,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  until	  five	  years	  later	  that	  he	  formally	  met	  with	  Spry	   on	   5	   May	   1965.	   At	   this	   meeting,	   Calwell	   received	   a	   briefing	   on	   Croatian	   activities	   in	  Australia,	  Soviet	  espionage	  and	  information	  regarding	  the	  Communist	  affiliations	  of	  Labor	  Party	  members	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2163).	  Calwell’s	  successor,	  Gough	  Whitlam,	  claimed	  he	  was	  not	  briefed	  on	  ASIO	  until	  after	  he	  became	  Prime	  Minister	  in	  1972	  (Whitlam	  1985:	  166).	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Overall,	  the	  newly	  created	  ASIO	  emerged	  with	  the	  reputation	  of	  a	  partisan	  organisation	  and	  a	  cloud	  over	  it	  credibility.	  Perhaps,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  consequences	   to	   arise	   from	   these	   events	   was	   that	   Menzies	   had	   unwittingly	  established	   a	   precedent	   for	   using	   intelligence	   as	   a	   means	   of	   political	   point	  scoring.	   The	   vestiges	   of	   this	   precedent	   appear	   throughout	   the	   Liberal	   Party’s	  twenty-­‐three	  year	  term	  in	  office.	  	  	  
William	  Wentworth	  	  (1950	  –	  1972)	  Some	   members	   of	   the	   Menzies	   government	   took	   his	   precedent	   to	   the	  extreme.	   Among	   the	   leading	   Cold	   War	   anti-­‐communists	   of	   the	   time	   was	   the	  Federal	   Member	   for	   Mackellar,	   and	   later	   Minister	   for	   Social	   Services,	   William	  Charles	   Wentworth.83	  An	   examination	   of	   his	   case	   is	   of	   more	   than	   anecdotal	  importance	  —	   it	   is	   significant	   for	   several	   reasons.	   One,	   it	   identifies	   a	   unique	  location	   from	   which	   politicisation	   can	   originate.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   case	   is	  instructive	   because	   it	   shows	   that	   the	   source	   of	   politicisation	   is	   not	   always	   the	  exclusive	   province	   of	   the	   executive.	   The	   implications	   that	   flow	   from	   the	  Wentworth	   case	   demonstrate	   that	   less	   influential	   members	   of	   parliament	   can	  exert	   an	   equally	   significant	   force	   in	   politicising	   intelligence.	   Additionally,	   the	  case	  demonstrates	  how	  a	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  had	  unrestricted	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  intelligence	  service,	  which	  he	  then	  put	  to	  political	  use.	  Overall,	  the	  case	  highlights	  that	  during	  the	  period	  under	  discussion	  there	  were	  very	  few	  protocols	  in	  place	  to	  limit	  the	  possibility	  of	  politicisation	  occurring.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  For	   an	   insightful	  monograph	   on	  William	  Wentworth,	   see:	   Lachlan	   Clohesy’s	   (2010)	  
Australian	  Cold	  Warrior:	  The	  Anti-­‐Communism	  of	  W.C.	  Wentworth,	   PhD	  Thesis,	   Victoria	  University,	  Australia.	  For	  an	  additional	  discussion	  about	  some	  of	  Wentworth’s	  activities	  see:	  Craig	  McLean	  (2001)	  Fear	  of	  Peace?	  Australian	  Government	  Responses	  To	  The	  Peace	  
Movement	  1949-­‐	  1959,	  Master	  of	  Arts	  Thesis,	  Victoria	  University,	  Australia.	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For	   over	   a	   twenty-­‐year	   period	   Wentworth	   requested	   and	   received	  numerous	  ASIO	  intelligence	  files	  (Clohesy	  2009:	  121).	  He	  used	  this	  information	  to	  denounce	  his	   personal	   critics,	   expose	  political	   dissenters	   and	   chastise	   those	  who	   held	   unconventional	   views.	   Through	   an	   examination	   of	   archival	   material	  and	   secondary	   sources	   it	   becomes	   clear	   that	  Wentworth	   had	   no	   scruples	  with	  using	  ASIO	  resources	  as	  a	  means	  of	  publicly	  exposing	  the	  ‘subversive’	  red	  thread	  of	  communism.	  For	  example,	  in	  July	  1950,	  when	  Wentworth	  first	  entered	  federal	  politics	   he	   sought	   personal	   access	   to	   ASIO’s	   security	   library	   to	   examine	   files	  relating	  to	  communist	  publications.	  Menzies	  quite	  rightly	  refused	  this	  request	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  members	  of	  parliament	  need	  not	  concern	  themselves	  with	  such	  matters,	   and	   perhaps	   because	   such	   an	   action	   may	   undermine	   the	   Director–General	   of	   Security	   (McLean	   2001:	   191).	   Wentworth,	   however,	   continued	   to	  push	  for	  a	  mechanism	  to	  expose	  communists.	  	  	  In	  August	  1950,	  Wentworth	  argued	  that	  ASIO	  should	  provide	  Members	  of	  the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   with	   an	   index	   listing	   publications	   and	   people	  associated	  with	  communism	  in	  Australia	  so	  that	  it	  could	  be	  put	  to	  public	  use.	  	  But	  Director	  General	  of	  Security,	  Charles	  Spry,	  considered	  this	  idea	  ‘an	  impossibility’.	  Spry	   remarked	   that	   such	   an	   enterprise	  would	   not	   only	   ‘be	   completely	   beyond	  our	  resources’	  but	  also	   ‘outside	  of	  my	  charter’.	  According	  to	  Spry,	  Wentworth’s	  proposal	  was	  both	  unacceptable	  and	  unworkable.	  	  ‘From	  the	  perspective	  of	  ASIO	  the	  public	  dissemination	  of	   information	  by	  it	   is	  contrary	  to	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  the	  organisation’.	  ASIO	  files	  ‘contain	  information	  which	  could	  not	  be	  provided	  for	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public	  perusal’	  (NAA:	  A	  1209,	  1957/4892).	  84	  But	  Wentworth	  persisted	  with	  the	  proposal	  and	  he	  raised	  it	  again	  in	  October	  1956.	  During	  the	  second	  reading	  of	  the	  
ASIO	  Act	  1956	  (Cwlth),	  Wentworth	  argued	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  that	  ASIO	   could	   provide	   a	   list	   of	   references	   identifying	   people	   associated	   with	  communism	  which	  should	  be	  made	  available	  to	  parliamentarians,	  the	  press,	  and	  the	   public	   to	   help	   fight	   against	   communist	   propaganda	   (House	   of	  Representatives	   31	   October	   –	   1	   November	   1956:	   2046–7).	   But	   the	   idea	   was	  again	  rejected.	  Not	  to	  be	  deterred,	  Wentworth	  continued	  to	  demand	  intelligence	  material	  from	  ASIO,	  and	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  he	  was	  successful.	  	  	   Throughout	   the	   1950s,	   Wentworth	   continued	   to	   request	   and	   obtain	   a	  wide	   range	   of	   intelligence	   information.	   To	   identify	   only	   a	   small	   portion,	   such	  requests	  included:	  information	  pertaining	  to	  the	  membership	  and	  affiliations	  of	  the	   Australia	   China	   Society	   and	   the	   National	   Welfare	   Fund,	   information	  regarding	   the	   names	   and	   affiliations	   of	   people	   connected	   to	   the	   Federation	   of	  Women	   Shoppers	   through	   to	   the	   names	   of	   recipients	   of	   the	   Commonwealth	  Literary	   Fund	   (Herein	   CLF)	   (NAA:	  A	   432,	   1956/2196).	   On	   one	   occasion,	  when	  Wentworth	   publicly	   exposed	   a	   scholarship	   recipient	   of	   the	   CLF	   in	   the	   Sydney	  
Morning	  Herald	  as,	   ‘not	  only	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party…	  but	  one	  of	   its	  leading	   operatives’	   the	   accused	   brought	   a	   libel	   case85	  against	   him86	  (Sydney	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  This	  information	  is	  drawn	  from	  a	  letter	  dated	  27	  March	  1952	  from	  C.	  F	  Spry	  to	  A.	  S.	  Brown,	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Prime	  Ministers	  Department,	  NAA:	  A	  1209,	  1957/4892.	  	  	  	  85	  Clohesy	  (2010)	  notes	  that	  the	  libel	  case	  brought	  against	  Wentworth	  was	  not	  because	  he	   exposed	   her	   as	   a	   Communist	   but	   because	   of	   aspersions	   cast	   on	   the	   validity	   of	   the	  accused’s	  marital	  status.	  The	  case	  was	  not	  successful,	  pp.	  235–237.	  	  	  	  	  86	  The	   accused	   was	   Katherine	   Susannah	   Pritchard,	   a	   founding	   member	   of	   the	   CPA.	  Pritchard	   was	   known	   to	   be	   a	   member	   of	   the	   KLOD	   group	   identified	   in	   the	   Venona…	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Morning	  Herald	  10	  September	  1952:2).	  That	  people	  may	  have	  been	  communists	  appears	   to	   have	   been	   an	   automatic	   indicator	   of	   their	   subversive	   behaviour.	  Moreover,	  that	  such	  people	  were	  not	  guilty	  of	  any	  specific	  crime	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  of	  little	  concern	  to	  Wentworth.	  	  	   Even	   at	   this	   early	   stage,	  Wentworth’s	   demands	   on	   ASIO	   resources	   had	  started	   to	  concern	  Director	  General	  Charles	  Spry.87	  ‘I	  have	  recently	  given	  some	  thought	  to	  the	  numbers	  and	  types	  of	  letters	  received	  from	  Mr	  Wentworth’,	  Spry	  wrote	   to	   Attorney	   General,	   J.	   A.	   Spicer,	   in	   March	   1953.	  Wentworth’s	   requests	  ‘amounted	  to	  a	  fairly	  formidable	  number	  —	  about	  30	  in	  the	  last	  twelve	  months	  —	   of	   which	   12	   contain	   specific	   requests	   for	   information	   on	   security	   matters’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  500).	  The	  requested	  information	  that	  most	  concerned	  Spry	  were	  files	  pertaining	  to	  private	  individuals.	  	   ‘Mr	   Wentworth’s	   reasons	   for	   requiring	   the	   information’	   Spry	   informed	  the	  Attorney	  General,	  ‘are	  in	  most	  cases	  either	  personal	  or	  political’.	  Aware	  of	  the	  implications,	  Spry	  reminded	  the	  Attorney	  General	  that	   ‘ASIO	  is	  completely	  non-­‐political	  and	  we	  pride	  ourselves	  on	  such.	  The	  requests	  for	  information	  from	  Mr	  Wentworth	   are	   making	   me	   very	   uneasy’.	   Exactly	   what	   Wentworth	   was	   doing	  with	   the	   information	   disturbed	   Spry.	   He	   explained	   that	   Wentworth	   did	   not	  always	   ‘come	   clean’	   as	   to	   why	   he	   wanted	   the	   information	   and	   was	   prone	   to	  ‘outrageous	  conclusions	   from	  very	   small	   inferences.	   I	  have	   felt	  more	  and	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  material	  for	  passing	  information	  to	  Soviet	  intelligence	  agents	  in	  Canberra	  (Ball	  &	  Horner	  1998:233)	  	  	  	  87	  Charles	  Spry	  (Later	  Sir)	  was	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO	  from	  July	  1950	  to	  January	  1970.	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disturbed	  at	   the	  possibilities’	   said	  Spry.	  The	  Attorney	  General	   tended	   to	  agree,	  remarking	  that	  he	  would	  inform	  Wentworth	  that	  he	  would	  not	  be	  receiving	  any	  further	   information	   unless	   he	   could	   supply	   a	   very	   good	   reason	   (NAA:	   A	   6119,	  500).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   archival	   documents	   show	   that	  Wentworth	   continued	   to	  pressure	  ASIO	  to	  deliver	  intelligence	  of	  a	  political	  nature	  to	  him.	  	  	   As	   a	   backbench	   member	   of	   parliament,	   Wentworth	   held	   no	   national	  security	   responsibilities.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  quantity	  of	   intelligence	  he	   requested	  and	   received	   on	   such	   matters	   was	   formidable.	   It	   not	   only	   included	   matters	  regarding	   the	   communist	   affiliations	   of	   private	   citizens	   but	   also	   extended	   to	  information	   regarding	   the	   communist	   connections	   of	   private	   businesses.	   For	  example,	  in	  December	  1953,	  Wentworth	  asked	  that	  the	  Attorney	  General	  obtain	  information	  from	  ASIO	  regarding	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  CPA.	  On	  4	  January	  1954,	  ASIO	  supplied	  him	  with	  six	  copies.	  The	  dossier	  given	  to	  Wentworth	  also	  included	  briefing	   notes	   on	   the	   organisation	   compiled	   by	   ASIO	   and	   the	   various	  correspondences	   of	   its	   members.	   Later	   in	   November	   1956,	   Wentworth	   again	  approached	  Attorney	  General,	  Neil	  O’Sullivan,	   to	  request	   that	  ASIO	   inquire	   into	  the	  League	  of	  Women	  Voters,	  merely	  because	  he	  believed,	  ‘there	  may	  possibly	  be	  some	  communist	  connection	  here’	  (NAA:	  A	  432,	  1956/2196).	  	  	   On	   the	   morning	   of	   13	   October	   1958,	   Wentworth	   phoned	   the	   Attorney	  General	  with	  what	  he	  described	  as	  an	  urgent	  inquiry	  for	  information	  on	  Roland	  Thorp,	  Professor	  of	  Pharmacology	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Sydney.	  At	  the	  time,	  Thorp	  was	   standing	   as	   a	   candidate	   for	   the	  University	   Senate.	  Wentworth	  believed	  he	  had	  a	  number	  of	  ‘Communist	  Party	  affiliations’	  and	  was	  an	  associate	  of	  Professor	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Milgate	   whom	  Wentworth	   also	   alleged	   was	   a	   communist.	   Wentworth	   wanted	  ASIO	  to	  verify	  these	  connections	  demanding	  to	  know	  ‘what	  can	  be	  done	  about	  it?’	  He	  suggested	  that	  ‘steps	  should	  be	  taken	  to	  alert	  the	  people	  concerned’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,498).	   	  ASIO	  did	  comply	  with	  Wentworth’s	  request,	  but	  Spry	  reported	  that	  Thorp	  was	  already	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  security	  file.	  His	  signature	  had	  been	  detected	  among	   three	   hundred	   and	   fifty	   Australian	   scientists	   who	   had	   called	   on	   the	  Menzies	  government	   to	  ban	  nuclear	  weapons	   testing	  earlier	   in	  1958.	  But	  ASIO	  had	   already	   vetted	  Thorp	  when	  he	   applied	   for	   a	  UNESCO	  position	   in	   Pakistan,	  and	   he	   was	   given	   a	   security	   clearance	   on	   that	   occasion,	   and	   regarding	  Wentworth’s	   inquiry,	   Spry	   replied	   curtly	   that	   ‘we	   have	   no	   evidence	   of	  communist	  affiliations	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Professor	  Thorp’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,498).	  	  	  	  	   Later	  on	  10	  October,	  Wentworth	  again	  wrote	  to	  the	  Attorney	  General	  Neil	  O’Sullivan	   seeking	   ASIO’s	   assistance.	   He	   wanted	   information	   regarding	   Mr	  William	  John	  Latona,	  the	  Joint	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Peace	  Congress,	  and	  a	  member	  of	  Wentworth’s	  electorate.	  Wentworth	  stated	  in	  the	  letter	  that	  ‘Latona	  is	  mixed	  up	  with	   a	   number	   of	   peace	   movements’	   and	   he	   wanted	   to	   know	   if	   he	   had	   any	  ‘communist	   connections’.	   Spry	   replied	   on	   27	   October	   1958,	   confirming	   that	  Latona	   ‘has	  been	  an	  active	  member	  of	  various	  peace	  associations	  since	  at	   least	  1950’.	   In	   carrying	   out	   these	   activities,	   Spry	   noted	   that	   ‘he	   has	   of	   course	  associated	  with	  members	   of	   the	  Communist	  Party	   of	  Australia’.	  However,	   Spry	  emphasised	  that	  	  ‘Latona	  is	  a	  genuine	  pacifist	  with	  no	  sympathy	  for	  communism’	  (NAA:	  A	   432,	   1956/2196).	   	   The	   above	   case	   represents	   only	   a	   small	   portion	   of	  Wentworth’s	   requests	   to	   ASIO	   during	   this	   time	   but	   the	   pattern	   continued	  unabated	  for	  another	  decade.	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ASIO	  pushes	  back	  —	  ‘I	  can	  not	  supply	  the	  information	  requested’	  	  Correspondence	   between	   Director	   General	   Spry	   and	   Attorney	   General	  Neil	   O’Sullivan	   shows	   that	   Spry	   had	   again	   started	   to	   push	   back	   against	  Wentworth’s	  demands.	  Spry	  was	  keen	   to	   impress	  on	   the	  Attorney	  General	   that	  Wentworth	   was	   not	   at	   this	   time	   a	   government	   minister	   and	   pointed	   out	   the	  difference	  between	  supplying	  intelligence	  to	  a	  minister	  who	  had	  a	  responsibility	  for	   security	  maters	   and	   supplying	   intelligence	   files	   to	   a	   backbench	  member	   of	  parliament	   who	   did	   not.	  88	  ‘While	   it	   was	   his	   duty	   to	   inform	   ministers	   and	  government	   departments	   on	   security	   matters	   which	   concern	   them’,	   Spry	  explained,	   it	  was	  beyond	  his	  duty	   to	  provide	   information	   ‘to	  private	  members’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  500).	  The	  Attorney	  General	  replied	  to	  Spry	  on	  4	  November	  again	  assuring	  him	  that,	  ‘you	  should	  not	  supply	  information	  to	  private	  members	  about	  private	   individuals’.	  O’Sullivan	   informed	  Spry	   that	  he	  would	  be	  communicating	  this	  to	  Wentworth	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  500).	  	  	  	   Wentworth,	   however,	   knew	   exactly	   how	   to	   work	   the	   system	   to	   his	  advantage.	   In	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives	   on	   3	   May	   1961,	   he	   asked	   Prime	  Minister	   Menzies	   ‘would	   it	   be	   possible	   for	   him	   to	   have	   made	   available	   to	  honourable	   members	   a	   list	   showing	   the	   office	   bearers	   of	   the	   Australian	  Communist	  Party	  and	  of	  the	  Party’s	  State	  branches’.	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  3	  May	  1961:	  1366).	  This	  enabled	  Wentworth	   to	   request	   information	  by	  avoiding	  the	  usual	  communication	  channel	  of	  the	  Attorney	  General’s	  office.	   	  Menzies	  put	  the	  request	  direct	  to	  ASIO,	  which	  was	  perfectly	  acceptable.	  One	  week	  later	  Spry	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  Wentworth	  did	  not	  become	  a	  minister	  until	  1968	  when	  he	  acquired	  the	  portfolio	  for	  Social	  Services	  and	  Aboriginal	  Affairs	  (Clohesy	  2009:	  126).	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supplied	   the	   Prime	   Minister	   with	   an	   extensive	   eleven-­‐page	   list	   detailing	   all	  known	   officer	   bearers	   of	   the	   CPA	   in	   the	   country,	   members	   of	   the	   Central	  Committee	   and	   their	   State	   Committees.	   The	   list	   was	   then	   forwarded	   to	  Wentworth	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2429).	  	  	   In	  March	  1963,	  Wentworth	  again	  sought	   intelligence	   from	  ASIO.	  On	   this	  occasion,	   he	   wanted	   a	   list	   of	   ‘people	   residing	   in	   my	   electorate	   who	   can	   be	  publicly	   identified	  as	  members	  or	  past	  members	  of	   the	  Communist	  Party’.	  Spry	  replied	  he	  could	  not	  provide	  such	  a	  list	  because	  it	  would	  involve	  a	  vast	  research	  project	  and	  his	  organisation	  could	  not	  spare	  the	  resources.	  Not	  satisfied	  with	  this	  response,	  Wentworth	  wrote	   back	   on	   14	  May	   suggesting	   that	   if	   ASIO’s	   list	  was	  narrowed	   down	   to	   New	   South	  Wales	   he	   could	   then	   sort	   the	   information	   into	  electorates	  himself	  and	  pass	  on	  the	  details	  to	  his	  colleagues.	  Perhaps	  irritated	  by	  Wentworth’s	   persistence,	   Spry	   appealed	   to	   the	   Attorney	   General,	   Sir	   Garfield	  Barwick.	   ‘My	   records	   are	   not	   designed	   to	   list	   persons	   who	   are	   or	   have	   been	  publicly	   identified	   as	   members	   or	   past	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party’	   he	  wrote	   on	   7	   June	   1963.	   ‘I	   therefore	   regret	   I	   can	   not	   supply	   the	   information	  requested’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  500).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   Wentworth’s	  repeated	  demands	  on	  ASIO	  resources	  had,	  indeed,	  started	  to	  test	   the	   limits	   of	   this	   egregious	   relationship.	   For	   example,	   two	   consecutive	  Directors	  General	  became	  increasingly	  uneasy	  with	  Wentworth’s	   improprieties.	  	  In	   1965,	   Spry	   complained	   to	   the	   Attorney	   General	   that	  Wentworth	   had	  made	  fifty-­‐nine	   requests	   for	   information	   in	   the	   previous	   two	   years,	   of	  which	   twenty	  requests	   were	   made	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   1965	   alone	   (Clohesy	   2009:	   126–127).	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Likewise,	  when	  Spry	  retired	  in	  1969	  his	  successor,	  Peter	  Barbour,	  inherited	  the	  Wentworth	   problem.	   It	  was	   plain	   early	   on	   that	   Director	   General	   Barbour	   held	  many	  of	   the	  same	  aversions,	   especially	   in	   regard	   to	  how	  Wentworth	  may	  have	  been	  using	   the	   information	  he	  had	  obtained.	  89	  	   ‘Over	   the	   years	  Mr	  Wentworth	  has	  been	   the	  only	  person	   consistently	   seeking	   such	  material	   from	  ASIO	  and	   to	  my	  recollection	  he	  has	  never	  disclosed	  the	  purpose	  of	  his	  requests’	  he	  explained	  to	   Attorney	   General,	   Ivor	   Greenwood,	   on	   18	   October	   1972.	   Barbour	   rightly	  suspected	   that	   Wentworth	   might	   have	   been	   using	   the	   material	   for	   his	   own	  political	  gain.	  As	  he	  confided	  to	  Greenwood:	  I	   assume,	   perhaps	   incorrectly,	   that	  Mr	  Wentworth	   does	   not	   require	   the	  information	  in	  his	  official	  capacity	  as	  Minister	  for	  Social	  Services.	  Perhaps	  I	  would	  be	  wrong	  in	  wondering	  whether	  the	  information	  is	  to	  be	  used	  for	  electioneering	  purposes.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  4070)	  	   Notes	  of	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  Attorney	  General	  reveal	  that	  Barbour	  held	  concerns	  regarding	  how	  Wentworth’s	  public	  use	  of	  intelligence	  might	  reflect	  on	  ASIO’s	  reputation.	  ‘It	  seems	  to	  me	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  the	  use	  of	  the	  security	  service’	  he	  explained	  to	  Greenwood.	  Barbour	  then	  indicated	  that	  he	  had	  ‘strong	  reservations’	   in	   supplying	   intelligence	   material	   to	   Wentworth,	   especially	   if	   it	  were	  to	  be	  put	  to	  public	  use.	  This,	  he	  reasoned	  was	  because:	  They	   [intelligence	   reports]	   are	   highly	   prone	   to	   inaccuracy	   and	   dispute.	  One	  query	  can	  reflect	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  whole	  and	  the	  reputation	  of	  ASIO	   can	   be	   compromised.	   Both	   my	   predecessor	   and	   I	   have	   advised	  against	   their	   use	   by	   Government	   spokesmen	   for	   these	   reasons.	   I	   am	  aware	   that	   it	  may	   be	   argued,	   as	  Mr	  Wentworth	   does,	   that	   ASIO	   should	  accept	   responsibility	   for	   recording	   and	   researching	   overt	  material	   from	  public	  sources.	  To	  my	  knowledge	  it	  has	  not	  been	  adopted	  as	  ASIO	  policy	  and	  appropriate	  staff	  allocated	  to	  this	  function.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  4070)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Peter	  Barbour	  was	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO	  from	  1970	  to	  1975.	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   Indeed,	   the	   above	   comments	   highlight	   that	   Barbour’s	   assumptions	  regarding	  just	  what	  function	  the	  intelligence	  organisation	  should	  serve	  differed	  from	   Wentworth’s.	   The	   Director	   General	   was	   aware	   that	   intelligence	   reports	  could	  be	  inaccurate	  and	  incomplete,	  and	  thereby	  could	  be	  dangerous	  when	  used	  in	  political	  statements.	  Wentworth,	  however,	  seems	  to	  have	  considered	  ASIO	  his	  personal	   research	   and	   fact–checking	   department.	   Two	   examples	   demonstrate	  this	  clearly.	  On	  13	  October	  1972,	  Wentworth	  asked	  for	  a	  biography	  of	  each	  of	  the	  members	   of	   the	   ‘Aarons	   Communist	   Party	   with	   particular	   reference	   to	   their	  union	   affiliations’.	   He	   also	   sought	   a	   list	   of	   office	   bearers	   of	   the	   other	   two	  communist	  parties	  (Marxist	  &	  Leninist)	  and	  their	  union	  affiliations.	  Shortly	  after,	  ASIO	  supplied	  him	  with	  a	  detailed	  four-­‐page	  document	  outlining	  the	  communist	  affiliations	  of	  state	  and	  federal	  trade	  union	  officials	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  4070).	  	  	   Upon	   receiving	   this	   information,	   Wentworth	   then	   submitted	   another	  request	   to	  ASIO	  on	  6	  November.	  On	   this	  occasion,	  he	  sought	   the	  verification	  of	  seventeen	   trade	  union	  officials	  and	  asked	   for	  any	   information	  regarding	  public	  references	  to	  communist	  trade	  union	  officials	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  4070).	  To	  Director	  General,	   Peter	   Barbour,	   Wentworth’s	   repeated	   demands	   were	   cause	   for	  comment,	   perhaps	   even	   concern.	   As	   he	   wrote	   in	   a	   Note	   for	   Record	   dated	   16	  November,	  ‘it	  had	  always	  been	  the	  policy	  to	  restrict	  the	  limited	  resources	  of	  ASIO	  to	   the	  collection	  of	  secret	   intelligence’	  and	  not	   toward	  researching	  newspapers	  for	  members	  of	  parliament.	  But	  Wentworth	  was	   adamant	   and	  he	   told	  Barbour	  that	  ASIO	  should	  keep	  files	  of	  published	  and	  unclassified	  material	  in	  addition	  to	  their	   secret	   intelligence.	   What	   is	   perhaps	   surprising	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   that	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although	   Attorney	   General,	   Ivor	   Greenwood,	   agreed	   with	   Barbour	   suggesting	  that	  ‘it	  probably	  was	  not	  an	  appropriate	  task	  for	  ASIO’,	  Wentworth	  received	  the	  information	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2147).	  	  	   A	  copy	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia’s	  23rd	  National	  Congress	  was	  passed	  to	  him	  on	  16	  November	  1972	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2147).	  ASIO	  also	  verified	  the	  list	   of	   trade	   union	   officials	   but	   noted	   that	   ‘only	   1	   of	   17’	   named	  by	  Wentworth	  could	  be	  reliably	  identified’	  (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  4070).	   	  Barbour	  again	  expressed	  his	  reservations	  reiterating	  to	  Attorney	  General	  Greenwood	  that	  ‘my	  organisation	  is	  not	  geared	  to	  collecting	  and	  researching	  published	  information.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  respond	   to	   Mr	   Wentworth’s	   requirements	   must	   therefore	   be	   unsatisfactory’.	  Barbour	   also	   attempted	   to	   deflect	  Wentworth’s	   future	   solicitations	   suggesting	  that	  the	  information	  he	  is	  seeking	  ‘may	  be	  obtainable	  from	  the	  research	  staff	  of	  the	  Parliamentary	  Library’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2147).	  	  It	  was	  only	  later	  in	  1972	  when	  the	   Liberal	   Party	   lost	   the	   federal	   election,	   that	   Wentworth’s	   exceptional	  relationship	   with	   ASIO	   started	   to	   decline.	   As	   Lachlan	   Clohesy	   in	   his	   study	  
Australian	  Cold	  Warrior:	  The	  Anti-­‐Communism	  of	  W.	  C.	  Wentworth,	  has	  suggested	  this	   was	   probably	   because	   Wentworth	   anticipated	   that	   the	   incoming	   Labor	  Attorney	   General,	   Lionel	   Murphy,	   would	   not	   be	   as	   accepting	   of	   his	   demands	  (Clohesy	  2010:	  268).	  	  	  	   It	   is	  clear	  that	  Wentworth	  was	  using	  intelligence	  for	  political	  ends;	  what	  needs	   to	   be	   understood	   is	   why	   he	   could	   do	   this	   with	   such	   success.	   Two	  important	   issues	   arise,	   the	   first	   regards	   oversight.	   Given	   the	   vast	   resources	  intelligence	   services	   have	   to	   acquire	   information	   on	  many	   subjects,	   there	   is	   a	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real	  temptation	  for	  members	  of	  parliament,	  as	  the	  Wentworth	  and	  Menzies	  cases	  demonstrate,	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	   this	   information	   to	   serve	   their	  own	  political	  agenda.	  It	  is	  fairly	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  both	  Menzies	  and	  Wentworth	  had	  a	   strong	   anti-­‐communist	   political	   agenda.	   There	   is	   also	   fairly	   strong	   evidence	  that	  both	  approached	  ASIO	  on	  several	  occasions	  to	  supply	  them	  with	  information	  that	  would	  be	  used	  to	  expose	  communists.	  That	  each	  could	  request	  and	  receive	  such	   information	   from	  ASIO	  with	   only	  minor	   obstruction	   highlights	   that	   there	  were	  very	   few	  mechanisms	   in	  place	   to	   insulate	  ASIO	   from	  such	  political	   abuse.	  This	  brings	  into	  question	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  minister(s)	  responsible	  for	  ASIO’s	  oversight.	  	  	   This	   leads	   to	   the	   second	   issue	   regarding	   how	   politicisation	   occurred.	  Evidence	  indicates	  that	  ASIO	  was	  not	  acting	  autonomously	  from	  government,	  but	  rather	  it	  was	  firmly	  under	  ministerial	  control.	  For	  reasons	  of	  political	  expediency	  ASIO	   intelligence	   material	   was	   frequently	   turned	   into	   a	   political	   product	   not	  necessarily	   because	   ASIO	   shared	   and	   supported	   the	   same	   political	   views,	   but	  because	   parliamentarians	   could	   freely	   request	   and	   use	   the	   information	   ASIO	  collected.	   On	  most	   occasions,	   the	  minister	   responsible	   for	   ASIO	   oversight,	   the	  Attorney	  General,	  allowed	  this	  to	  take	  place.	  As	  McKnight	  accurately	  points	  out	  ‘the	   undoubted	   partisan	   behaviour	   of	   ASIO	   largely	   stemmed	   from	   close	  ‘democratic’	   control	   by	   ministers	   who	   sought	   to	   take	   advantage	   of	   the	  powers…of	  the	  security	  agency’	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  721).	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Evidence	  presented	  above	  tends	  to	  affirm	  that	  both	  Spry	  and	  Barbour	  did	  resist	   this	   political	   pressure,	   but	   their	   objections	   had	   little	   effect.	   Spry	   and	  Barbour	  were	  aware	  that	  politicisation	  would	  probably	  occur.	  This	  suggests	  that	  rather	  than	  simply	  casting	  ASIO	  in	  the	  typical	  conservative	  anti-­‐communist	  mold	  a	  more	  complex	  explanation	  applies.	  It	  would	  be	  mistaken	  to	  suppose	  that	  ASIO	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Billy	  Snedden	  	  (1965)	  The	  partisan	  use	  of	  intelligence	  surfaced	  once	  again	  on	  6	  May	  1965,	  when	  Attorney	  General,	  Billy	  Snedden,	  was	  asked	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  if	  he	  knew	  who	   had	   organised	   a	  North	   Vietnamese	   peace	  march	   in	   Canberra	   on	   17	  March.	  At	  this	  event,	  protesters	  had	  entered	  Parliament	  House	  demanding	  access	  to	   the	   Prime	   Minister,	   the	   Leader	   of	   the	   Opposition,	   and	   other	   authorities,	  imploring	  them	  to	  withdraw	  troops	  from	  Vietnam.	  Snedden	  informed	  the	  House	  that	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	   branch	   of	   the	   Committee	   for	   International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Disarmament	   had	   organised	   and	   instructed	   the	   protests.	   The	  people	  who	   lead	   these	   groups	   ‘almost	  without	   exception’,	   Snedden	   averred	   to	  the	  House	  were	   ‘associated	  with	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia	  or	   involved	  with	   the	   activities	   of	   Communist	   influenced	   movements’	   (House	   of	  Representatives,	   6	   May	   1965:	   1293).	   Probably	   Snedden’s	   intention	   was	   to	  connect	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  peace	  movement	  to	  the	  CPA	  thereby	  questioning	  the	  true	   motivation	   of	   their	   protest.	   But	   all	   of	   Snedden’s	   information	   was	   drawn	  from	  a	  dossier	   created	  by	  ASIO’s	   Special	  Projects	  Branch	   titled	  The	  Communist	  
Role	   in	   the	   Anti-­‐Vietnam	   War	   and	   Anti-­‐Conscription	   Protest	   Movements	   in	  
Australia.	  This	  document	  detailed	  the	  connections	  between	  a	  number	  of	  anti-­‐war	  groups	   and	   the	   international	   communist	   movement	   and	   allowed	   Snedden	   to	  publicly	  demonstrate	  the	  relationship	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6).	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Since	   1961,	   ASIO	   had	   been	   observing	   closely	   the	   events	   leading	   to	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   Committee	   for	   International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	  Disarmament.	  ASIO	  analysts	  had	  traced	  the	  origins	  of	  this	  organisation	  back	  to	  a	  statement	  issued	  at	  the	  5th	  World	  Trade	  Union	  Congress,	  organised	  by	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Trade	  Unions	  (WFTU)	  in	  Moscow	  in	  December	  1961.	  The	  Congress	  at	  this	  meeting	  had	  called	  for:	  The	  workers	  and	  trade	  unions	  of	  the	  whole	  world	  to	  give	  active	  support	  to	  the	  population	  of	  South	  Vietnam	  in	  just	  and	  heroic	  struggles	  against	  the	  American	   imperialism,	   and	   the	  Ngo	  Dinh	  Diem	  dictatorship,	   in	   order	   to	  achieve	  the	  peaceful	  unification	  of	  Vietnam.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6)	  	  According	   to	   the	   ASIO	   assessment	   the	   WFTU	   was	   part	   of	   ‘an	   international	  communist	   front	   organization’	   designed	   to	  mobilise	  workers	   and	   trade	   unions	  against	  intervention	  in	  Vietnam.	  Between	  20	  and	  27	  October	  1963,	  the	  Congress	  held	   two	   more	   conferences,	   one	   in	   Hanoi	   Vietnam	   and	   the	   other	   in	   Sofia,	  Bulgaria.	   The	   outcome	   of	   these	   meetings	   was	   the	   establishment	   of	   an	  ‘International	  Trade	  Union	  Committee	  of	  Solidarity	  with	  the	  Workers	  People	  of	  South	   Vietnam’.	   Among	   a	   number	   of	   objectives,	   this	   organisation	   sought	   to	  mobilise	   resources	   throughout	   the	   world	   to	   ‘secure	   the	   withdrawal	   of	   United	  States	   troops	   from	  Vietnam’	  and	  to	   ‘develop	  and	  organise	  with	   the	   trade	  union	  movement	  of	   all	   countries	   into	  a	  widespread	  mass	  movement’.	  Based	  on	   these	  documents	   it	  appears	  ASIO	  analysts	  were	  able	  to	  tenuously	   link	  the	  statements	  issued	   by	   the	   WFTU	   to	   a	   resolution	   published	   by	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	  Australia	   when	   it	   met	   in	   June	   1964	   at	   its	   20th	   congress.	   The	   CPA’s	   statement	  closely	  resembled	  instructions	  issued	  by	  the	  WFTU.	  First,	  the	  CPA	  admitted	  that	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‘the	  Communists	  play	  an	  active	  part	  in	  this	  movement’.	  The	  statement	  went	  on	  to	  add	  that:	  	  By	   patient	   and	   painstaking	   work,	   the	   Communists	   have	   already	   helped	  broaden	   the	   peace	  movement	   in	   Australia.	   The	   Communist	   Party	   urges	  the	  Australian	  people	  to	  unite	  around	  an	  independent	  foreign	  policy	  and	  force	   its	   introduction.	   In	   our	   view	   the	  minimum	  needs	   are:	  withdrawal	  from	   aggressive	   pacts	   such	   as	   SEATO	   and	   ANZUS.	   Recall	   of	   Australian	  troops	  from,	  Malaya,	  Thailand	  and	  South	  Vietnam.	  No	  further	  interference	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  Asian	  peoples.	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6)	  	   ASIO	   analysts	   appear	   to	   have	   concluded	   that	   the	  Australian	   Communist	  Party	   ‘was	  now	   fully	   in	   tune	  with	   international	  developments’	  and	  active	   in	   its	  support	  of	  the	  peace	  movement	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6).	  Organisations	  like	  the	  Committee	   for	   International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament	  were	   in	  ASIO’s	  view	   part	   of	   the	   communist	   front	   organisations	   acting	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	  WFTU	  because	   it	   expressed	   similar	   political	   beliefs,	   appeared	   to	   contain	  members	   of	  the	  CPA,	  and	  generally	  supported	  CPA	  policies	  (McKnight	  1994:	  211).	  	  	   Snedden’s	  public	  statement	  on	  this	  issue	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  the	  subject	   of	   this	   chapter	   for	   two	   reasons.	   One	   is	   that	   Snedden	   appears	   to	   have	  publicly	   cited	   intelligence	   material	   to	   justify	   his	   political	   argument.	   This	   is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  claims	  he	  made	  connecting	  the	  Committee	  for	  International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament	   to	   the	  CPA	  and	  anti-­‐war	  movement,	  which	   closely	  resembled	  the	  exact	  same	  points	  made	  by	  ASIO.	  And	  two,	  this	  tends	  to	  indicate	  that	   the	   government	  was	   openly	   using	   secret	   intelligence	  material	   as	   a	   public	  communication	  strategy.	  As	  McKnight	  argues,	   this	  practice	   clearly	  had	  political	  advantages	   because	   it	   ‘allowed	   the	   government	   to	   reduce	   protest	   activity	   to	  communist	  inspired	  campaigns’	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  712).	  The	  problem	  was	  that	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ASIO	   again	   appeared	   to	   be	   advocating	   the	   government’s	   policy	   agenda,	   not	   by	  what	   it	  had	  privately	  assessed,	  but	  by	   the	  blatant	  use	  of	   it	   in	   the	  government’s	  public	  arguments.	  The	  attributes	  of	  this	  case	  show	  that	  when	  ASIO	  material	  was	  used	  in	  the	  government’s	  public	  statements,	  ASIO	  became	  the	  servant	  of	  partisan	  politics	  and	  was	  thereby	  subjected	  to	  politicisation.	  	  	  
	  
Harold	  Holt	  and	  Malcolm	  Fraser	  (1966)	  Such	   unabashed	   political	   commitment	   to	   making	   intelligence	   a	   tool	   of	  government	   persuasion	   would	   again	   surface	   in	   September	   1966.	   But	   now	  intelligence	  would	  be	  used	  to	  denigrate	  citizens	  because	  of	  their	  association	  with	  organisations	   opposing	   the	   government’s	   policies	   on	   the	   Vietnam	   War.	  Intelligence	   files	   would	   again	   facilitate	   government	   arguments	   that	   legitimate	  political	  dissent	  had	  a	  more	  subversive	  ulterior	  motive.	  	  	   On	   27	   September	   1966,	   Australian	   newspapers	   reported	   that	   a	   fourth	  year	   student	   from	   a	   Sydney	   Grammar	   school	   had	   been	   expelled	   because	   he	  refused	   to	   remain	   in	   the	   school’s	   army	   cadet	   corps.	   Fifteen-­‐year-­‐old,	   Robert	  Michaelis,	   told	  reporters	   that	  his	   fellow	  schoolboys	  were	   forced	   to	   take	  part	   in	  ‘Operation	  Guerrilla’	  which	  was	  a	  ‘search	  and	  destroy	  exercise’	  conducted	  at	  the	  school.	   ‘We	   had	   to	   go	   out	   after	   cadets	   dressed	   as,	   and	   playing	   the	   part	   of	  Vietcong.	  We	   had	   to	   take	   them	   prisoner	   and	   if	   necessary	   “kill”	   them	   by	   firing	  blanks’	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  27	  September	  1966:1).	  Michaelis	  refused	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  exercises	  because	  he	  believed	  ‘it	  propagated	  the	  idea	  that	  it	  is	  right	  to	  kill	   Vietcong’,	   and	   because	   he	   objected	   to	   schools	   being	   used	   as	   a	   ‘training	  ground	  for	  the	  war	  in	  Vietnam’	  (Canberra	  Times	  27	  September	  1966:	  1).	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Shortly	  after,	  Fred	  Daly,	  Federal	  Member	  for	  Grayndler	  brought	  the	  issue	  to	   the	   attention	   of	   parliament.	   Incensed	   at	  Michaelis’	   treatment,	   Daly	   attacked	  the	   government’s	   policy	   of	   schoolboy	   cadet	   training.	   ‘I	   believe	   that	  many	   boys	  now	  in	  the	  schools	  cadet	  corps	  will	  go	  straight	  from	  these	  corps	  to	  Vietnam	  and	  Asia’,	  predicted	  Daly.	  ‘It	  is	  conscripting	  kids,	  victimising	  and	  indoctrinating	  them’	  he	   argued.	   The	   government,	   he	   said	   should	   be	   ‘ashamed’	   of	   supporting	   such	   a	  policy.	   The	   then	   Minister	   for	   the	   Army,	   Malcolm	   Fraser,	   defended	   the	  government’s	   policy.	   He	   argued	   that	   it	   had	   been	   suggested	   to	   him	   that	   ‘this	  incident	  had	  occurred	  as	  a	   result	  of	  people	  who	  are	  certainly	  opposed	   to	  what	  the	   government	   is	   doing	   in	   South	   Vietnam’.	   The	   whole	   incident,	   according	   to	  Fraser,	  ‘could	  have	  been	  designed	  to	  incite	  opposition’	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  28–29	   September	   1966:	   1402).	   His	   suspicions	   were	   directed	   at	   the	   anti-­‐war	  movement.	  	  	  	  	   Fraser	  then	  invoked	  ASIO	  intelligence	  material	  to	  support	  his	  claim.90	  He	  placed	   on	   the	   official	  Hansard	   detailed	   personal	   information	   obtained	   by	  ASIO	  regarding	   the	  Michaelis	   family.	   This	  was	   designed	   to	   emphasise	   his	   claim	   that	  the	  actions	  of	  Michaelis	  were	  not	  innocent	  but	  rather	  seditious.	  In	  the	  process,	  he	  smeared	  the	  member	  for	  Grayndler,	  Michaelis	  and	  the	  boy’s	  mother.	  Fraser:	  So	  that	  the	  honourable	  member	  for	  Grayndler	  may	  know	  the	  company	  in	  which	   he	   is	   operating	   tonight,	   I	   should	   like	   to	   give	   him	   certain	  information.	  This	  cadet	   is	  the	  son	  of	  Mrs	  Ann	  Margaret	  Butler	  Michaelis,	  of	   28	   Redan	   Street,	   Mosman,	   New	   South	   Wales.	   Mrs	   Michaelis	   is	   a	  committee	  member	  of	   the	  Association	  of	   International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament.	   The	   Association	   of	   International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  According	  to	  Fraser’s	  biographer,	  Phillip	  Ayres,	  Fraser	  obtained	  the	  ASIO	  intelligence	  report	  through	  the	  Attorney	  General	  Billy	  Snedden,	  see:	  Ayres,	  P	  (1989)	  Malcolm	  Fraser	  
A	  Biography,	  Mandarin	  Australia:	  Victoria,	  Australia.	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Disarmament,	   as	   many	   people	   will	   know,	   is	   regarded	   as	   being	   under	  Communist	   influence.	   It	   superseded	   the	   New	   South	   Wales	   Peace	  Committee,	   which	   was	   also	   known	   to	   be	   a	   Communist	   inspired	  organisation.	  	  This	  is	  the	  circumstance,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  company,	  which	  the	  honourable	  member	  for	  Grayndler	  is	  keeping	  this	  evening.	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  28–29	  September	  1966:	  1402)	  	  	  	   The	   matter	   came	   to	   a	   head	   the	   following	   day	   in	   the	   House	   of	  Representatives	   when	   the	   Deputy	   Leader	   of	   the	   Opposition,	   Gough	   Whitlam,	  asked	  Prime	  Minister	  Holt	  whether	  he	  approved	  of	   intelligence	  files	  being	  used	  to	  discredit	  a	  fifteen-­‐year-­‐old	  schoolboy?	  Holt,	  sensing	  trouble,	  prevaricated	  the	  point.	   He	   suggested	   that	   the	   Minister	   for	   the	   Army	   [Fraser]	   had	   ‘a	   general	  responsibility’	   to	   use	   any	   information	   provided	   to	   him	   to	   defend	   the	  government’s	   Vietnam	   policy.	   To	   substantiate	   the	   government’s	   actions,	   Holt	  then	   read	   from	   another	   ASIO	   document	   prepared	   on	   Mrs	   Michaelis,	   thereby	  politicising	  the	  issue	  further.	  	  	  	   This	   document	   revealed	   that	  Mrs	  Michaelis	  was	   the	   State	   Secretary	   for	  the	   Women’s	   International	   League	   for	   Peace	   and	   Freedom,	   which	   had	   been	  connected	   to	   the	  activities	  of	   the	  Association	  of	   International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament.	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition,	  Arthur	  Calwell,	  called	  upon	  Holt	  to	  table	  the	   documents	   from	  which	   he	  was	   reading.	   Holt,	   admitting	   the	   document	  was	  from	  ASIO,	  refused.	  His	  rationale	  was	  that	  ‘it	  has	  never	  been	  the	  practice	  of	  this	  country…for	  communications	  from	  the	  security	  service	  to	  the	  government	  to	  be	  made	  publicly	  available’	   (House	  of	  Representatives	  29	  September	  1966:	  1415–1416).	  Holt’s	  actions	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed.	  	  	  
	   248	  
The	   issue	   of	   using	   an	   intelligence	   service	   to	   blatantly	   target	   groups	   for	  political	   purposes	   was	   raised	   at	   a	   press	   conference	   on	   1	   October	   1966.	   After	  admitting	  the	  documents	  cited	  were	  from	  ASIO	  the	  press	  then	  proceeded	  to	  grill	  Holt	  about	  the	  use	  of	  intelligence	  in	  parliament.	  Was	  it	  proper	  to	  use	  a	  security	  service	   to	  help	   the	   government	  make	   a	   statement	   in	  parliament?	  Why	  had	   the	  government	  resorted	  to	  the	  security	  service	  for	  information	  on	  a	  political	  issue?	  Was	  this	  not	  an	  attempt	  to	  smear	  the	  Michaelis	  Family?	  Holt	  responded	  that	  ‘I	  do	  not	   know	   whether	   it	   is	   a	   smear	   of	   people	   to	   have	   factually	   stated	   what	   they	  themselves	   have	   publicly	   subscribed	   to’.	   One	   reporter	   suggested	   that	   this	  was	  the	  first	  time	  in	  his	  memory	  where	  a	  security	  service	  document	  had	  been	  quoted	  in	   the	  House.	  Holt	   replied	   simply	   that	   ‘I	   don’t	   think	   that	   it	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   great	  substance’	  (Canberra	  Times,	  1	  October	  1966:	  3).	  	  	   Privately	  though	  Holt	  expressed	  a	  different	  view.	  It	  is	  fairly	  clear	  that	  he	  was	  unsure	  about	  just	  how	  to	  appropriately	  use	  ASIO	  material	  in	  parliament.	  He	  confided	  to	  Director	  General	  Spry	  on	  3	  October	  that	  he	  was	  not	  well	  appraised	  with	  the	  procedure	  of	  ASIO	  giving	  information	  to	  ministers	  on	  security	  matters.	  Holt	  asked	  for	  a	  detailed	  explanation	  of	  what	  had	  been	  the	  practice	  in	  previous	  cases.	  Spry	  referred	  him	  to	  the	  ASIO	  Act.	  Holt	  also	  expressed	  concern	  about	  the	  claims	  the	  press	  were	  making	  that	  this	  was	  the	  first	   time	  intelligence	  had	  been	  used	  in	  parliament.	  The	  Director	  General	  assured	  him	  that	   ‘this	   indeed	  was	  not	  the	  case’.	  Spry	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  ‘over	  the	  years	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  debates	  on	  Peace	  Conferences	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  Ministers	  concerned	  had	  obviously	  used	  and	  did	  use	  security	  information	  that	  had	  been	  supplied	  to	  them	  by	  ASIO’.	  In	  a	  striking	  move,	  Spry	  then	  proceeded	  to	  brief	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  with	  further	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information	   regarding	   Mrs	   Michaelis’	   protest	   activity,	   suggesting	   more	  information	  could	  be	  provided	  and	  Holt	  accepted	  the	  offer	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2273).	  	  	   Some	   initial	   conclusions	   can	   be	   drawn	   from	   the	   Michaelis	   affair	   that	  reveals	   one	   of	   the	   government’s	   fundamental	   assumptions:	   that	   the	   peace	  movement	   was	   actually	   a	   front	   for	   communist	   inspired	   activity,	   and	   thereby	  ASIO’s	   task	  was	   to	   target	   these	  political	   groups.	  Consequently,	   this	  assumption	  left	  little	  room	  for	  any	  distinction	  to	  be	  made	  between	  legitimate	  political	  dissent	  and	  subversion.	  The	  secret	  contents	  of	  ASIO	  intelligence	  files	  were	  not	  only	  used	  to	   justify	  this	  assumption	  but	  also	  to	  back	  the	  government’s	  political	  prejudice.	  Such	  a	  practice	  undoubtedly	  confirmed	  the	  suspicions	  of	  those	  who	  viewed	  ASIO	  as	   a	  means	   of	  maintaining	   the	   political	   orthodoxy.	  More	   importantly,	   this	   case	  demonstrates	   how	   easily	   intelligence	   can	   be	   used	   simultaneously	   to	   denounce	  those	  who	  hold	  opposed	  political	  ideologies	  while	  also	  justifying	  a	  government’s	  underlying	  assumptions.	  	  	   Holt	   and	   Fraser’s	   use	   of	   ASIO	   material	   also	   closely	   resembled	   Menzies	  public	   shaming	   strategy.	   However,	   it	   also	   represented	   a	   break	   from	   the	  precedent	   established	   by	   Menzies	   in	   two	   ways.	   First,	   Holt	   unlike	   Menzies	  publicly	  disclosed	  that	  the	  information	  he	  cited	  was	  taken	  from	  ASIO	  intelligence	  files.91	  Such	  a	  disclosure	  not	  only	  publicised	  ASIO	  activities	  but	  also	  highlighted	  that	   intelligence	   was	   being	   used	   to	  make	   a	   case	   for	   the	   government.	   In	   other	  words,	   intelligence	  became	  a	   tool	  of	   government	   communication	   to	   strengthen	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  See:	  	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  29	  September	  1966:	  1416;	  Canberra	  Times,	  1	  October	  1966:3.	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its	   agenda	   and	   impugn	   its	   opponents.	   This	   implicated	   ASIO	   as	   much	   as	   the	  government	   in	   the	   ensuing	   scandal.	   Second,	   and	   probably	   because	   of	   this,	   the	  government	   and	   ASIO	   did	   not	   escape	   severe	   public	   criticism	   for	   doing	   so.	  Perhaps	  because	  of	  both	  points,	  serious	  concerns	  began	  to	  arise	  from	  within	  the	  intelligence	  community	  and	  they	  began	  to	  reconsider	  the	  government’s	  demands	  for	  political	  ammunition.	  	  
	  
Resistance	  but	  no	  embargo	  Director	   General	   of	   ASIO,	   Charles	   Spry,	   was	   not	   always	   willing	   to	   pass	  information	  on	  to	  his	  political	  masters	  for	  their	  use	  in	  political	  debates.	  He	  began	  quietly	  to	  object	  to	  the	  use	  of	  his	  organisation	  for	  smear	  and	  partisan	  gain.	  On	  3	  October,	  during	   the	  events	  of	   the	  Michaelis	   episode,	   Spry	  had	   cautioned	  Prime	  Minister	   Holt	   about	   using	   intelligence	   in	   parliament	   and	   urged	   for	   restraint.	  ‘Statements	  regarding	  security	  should	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  minimum’	  he	  suggested	  to	  the	   Prime	   Minister.	   Spry	   also	   sought	   a	   means	   of	   redirecting	   requests	   for	  information	  by	  members	  of	  parliament	  that	  might	  have	  political	  implications.	  He	  suggested	   that	  when	   such	   requests	  were	  made	  he	  might	  direct	   the	   inquirer	   to	  the	  Prime	  Minister	   for	  approval	  before	  any	  statements	  were	  given.	  Holt	  agreed	  but	  indicated	  that	  he	  did	  not	  want	  an	  ‘embargo’	  applied	  to	  all	  Ministers	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2273).	   It	  was	   later	  on	  1	  February	  1968	   that	  Prime	  Minister	   John	  Gorton	  further	   limited	  parliamentarian’s	  access	   to	   the	  Director	  General.	  Gorton	  agreed	  that	  the	  only	  people	  who	  should	  have	  access	  to	  the	  Director	  General	   to	  discuss	  matters	  of	  security,	  or	  visit	  ASIO	  Headquarters	  were:	  the	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister,	  Minister	  for	  Defence,	  the	  Minister	  For	  External	  Affairs	  and	  the	  Attorney	  General	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2133).	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Despite	   Spry’s	   attempt	   to	   resist	   parliamentarians’	   requesting	   and	   using	  ASIO	   intelligence	   material	   for	   political	   purposes	   it	   had	   little	   effect,	   and	   the	  practice	   continued.	   	   However,	   that	   Spry	   attempted	   to	   shield	   ASIO	   from	   such	  political	   improprieties	   indicates	   that	   significant	   political	   pressure	   emanating	  from	  above	  was	  a	  primary	  cause	  of	  the	  politicisation.	   	   It	   is	  also	  perhaps	  a	  good	  indication	   of	   how	   deeply	   embedded	   and	   accepted	   the	   practice	   of	   using	  intelligence	  as	  a	   tool	  of	  political	  persuasion	  had	  become	  to	  government.	   In	   this	  case,	  it	  becomes	  fairly	  clear	  that	  ASIO	  was	  prevailed	  upon	  to	  supply	  its	  political	  masters	  with	  information	  that	  would	  incriminate	  opponents	  of	  their	  policy.	  ASIO	  itself	  had	  very	  little	  means	  of	  resisting	  this	  pressure.	  	  	  
Nigel	  Bowen	  (1968)	  Sherman	   Kent,	   one	   of	   the	   founding	   fathers	   of	   the	   study	   of	   intelligence,	  argues	   that	   ‘intelligence	   means	   knowledge’	   (Kent	   1951:3).	   Put	   simply,	   the	  intelligence	  process92	  transforms	  disparate	  and	  abstract	  information	  into	  a	  form	  which	  is	  both	  understandable	  and	  useable	  to	  decision	  makers	  (Hastedt	  1987:54).	  	  The	   knowledge	   generated	   essentially	   extends	   the	   scope	   of	   political	   resources	  available	   to	   a	   government	   to	   enhance	   policy	   development.	   In	   some	   cases,	  however,	   that	   knowledge	   can	   be	   drawn	   upon	   for	   an	   ulterior	   purpose,	   for	  example,	  to	  facilitate	  a	  partisan	  political	  argument.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  occurred	  in	  May	   1968.	   Attorney	   General,	   Nigel	   Bowen,	   on	   this	   occasion	   cited	   two	   ASIO	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  The	   intelligence	   process	   refers	   to	   the	   activities	   involved	   in	   the	   preparation	   and	  collection	   of	   information.	   This	   cycle	   generally	   consists	   of	   five	   stages:	   planning	   and	  direction,	  collection,	  processing,	  production	  and	  analysis,	  and	  dissemination.	  Johnson,	  L	  (2003)	  ‘Bricks	  and	  Mortar	  for	  a	  Theory	  of	  Intelligence’,	  Comparative	  Strategy,	  Vol.	  22(1),	  pp.	  1–29.	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Special	   Projects	   documents	   in	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives.93	  It	   appears	   that	  Bowen	   used	   these	   documents	   to	   give	   his	   rhetorical	   claims	   political	   substance,	  namely	   that	   the	   peace	   movement	   was	   a	   vehicle	   for	   extending	   the	   communist	  party’s	   ideology	   in	   Australia.	   The	   following	   case	   is	   important	   to	   this	   study	  because	   it	   demonstrates	   why	   politicians	   might	   be	   tempted	   to	   draw	   upon	  intelligence	  for	  political	  purposes.	  	  	   On	  9	  May	  1968,	  John	  McLeay,	  Liberal	  Member	  for	  Boothby,	  put	  forward	  a	  question	  to	  Acting	  Attorney	  General	  Bill	  Snedden,	  (Bowen	  was	  absent	   from	  the	  House)	   asking	  him	  who	  was	   responsible	   for	  organising	  a	   student	   anti-­‐Vietnam	  War	   demonstration	   to	   be	   held	   inside	   Parliament	   House	   the	   following	   week	  (House	   of	   Representatives	   9	   May	   1968:	   1258–1259).	   Upon	   his	   return,	   Bowen	  provided	  a	  statement	  to	  the	  House	  on	  14	  May.	  The	  information	  he	  presented	  to	  the	  House	  was	  taken	  directly	  from	  the	  aforementioned	  ASIO	  assessments.	  Bowen	  used	   these	   documents	   to	   argue	   that	   student	   involvement	   in	   the	   protest	  movement	   was	   a	   result	   of	   communist	   manipulation,	   thereby	   questioning	   the	  motivation	  of	  the	  student’s	  demands.	  	  	   Determined	   to	   drive	   this	   assertion	   home,	   Bowen	   started	   his	   address	  citing	  ASIO	  material	  to	  detail	  how	  the	  various	  peace	  movements	  in	  Australia	  had	  become	   an	   instrument	   of	   Soviet	   foreign	   policy.	   He	   averred	   to	   the	   House	   ‘the	  Australian	  Congress	  for	  International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament	  resulted	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  The	   documents	   were:	   (1)	   The	   Communist	   Role	   in	   the	   Anti-­‐Vietnam	   War	   and	   Anti-­‐
Conscription	   Protest	   Movements	   in	   Australia,	   (2)	   The	   Development	   and	   Use	   of	  
Demonstrations	   as	   a	   Tactic	   by	   Anti-­‐Vietnam	   War	   and	   Anti-­‐Conscription	   Protest	  
Organisations	  in	  Australia,	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6).	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the	  Peace	  Committee	  setting	  up	  in	  March	  1965	  the	  Association	  for	  International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament,	  New	  South	  Wales,	  known	  by	   the	   initials	  AICD’.	  He	   then	   said	   that	   representatives	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   had	   laid	   down	   the	  ‘guide	  to	  action’	  of	  this	  group	  in	  Moscow	  in	  1965	  where	  a	  delegation	  of	  the	  CPA	  were	  present	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  14	  May	  1968:1386).	  	  	   One	  ASIO	  Special	  Projects	  document	   titled:	   ‘The	  Communist	  Role	   in	  The	  Anti-­‐Vietnam	  War	  and	  Anti-­‐Conscription	  Protest	  Movements	  in	  Australia’	  makes	  a	  strikingly	  similar	  statement.	   It	  reads:	   ‘the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Peace	  Committee	  for	   International	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Disarmament	  …helped	   form	   in	  March	  1965,	  the	   New	   South	   Wales	   “Association	   for	   International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	  Disarmament”’.	  It	  also	  stated	  that	  the	  CPA	  had	  sent	  a	  delegation	  to	  a	  consultative	  meeting	  of	  the	  Communist	  and	  Workers	  parties	  to	  Moscow	  in	  March	  1965	  where	  they	  had	  received	  direct	   instructions	  about	  operations	   to	  campaign	  against	   the	  war	  in	  Vietnam	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6).	  Numerous	  other	  similarities	  occur	  in	  Bowen’s	  speech.	  	  	   Bowen	   then	   argued	   to	   the	  House	   that	   the	   student	   protests	   in	   Canberra	  had	  been	  co-­‐opted	  by	  communist	  front	  organisations	  such	  as	  the	  Association	  for	  International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Disarmament	   (AICD).	   He	   emphasised	   that	   the	  student	   protests	   ‘are	   planned	   and	   organised	   from	   the	   outside,	   it	   is	   not	   the	  spontaneous	  action	  of	  school	  children’	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  14	  May	  1968:	  1387).	   Evidence	   to	   support	   this	   assertion	   came	   from	   information	   ASIO	   had	  gleaned	  from	  the	  ‘Project	  Vietnam’	  conference	  held	  earlier	  in	  January.	  ASIO	  had	  learned	  that	  one	  resolution	  to	  come	  from	  the	  conference	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  get	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more	   young	   people	   involved	   in	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement.	   Citing	   the	   ASIO	  documents	  Bowen	  told	  the	  House	  that	  groups	  like	  AICD	  had	  agreed	  that	  the	  best	  way	   to	   involve	   young	   people	   in	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement	   was	   to	   co-­‐opt	   their	  movement	  and	  subvert	  their	  cause.	  Next	  Bowen	  quoted	  to	  the	  House	  the	  Project	  Vietnam	  conference	  resolution	  that	  urged	  students	  to:	  Establish	   a	   conscious	   link	   between	   students’	   resentment	   of	   authority,	  their	  demands	  for	  more	  say	  in	  the	  administration	  of	  university	  affairs	  and	  a	   progressive	   social	   philosophy	   embodying	   opposition	   to	   the	   Vietnam	  war,	   opposition	   to	   conscription	   and	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   problems	  facing	  the	  Third	  World.	  	  	  	  	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  14	  May	  1968:	  1387–88)	  	   Bowen	   told	   the	   House	   that	   the	   co-­‐option	   of	   students	   in	   the	   anti-­‐war	  demonstrations	   in	  Canberra	  was	  a	  direct	   consequence	  of	   this	  policy.	   	   	  He	   then	  went	  on	   to	  cite	  more	   information	   from	  the	  ASIO	  assessment	   to	  substantiated	  a	  direct	   link	   between	   leading	  members	   of	   AICD	   to	   the	   CPA.	   ‘Mr	  W.	   Gollan,	   I	   am	  informed	   is	   currently	   a	   member	   of	   the	   National	   Executive	   of	   the	   Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia,	   and	  a	  member	  of	   the	  AICD	  Committee	  and	  a	  member	  of	   the	  World	  Peace	  Council’	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  14	  May	  1968:	  1388).	  As	  a	  point	  of	   comparison	   the	   ASIO	   Special	   Projects	   document	   makes	   the	   following	  statement.	   ‘William	  Eric	  Gollan’	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  ‘Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  CPA’	  and	  had	  been	   ‘elected	   to	   the	  AICD	  Committee	  upon	   its	   inaugural	  meeting’	  on	  16	  March	  1965	  (NAA:	  A	  12389,	  A	  30,	  Part	  6).	  	  	   Here,	   Bowen’s	   use	   of	   intelligence	   signifies	   how	   persuasive	   intelligence	  can	   be.	   It	   shows	   that	   his	   claims	   were	   not	   based	   on	   hearsay,	   but	   on	   all	   the	  available	   information	   at	   hand.	   In	   this	   case,	   intelligence	   helped	   transform	   his	  assertion	   into	   a	   statement	   of	   unequivocal	   fact	   directly	   supporting	   his	   political	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argument.	   Intelligence	   substantiated	  Bowen’s	   contention	   that	   communism	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  peace	  movement	  and	  the	  student	  protest	  bodies,	  which	  as	  the	  government	   suggested,	   was	   a	   vehicle	   for	   the	   extension	   of	   the	   communist	  ideology.	   The	   secret	   knowledge	   generated	   from	   intelligence	   provided	   the	   link	  that	   allowed	   Bowen	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   connection	   between	   dissent	   and	  subversion.	  	  	  	   From	   the	   opposition’s	   point	   of	   view,	   such	   a	   tactic	   was	   beyond	  justification.	   Leonard	   Devine,	   Labor	   Member	   for	   East	   Sydney,	   objected	   to	   the	  blatant	   misuse	   of	   the	   intelligence	   service	   reminding	   the	   House	   that	   the	  government	   had	   an	   inglorious	   history	   of	   using	   intelligence	   advice	   for	   its	   own	  political	  ends.	  Devine:	  I	  am	  sick	  and	  tired	  of	  coming	  into	  this	  chamber	  and	  hearing	  members	  of	  the	   Australian	   Labor	   Party	   being	   castigated	   by	   honourable	   members	  opposite	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   information	   supplied	   to	   them	   by	   the	   security	  service.	  When	   it	   suits	   the	  political	   purposes	  of	  members	  of	   government	  they	   get	   information	   and	   use	   it	   here.	   If	   they	   want	   to	   attack	   some	  individual	   who	   has	   not	   the	   right	   to	   say	   a	   word	   in	   reply	   they	   use	  information	  under	  the	  privilege	  of	  the	  parliament.	  	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  14	  May	  1968:	  1416)	  	   Despite	  protests	  from	  the	  Opposition,	  government	  ministers	  continued	  to	  ask	  ASIO	  for	  information.	  Director	  General,	  Peter	  Barbour,	  and	  senior	  ASIO	  staff	  resisted	   many	   of	   these	   solicitations,	   but	   they	   were	   not	   always	   successful	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  718–719).94	  On	  17	   June	  1970,	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  ASIO,	   J.	  C.	  Behm,	  informed	  the	  Attorney	  General	  that	  some	  information	  requested	  through	  his	  office	  ‘appeared	  to	  be	  outside	  ASIO’s	  purview	  and	  sometimes	  not	  specifically	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  cases	  not	  mentioned	  here,	  see	  David	  McKnight	  (2008	  a)	  
Partisan	  Improprieties:	  Ministerial	  Control	  and	  Australia’s	  Security	  Agencies	  1962–72.	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connected	   with	   a	   security	   inquiry’.	   Behm	   suggested	   that	   the	   ‘Liberal	   Party	  research	  groups	  could	  provide	  the	  service	  which	  members	  sought’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2137).	   Behm’s	   suggestion	   was	   clearly	   not	   given	   much	   weight,	   and	   the	   same	  problem	   surfaced	   immediately	  when	  Barbour	  met	  with	   the	   incoming	  Attorney	  General,	  Ivor	  Greenwood,	  on	  11	  August	  1971.	  	  	  
Ivor	  Greenwood	  (1971	  –	  1974)	  When	  Greenwood	  first	  met	  with	  Director	  General,	  Peter	  Barbour,	  he	  put	  forward	  a	  bold	  proposition.	  Greenwood	  explained	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  explore	  the	  possibility	   of	   ASIO	   undertaking	   research	   and	   collation	   of	   material	   concerning	  subversive	  activities	  so	  he	  could	  use	  this	  information	  to	  make	  public	  statements.	  Rightfully,	   Barbour	   cautioned	   against	   such	   a	   practice	   and	   told	   the	   Attorney	  General	  that	  ‘the	  preparation	  of	  material	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  informing	  the	  public	  was	  not	   strictly	   the	   function	  of	  ASIO’.	   	  Barbour	   later	   reflected	  on	  Greenwood’s	  reaction	  in	  a	  Note	  for	  Record.	  He	  said	  that	  Greenwood	  told	  him	  ‘it	  was	  a	  function	  of	  ASIO	  to	  advise	  Ministers,	  and	  Ministers	  could	  perform	  the	  exposure’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	   2139).	   This	   comment	   not	   only	   speaks	   to	   Greenwood’s	   audacity	   in	   using	  ASIO	   as	   a	   political	   resource,	   but	   also	   highlights	   that	   ASIO	   management	   were	  uncomfortable	  with	  this	  practice.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  the	  difficulty	  consecutive	  Directors	  General	  had	  in	  opposing	  the	  demands	  of	  their	  political	  masters.	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One	   issue	   that	   concerned	   Greenwood	   was	   the	   possibility	   of	   subversive	  content	   in	   televised	   news	   and	   radio	   broadcasts.95	  An	   example	   of	   the	   way	   in	  which	  he	  tried	  to	  use	  intelligence	  to	  regulate	  media	  content	  appears	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Jon	  Cassidy,	  a	  special	  projects	  officer	  employed	  at	  the	  Australian	  Broadcasting	  Commission	   (ABC).	   Throughout	   August	   1971,	   a	   series	   of	   articles	   published	   in	  
The	  Melbourne	   Observer	   raised	   concerns	   about	   Cassidy’s	   political	   associations	  and	   his	   influence	   on	   ABC	   programming.96	  The	   Observer	   claimed	   that	   while	   he	  was	   still	   employed	   at	   the	   ABC,	   Cassidy	  was	   directing	   ‘secret	   terror	   groups’	   at	  Melbourne’s	   Monash	   and	   La	   Trobe	   Universities	   (The	   Melbourne	   Observer,	   1	  August	  1971).	   	  These	  reports	  became	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  smear	  campaign	  conducted	  in	   the	   Senate	   to	   discredit	   Cassidy	   and	   the	   student	   protest	   movement.	   On	   18	  August	  1971,	  Senator,	  John	  Kane,	  brought	  the	  matter	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  Attorney	  General	  Greenwood.	  Kane	  asked	  Greenwood	   if	  he	  was	  aware	  of	   the	  allegations	  and	   wanted	   the	   Attorney	   General	   to	   investigate	   who	   was	   responsible	   for	  employing	  such	  a	  man	  as	  Cassidy	  (Senate,	  18	  August	  1971:	  53).	  	   Following	  these	  questions	  in	  the	  Senate,	  on	  31	  August	  1971,	  Greenwood	  asked	  ASIO	  to	  prepare	  a	  report	  on	  Cassidy.	  The	  report	  was	  supplied	  to	  him	  one	  week	  later	  and	  noted	  that	  Cassidy	  was	  involved	  in	  various	  student	  labour	  clubs	  and	   active	   in	   groups	   such	   as	   ‘Students	   in	   Dissent’	   and	   the	   ‘Workers	   Student	  Alliance’.	  Although	  the	  ASIO	  assessment	  stated	  that	  publications	  printed	  by	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  The	  issue	  of	  subversive	  content	  in	  Australian	  broadcasting	  had	  been	  a	  concern	  to	  both	  the	  Conservative	  government	  and	  ASIO	  from	  as	  early	  as	  1951	  when	  it	  began	  vetting	  ABC	  personnel	   and	   scrutinising	   the	   content	   of	   commercial	   broadcasts,	   See:	   McKnight,	   D	  (1998)	   ‘Broadcasting	  and	   the	  Enemy	  Within:	  Political	  Surveillance	  and	   the	  ABC	  1951–64’,	  Media	  International,	  No.	  87,	  pp.	  35–48;	  and	  McKnight,	  D	  (1998)	  ‘The	  Hunt	  For	  Reds	  Under	  ABC’s	  Bed’,	  The	  Australian,	  25–26	  July,	  pp.	  1–2.	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  The	  Melbourne	  Observer	  1,	  8,15,	  22,	  29	  August	  1971.	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organisations	   ‘openly	   espoused	   a	   Marxism/Leninism,	   Mao	   Tse	   Tung	   thought	  philosophy’,	  it	  maintained	  that	  ‘there	  is	  no	  evidence	  to	  indicate	  clearly	  Cassidy’s	  political	   philosophy’.	   The	   report	   also	   emphasised	   that	   ‘there	   is	   no	   evidence	   of	  contact	   between	   Cassidy	   and	   the	   CPA’	   	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2139).	   Although	   ASIO	  reported	   no	   adverse	   security	   issues	   regarding	   Cassidy,	   the	   accusations	   cast	  suspicion	  on	  the	  ABC’s	  reputation.	  	  	   Cassidy’s	   employment	   immediately	   became	   a	   concern	   to	   ABC	  management.	  On	  24	  August	  1971,	  Douglas	  Mclean,	  The	  ABC’s	  Assistant	  Manager	  in	  Victoria,	  interviewed	  Cassidy	  regarding	  the	  claims	  raised	  in	  The	  Observer	  and	  the	  Senate.	  Cassidy	  denied	  all	  of	  the	  accusations	  and	  questioned	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	   statements	   made	   about	   him	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   1793).	   However,	   ABC	  management	  was	  not	  convinced	  and	  they	  became	  suspicious	  that	  Cassidy	  could	  be	  influencing	  the	  content	  of	  ABC	  broadcasts.	  	  ABC	  management	  turned	  to	  ASIO	  for	  advice.	  	   On	   16	   September,	   McLean	   met	   with	   Director	   General,	   Peter	   Barbour,	  asking	  for	  any	  information	  ASIO	  had	  on	  Cassidy.	  Notes	  of	  the	  conversation	  show	  that	  Barbour,	   initially	   at	   least,	  was	  uneasy	  with	   the	   request.	  He	   explained	   that	  any	   formal	   request	   for	   information	   would	   have	   to	   be	  made	   in	   writing	   to	   him	  from	   the	   General	  Manager	   of	   the	   ABC.	   Informally,	   however,	   Barbour	   provided	  some	   details	   regarding	   Cassidy’s	   background	   and	   his	   involvement	   with	   the	  Workers	   Student	  Alliance.	   Barbour	   told	  McLean	   that	   ‘information	   published	   in	  the	  Observer	  was	  assessed	  by	  me	  as	  being	  more	  accurate	  than	  inaccurate’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1793).	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Further	   accusations	   were	   raised	   against	   Cassidy	   in	   the	   Senate	   on	   15	  September	  1971.	  Senator	  Kane,	  in	  more	  of	  a	  statement	  than	  a	  question,	  informed	  Senate	  Members	  that	  Cassidy	  had	  delivered	  a	  speech	  to	  one	  hundred	  and	  twenty	  members	  of	   the	  Workers	  Student	  Alliance	  directing	  them	   ‘to	  penetrate	  schools,	  Universities,	   Trade	   Unions,	   the	   Australian	   Army	   and	   the	   Australian	   Security	  Intelligence	   Organisation’.	   Senator	   Kane	   demanded	   the	   Attorney	   General	  investigate	   and	   report	   to	   the	   Senate	   immediately	   (Senate	   15	   September	   1971:	  	  718–719).	  These	  allegations	  were	  enough	  to	  reinforce	  Greenwood’s	  suspicions,	  and	  probably	  further	  alarmed	  ABC	  management.	  Cassidy,	  however,	  continued	  to	  deny	   the	   allegations	   explaining	   to	   his	   superiors	   at	   the	   ABC	   that	   ‘I	   did	   not	  advocate	  penetrating	   the	  Australian	  Security	   Intelligence	  Organisation.	   I	  would	  regard	  such	  a	  move	  as	  ridiculous’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1793).	  	  Despite	  his	  denials,	  the	  ABC	   became	   increasingly	   concerned	   about	   Cassidy’s	   possible	   subversive	  influence	  and	   it	  appears	   they	  began	   looking	   for	  an	  avenue	   in	  which	   they	  could	  dismiss	  him.	  	  	  	  	  	   Responding	  to	  these	  concerns,	  Attorney	  General	  Greenwood	  pressed	  ASIO	  for	  more	   information	  on	  Cassidy’s	  activities	  and	  in	  October	  1971,	  he	  was	  given	  access	   to	   ASIO	   surveillance	   material.	   Archival	   documents	   reveal	   that	   raw	  unanalysed	   intelligence	   obtained	   from	   a	   transcript	   of	   telephone	   interceptions	  that	   had	   been	   placed	   on	   Cassidy’s	   phone	   line	   in	   September	   were	   provided	   to	  Greenwood.	  He	  then	  asked	  ASIO	  to	  supply	  him	  with	  ‘anything	  else	  [ASIO]	  had’	  on	  Cassidy	  for	  the	  previous	  two	  months	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2139).	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It	  is	  very	  likely	  that	  Greenwood	  then	  passed	  selected	  information	  to	  ABC	  management	   in	   some	   form	  because	   by	  November,	   the	   General	  Manager	   of	   the	  ABC,	   Talbot	   Duckmanton,	   had	   informed	   Peter	   Barbour	   that	   ‘commissioners	   of	  the	   ABC	   were	   pressing	   for	   him	   to	   dispense	   with	   the	   services	   of	   Cassidy’.	   A	  concerted	  effort	  was	  then	  made	  to	  constrain	  Cassidy’s	  activities	  at	  the	  ABC	  and	  he	   was	   then	   placed	   into	   a	   position	   of	   	   ‘under-­‐employment’	   and	   delegated	   to	  duties	  where	  he	  could	  not	   ‘exercise	  any	  undue	   influence’	   (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1793).	  Evidence	   indicates	   that	   Barbour,	   however,	   was	   now	   becoming	   increasingly	  concerned	  with	  how	  this	  might	  reflect	  both	  on	  himself	  and	  the	  organisation.	  He	  penned	  in	  a	  Note	  for	  Record	  on	  18	  November	  1971,	  that	  Greenwood	  ‘had	  hoped	  the	   information	   on	  Cassidy’s	   activities	   regarding	   the	  Workers	   Student	  Alliance	  could	  be	  read	  into	  the	  public	  record’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2139).	  Barbour	  had	  reason	  to	  be	  concerned	  because	  in	  August	  1972,	  Greenwood	  did	  just	  that.	  	   He	  made	  a	  series	  of	  statements	  to	  the	  Senate	  about	  what	  he	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  group	  of	  employees	  within	  the	  ABC	  supporting	  a	  certain	  ‘ideological	  viewpoint’	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  control	  of	  the	  ABC’	  (Senate	  30	  August	  1972:	  523	  &529).	  This	  appears	   to	  be	  an	  exaggerated	  statement	  because	  at	   this	  time	  ASIO	  had	  not	  provided	  any	  firm	  assessment	  of	  Cassidy’s	  political	  views.	  But	  nevertheless,	   Greenwood	   told	   the	   Senate	   that	   ‘I	   know,	   or	   I	   believe	   I	   know,	   of	  some	   of	   the	   persons	   who	   constitute	   this	   group’.	   While	   he	   made	   no	   direct	  reference	   to	   Cassidy,	   he	   did	   expose	   organisations	   that	   were	   associated	   with	  Cassidy.	  Greenwood	  said	  that:	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This	   group	   goes	  under	   the	  names	  of	   the	  Marcusian	   and	  New	  Leftism.	   It	  finds	  expression	  in	  a	  host	  of	  bodies	  in	  this	  country,	  which	  for	  example,	  the	  Workers	  Student	  Alliance	  is	  one	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  is	  another.	  	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Senate	  30	  August	  1972:	  532)	  	  	  	  	   Not	   satisfied	   though,	   Greenwood	   continued	   to	   press	   ASIO	   for	   more	  information	   and	   on	   6	   September	   1972,	   he	   was	   provided	   with	   a	   ‘current	  intelligence	   report’	   on	   Cassidy.	   This	   report	   was	   now	   more	   conclusive	   about	  Cassidy’s	  political	  philosophy	  and	  contradicted	  his	  denial	  of	  being	  involved	  with	  the	   Workers	   Student	   Alliance.	   It	   reported	   that	   Cassidy	   was	   now	   a	   leading	  member	   of	   the	   Workers	   Student	   Alliance	   and	   a	   self-­‐described	   ‘communist	  revolutionary’.	  The	  report	  noted	  that	  in	  his	  official	  capacity	  as	  an	  ABC	  employee	  Cassidy	   had	   attended	   a	   conference	   on	   racism	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Queensland	  between	   28	   January	   and	   2	   February	   1972	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2147).	   ASIO’s	  surveillance	  of	  the	  conference	  also	  found	  that	  Cassidy	  was	  now	  involved	  with	  the	  Black	  Panther	  Party	  of	  Australia.	  Further	  information	  identified	  that	  Cassidy	  had	  been	  seen	  handing	  out	  publications	  of	  Struggle	   at	   the	   conference.	  97	  Even	  more	  troubling	  was	  that	  ASIO	  surveillance	  had	  picked	  up	  Cassidy	  stating	  that	  without	  any	  difficulty	  he	  was	  able	  to	  convince	  his	  ABC	  superiors	  that	  the	  conference	  was	  worthy	   of	   coverage	   and	   had	   boasted	   he	   was	   getting	   ‘a	   week’s	   holiday	   for	   the	  revolution’.	   A	   later	   ASIO	   document	   dated	   10	   February	   1972,	   reported	   that	  Cassidy	  was	  also	  selling	  copies	  of	  Struggle	  to	  a	  number	  of	  employees	  of	  the	  ABC	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2292).	  While	  these	  assessments	  are	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  previous	  files	  on	  Cassidy,	  it	  is,	  however,	  difficult	  to	  determine	  whether	  ASIO	  had	  submitted	  to	  pressure	  and	  changed	  its	  views.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  Struggle	  was	  a	  publication	  issued	  by	  the	  Workers	  Student	  Alliance.	  
	   262	  
There	   is,	  however,	   strong	  evidence	   to	  suggest	   that	   this	  new	  information	  was	   passed	   from	   ASIO	   to	   ABC	   management.	   Managing	   Director,	   Talbot	  Duckmanton,	  wrote	  to	  Peter	  Barbour	  asking	  him	  ‘whether	  it	  would	  be	  prejudicial	  to	  ASIO	  sources	  of	  information	  to	  confront	  Cassidy	  with	  the	  information	  that	  he	  had	   participated	   in	   the	   conference	   on	   racism	   in	   Brisbane	   and	   had	   been	   seen	  distributing	  copies	  of	  Struggle’.	  Barbour	  replied	  that	  it	  would	  not,	  and	  noted	  for	  the	  record	  that	   ‘I	  gather	  that	  he	  [Duckmanton]	   intended	  to	  take	  some	  action	   in	  respect	  of	  Cassidy’s	  employment	  at	  the	  ABC’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1793).	  	  Duckmanton	  confronted	   Cassidy	  with	   the	   information	   on	   29	   June,	   but	   again	   Cassidy	   denied	  the	   allegations.	   By	   this	   time,	   the	   ABC	   was	   keen	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   Cassidy	   but	   as	  Duckmanton	  explained	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Barbour,	  the	  ABC	  could	  only	  dismiss	  him	  on	  grounds	  of	  incompetence	  or	  misconduct	  and	  that	  intelligence	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  prove	  either	  of	  these.	  	  	  But	  the	  damage	  had	  been	  done	  and	  the	  ABC	  had	  other	  means	  of	  punishing	  Cassidy.	  His	  name	  was	  dropped	  from	  the	  credits	  of	  the	  ABC’s	  Nightcap	  program	  of	   which	   he	   was	   assistant	   producer	   (The	  Melbourne	  Observer	   8	   August	   1971).	  And,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  he	  was	  moved	  into	  a	  position	  where	  he	  could	  exude	  no	   influence	   on	   ABC	   broadcasts.	   The	   full	   consequences	   of	   the	   incident	   would	  only	  be	  revealed	  years	  later.	  Cassidy	  later	  reflected	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  events	  telling	   researcher,	  Nick	  McLaren,	   that	   because	  ABC	  management	   knew	  he	  was	  under	   surveillance	   this	  had	  a	  profound	   impact	  on	  his	   ability	   to	  progress	   in	  his	  career	  and	  to	  gain	  any	  promotion	  within	  the	  ABC	  (McLaren	  2010:	  79).	  98	  Just	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  This	  may	  be	  a	  slightly	  exaggerated	  claim.	  Although	  Cassidy’s	  input	  into	  on–air	  content	  may	  have	  been	  curtailed,	  his	   influence	  in	  other	  areas	  did	  not	  suffer.	   In	  1982,	  Cassidy…	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  became	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Victorian	  Branch	  of	  the	  ABC	  Staff	  Association.	  See:	  McAdam,	  A	  (1983)	  ‘The	  ABC’s	  Marxist’s’,	  Quadrant,	  Vol.	  27,	  January–February.	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The	  utmost	  publicity	  Archival	  documents	   confirm	   that	  Greenwood	  continued	   to	  push	  ASIO	   to	  conduct	   surveillance	   on	   his	   political	   opponents	   and	   provide	   him	   with	   the	  information.	  On	  19	  October	  1971,	  Greenwood	  asked	  for	   the	  security	  records	  of	  several	  trade	  union	  and	  Labor	  Party	  officials.	  One	  of	  these	  records	  regarded,	  Jack	  Mundey,	  Secretary	  of	  the	  NSW	  Building	  and	  Construction	  Union,	  and	  a	  member	  of	   the	   National	   Executive	   of	   the	   CPA	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2139).	   The	   information	  supplied	   to	   Greenwood	  was	   then	   put	   to	   use	   in	   a	   Senate	   debate	   on	   31	   August	  1972	   to	   discredit	   Mundy’s	   reputation.	   As	   Senator	   Hannan	   explained,	   ‘the	  Communist	   Mundey’	   and	   his	   union	   were	   ‘responsible	   for	   the	   destruction	   of	  buildings’	  and	  ‘placing	  bombs	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Labour	  and	  National	  Service	  in	   Perth’	   (Senate	   31	   August	   1972:588).	   	   Senator,	   John	   Carrick,	   then	   asked	  Greenwood	   to	   ‘inform	   the	   Senate	   of	   the	   background	  of	   this	   gentleman	   and	  his	  actions’.	   Greenwood	   confirmed	   that	   Mundey	   and	   his	   union	   had	   indeed	   been	  involved	   in	   acts	   of	   physical	   violence	   during	   trade	   union	   disputes.	   He	   also	  informed	   the	   Senate	   that	   Mundey	   	   ‘is	   an	   acknowledged	   member	   of	   the	  Communist	   Party’.	   Greenwood’s	   rationale	   for	   exposing	  Mundey	  was	   as	   he	   had	  earlier	   suggested,	   ‘because	   it	   is	   the	   sort	   of	   thing	   which	   ought	   to	   be	   given	   the	  utmost	  publicity’	  (Senate	  31	  August	  1972:	  593).	  	  	  
	   Communist	   Party	   connections	   to	   the	   trade	   union	   movement	   and	   the	  Labor	  Party	  were	  of	  particular	   interest	   to	  Greenwood,	  and	  he	  continued	  to	  use	  intelligence	  material	  to	  publicly	  expose	  them.	  Despite	  these	  matters	  having	  very	  little	   relevance	   to	   matters	   of	   national	   security,	   Greenwood	   pressed	   ASIO	   to	  forward	  security	   information	  on	  private	  citizens	   to	  him.	  For	  example,	  he	  asked	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ASIO	   what	   records	   they	   could	   provide	   on,	   John	   Halfpenny,	   Secretary	   of	   the	  Victorian	  Amalgamated	  Metal	  Workers	  Union	   (NAA:	  A	   6122,	   2139).	  Halfpenny	  had	  been	  a	  powerful	  union	  organiser	  in	  Victoria	  and	  on	  one	  occasion,	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  union,	  he	  had	  petitioned	  the	  Labor	  Party	  to	  abolish	  ASIO	  (The	  Age,	  14	  May	  1974:3).	  Halfpenny’s	  ASIO	  dossier	  reported	  that	  he	  had	  risen	  quickly	  through	  the	  ranks	  of	   the	  Eureka	  Youth	  League	   to	  become	  the	  State	  President	  and	  was	   then	  elected	  to	  the	  National	  Committee	  in	  1958.	  The	  ASIO	  report	  also	  confirmed	  that	  he	  was	  a	  known	  member	  of	   the	  CPA	  and	  had	  attended	   the	   International	  Trade	  Union	  Conference	   on	   Social	   Security	   in	  Moscow	   in	   1971	   (NAA:	  A	  6122,	   2139).	  Later	   in	   August	   1972,	   Greenwood	   was	   supplied	   with	   further	   information	   on	  Halfpenny.	  ASIO	  informed	  him	  that	  Halfpenny	  had	  recently	  become	  a	  member	  of	  the	   Victorian	   branch	   of	   the	   Australian	   Labor	   Party.	   In	   a	   preface	   to	   the	   report,	  Director	  General,	  Peter	  Barbour,	  advised	  Greenwood	  that	   ‘should	  you	  decide	  to	  use	  some	  of	  the	  material	  in	  a	  public	  statement	  I	  would	  be	  grateful	  if	  you	  would	  refer	  the	  matter	  to	  me	  first	  due	  to	  the	  sensitivity	  of	  the	  material’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2147).	  	  	  	  	  	  	   This	   information	   appears	   to	   have	   allowed	   conservative	   politicians	   to	  publicly	  discredit	  Halfpenny’s	   integrity	  and	  expose	  him	  as	  a	  communist	  on	  two	  separate	   occasions.	   The	   first	   instance	   occurred	   on	   16	   October	   1972	   during	   a	  televised	  debate	  broadcast	  on	  the	  Channel	  Nine	  program	  A	  Current	  Affair.	  During	  the	   debate,	   Greenwood	   and	   former	   Prime	  Minister,	   John	   Gorton,	   first	   claimed	  that	   two	   communists	  were	   influencing	   Labor	   Party	   policy.	   The	   two	  men	  were	  identified	   as	   Mr	   L.	   Carmichael	   and	   Mr	   J.	   Halfpenny.	   Labor	   frontbencher,	   Jim	  Cairns,	  speaking	  on	  the	  same	  program	  suggested	  this	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  slander	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the	  Labor	  Party	  and	  he	  then	  defended	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  accused.	  But	  Cairns’	  response	  was	   cut	   from	   the	   broadcast	   before	   it	   went	   to	   air	   (The	  Australian	   17	  October	  1972:	  2).	  	  	  To	  the	  protests	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party,	  Greenwood	  continued	  his	  attack	  in	  the	  Senate	  a	   few	  days	   later	  on	  19	  October	  1972.	  He	  told	  the	  Senate	  that	  Halfpenny	  was	   one	  of	   the	  most	   ‘active	  disruptionist	   communists	   in	   the	   country’	  who	  had	  exerted	   a	   significant	   influence	   upon	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Australian	   Labor	   Party	  through	   the	   trade	   union	   movement	   (Senate	   19	   October	   1972:	   1704–1705).	  Perhaps	   the	   principal	   theme	   running	   through	   this	   incident	   is	   that	   ASIO	  intelligence	  material	  appeared	   to	  be	  underpinning	   the	  government’s	   claim	   that	  communism	   was	   influencing	   ALP	   policy.	   Almost	   certainly	   some	   of	   the	  information	  used	  to	  support	  this	  claim	  came	  from	  the	  dossiers	  Greenwood	  had	  asked	  ASIO	  to	  prepare	  on	  Halfpenny	  in	  October	  1971	  and	  August	  1972.	  	  	  	  	  	   For	  almost	  23	  years,	  despite	  many	  attempts	  by	  ASIO	  to	  resist	  the	  practice,	  respective	   Prime	   Ministers,	   Attorneys	   General,	   and	   parliamentarians	   misused	  intelligence	   information	   for	   their	   own	   political	   ends.	   Some	   of	   these	  improprieties,	   although	   long	   suspected,	  were	  only	  made	  public	   after	   the	  Labor	  Party	   had	   assumed	   control	   of	   the	   government	   in	   1972.	   Given	   Greenwood’s	  relationship	  with	   journalists	   it	   is	  perhaps	  not	   surprising	   that	  on	  14	  May	  1974,	  
The	  Age	  newspaper	  published	  an	  ASIO	  minute	  disclosing	  many	  of	  Greenwood’s	  indiscretions.	   It	   confirmed	   that	   Greenwood	   had	   instructed	   the	   organisation	   to	  conduct	  numerous	   checks	  on	  private	   citizens	   and	   to	   compile	  dossiers	  on	   them	  for	   his	   own	   political	   purpose.	   The	   article	   revealed	   the	   incidents	   regarding	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Cassidy,	   Mundey,	   Halfpenny	   and	   a	   number	   of	   other	   subjects	   Greenwood	   had	  asked	   ASIO	   to	   provide	   information	   on.	  When	   confronted	  with	   the	   information	  those	   subjected	   to	   the	   surveillance	   said	   they	  were	   not	   surprised.	   (The	  Age	   14	  May	  1974:	  3).	  Greenwood	  responded	  on	  1	  July	  1974	  in	  The	  Sun	  newspaper.	  He	  accused	  the	  Labor	  Party	  of	  leaking	  documents	  to	  journalists	  in	  order	  to	  damage	  ASIO’s	  reputation	  (The	  Sun	  1	  July	  1974:	  4).	  This	  was	  perhaps	  a	  striking	  comment	  given	  his	  own	  disregard	  for	  the	  political	  neutrality	  of	  the	  organisation	  during	  his	  term	   as	   Attorney	   General.	   However,	   McKnight	   when	   conducting	   research	  interviews	  for	  his	  book	  Australia’s	  Spies	  and	  their	  Secrets	  was	  told	  that	  the	  ASIO	  document	  was	  leaked	  to	  the	  Age	  not	  by	  the	  Labor	  Party	  but	  by	  ‘a	  disgusted	  public	  servant’	   who	   had	   taken	   the	   document	   from	   Greenwood’s	   own	   files	   (McKnight	  1994:286).	  	  	  
Conclusion	  and	  preliminary	  findings	  In	   each	   of	   the	   cases	   discussed	   in	   this	   chapter,	   politicisation	   was	  ubiquitous	   and	   clearly	   motivated	   by	   the	   government’s	   own	   political	   interests.	  Although	   ASIO	   may	   have	   at	   times	   mirrored	   the	   government’s	   conservative	  attitude	  towards	  communism,	  the	  politicisation	  of	  intelligence	  in	  the	  above	  cases	  did	   not	   arise	   because	   it	   was	   an	   overtly	   partisan	   organisation.	  While	   the	   cases	  examined	   above	   may	   not	   be	   representative	   of	   the	   government’s	   or	   ASIO’s	  behaviour	   throughout	   the	   Cold	  War,	   the	   findings	   of	   this	   chapter	   indicate	   that	  politicisation	   occurred	   less	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   ASIO’s	   allegiance	   to	   conservative	  politics	   and	   more	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   parliamentarians	   misusing	   intelligence	   to	  achieve	   their	   own	   political	   goals.	   It	   was	   not	   so	   much	   that	   ASIO	   collected	  information	   on	   private	   citizens	   and	   activist	   groups,	   but	   the	  way	   in	  which	   that	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information	   was	   used	   in	   a	   parliamentary	   and	   public	   context	   that	   led	   to	  politicisation.	  	  	  	  For	  example,	  intelligence	  material	  became	  a	  powerful	  political	  tool,	  which	  could	  be	  used	   to	  articulate	   the	  apparent	   subversive	  nature	  of	   communism,	   the	  anti-­‐war	  movement	  and	  political	  dissent.	  Prime	  ministers,	  attorneys	  general,	  and	  members	  of	  parliament	  consistently	  brought	   intelligence	  advice	   into	   the	  public	  sphere	  in	  order	  to	  emphasise	  a	  link	  between	  political	  opposition	  and	  subversion.	  This	  was	  often	  done	  without	  the	  knowledge	  of,	  or	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  Directors	  General	  Reed,	  Spry	  and	  Barbour.	  One	  point	  this	  underscores,	  as	  McKnight’s	  study	  concluded	   is	   ‘the	   ineffectual	   resistance	   of	   senior	   ASIO	   figures’	   indicates	   that	   it	  was	  the	  unfettered	  Ministerial	  control	  of	  ASIO	  that	  led	  it	  to	  become	  a	  politicised	  organisation	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  721).	  What	  can	  be	  seen	  throughout	  the	  cases	  in	  this	   chapter	   is	   an	   excessive	   attempt	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   government,	   to	   use	  intelligence	  to	  promote	  their	  own	  particular	  political	  interests.	  	  	   Throughout	   the	   period	   under	   discussion,	   the	   partisan	   political	   use	   of	  intelligence	   did	   little	   to	   strengthen	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   politically	   neutral	   and	  objective	   intelligence	   organisation.	   Prime	   Minister	   Chifley’s	   vision	   of	   an	  impartial	   organisation	   designed	   to	   inform	   government	   decision-­‐making	   was	  turned	   into	   a	   tool	   of	   influence	   on	   behalf	   of	   government.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	  important	   feature	   revealed	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	   intelligence	   was	   used	   to	  persuade	  not	  inform.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  have	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  two	  conditions.	  One	   is	   that	   intelligence	   became	   a	   compelling	   means	   of	   justifying	   the	  government’s	   political	   agenda.	   And	   two,	   intelligence	   extended	   the	   scope	   of	  
	  269	  
political	  resources	  available	  to	  politicians	  in	  order	  to	  make	  these	  assertions.	  The	  temptation	  to	  use	  it	  became	  irresistible.	  	  	   For	   example,	   in	  his	  Communist	  Party	  dissolution	   speech	  Prime	  Minister	  Menzies	  used	   intelligence	   to	   justify	   the	  government’s	  case	   that	   the	   trade	  union	  movement	  was	  honeycombed	  with	  communists.	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  Justice	  Reed,	  was	  not	  consulted	  before	  this	  information	  was	  publicly	  revealed.	  He	  noted	  that	   the	   information	  ASIO	   supplied	  was	   intended	   to	   inform	   the	   government	   of	  the	   situation.	   It	  was	   not	   intended	   to	   give	   substance	   to	   a	   political	   speech	   or	   to	  lend	   support	   toward	   a	   policy	   decision.	   Likewise,	   in	   the	   Michaelis	   case	   Prime	  Minister	  Holt	  and	  then	  Minister	  for	  the	  Army,	  Malcolm	  Fraser,	  used	  intelligence	  not	   to	   inform	   their	   policy	   decisions,	   but	   rather	   to	   persuade	   an	   audience	   and	  smear	  their	  political	  opponents.	  In	  this	  instance,	  intelligence	  was	  used	  to	  connect	  political	   opposition	   to	   subversion.	   This	   pattern	   continued	   under	   Attorneys	  General	   Billy	   Snedden,	   Nigel	   Bowen,	   and	   Ivor	   Greenwood.	   On	   a	   number	   of	  occasions,	   they	   used	   intelligence	   files	   in	   parliament	   to	   deride	   opposition	   by	  linking	   legitimate	   political	   dissent	   to	   subversion.	   Intelligence	  was	   deployed	   to	  justify	  such	  claims.	  	  	  ASIO	   undoubtedly	   collected	   vast	   amounts	   of	   information	   on	   private	  citizens.	  It	  also	  screened	  appointments	  to	  the	  public	  service	  and	  academia	  while	  monitoring	   the	   activities	   of	   politicians,	   journalists,	   the	   media	   and	   the	   various	  peace	  movements.	  In	  regard	  to	  politicisation,	  it	  was	  not	  that	  this	  information	  was	  collected	   but	   rather	   how	   it	   was	   used	   to	   political	   advantage.	   On	   numerous	  occasions,	   political	   leaders	   used	   intelligence	   material	   to	   discredit	   legitimate	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political	  dissent	  and	   to	  obstruct	   the	   careers	  of	   those	  who	  espoused	  alternative	  political	   ideologies.	   In	   this	   sense,	   intelligence	   became	   a	   powerful	   partisan	  resource.	  	  	  	  	  	   One	   of	   the	   primary	   problems	   facing	   the	   government	   when	   it	   came	   to	  dealing	  with	   communism	  and	   the	  anti-­‐war	  movement	  was	   justifying	   their	  own	  position	   toward	   it.	   They	   needed	   to	   show	   that	   members	   of	   these	   groups	   were	  skilful	  manipulators,	  subversive	  and	  a	  threat	  to	  security.	  Strong	  representations	  were	  needed	  to	  make	  this	  point.	  As	  a	  political	  resource,	  intelligence	  extended	  the	  scope	   of	   the	   information	   available	   to	   politicians	   allowing	   them	   to	   make	   this	  connection.	   This	   is	   precisely	   why	   the	   government	   turned	   to	   ASIO	   to	   obtain	  information	   regarding	   the	   communist	   influence	   in	   the	   trade	   unions	   during	  preparation	   of	   the	   Communist	   Dissolution	   Bill.	   Likewise,	   as	   the	   William	  Wentworth	   case	   demonstrates	   the	   intelligence	   service	   substantially	   increased	  his	  ability	  to	  publicly	  expose	  and	  diminish	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  alternative	  political	  views.	  For	  nearly	  two	  decades,	  Wentworth	  used	  ASIO	  as	  a	  resource	  to	  check	  the	  associations	  of	  people	  he	  suspected	  to	  be	  communists.	  Others	  such	  as	  Attorneys	  General	   Bowen	   and	  Greenwood	   built	   upon	   this	   precedent.	   They	   tended	   to	   use	  ASIO	   as	   their	   personal	   fact-­‐checking	   department.	   This	   greatly	   enhanced	   their	  argument	   that	   the	   ideas	   espoused	   by	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement	   were	   actually	  underpinned	  by	  notions	  of	  dissent,	  subversion,	  and	  disloyalty.	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The	   cases	   analysed	   in	   this	   chapter	   tend	   to	   confirm	   that	   bringing	  intelligence	  into	  political	  debates	  is	  hazardous	  and	  often	  results	  in	  politicisation.	  This	   appears	   to	   be	   because	   such	   actions	   can	   create	   the	   perception	  —	   real	   or	  imagined	  —	   that	   the	   intelligence	   services	   are	   aligned	  with	   political	   parties	   or	  political	   leaders.	   Within	   this	   context,	   the	   mantle	   of	   intelligence	   as	   politically	  neutral	   is	   diminished	   the	   more	   it	   is	   used	   in	   the	   political	   arguments	   of	  government.	   While	   intelligence	   is	   undoubtedly	   a	   valuable	   commodity	   when	  appropriately	  used	  to	   inform	  political	  decision-­‐making,	  evidence	  suggest	  that	   it	  is	  also	  a	  destructive	  force	  when	  used	  publicly	  to	  underscore	  a	  political	  point.	  	  	   It	  is	  perhaps	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  more	  intelligence	  is	  used	  in	  political	  debates	   the	   likelihood	  of	   it	  becoming	  politicised	   increases.	  Finding	  the	  optimal	  balance	  between	  using	  intelligence	  to	  inform	  policy	  without	  it	  stepping	  into	  the	  role	  of	  advocating	  for	  a	  policy	  choice	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  achieve.	  There	  can	  be	  no	  certainty	  that	  achieving	  such	  a	  balance	  would	  eliminate	  politicisation	  from	  occurring.	  	  	   The	  politicisation	  of	  intelligence	  within	  the	  Australian	  context	  has	  a	  long	  history.	  In	  1949,	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  services	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  start	  anew.	  The	  creation	  of	  ASIO	  was	  a	  chance	  to	  move	  away	  from	  a	  history	  of	  partisan	  conflicts,	   maladministration,	   and	   politicisation	   that	   had	   bedevilled	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   services	   during	   previous	   five	   decades.	   This	   was	   an	  opportunity	   to	   reverse	   its	   misfortunes.	   A	   chance	   to	   make	   the	   intelligence	  services	   less	   vulnerable	   to	   partisan	   politics	   and	  more	   responsive	   to	   legitimate	  security	  concerns.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  unfortunate	  then	  that	  during	  its	  formative	  years	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From	  the	  shadows	  to	  the	  spotlight:	  Intelligence	  
leaks,	  subversion,	  and	  media	  intercession	  	  
(1972	  –	  1975)	  
	  
	  
It	  is	  my	  opinion	  that	  something	  constructive	  should	  be	  done	  to	  implement	  a	  
coordinated	  plan	  of	  anti-­‐Communist	  propaganda	  throughout	  Australia.	  The	  
mediums	  vitally	  concerned	  are	  Press	  and	  Radio.	  (Director	  General	  of	  Security	  C.	  F.	  Spry)99	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  With	   a	   few	   exceptions,	   interaction	   between	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	  services	   and	   the	   media	   has	   received	   little	   sustained	   analysis.	  100	  	   Even	   less	  attention	  has	  focused	  on	  how	  such	  interaction	  might	  result	  in	  politicisation.	  The	  subject	   of	   this	   chapter	   explores	   ASIO’s	   relationship	  with	   the	   Australian	  media	  during	   the	   years	   1972	   to	   1975,	   evaluating	   to	   what	   extent	   this	   interaction	  resulted	   in	  politicised	   intelligence.	  The	  chapter	  has	   two	  specific	  aims.	  One	   is	   to	  explain	  how	  intelligence	  intervention	  in	  the	  media	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politicisation.	  The	  second	   is	   to	   identify	  and	  explain	  what	  conditions	  enabled	  politicisation	  to	  occur.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  NAA:	  A	  1209,	  1957/4892,	  18	  August	  1950.	  	  	  100	  See:	   	   Deery,	   P	   (2001)	   ‘Covert	   Propaganda	   and	   the	   Cold	   War	   and	   Australia	   1948–1955’,	   The	   Round	   Table:	   The	   Commonwealth	   Journal	   of	   International	   Affairs,	   Vol.	   90	  (361),	  pp.	  607–621;	  McKnight,	  D	  (2008	  b)	  ‘Not	  Attributable	  to	  Official	  Sources:	  Counter	  Propaganda	  and	  the	  Mass	  Media’,	  Media	  International	  Australia,	  No.	  128,	  August,	  pp.	  5–17.	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In	   the	   late	   1950s	   and	   early	   1960s,	   ASIO	   took	   a	   great	   interest	   in	   the	  Australian	  media.	  Archival	  files	  show	  that	  on	  26	  March	  1961,	  an	  unnamed	  ASIO	  officer	  sought	  assistance	  from	  one	  of	  his	  media	  contacts.	  ‘The	  situation	  in	  the	  C	  P	  [Communist	   Party]	   is	   really	   at	   boiling	   point	   at	   this	   stage	   and	   an	   article	   in	   a	  newspaper	  could	  do	  a	  lot	  to	  kick	  it	  along.	  Please	  do	  all	  you	  can’.	  	  Attached	  to	  the	  letter	  was	  another	  document,	  which	  the	  ASIO	  officer	  said	  ‘could	  be	  of	  some	  use’.	  The	  archival	   file	  documenting	   this	  case	   is	  not	  clear	  on	  what	  ASIO	  material	  was	  offered	  to	  the	  media,	  but	  it	  did	  state	  	  ‘could	  you	  please	  retype	  our	  article	  before	  passing	  it	  on	  and	  destroy	  the	  original’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1940).	  	  	  	   Three	   days	   later,	   ASIO	   requested	   further	   assistance	   from	   several	  media	  organisations.	   A	   minute	   prepared	   on	   29	   March	   shows	   that	   ASIO’s	   Special	  Services	   Branch	   had	   an	   operation	   that	   was	   ‘designed	   to	   exploit	   to	   the	   fullest	  possible	  extent	  within	  Australia	   the	   ideological	   split	  between	  China	  and	  Russia	  and	   the	   subsequent	   dissentions	   arising	   from	   it	  within	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	  Australia’.	   Editors	   of	   the	   Herald	   group,	   The	   Age	   and	   News	  Weekly	   were	   then	  briefed	  by	  ASIO	  and	   supplied	  with	  material.	  They	  were	  encouraged	   to	  use	   this	  material	   in	   articles	   emphasising	   the	   divisions	   that	   the	   Sino–Soviet	   split	   had	  created	  within	  the	  CPA,	  and	  then	  to	  ‘continue	  the	  attack	  after	  publication	  of	  the	  articles’.	  Briefings	  were	  also	  conducted	  with	  an	  editor	  of	  The	  Bulletin	  newspaper.	  A	   television	   contact	   was	   provided	   with	   information	   and	   asked	   to	   produce	   a	  program	   that	  would	   discuss	   the	   tensions	   the	   split	   had	   aroused	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	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1940).	   Subsequently,	   several	   articles	   appeared	   in	   the	   aforementioned	  newspapers.101	  	  	  But	  this	  was	  not	  an	  isolated	  case.	  ASIO’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Australian	  media	   had	   a	  much	   longer	   history	  which	   began	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   Cold	  War.	   It	  continued	  until	   just	  months	  before	  the	  Whitlam	  Labor	  government	  was	  elected	  in	  December	  1972	  when	  the	  practice	  was	  officially	  discontinued.	  But	  for	  seventeen	  years	  before	  1972,	  ASIO	  had	  been	  actively	  intervening	  in	  the	  media.	  It	  had	  cultivated	   journalists,	  newspaper	  editors,	   and	  other	  media	   representatives	  to	   use	   as	   part	   of	   its	   counter	   propaganda	   and	   exposure	   measures	   known	   as	  ‘spoiling	   operations’	   (Anderson	   2005:337).	   These	   activities	   were	   intended	   to	  disrupt	  and	  damage	  the	  political	  activities	  of	  the	  left	  and	  were	  rationalised	  as	  a	  means	  of	  combating	  the	  spread	  of	  communist	  propaganda	  activities	  in	  Australia	  (McKnight	  1994:	  195).	  	  Often	  ASIO’s	  spoiling	  operations	  had	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  countering	  communist	  propaganda	  but	  instead	  were	  ‘aggressive	  foray’s	  into	  the	  world	  of	  politics’	  where	  the	  organisation	  could	  express	  it	  own	  political	  views	  in	  the	  press	  (McKnight	  2008	  b:	  5).	  These	  operations	  were	  intended	  to	  be	  counter-­‐intelligence	   measures	   designed	   to	   inhibit	   communist	   propaganda	   but	   they	  became	  a	  partisan	  exercise	  in	  managing	  public	  opinion	  and	  conditioning	  political	  attitudes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  The	  Bulletin	  published	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  over	  three	  editions	  while	  News	  Weekly	  also	  published	  several	  articles.	  See:	  The	  Bulletin	  19	  August	  1961:17;	  26	  August	  1961:	  18;	  2	  September	  1961:17	  and	  News	  Weekly	  15	  March	  1961:	  8;	  29	  March	  1961:	  1;	  3	  May	  1961:	  3	  and	  The	  Herald	  7	  March	  1961:	  13.	  	  	  
	   276	  
On	   several	   other	   occasions,	   intelligence	   material	   was	   provided	   to	   the	  media	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   discrediting	   the	   members	   of	   left	   wing	   political	  groups,	   activist	   associations,	   the	   peace	   movement,	   and	   even	   high-­‐ranking	  members	  of	  the	  government.	  When	  these	  practices	  were	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  Prime	  Minister,	  Gough	  Whitlam,	  ASIO’s	  media	  intercessions	  began	  to	  unravel.	  He	  later	  recalled	  that	  ‘ASIO	  had	  acted	  in	  a	  wholly	  unwarranted	  fashion	  and	  outside	  its	   legitimate	   functions	   in	   supplying	   the	  media	   with	  material	   about	   individual	  citizens’.	  Against	  this	  background	  in	  July	  1974,	  Whitlam	  decided	  to	  expose	  ASIO’s	  spoiling	   operations.	   Shortly	   after,	   he	   announced	   a	   Royal	   Commission	   into	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	  community	   to	   investigate	   the	  role	  and	   function	  of	  every	  Australian	  intelligence	  agency	  (Whitlam	  1985:	  171).	  	  	   *****	  	  Some	   academic	   attention	  has	   been	  paid	   to	   the	   subject	   in	   the	  Australian	  literature.	   For	   example,	  David	  McKnight’s	   (2008	  b)	   article,	   ‘Not	  Attributable	   to	  Official	   Sources:	   Counter	   Propaganda	   and	   the	   Mass	   Media’	   is	   of	   particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  chapter.	  McKnight’s	  study	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  the	   relationship	   between	   ASIO	   and	   various	   Australian	   media	   organisations.	  While	  his	  study	  does	  not	  specifically	  deal	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  politicisation,	  it	  does	  provide	  two	  important	  findings	  that	  guide	  the	  following	  analysis.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  intelligence	  organisations	  and	  journalists	  can	  be	  mutually	  beneficial.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   McKnight	   argues	   that	   secret	   information	   can	   be	  disclosed	   to	   journalists	   as	   part	   of	   the	   communication	   strategy	   of	   the	   security	  service	  because	  it	  can	  give	  voice	  to	  an	  otherwise	  publicly	  silent	  organisation.	  The	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second	   involves	   the	   unique	   forms	   of	   information	   that	   intelligence	   services	  collect.	  Surveillance	  powers	  vested	  in	  intelligence	  services	  permit	  the	  collection	  of	   highly	   privileged	   forms	   of	   information	   that	   are	   not	   available	   through	   other	  means.	   Journalists	   may	   be	   tempted	   to	   publish	   such	   material	   because	   it	   can	  provide	  their	  reporting	  with	  ‘scoops’	  and	  exclusive	  information.	  McKnight	  warns	  that	  the	  relationship	  can	  become	  unbalanced	  and	  one	  of	  dependence.	  He	  found	  that	   in	  most	   cases,	   the	   stories	   that	   resulted	   from	   this	   relationship	  were	  more	  often	   beneficial	   to	   the	   intelligence	   service	   than	   to	   the	   journalists	   	   (McKnight	  2008	  b:	  15).	  	  	   Others	   have	   studied	   the	   issue	   from	   a	   narrower	   perspective.	   Fay	  Anderson’s	   (2005)	   book,	   An	   Historian’s	   Life,	   Max	   Crawford	   and	   the	   Politics	   of	  
Academic	   Freedom	   analysed	   how	   ASIO	   manipulated	   the	   press	   to	   expose	  communists	   working	   at	   Melbourne	   University.	   However,	   her	   work	   focuses	   on	  how	   ASIO	   used	   the	   media	   to	   stifle	   academic	   freedom	   and	   limit	   dissent	   in	  Australian	   Universities,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   means	   of	   policy	   manipulation.	   Fiona	  Capp’s	  Writers	  Defiled	  (1993)	  took	  a	  similar	  approach.	  While	  her	  study	  makes	  a	  significant	   contribution	   to	   the	   field,	   it	   examines	   how	   ASIO	   conducted	  surveillance	  on	  Australian	  writers.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  Capp	  focuses	  on	  how	  ASIO	  used	  the	   media	   to	   vilify	   writers	   and	   repress	   the	   content	   of	   Australian	   literature,	  without	  mentioning	  politicisation.	  Valuable	  though	  this	  literature	  is	  in	  providing	  context	   and	   background	   to	   the	   subject	   it	   has	   not	   examined	   how	   intelligence	  intervention	  in	  the	  media	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  manipulation	  or	   a	   form	   of	   politicisation.	   Others,	   however,	   have	   given	   this	   topic	   a	   wider	  examination.	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Two	   studies	   investigate	   how	   intelligence	   intervention	   in	   the	  media	   can	  result	   in	   politicisation.	   In	   Fixing	   the	   Facts,	   Rovner	   (2011)	   outlines	   a	   form	   of	  politicisation,	   which	   he	   describes	   as	   ‘intelligence	   subverting	   policy’.	   Rovner	  suggests	   this	   usually	   occurs	   when	   intelligence	   organisations,	   or	   their	   staff,	  attempt	   to	   undermine	   existing	   policies	   or	   preferred	   policy	   choices	   of	   a	  government.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   intelligence	   organisations	   may	   disseminate	  information	   either	   through	   well-­‐placed	   leaks	   to	   the	   media	   or	   by	   providing	  information	  to	  political	  opponents	  because	   they	  may	   fear	  becoming	  scapegoats	  for	   policy	   failures.	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   an	   intelligence	   organisation,	   this	  practice	  can	  act	  as	  a	  form	  of	  self-­‐protection.	  Leaks	  are	  provided	  to	  the	  media	  to	  highlight	   that	   a	   security	   failure	   is	   the	   result	   of	   bad	  policy	   choices	   and	  not	   bad	  intelligence	  work.	   But	  Rovner’s	   study	   found	   that	   even	   the	   perception	   that	   this	  form	   of	   intelligence	   subversion	   is	   occurring	   could	   lead	   to	   what	   he	   calls,	   ‘a	  subversion–manipulation	   feedback	   loop’.	   For	   example,	   when	   an	   intelligence	  organisation	   suspects	   that	   they	  might	  become	   the	   scapegoat	   for	   a	   failed	  policy	  decision	   they	   attempt	   to	   subvert	   it	   by	   leaking.	   But,	   policy-­‐makers	  may	   in	   turn	  ignore	  intelligence	  assessments	  because	  they	  fear	  leaks	  and	  exposure.	  This	  leads	  to	   a	   highly	   dysfunctional	   relationship,	   mutual	   hostility,	   and	   a	   breakdown	   in	  communication	  and	  cooperation	  (Rovner	  2011:	  32–35).	  	  	  	   There	   are	   also	   strong	   parallels	   to	   be	   drawn	   between	   ASIO’s	   media	  interventions	   and	   intelligence	   interventions	   in	   British	   politics.	   One	   study	  conducted	  by	  Uri	  Bar-­‐Joseph	  (1995)	  titled	  Intelligence	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Politics	  
of	  Democratic	  States	  provides	   two	   case	   studies	  —	  among	  others	  —	   that	   are	   of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  this	  chapter.	  The	  first	  involved	  a	  case	  where	  military	  and	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intelligence	   officers	   conspired	   to	   subvert	   the	   policy	   of	   British	   Prime	   Minister	  Lloyd	   George	   in	   1920.	   Another	   instance	   involved	   British	   intelligence	   officials	  leaking	   secret	   information	   to	   the	   media	   in	   order	   to	   undermine	   the	   Labour	  government	   of	   Ramsay	   McDonald	   in	   1924.	   Bar-­‐Joseph	   put	   forward	   three	  hypotheses	  to	  explain	  such	  behaviours.	  	  	   The	   first	   builds	   on	   the	   traditionalist	   –	   activist	   theory	   of	   proximity,	  outlined	   in	   chapter	   one.	   Bar-­‐Joseph	   found	   that	  when	   intelligence	   agencies	   and	  policy-­‐makers	  do	  not	  adequately	  separate	  their	  domains,	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	   two	   functions	   becomes	   unclear.	   Political	   neutrality	   is	   compromised	   when	  intelligence	  requirements	  are	  dictated	  by	  policy	  preferences.	  	  The	  second	  finding	  regards	   the	   professional	   ethic.	   Bar-­‐Joseph’s	   study	   found	   a	   high	   correlation	  between	   the	   attempts	   of	   intelligence	   organisations	   to	   intervene	   in	   politics	   and	  the	   level	   of	   professionalism	   within	   intelligence	   organisations.	   He	   found	   that	  intelligence	  officials	  who	  exhibit	  a	  low	  level	  of	  professionalism	  were	  more	  likely	  to	   intervene	   in	   political	  matters.	   Bar-­‐Joseph’s	   final	   observation	  was	   concerned	  with	  political	  control	  and	  oversight	  of	  intelligence	  organisations.	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  political	  systems	  where	  oversight	  is	  maintained	  only	  by	  the	  executive	  arm	  of	  government,	   intelligence	   organisations	   are	  more	   likely	   to	   intervene	   in	   politics.	  	  He	   concluded	   that	   a	   ‘unilateral’	   control	   system	   was	   not	   sufficient	   to	   prevent	  intelligence	   from	   intervening	   in	   politics	   (Bar-­‐Joseph	  1995:	   338).	   The	   following	  discussion	   builds	   on	   this	   literature,	   by	   asking	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   findings	   of	  these	   studies	   can	   provide	   a	   framework	   to	   analyse	   how	   ASIO’s	   intervention	   in	  politics	  through	  media	  intercession	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  form	  of	  politicisation.	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Spoiling	  operations	  and	  media	  intercession	  In	  1959,	  ASIO	  arranged	  for	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  to	  be	  placed	  in	  Australian	  newspapers	  that	  would	  expose	  the	  international	  convention	  of	  the	  Australian	  –	  New	   Zealand	   Congress	   for	   International	   Co-­‐operation	   and	   Disarmament	   as	   a	  communist	  front.	  102	  One	  memo	  dated	  18	  September	  1959,	  shows	  that	  ASIO	  had	  approached	  members	  of	  the	  ‘friendly	  press’	  and	  encouraged	  them	  to	  report	  ‘only	  the	   adverse	   aspects’	   of	   the	   Congress.	   But	   one	   unnamed	   newspaper	   failed	   to	  uphold	  ASIO’s	  request.	  The	  editor	  was	  immediately	  visited	  by	  an	  ASIO	  officer	  and	  reminded	   that	   the	  Congress	  was	   ‘Communist	   inspired’.	  The	  editor	  was	   ‘at	  once	  most	   apologetic’	   noted	   the	  minutes	   of	   the	   conversation.	   He	   ‘regretted	   that	   his	  paper	   had	   been	   the	   avenue	   of	   free	   publicity	   for	   the	   congress’,	   and	   he	   assured	  ASIO	  that	  no	   further	  publicity	  of	   this	  nature	  would	  be	  given	   to	   the	  Congress	   in	  his	  paper	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2013).	  	  	  	  	  	   After	   this	   success,	   a	   Special	   Projects	   Section	   was	   formally	   established	  within	  the	  B1	  Counter	  Subversion	  branch	  of	  ASIO	  in	  July	  1965	  to	  prepare	  studies	  for	  the	  use	  of	  government	  and	  outside	  contacts.	  This	  branch	  continued	  releasing	  ‘background	   information’	   to	   selected	  media	   outlets	   until	   1968	  when	   a	   Special	  Projects	   Branch	   was	   established	   to	   carry	   out	   special	   operations	   and	   research	  projects	   under	   the	  direction	   of	   the	  Director	  General	   of	   Security	   (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2079:100–104).	   The	   function	   of	   the	   Special	   Projects	   Branch	   was	   to	   prepare	  material	   for	   covert	   spoiling	   operations	   and	   counter	   propaganda	   activities,	   and	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Branch	  was	  instructed	  to	  establish	  and	  maintain	  liaison	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  102	  For	   a	   further	   synopsis	   of	   this	   event	   See:	   McKnight	   (2008	   c)	   ‘Rethinking	   Cold	  War	  History’,	  and	  McLean,	  C	  (2001)	  ‘Fear	  or	  Peace:	  Australian	  government	  responses	  to	  the	  Peace	  Movement	  1949–1959’.	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chosen	  contacts	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  fields,	  including	  press,	  radio,	  and	  television	  (NAA:	  A	  12694,	  18).	  	  	   The	  purpose	   of	  maintaining	   these	  media	   contacts	   appears	   to	   have	  been	  not	  only	  to	  channel	  ASIO’s	  views	  on	  topical	  political	  issues	  into	  the	  public	  arena,	  but	  also	  to	  glean	  information	  from	  journalists,	  and	  to	  promote	  the	  organisation	  itself.	  The	  Special	  Projects	  Branch	  had	   intimate	   links	  with	  a	  number	  of	   leading	  Australian	   newspapers.	   For	   example,	   one	   Special	   Projects	   officer,	   Bruce	  Campbell,	  was	  the	  son	  of	  Sir	  Harold	  Alfred	  Campbell,	  the	  long	  time	  editor	  of	  The	  
Age	  newspaper	  from	  1939	  until	  1959	  (Nation	  Review	  2–8	  December	  1976:149).	  Other	  senior	  media	  contacts	  included	  a	  later	  editor	  of	  The	  Age,	  Graham	  Perkins,	  editors	  of	  The	  Bulletin,	  Peter	  Hastings,	  and	  Peter	  Coleman,	  and	  chief	  of	  the	  Herald	  and	  Weekly	  Times	  group,	  Phillip	  Jones	  (McKnight	  1994:	  184–185;	  The	  Australian	  28	   July	   1998:	   5).	   Another	   contact	   was	   a	   later	   editor	   of	   The	   Bulletin,	   Donald	  Horne.	   He	  wrote	   that	   on	   several	   occasions	   he	   had	  met	   with	   Director	   General,	  Charles	  Spry,	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  ASIO	  officers.	  Horne	  recalled	  that	  a	  number	  of	  The	  Bulletin’s	  staff	  had	  received	  material	   from	  ASIO,	  most	  of	  which	  regarded	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia	  (Horne	  2000:	  112–113).	  	  	  	   ASIO	  had	  close	   links	  with	  other	  Australian	  news	  media	  organisations.	   In	  1974,	   after	   learning	   of	   ASIO’s	   spoiling	   activities	   Prime	   Minister	   Whitlam	  demanded	  a	  list	  of	  all	  newspapers	  that	  had	  participated	  in	  the	  operations.	  That	  list	   contained	   sixteen	   leading	   Australian	   newspapers	   including	   among	   others:	  
The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  The	  Adelaide	  Advertiser,	  The	  Australian,	  The	  Bulletin,	  
The	  Age	   and	  The	  Australian	   Financial	   Review	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2134).	   It	   appears	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reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  developing	  these	  relationships	  was	  to	   influence	   public	   opinion	   on	   political	   issues	   by	   discrediting	  members	   of	   the	  Communist	   Party	   of	   Australia,	   exposing	   left	   wing	   dissent	   during	   the	   Vietnam	  War,	   and	   emphasising	   the	   communist	   influence	   in	   the	   trade	   union	   and	   labour	  movements.	   ASIO’s	   media	   operations	   were	   an	   effective	   means	   of	   placing	   the	  political	   views	   of	   an	   apparent	   apolitical	   intelligence	   organisation	   before	   the	  public.	  	  	   Writing	   in	  The	  Australian,	  McKnight	  suggested	   that	  on	  several	  occasions	  ASIO	   used	   the	  media	   to	   give	   voice	   to	   their	   own	   political	   agenda.	   For	   example,	  story	   ideas	  and	  certain	  angles	  were	  suggested	  to	   journalists	  that	  might	  present	  ASIO’s	  political	  views	  in	  a	  flattering	  light.	  In	  June	  1961,	  then	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  Charles	  Spry,	  encouraged	  an	  unnamed	   journalist	   to	  write	  articles	   for	  The	  
Bulletin	  attacking	   left	  wing	   academics	   at	  Melbourne	  University	   (The	  Australian	  28	  July	  1998:	  5).	  Other	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  on	  4	  November	  1965,	  the	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  ASIO’s	  New	  South	  Wales	  branch	  proposed	  a	  television	  program	  that	  would	   depict	   the	   spread	   of	   communist	   revolutions	   and	   takeovers	   through	   the	  world.	  He	  suggested	  that	  the	  film	  would	  be	  an	  effective	  instrument	  to	  inform	  the	  public	   about	   the	   violent	   tactics	   communist’s	   used	   to	   achieve	   their	   goals.	   	   The	  Deputy	   Director	   recommended	   that	   the	   program	   could	   ‘be	   interspersed	   with	  images	   of	   violence	   as	   used	   by	   Communists;	   e.g.	   Hungary,	  Malaysia,	   Tibet,	   etc.’	  	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1986).	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But	  the	  relationship	  between	  ASIO	  and	  the	  media	  was	  not	  always	  so	  one-­‐sided.	   Some	   representatives	   of	   the	   media	   willingly	   offered	   to	   write	   flattering	  pieces	  on	  ASIO	  in	  return	  for	  information.	  In	  April	  1964,	  Sydney	  journalist	  Robert	  Mayne	   wrote	   to,	   Charles	   Spy,	   seeking	   ASIO	   assistance	   for	   an	   article	   he	   was	  writing	   in	   the	   Sydney	   Morning	   Herald.	   Mayne	   felt	   that	   ‘an	   honest	   article	   on	  Australian	   Security	  would	  do	  only	   good	  and	  help	  dispel	   a	   lot	   of	   absurd	  myths’	  regarding	   the	   organisation.	   Shortly	   after,	   representatives	   of	   ASIO	   met	   with	  Mayne	  to	  provide	  the	  information	  he	  had	  requested	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1984).	  On	  22	  May	   1964,	   a	   flattering	   piece	   on	   ASIO	   appeared	   in	   the	   Sydney	  Morning	   Herald	  credited	   to	   an	   unnamed	   ‘staff	   correspondent’	   under	   the	   headline:	   ‘ASIO:	  Government	   Arm	   of	   National	   Security’.	   It	   revealed	   detailed	   information	   on	  successful	   ASIO	   operations	   and	   defended	   ASIO’s	   telephone	   interception	  techniques	  and	  the	  increasing	  budget	  expenditure	  the	  organisation	  had	  received	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  22	  May	  1964:2).	  Mayne	  wrote	  to	  Spry	  on	  29	  May	  1964	  thanking	  him	  for	   the	  assistance	  and	  courtesy	  ASIO	  officers	  had	  extended	  to	  his	  research	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1984).	  But	  Mayne	  was	  expected	  to	  return	  the	  favour.	   ‘I	  was	   asked	   to	   provide	   details	   of	   the	   political	   views	   of	   Mr	   Robert	   Duffield,	   the	  foreign	   editor	   of	  The	  Australian	   newspaper’,	  Mayne	   later	   revealed	   in	   an	   article	  for	   the	  National	   Times.	   He	  was	   asked	   to	   collect	   this	   information	   only	   because	  Duffield	  had	  expressed	  critical	  views	  on	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  (Mayne	  1973:	  4).	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Another	   media	   figure	   to	   show	   deference	   toward	   ASIO	   was	   Robert	  Raymond,	   filmmaker	   and	   one	   of	   the	   founders	   of	   the	   ABC’s	   Four	   Corners	  program.103	  In	  1965,	  Raymond	  approached	  ASIO	  for	  assistance	  in	  making	  a	  film	  titled:	  Have	  you	  a	   spy	   in	  your	   street?104	  He	   suggested	   the	   film	   could	   be	   used	   to	  outline	   the	  history	   of	  ASIO	   and	   to	   show	   the	   organisation’s	   success	   in	   handling	  the	  Petrov	  and	  Skripov	  cases.	  Raymond	  stated	  that	  ASIO	  would	  be	  able	  to	  vet	  the	  final	  product	  and	  insert	  anything	  into	  the	  film	  that	  they	  required.	  So	  enthusiastic	  to	   gain	   ASIO’s	   approval	   Raymond	   indicated	   that	   ‘he	   was	   prepared	   to	   bow	   to	  ASIO’s	  wishes	  at	   any	   stage	  even	   to	   the	  extent	  of	  discontinuing	   the	   film’	   should	  ASIO	   be	   unhappy	   with	   the	   production.	   A	   treatment	   of	   the	   film’s	   script	   was	  submitted	  to	  Director	  General	  Charles	  Spry	  in	  May	  1966.	  Raymond	  suggested	  the	  film	  could	  clarify	  the	  functions	  of	  ASIO,	  which	  he	  argued	  ‘were	  possibly	  confused	  in	  the	  public	  mind…	  you	  can	  depend	  on	  the	  film	  making	  clear	  the	  point	  that	  there	  is	   no	   political	   influence	   whatsoever	   in	   the	   work	   of	   ASIO’.	   The	   film	   was	   to	   be	  distributed	   to	   television	   stations	   throughout	   Australia	   with	   the	   possibility	   of	  international	  release.	  Although	  Spry	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  production,	  because	  of	  the	  upcoming	  federal	  election	  in	  November	  1966,	  he	  decided	  the	  film	  ‘should	  be	  left	  in	  abeyance	  for	  a	  more	  appropriate	  time’	  	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1986).	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Raymond	   also	   worked	   for	   Channel	   Nine	   and	   the	   Seven	   Network	   and	   was	   later	   a	  member	  of	  the	  Board	  of	  Directors	  at	  the	  ABC	  (Raymond,	  R	  1999,	  Out	  of	  the	  Box,	  Seaview	  
Press).	  	  	  104	  A	   later	   version	   of	   the	   film	   is	   entitled:	   Second	   Oldest	   Profession.	   Raymond	   is	   also	  identified	  as	  the	  filmmaker	  in	  the	  script	  he	  submitted	  to	  ASIO	  for	  approval	  see:	  NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1986:	  81).	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The	  Analysis	  On	   16	   September	   1971,	   Australian	   businessman,	   Peter	   Warren,	  approached,	   Robert	  Mayne,	   proposing	   that	   he	   edit	   a	   new	  magazine	   called	  The	  
Analysis.	  Warren	   indicated	   that	   the	   publication	  would	   have	   access	   to	  material	  supplied	   from	   ASIO.	   Intrigued	   at	   the	   prospect	   of	   digging	   through	   ASIO	  documents	  Mayne	  agreed	  to	  Warren’s	  proposal.	  Subsequently,	  a	  second	  meeting	  was	   arranged	   between	   Mayne	   and	  Warren	   for	   21	   September	   1971	   to	   set	   out	  further	  details	  of	  the	  publication	  (NAA:	  A	  8913,	  Box	  1).	  	  	   At	   this	  second	  meeting,	  Warren	  was	  accompanied	  by	  two	  men.	  The	   first	  was	  Peter	  Coleman,	  Member	  of	  the	  Legislative	  Assembly	  of	  New	  South	  Wales,	  the	  second	  was	  Director	  of	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  Branch,	  Ernest	  Redford	  (NAA:	  A	  8913,	  Box	  1).	  Archival	  documents	  show	  that	  direct	  contact	  between	  Coleman	  and	  ASIO	  had	  been	  established	   in	  1963.	  A	  Situation	  Report	  written	  by	   the	  Regional	  Director	  of	  ASIO’s	  New	  South	  Wales	  branch	  dated	  23	  November	  1963	  stated	  that	  Coleman	  was	  ‘keen	  to	  assist’	  and	  that	  he	  had	  ‘restated	  his	  willingness	  to	  publish	  anything	   topical	   concerning	   the	   Communist	   Party’	   in	  The	  Bulletin.	   At	   the	   time,	  the	   Regional	   Director	   added	   that,	   ASIO	   had	   supplied	   Coleman	   with	   material	  regarding	   the	   Australasian	   Book	   Society	   and	   ASIO	  were	  willing	   to	   supply	   him	  with	   more	   material	   in	   future	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2126).	   According	   to	   ASIO,	   the	  Australasian	  Book	  Society	  was	  a	  front	  organisation	  used	  by	  the	  CPA	  to	  distribute	  propaganda	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  1698).	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Coleman	  had	  been	  the	  associate	  editor	  of	  The	  Bulletin	  newspaper.	  Under	  his	   editorship	   several	   articles	   highly	   critical	   of	   the	   CPA	   and	   student	   peace	  movement	   had	   appeared	   in	   The	   Bulletin.	   Many	   of	   the	   articles	   cited	   detailed	  information	  on	  CPA	  members	  and	  other	  left	  wing	  activists	  (McKnight	  2008	  b:14).	  But	  Coleman	  was	  also	  credited	  as	  the	  author	  of	  a	  curious	  pamphlet	  titled	  School	  
Power:	  Is	  Your	  Child	  Being	  Manipulated	  by	  Political	  Operators?	   Published	  by	   the	  Moree	   Champion,	   the	   pamphlet	   offered	   Coleman’s	   (and	   likely	   ASIO’s)	   extreme	  view	  of	  the	  ‘radical	  student	  underground’.	  The	  forty-­‐page	  pamphlet	  detailed	  the	  student	  protest	  movement’s	   association	   to	   international	   ‘revolutionary	  parties’	  and	  promoted	  a	  theme	  demonstrating	  its	  strong	  support	  for	  Trotskyism	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia	  (Coleman	  1970:	  6).	  Archival	  documents	  show	  this	  publication	  was	  based	  on	  ASIO	  intelligence	  material.	  	  	   Several	   sections	   of	   Coleman’s	   pamphlet	   drew	   heavily	   from	   an	   ASIO	  Special	  Projects	  paper	  titled	  ‘Program	  For	  Revolution	  in	  High	  Schools’	  prepared	  in	  1969.	  ASIO’s	  support	   for	  Coleman’s	  pamphlet	  was	  part	  of	  a	  secret	  operation	  named	   ‘Operation	  Beacon	  XII’.	  Documents	  show	  that	   ‘Beacon	  XII’	  was	  a	  special	  operation	   designed	   to	   cover	   ‘administrative	   arrangements’	   for	   Coleman’s	  publication.	  This	   involved	  organising	   financial	   and	  public	   relations	   support	   for	  the	  publication	  and	  helping	  with	   the	  distribution	  and	  printing	  of	   the	  pamphlet.	  Such	  assistance	  extended	  to	  involving	  individuals	  such	  as	  Peter	  Warren	  who	  had	  ‘given	   significant	   support,	   both	   financially	   and	   public	   relations	   wise,	   to	   the	  publication’	   and	   ‘several	   other	   NSW	   stockbrokers	   who	   wished	   to	   remain	  anonymous’.	   Sixteen	   thousand	   copies	  were	  distributed	   throughout	  Australia	   at	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the	  time,	  along	  with	  significant	  promotion	  in	  the	  media	  of	  which	  ASIO	  noted	  had	  ‘produced	  favourable	  results’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2126).	  	  	   In	   his	   testimony,	   Mayne	   recalled	   that	   the	   discussion	   of	   the	   second	  meeting	  centred	  on	  determining	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  magazine.	  In	  Mayne’s	  words,	  it	   became	   ‘quite	   clear	   the	   magazine	   they	   were	   to	   produce	   was	   to	   be	   used	   to	  discredit	  those	  people	  whose	  political	  views	  they	  did	  not	  share,	  namely,	  those	  on	  the	  left	  wing	  of	  politics’.	  Apparently,	  Warren	  made	  his	  intentions	  clear	  by	  stating	  that	   he	  wanted	   to	   ‘show	   the	   truth	   about	   subversives	   and	   left	  wingers’.	  Mayne	  informed	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  that	  ASIO	  officer	  Ernest	  Redford,	  in	  his	  opinion,	  was	   ‘speaking	  with	  the	  authority	  of	   the	  organisation’	  and	  had	  agreed	  to	  supply	  information	   that	   would	   accomplish	   such	   a	   task.	   Publication	   of	   The	   Analysis	  magazine	  had	  further	  connections	  to	  other	  political	  figures.	  It	  was	  to	  be	  printed	  by	  Henry	  Sullivan,	  Member	  of	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Upper	  House	  and	  owner	  of	  the	  Moree	  Champion.	  The	  same	  publisher	  of	  Coleman’s	  School	  Power	  pamphlet	  (NAA:	  A	  8913,	  Box	  1).	  	  	   Mayne	  soon	  began	  receiving	   the	   information	  he	  was	  promised.	  Coleman	  delivered	   the	   first	   instalment	   comprised	   of	   five	   manila	   folders	   containing	  information	   to	   be	   used	   in	   the	   first	   edition	   of	   The	  Analysis.105	  A	   few	   days	   later	  Redford	   provided	   further	   information	   to	   Mayne	   including	   several	   ASIO	   files	  dealing	  with	  protest	  movements	  in	  Australia,	  the	  identification	  of	  protesters,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Coleman	  later	  admitted	  that	  he	  had	  received	  ASIO	  files	  from	  Redford	  for	  publication	  in	  the	  Analysis	  magazine,	  but	  denied	  the	  material	  contained	  any	  secret	  information,	  see:	  New	  South	  Wales	  Legislative	  Assembly,	  Official	  Hansard,	  Wednesday	  1	  March	  1978.	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information	   outlining	   ASIO’s	   political	   views.	   Much	   of	   the	   information	   outlined	  the	   activities	   of	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   of	   Australia	   and	   the	   anti-­‐Vietnam	   War	   movement	   such	   as	   Albert	   Langer,	   Brian	   Medlin,	   Daniel	   O’Neil,	  Robert	  Gould,	  and	  Dennis	  Freney.106	  Mayne	  was	  instructed	  to	  use	  this	  material	  to	  compose	   the	   first	   article	   published	   in	   The	   Analysis	   under	   the	   headline:	   ‘The	  Agitators’.	  Mayne	  wrote	  the	  article	  describing	  it	  as	  ‘acid	  tipped	  biographies’	  and	  submitted	  them	  to	  Warren	  (NAA:	  A	  8913,	  Box	  1).	  However,	  Warren	  and	  Coleman	  seemingly	  lost	  faith	  in	  Mayne	  when	  he	  attempted	  to	  publish	  the	  story	  in	  another	  newspaper.	  Warren	  exhorted	  that	   ‘he	  would	  not	  recommend	  such	  a	  course’,	  —threats	  of	  blackmail	  was	  then	  cast	  against	  Mayne	  (NAA:	  A	  12388,	  73A).	  107	  As	  a	  result,	   the	   article	   was	   never	   published	   and	   the	   magazine	   never	   appeared.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  episode	  highlights	  how	  political	  leaders	  in	  cooperation	  with	  the	  intelligence	  services	  supplied	  information	  about	  private	  citizens	  to	  the	  media	  in	  order	  to	  discredit	  their	  views.	  It	  reveals	  how	  the	  political	  views	  of	  an	  intelligence	  agency	  can	  be	  made	  public	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  shaping	  public	  sentiment.	  Such	  actions	   suggest	   that	   some	   ASIO	   staff	  were	  more	   intent	   on	   establishing	   enmity	  towards	  the	  left	  than	  they	  were	  with	  informing	  policy	  development.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Coleman’s	  claim	  that	  the	  files	  contained	  no	  secret	  material	  is	  clearly	  erroneous.	  For	  an	   overview	   of	   the	   content	   of	   these	   files	   see:	   New	   South	  Wales	   Legislative	   Assembly,	  Official	  Hansard,	  Wednesday,	  1	  March	  1978,	  where	  the	  documents	  were	  tabled.	  	  	  	  	  107	  The	  threat	  to	  blackmail	  Mayne	  was	  documented	  in	  camera	  at	  the	  Royal	  Commission’s	  inquiry.	  One	  of	  Mayne’s	  relatives	  was	  a	  junior	  ASIO	  officer	  at	  the	  time	  and	  knew	  nothing	  of	   the	  Analysis	  proposal.	   It	   appears,	  however,	   that	   the	  career	  of	   the	   junior	  officer	  was	  threatened	   if	  Mayne	  went	   ahead	  with	   publishing	   the	  material	   elsewhere.	   	   See	  NAA:	  A	  12388,	  73	  A.	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Mayne	  was	  left	  with	  real	  concerns	  about	  the	  political	  tactics	  of	  a	  supposed	  apolitical	   intelligence	   organisation.	   ‘I	   have	   certain	   personal	   unhappy	   feelings	  about	  the	  whole	  issue’	  he	  told	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  in	  1975.	  ‘I	  believe	  that	  the	  sort	  of	  malpractice	  that	  went	  on,	  the	  handing	  out	  of	  ASIO	  documents,	  continued	  quite	  widely	  at	   least	  until	  1972	  and	  possibly	   afterwards.	  My	   feeling	   is	   that	  my	  own	  involvement	  with	  ASIO	  was	  possibly	  the	  tip	  of	  a	  very	  large	  iceberg.	  I	  suspect	  that	  ASIO	  were	  handing	   out	   information	   to	   people	  with	   right	  wing	   tendencies,	  including	   members	   of	   parliament	   throughout	   the	   nation’.	   Mayne	   ended	   his	  testimony	  to	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  by	  noting	  that	  subsequent	  articles	  published	  in	   The	   Bulletin	   newspaper	   by,	   Peter	   Samuel,	   had	   quoted	   from	   the	   same	   ASIO	  documents	  that	  had	  been	  given	  to	  him	  (NAA:	  A	  12388,	  73	  A;	  NAA:	  A	  8913,	  Box	  1).	   	  These	  events	  surrounding	  The	  Analysis	  incident	  are	  a	  telling	  story	  of	  how	  intelligence	   services	   and	   politicians	   can	   attempt	   to	   cultivate	   media	  representatives	  and	  use	  them	  to	  sell	  their	  own	  political	  viewpoints.	  In	  this	  case,	  it	   was	   a	   clear	   attempt	   to	   use	   intelligence	   material	   as	   a	   political	   weapon	   to	  emphasise	   the	   alleged	   subversive	   nature	   of	   left	  wing	   politics	   at	   the	  moment	   a	  Labor	  government	  seemed	  certain	  to	  come	  to	  power.	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Security	  Clearances	  Much	  of	  the	  information	  given	  to,	  Robert	  Mayne,	  in	  1971	  regarded	  certain	  left	   wing	   activists.	   One	   in	   particular	   was	   Robert	   Gould.	   	   Only	   three	   months	  beforehand,	  at	  the	  29th	  Federal	  Labor	  Party	  conference	  Gould	  called	  for	  a	  report	  to	   be	   published	   on	   ‘the	   vermin	   planted	   by	   ASIO	   in	   the	   unions	   and	   other	  organizations’.	  Gould	  declaimed	  ASIO’s	  function	  as	  ‘completely	  illicit’.	  He	  went	  on	  to	   describe	   ASIO’s	   activities	   as	   ‘a	   disguised	   hidden	   investigation	   of	   political	  activities,	  mainly	  of	  the	  Left’.	  Gould	  then	  put	  to	  the	  conference	  a	  bold	  proposal:	  ‘that	   ASIO	   be	   abolished’.	   The	   motion	   received	   substantial	   support	   and	   was	  thereby	  put	  to	  a	  vote.	  The	  result	  —	  which	  would	  have	  committed	  a	  federal	  Labor	  government	  to	  the	  complete	  termination	  of	  the	  organisation	  —	  tied	  at	  22	  all.	   It	  was	  only	  defeated	  when	  ALP	  President,	  Mr	  T	  J.	  Burns,	  placed	  his	  casting	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  retaining	  the	  organisation.	  Thus,	  the	  abolition	  of	  ASIO	  failed	  by	  only	  the	  smallest	   of	  margins	   (Cameron	  Papers	  MS	  4614,	  Box	  2;	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald,	  June	   25,	   1971:	   2).	   Needless	   to	   say,	   the	   attitude	   of	  many	   in	   the	  ALP	  was	  made	  abundantly	  clear.	  Significant	  changes	  were	  foreshadowed	  in	  the	  security	  sector	  if	  Labor	   was	   to	   win	   the	   upcoming	   federal	   election	   (Hocking	   1993:64;	   McKnight	  1994:	  265).	  Given	  the	  close	  result	  of	   the	  vote,	  Gould’s	  bold	  proposal	  did	  not	  go	  unnoticed	  by	  the	  intelligence	  services.	  	  	   When	   the	   Whitlam	   government	   came	   to	   office	   in	   December	   1972,	  relations	  between	   the	  new	  government	  and	   the	   intelligence	  services	  were	  cool	  and	   dominated	   by	   mutual	   distrust.	   The	   Labor	   Party	   was	   highly	   critical	   of	   the	  previous	  government’s	  partisan	  use	  of	  the	  intelligence	  services	  and	  regarded	  the	  services	   as	   complicit	   in	   such	   behaviour.	   To	   many	   in	   the	   ALP,	   the	   intelligence	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services	  had	  proved	  to	  be	  little	  more	  than	   ‘a	  de	  facto	  wing’	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  and	   the	   self	   imposed	   guardians	   of	   conservative	   values	   (McKnight	   1994:	   246).	  Labor	   focused	   accountability	   for	   this	   politicisation	   squarely	   on	   the	   former	  government’s	   lack	   of	   ministerial	   guidance	   over	   the	   services.	   On	   several	  occasions,	  Whitlam	  made	  reference	  to	  the	  ministerial	   ‘manipulation	  of	  ASIO’	  by	  the	  Menzies	  government	  and	   the	   ‘dereliction	  of	  duties	  by	   successive	  Attorneys	  General’	   (Whitlam	   1985:	   161).	   Questions	   were	   raised	   as	   to	   whether	   the	  operations	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community	  were	  grounded	  in	  considerations	  other	  than	  national	  security.	  Although	  Labor	  sought	  reform,	  it	  waited	  another	  eighteen	  months	  before	  taking	  any	  definitive	  action.	  	  	   In	   December	   1972,	   prospective	   Attorney	   General,	   Lionel	   Murphy,	  revealed	  plans	  that	  ASIO’s	  conduct	  would	  be	  subject	  to	  closer	  control	  by	  a	  future	  Labor	   government	   (Canberra	  Times	   7	   December	   1972:	   1).	   On	   22	  March	   1973,	  Whitlam	   hinted	   further	   at	   Labor’s	   intentions.	   ‘If	   necessary,	   he	   suggested,	   ‘the	  government	   would	   reorganise	   Australia’s	   security	   and	   intelligence	   services’	  (Canberra	   Times,	   22	   March	   1973:	   1).	   During	   the	   double	   dissolution	   election	  campaign	   in	   the	   following	   year	  Whitlam	   took	   a	   firmer	   position.	   ‘If	   re-­‐elected’	  pledged	   Whitlam,	   his	   ‘government	   would	   appoint	   a	   judicial	   inquiry	   into	   the	  structure	  of	   the	  Australian	  security	  services’	  (Whitlam	  1974:34).	  Labor’s	  policy	  toward	   ASIO	   steadily	   built,	   and	   signalled	   a	   radical	   departure	   from	   the	   cosy	  relationship	  that	  had	  existed	  between	  the	  services	  and	  the	  previous	  government	  for	  the	  twenty	  years.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  these	  announcements	  caused	  concern.	  On	  several	   occasions	   the	   intelligence	   services	   began	   to	   push	   back	   against	   the	  government	   and	   instances	   of	   politicisation	   quickly	   surfaced.	   Again,	   the	   media	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served	  as	   an	   effective	   conduit	   in	  which	  ASIO	   could	   express	  publicly	   its	  private	  criticism	  of	  Labor	  policy.	  	  	  	   Even	   at	   this	   very	   early	   stage	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Whitlam	  government	  and	  ASIO	   two	  conditions	   identified	  by	  Rovner	   (2011)	  are	  present:	  mutual	   hostility	   and	   the	   need	   for	   self-­‐preservation.	   First,	   the	   Labor	   Party	  was	  highly	  suspicious	   that	  ASIO	  was	  a	  bastion	  of	  conservative	  values	  and	  hostile	   to	  the	   left.	   It	   had	   for	   example,	   only	   one	   year	   beforehand	   seriously	   considered	   a	  policy	   that	   would	   dissolve	   the	   organisation.	   From	   ASIO’s	   perspective,	   such	   a	  policy	  was	  probably	  considered	  imprudent	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  national	  security	  but	  also	   in	   regard	   to	   its	   own	   self-­‐interest.	   	   This	   probably	   only	   heightened	   the	  hostility	   between	   the	   two	   parties	   but	   may	   have	   also	   contributed	   to	   the	  perception	   that	  ASIO	  would	  need	   to	  protect	   its	   own	  existence.	   In	  other	  words,	  the	  possibility	  of	  politicisation	  in	  some	  form	  was	  very	  high	  from	  the	  outset.	  	  	   On	  3	  December	  1972,	  one	  day	  after	  Labor	  had	  won	  the	  election,	  Whitlam	  met	   with	   the	   permanent	   heads	   of	   the	   public	   service	   and	   introduced	   his	   key	  advisors,	   Richard	   Hall,	   Eric	   Walsh,	   Jim	   Spigelman,	   and	   Graham	   Freudenburg.	  According	   to	   Whitlam’s	   Press	   Secretary,	   Graham	   Freudenburg,	   Whitlam	  announced	   that	   ‘I	   take	   full	   responsibility	   for	   these	  men.	   I	   vouch	   for	   them	   and	  they	   are	   not	   to	   be	   subject	   to	   security	   clearances’.	   Whitlam’s	   deep-­‐seated	  suspicions	  of	  ASIO	  were	  clearly	  evident	  as	  he	  announced	  ‘these	  men	  are	  not	  to	  be	  harassed	  by	  ASIO’.	  Graham	  Freudenburg	  recalled	  that	  this	  was	  a	  gesture	  meant	  to	  demonstrate	  Whitlam’s	  personal	  responsibility	  for	  his	  staff	  and	  an	  expression	  of	   confidence	   in	   their	   loyalty	   (Freudenburg	   1977:	   260;	   2005:	   138).	   But	   the	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security	   sector	   saw	   the	  matter	   differently	   and	   they	   seem	   to	   have	   decided	   the	  choice	  as	  an	  irresponsible	  policy.	  Under	  a	  standing	  arrangement,	  the	  Australian	  Defence	   Department,	   the	   Joint	   Intelligence	   Organisation	   (JIO),	   ASIO,	   and	   the	  Central	   Intelligence	   Agency	   (CIA),	   all	   personal	   staff	   of	   government	   Ministers,	  upon	   taking	   office,	   were	   required	   to	   be	   vetted	   in	   order	   to	   obtain	   a	   security	  clearance.	  When	   intelligence	   officials	   learned	   that	   the	   staffs	   of	   the	   new	   Labor	  government	  were	  not	   to	  be	   subject	   to	   standard	  procedure,	   they	  began	   to	  push	  back	  against	  Whitlam’s	  decision.	  	  	   Shortly	  after	  Whitlam’s	  announcement,	  Mr	  M.	  Worth	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  department	  reported	  the	  decision	  directly	  to	  ASIO.	  They	  sent	   a	   stern	   rebuke	   straight	   back	   advising	   Worth	   that	   he	   should	   ‘discretely	  suggest	   to	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   that	   security	   clearances	   for	  his	  personal	   staff	   be	  sought’.	  This	  advice	  was	  immediately	  rejected.	  Richard	  Hall,	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  private	   secretary	   said	   that	   Whitlam	   ‘did	   not	   wish	   to	   have	   his	   personal	   staff	  vetted’.	  Hall	  then	  announced	  that	  several	  additional	  appointments	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	   Prime	  Minister’s	   staff	  would	   also	   not	   be	   subject	   to	   vetting	   	   (NAA:	   A	   6122,	  2134).	  This	  news	  was	  quickly	  relayed	  to	  US	  intelligence	  officials.	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Accounts	   by	   several	   of	  Whitlam’s	   staff	   highlight	   that	   the	   response	   from	  both	   the	  Australian	   and	  US	   intelligence	   community	  was	   less	   than	   enthusiastic.	  John	  Bennetts,	  a	  veteran	  political	  journalist	  for	  The	  Herald	  and	  The	  Age	  accosted	  Graham	  Freudenburg	  about	  the	  announcement	  telling	  him108	  ‘no	  security	  checks	  hey?	   We’ll	   see	   about	   that’	   (Freudenburg	   2005:	   137).	   That	   Bennetts	   was	   a	  political	  journalist	  may	  partly	  explain	  why	  he	  was	  interested	  in	  the	  events,	  but	  it	  is	   not	   the	   only	   reason.	   Bennetts	   was	   also	   an	   analyst	   at	   the	   Joint	   Intelligence	  Organisation	  and	  later	  became	  their	  liaison	  with	  the	  CIA	  when	  he	  was	  appointed	  the	  Australian	  representative	   in	  Washington	  D.C.	   (NAA:	  A	  6119,	  1905).	   	   It	   seems	  likely	   that	   Bennetts’	   comments	   were	   actually	   expressed	   on	   behalf	   of	   both	  intelligence	   services.	   Pressure	   was	   being	   placed	   on	   the	   new	   government	   to	  revoke	  its	  decision.	  	  	   Richard	  Hall	   also	   received	   veiled	   threats	   from	   the	   security	   services.	   He	  was	   informed	   that	   security	   officials	   in	   Australia	   had	   been	   greatly	   alarmed	   by	  Whitlam’s	  decision	  and	  that	  Washington	  was	  also	  very	  uneasy.	  Hall	  learned	  that	  if	   Australia	   wished	   to	   continue	   to	   receive	   restricted	   information	   from	   its	  American	  allies,	   then	  Whitlam’s	  staff	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  security	  clearances.	  No	  clearances,	   no	   information.	   In	   rather	   straightforward	   terms,	   United	   States	  Embassy	  official	  Tom	  Conlon	  informed	  Hall	  —	  ‘your	  Prime	  Minister	  has	  just	  cut	  off	   one	   of	   his	   options’	   (Hall	   1978:	   2).	   Conlon	   implied	   that	   if	   staff	   were	   not	  security	   cleared	   America	   would	   cut	   the	   flow	   of	   intelligence	   information	   with	  Australia.	   This	   severance,	   if	   carried	   out,	   would	   have	   been	   both	   publicly	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  Graham	  Freudenberg	  and	  Allan	  Ashbolt	   (Director	  of	   the	  ABC’s	  Special	  Projects	  Department)	  both	   claim	   that	   Bennetts	   was	   an	   ASIO	   plant	   in	   the	   press	   gallery.	   This	   appears	   partly	   true.	  Bennetts	   actually	   worked	   for	   the	   Joint	   Intelligence	   Organisation.	   See:	   NAA:	   A	   6119,	   1905;	  Freudenberg,	  G	  (2005)	  p.	  139	  and	  Ashbolt,	  A	  (1974)	  p.	  129.	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embarrassing	   and	   but	   also	   destabilising	   for	   the	   new	   government.	   Given	   the	  domestic	   and	   international	   consternation	   aroused	   by	   Whitlam’s	   decision,	   Sir	  John	   Bunting,	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   Department	   arranged	   for	  Whitlam	  to	  meet	  with	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  Peter	  Barbour.	  	  	  The	   two	  met	   for	   the	   first	   time	   on	   the	   afternoon	   of	   14	   December	   1972.	  Notes	  of	  the	  meeting	  reveal	  a	  level	  of	  mutual	  hostility	  between	  the	  two.	  ‘I	  am	  not	  very	  well	   disposed	   toward	   ASIO’	  was	  Whitlam’s	   initial	   remark,	   adding	   that	   he	  was	  not	  very	   impressed	  with	   the	  ASIO	  staff	  he	  knew.	  Barbour	  chose	  his	  words	  carefully,	   responding	   that,	   twenty-­‐two	   years	   in	   opposition	   had	   left	   the	   Labor	  Party	  with	  an	   ‘accumulation	  of	   ignorance,	  misinformation,	  and	  suspicion	  which	  ASIO	  was	   unable	   to	   dispel’.	   The	   Prime	  Minister	   agreed	   that	   this	   had	   led	   to	   an	  ‘unhealthy	  situation	  in	  many	  ways’.	  Barbour	  then	  invited	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	   government	   to	   ‘acquaint	   themselves	   with	   the	   role	   and	   activities	   of	   ASIO	  before	   forming	   judgments	   based	   on	   speculation	   and	   unfounded	   assumptions’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2134).	  	   Barbour	   pressed	   Whitlam	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   security	   clearances,	   but	   the	  Prime	   Minister	   tended	   to	   skirt	   around	   the	   issue.	   Whitlam	   said	   that	   he	   had	  ‘reserved	  his	  decision’	  on	  whether	  his	  staff	  would	  be	  security	  cleared.	  He	  wanted	  to	  wait	  until	  an	  administrative	  appeals	  system	  could	  be	   implemented	  so	   that	   if	  staff	   received	   an	   adverse	   security	   assessment	   they	   had	   grounds	   on	   which	   to	  appeal.	  Whitlam	  said	  this	  would	   ‘bring	  credit	   to	  ASIO’	  and	  Barbour	  agreed.	  But	  Barbour	   argued	   the	   procedure	   would	   take	   some	   time	   to	   implement	   and	  meanwhile	  urged	   that	  Whitlam’s	   staff	   could	  still	  be	  cleared.	  Anybody	  receiving	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an	   adverse	   assessment,	   Barbour	   advised,	   would	   still	   have	   recourse	   to	   appeal	  when	   the	   appeals	   system	  was	   later	   introduced.	   The	   Prime	  Minister	   agreed	   to	  this.	   He	   then	   gave	   permission	   that	   ‘Departmental	   Heads	   refer	   their	   staff	   for	  security	  checking	  by	  ASIO’	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2134).	  	  	   But	  confusion	  arose	  over	  the	  issue.	  The	  staff	  of	  government	  departments	  would	  be	  vetted	  by	  ASIO,	  but	  personal	  staff	  would	  not.	  This	  compromise	  was	  not	  a	  satisfactory	  resolution	  for	  Barbour,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  ASIO	  seems	  to	  have	  taken	  recourse	  to	  the	  press	  in	  order	  to	  pressure	  the	  government	  into	  a	  full	  agreement	  (McKnight	   1994:259).	   In	   Canberra	   and	   Sydney,	   highly	   critical	   stories	   began	  appearing	  in	  Australian	  newspapers.	  Richard	  Hall	  described	  the	  stories	  as	  ‘quasi-­‐inspired	   leaks’	   designed	   to	   ‘deliberately	   and	  mischievously’	  mislead	   the	   public	  (Hall	   1978:2).	   McKnight	   concluded	   that	   the	   placement	   of	   the	   articles	   was	   an	  ‘ASIO	   inspired	   media	   campaign’	   (McKnight	   1994:	   259).	   Most	   certainly,	   the	  articles	  tended	  to	  resemble	  quite	  similar	  views	  as	  those	  expressed	  by	  ASIO	  and	  senior	  public	  servants.	  	  	   ‘The	  Prime	  Minister	  has	  insisted	  that	  none	  of	  his	  staff	  be	  checked	  by	  the	  Australian	   Security	   Intelligence	   Organisation’	   wrote	   an	   anonymous	   pen	   in	   the	  
Canberra	   Times	   on	   18	   December	   1972.	   	   ‘Reliable	   sources	   said	   that	   the	   step	  diverged	   from	   the	   usual	   practice’.	   These	   same	   ‘reliable	   sources’,	   the	   Canberra	  
Times	   emphasised,	   said	   that	   ‘it	   would	   be	   up	   to	   individual	   Ministers	   to	   decide	  whether	  their	  staff	  should	  undergo	  security	  checks’.	  The	  anonymous	  pen	  wrote	  that	  this	  decision	  had	  caused	  concern	  in	  departmental	  circles	  because	  ‘access	  to	  secret	  documents	  would	  be	  granted	  to	  persons	  whom	  the	  security	  service	  knows	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little’	   (Canberra	   Times	   18	   December	   1972:	   3,	   Author’s	   emphasis).	   	   The	   term	  reliable	   sources	   implied	   that	   such	   views	  were	   not	   the	   Times’	   speculation,	   but	  rather	   a	   view	   carrying	   the	   imprimatur	   of	   the	   security	   service.	   As	   McKnight’s	  (2008	   b)	   study	   demonstrated,	   intelligence	   information	   can	   be	   attractive	   to	  journalists,	  but	  it	  can	  also	  be	  an	  avenue	  of	  expressing	  the	  security	  services’	  own	  views.	  The	  Canberra	  Times	  presented	  a	  selective	  version	  of	  the	  facts	  and	  did	  not	  mention	   that	   Whitlam	   had	   by	   now	   instructed	   ASIO	   to	   vet	   the	   staff	   of	  departmental	  heads.	  The	  article,	  to	  some	  extent,	  lent	  to	  a	  misconstruction	  of	  the	  events.	  	  	   Dutifully,	   The	   Canberra	  Times	   kept	   the	   public	   informed	   on	   all	   the	  main	  criticisms	  of	  Whitlam’s	   decision.	   The	  next	   day	  under	   the	  headline	   ‘Decision	  by	  PM	   creates	   problems’,	   it	   ran	   a	   far	   more	   alarming	   story.	   The	   story	   not	   only	  implied	   that	   Whitlam’s	   decision	   was	   illegal,	   but	   also	   it	   restated	   the	   private	  comments	   made	   by	   Conlon	   to	   Hall	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   severance	   of	   the	   US–Australian	  intelligence	  relationship.	   ‘Defence	  and	  political	   intelligence	  on	  which	  Australia	  has	  relied	  heavily	  in	  recent	  years	  could	  quickly	  be	  closed.	  The	  decision	  is	   expected	   to	   result	   in	   immediate	   difficulties	  with	   US	   and	   British	   intelligence	  agencies.	  Ministers	  with	  unscreened	  staff	  could	  be	  breaking	  the	  Crimes	  Act’.	  The	  story	  then	  made	  an	  even	  more	  important	  revelation:	  	  All	   likely	   members	   of	   the	   new	   government	   are	   believed	   to	   have	   been	  screened	   already	   by	   ASIO	   although	   some	   of	   the	   new	   members	   of	   the	  House	  of	  Representative	  may	  not	  have	  been	  processed.	  	  	  	  	  	  (Canberra	  Times	  19	  December	  1972:	  7	  Author’s	  emphasis)	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This	  was	  a	  revealing	  statement.	  	  Although	  Barbour	  was	  told	  that	  Whitlam	  had	  reserved	  his	  decision	  not	  to	  have	  personal	  staff	  cleared,	   it	  seems	  that	  ASIO	  had	  started	  to	  vet	  Whitlam’s	  staff	  without	  his	  permission.	  But	  just	  how	  had	  ASIO	  obtained	   such	   information?	   Was	   ASIO	   collecting	   information	   on	   political	  candidates	  before	  they	  became	  members	  of	  parliament?	  One	  of	  Whitlam’s	  staff,	  Richard	  Hall,	  who	  was	  personally	   involved	   in	   these	  events,	  quickly	  pointed	  out	  that	   ‘politicians	   do	   not	   fill	   out	   forms	  with	   personal	   references	   on	   running	   for	  office.	  It	  can	  only	  be	  deduced	  that	  the	  information	  for	  processing	  was	  obtained	  in	  clandestine	  ways’	   (Hall	   1974:	  3).	   Further	   evidence	   from	  McKnight	   reveals	   that	  some	  of	  Whitlam’s	  cabinet,	   indeed,	  had	  security	   files	  dating	   from	  1947.	  Among	  them	  were:	  Jim	  Cairns,	  Clyde	  Cameron,	  Tom	  Uren,	  Jim	  Cavenagh,	  and	  Moss	  Cass	  along	  with	  a	  number	  of	  Whitlam’s	  backbenchers.	  Curiously,	  the	  majority	  of	  these	  files	   were	   destroyed	   just	   before	   the	   1972	   election,	   and	   later,	   more	   where	  destroyed	   on	   the	   instruction	   of	   Justice	   Edward	   Woodward	   when	   he	   was	  appointed	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO	  in	  1975	  (McKnight	  1994:	  265	  &	  325;	  Miller	  2006:	  32).	  	  	   Whitlam	  met	  Barbour	  the	  day	  the	  Canberra	  Times	  article	  was	  published.	  Barbour	  raised	  the	   issue	  of	  security	  clearances	  and	  showed	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  the	   newspaper	   article	   saying	   that	   ‘by	   not	   going	   through	   the	   familities	   [sic]	   an	  unnecessary	  controversy	  had	  arisen’.	  	  Whitlam	  refused	  to	  back	  down,	  repeating	  that	   he	   had	   ‘complete	   confidence	   in	   his	   staff’	   and	   argued	   that	   if	   he	   were	   to	  subject	   them	   to	   a	   vetting	   procedure	   ‘they	   would	   feel	   he	   did	   not	   trust	   him’.	  Cunningly,	  Barbour	  replied	  that	  if	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  such	  confidence	  in	  his	  staff	   a	   security	   check	   ‘would	   be	   a	   mere	   formality’,	   and	   any	  more	   controversy	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might	  be	  avoided.	  At	   this	  point,	  Whitlam	  may	  have	  started	  to	  succumb	  to	  ASIO	  pressure	  and	  the	  American	  threat	  to	  withhold	  intelligence	  cooperation.	  He	  asked	  Barbour	   to	   report	   on	   the	   US	   and	   British	   reactions.	   Considering	   the	   wider	  ramifications	  of	  his	  decision,	  Whitlam	  begun	  to	  show	  signs	  that	  he	  was	  willing	  to	  back	  down.	  He	  told	  Barbour	  that	  he	  would	  discuss	  the	  issue	  with	  Lance	  Barnard	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2134).	  	  	   It	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  intelligence	  officials	  continued	  applying	  pressure	  on	  the	  government	  by	  agitating	   in	   the	  press	  because	  two	  more	  stories	   followed	   in	  
The	   Canberra	   Times	   and	   the	   Sydney	   Morning	   Herald.	   Both	   articles	   contained	  information	  that	  had	  been	  discussed	  privately	  between	  Whitlam	  and	  Barbour	  at	  their	   meetings	   on	   14	   and	   19	   December.	   The	   Canberra	   Times	   anonymously	  penned	  an	  article	  emphasising	   that	  public	   servants	  had	  always	  been	  subject	   to	  ASIO	  vetting	  before	  being	  given	  security	  clearances.	  ‘Now	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  new	  government	  is	  to	  operate	  a	  double	  standard	  in	  this	  respect,	  shielding	  from	  ASIO	  members	   of	   Ministers	   personal	   staff.	   This	   is	   grossly	   unfair’	   reasoned	   the	  
Canberra	  Times.	  The	  article	  then	  commented	  about	  the	  security	  appeals	  tribunal	  that	  Whitlam	  and	  Barbour	  had	  discussed.	   ‘The	  government	  would	  be	  employed	  if,	  instead	  of	  putting	  some	  favoured	  employees	  out	  of	  reach	  of	  ASIO,	  it	  instituted	  a	  system	  which	  would	  allow	  the	  subject	  of	  an	  ASIO	  report…	  to	  appeal	  against	  the	  findings’	  (Canberra	  Times	  21	  December	  1972:	  2).	  	  	  	  	   The	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  published	  a	  similar	  article	   the	  next	  day,	  and	  again,	  no	  author	  was	  credited	  for	  the	  story.	   	  Whitlam’s	  decision	  not	  to	  have	  his	  staff	   cleared	  was	   ‘simply	  puzzling…	  and	  highly	   embarrassing’	   editorialised	  The	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Herald	  on	  22	  December.	  The	  Americans	  were	  ‘absolutely	  emphatic’	  that	  friendly	  governments	   wishing	   to	   receive	   security	   information	   must	   have	   their	   staff	  cleared.	  The	  article	  paid	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  ending	  intelligence	  cooperation	   between	   Australia	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   	   Not	   only	   would	   this	  severance	   impact	   on	   issues	   of	   national	   security,	   but	   also	   severely	   damage	  matters	   of	   foreign	   affairs	   and	   defence.	   	   ‘The	  most	   curious	   aspect	   of	   the	  whole	  affair	  is	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  action	  was	  not	  necessary’.	  Just	  as	  Barbour	  had	  suggested	   to	  Whitlam,	  The	  Herald	   reasoned	   that	   if	   the	   Prime	  Minister	   ‘had	   his	  staff	  cleared	  by	  ASIO	  a	  highly	  embarrassing	  situation	  would	  never	  have	  arisen’	  (Sydney	  Morning	  Herald	  22	  December	  1972:	  6).	  	  	   It	   appears	   that	   ASIO’s	   media	   strategy	   was	   taking	   effect.	   On	   2	   January	  1973,	   Sir	   John	   Bunting	   relayed	   a	  message	   to	   Barbour	   indicating	   that	  Whitlam	  would	   change	   his	  mind.	   ‘The	  Prime	  Minister	   had	   registered	   the	   significance	   of	  the	  point’,	  said	  Bunting,	  	  ‘and	  appeared	  to	  be	  verging	  on	  agreeing	  to	  the	  checks’	  (NAA:	   A	   6122,	   2134).	   Now	   the	   Opposition	   applied	   its	   pressure.	   Billy	   Snedden	  demanded	   urgent	   advice	   on	   the	   state	   of	   the	   intelligence	   alliance.	  Whitlam	  had	  the	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  look	  into	  the	  question	  and	  they	  reported	  that	  there	  had	  been	  no	  disruption	  to	  the	  flow	  of	  classified	  material	  (Hall	  1978:	   4).	   Officially,	   there	   was	   no	   threat	   to	   the	   intelligence	   alliance,	   but	   the	  damage	   had	   been	   done.	   On	   8	   January	   1973,	   Whitlam	   backed	   down.	   Attorney	  General,	  Lionel	  Murphy,	  told	  Barbour	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  had	  now	  agreed	  to	  the	  security	  vetting	  of	  his	  staff	  (NAA:	  A	  6122,	  2147).	  The	  Canberra	  Times	  and	  The	  
Australian	   immediately	  reported	  that	  Whitlam	  had	  ‘reversed’	  his	  decision.	  ASIO	  was	   now	   to	   conduct	   full	   checks	   on	   all	   Prime	  Ministerial	   staff	   and	   those	   of	   the	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Attorney	  General	  (The	  Australian	  11	  January	  1973:	  2;	  Canberra	  Times	  12	  January	  1973:	  7).	  By	  28	  February	  1973,	  the	  clearance	  process	  had	  been	  completed.	   	  No	  staff	   received	   an	   adverse	   security	   assessment	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   28	  February	  1973:	  33).	  
	  
Preliminary	  insights	  There	   is,	   perhaps,	   one	   main	   theme	   running	   through	   this	   event:	   the	  improper	   dissemination	   and	   leaking	   of	   intelligence	   material	   to	   the	   media	   in	  order	   to	   undermine	   the	   government’s	   policy	   decision.	   Circumstantial	   evidence	  indicates	   that	   intelligence	   leaks	   played	   a	   role	   in	   pressuring	   Whitlam	   into	  changing	  his	  policy.	  That	   is,	  ASIO	  leaked	  selective	   information	  to	  the	  press	  that	  would	  undermine	  the	  government’s	  standing	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  have	  the	  security	  clearance	   policy	   reversed.	   Based	   on	   the	   available	   evidence	   it	   is	   perhaps	  reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   intelligence	   officers	   cooperated	   in	   some	   way	   with	  media	  representatives	  to	  achieve	  this	  goal.	  	  	   This	  evidence	  suggests	  two	  further	  conclusions.	  Both	  give	  some	  relevance	  to	   Bar-­‐Joseph’s	   earlier	   findings.	   	   First,	   there	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   a	   thorough	  lack	   of	   government	   control	   over	   the	   intelligence	   service.	   But	   this	   is	   perhaps	  reasonable	  given	  that	  when	  the	  episode	  began	  Whitlam	  had	  not	  been	  sworn	  into	  office,	  and	  by	  the	   time	  the	  episode	  had	  concluded,	  his	  government	  had	  been	   in	  office	   less	   than	   two	  months.	  While	  Labor	   sought	   reform,	   it	  had	  had	  no	   time	   to	  make	   any	   changes	   to	   control	   or	   oversight.	   	   Second,	   as	   Bar-­‐Joseph’s	   study	   has	  indicated,	   there	   appears	   to	   have	   been	   a	   low	   level	   of	   professional	   ethic.	   The	  intelligence	   service	   itself	   exhibited	   a	   highly	   unsatisfactory	   level	   of	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professionalism.	   For	   example,	   rather	   than	   maintaining	   political	   neutrality	   and	  serving	   the	   policy	   interests	   of	   new	   government,	   it	   appears	   ASIO	   tried	   to	  undermine	   the	   government	   through	   well-­‐placed	   leaks	   of	   information	   in	   the	  press.	   This	   could	   have	   been	   due	   to	   several	   factors.	   ASIO	   may	   have	   felt	   that	  Whitlam’s	  decision	  was	  simply	  a	  bad	  policy	  choice.	  Or	  it	  may	  have	  felt	  that	  any	  security	  breaches	  resulting	  from	  the	  decision	  would	  have	  been	  blamed	  on	  them.	  	  It	   may	   have	   also	   been	   taken	   as	   an	   indication	   that	   ASIO	   was	   not	   needed	   and	  thereby	  a	  means	  of	  self-­‐protection.	  	  	   For	   the	  past	   twenty-­‐three	  years,	  ASIO	  had	  served	  a	  Liberal	  government,	  and	  for	  much	  of	  that	  time	  many	  of	  its	  surveillance	  targets	  were	  from	  the	  left	  of	  political	  spectrum	  including	  members	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  Moreover,	  the	  former	  government	   had	   officially	   sanctioned	   these	  media	   interventions	   as	   a	  means	   of	  countering	  communist	  propaganda.	  It	  could	  be	  concluded	  that	  a	  lack	  of	  political	  control,	  coupled	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  unprofessionalism,	  led	  to	  ideal	  conditions	  in	  which	  politicisation	  could	  occur.	  	  	   These	  two	  conditions	  may	  have	  fostered	  within	  the	  intelligence	  service	  a	  certain	   kind	  of	   attitude.	   It	   appears	   that	   some	  ASIO	  officers	   interfered	  with	   the	  policy	   of	   the	  Whitlam	   government	   because	   they	   considered	   such	   a	   choice	  was	  imprudent.	   This	   itself	   points	   to	   another	   condition,	   which	   may	   have	   allowed	  politicisation	   to	   occur:	   the	   failure	   (or	   refusal)	   to	   adapt	   to	   a	   changing	   political	  environment.	   ASIO’s	   tacit	   interference	   with	   the	   policy	   choice	   of	   the	   Whitlam	  government	   reflects	   an	   unwillingness	   to	   accept	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   new	   Labor	  government	  and	  an	  adherence	  to	  the	  previous	  conservative	  political	  orthodoxy.	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   are	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   citing	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   of	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   information	   being	  leaked	  to	  the	  media	  for	  political	  purposes.	  For	  a	  selection	  see:	  ‘How	  secret	  police	  use	  the	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  and	  vice	  versa’	  New	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  No.	  23.	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  1976,	  pp.	  3–8;	  McKnight,	  D	  (1998)	  Broadcasting	  and	  the	  Enemy	  Within:	  Political	  Surveillance	  and	  the	  ABC,	  1951–64’,	  Media	  
International	  Australia,	  No.	  87,	  May,	  pp.	  35–47;	  McKnight,	  D	  (2008	  b)	   ‘Not	  Attributable	  to	  Official	   Sources:	   Counter	  Propaganda	   and	   the	  Mass	  Media’,	  Media	  International,	  No.	  128,	  August,	  pp.	  5–17;	  Deery,	  P	  (2001)	  ‘Covert	  Propaganda	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  Britain	  and	  Australia	   1948–1955’,	   The	   Round	   Table:	   The	   Commonwealth	   Journal	   of	   International	  
Affairs,	  Vol.	  90	  (361)	  pp.	  607–621.	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The	  Bulletin	  On	   22	   June	   1974,	   The	   Bulletin	   newspaper	   published	   an	   article	   by	  journalist,	   Peter	   Samuel,	   regarding	   the	   new	   Deputy	   Prime	   Minister,	   Dr	   Jim	  Cairns.	   Samuel’s	   article	   was	   based	   on	   a	   twelve-­‐page	   assessment	   of	   Cairns	  prepared	  in	  1971	  by	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  Section	  and	  titled:	  ‘An	  ALP	  Socialist	  Looks	   at	   the	   Australian	   Parliamentary	   System’	   (NAA:	   A	   12694,	   18).	   The	  information	  given	  to	  Samuel	  was	  probably	  intended	  to	  discredit	  Cairns’	  standing	  and	  propagate	  ASIO’s	  own	  political	  views.	  But	  the	  exercise	  failed	  miserably	  when	  Samuel	   took	   a	   decidedly	   different	   approach.	   Rather	   than	   emphasising	   Cairns’	  socialist	   tendencies,	   Samuel	   chose	   to	   focus	   on	   what	   might	   be	   considered	   the	  miscreant	   conduct	   of	   ASIO’s	   media	   interventions.	   Extracts	   of	   the	   material	  published	   by	   Samuel	   bears	   repeating	   because	   it	   provides	   valuable	   insight	   into	  the	   partisan	   political	   views	   ASIO	   wished	   to	   be	   placed	   into	   the	   public	   arena	  regarding	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party.	  	  Indeed,	  as	  Samuel	  noted	  the	  most	  ‘sensational	  aspect’	  of	  the	  information	  given	  to	  him	  is	  that	  ‘it	  will	  confirm	  in	  the	  minds	   of	   many	   government	   members…	   the	   long	   standing	   hostility	   and	  antagonism	   of	   the	   security	   service	   toward	   the	   Whitlam	   government’	   (The	  
Bulletin	  22	  June	  1974:	  8).	  	  	   Samuel	   reproduced	   several	  passages	   from	   the	  ASIO	  document.	  The	   first	  provided	   an	   assessment	   of	  Dr	   Cairns’	   political	   philosophy.	   It	   reported	   that	   the	  form	   of	   ‘Socialism’	   advocated	   by	   Cairns	   ‘bears	   a	   striking	   resemblance	   to	   that	  promoted	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia’	  announced	  at	   its	  22nd	  Congress	  in	  March	  1970.	  Reference	  was	  also	  made	  to	  Cairns’	  attitude	  regarding	  the	  future	  of	   security	   services	   noting	   that	   ‘Cairns	   would	   curtail	   the	   powers	   of	   security	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[organisations]	   engaged	   in	   political	   and	   cultural	   intimidation’.	   ASIO	   suggested	  that	  Cairns	  would	  advocate	   for	   ‘the	  politicisation	  of	  all	  organisations,	   including	  factories,	  schools	  and	  Universities’.	  The	  assessment	  concluded	  with	  the	  comment	  that	  Cairns’	  activities	   ‘could	   lead,	  via	  civil,	   industrial	  and	  political	  unrest	   to	   the	  growth	   of	   elitism	   in	   every	   sphere,	   to	   the	  manipulation	   of	   demagogues,	   to	   the	  fascist	  cult	  of	  personality,	   to	  the	  worship	  of	   force,	  and	  to	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  democratic	   parliamentary	   system	   of	   government	   and	   replace	   it	   by	   a	   form	   of	  collectivism.	  That	  way’	  the	  assessment	  stressed	   ‘lies	  anarchy	  and	  in	  due	  course	  left	   wing	   fascism’	   (The	   Bulletin	   22	   June	   1974:	   9).	   Samuel’s	   article	   tends	   to	  confirm	  that	  ASIO	  had	  been	  compiling	  reports	  on	  members	  of	  the	  Labor	  Party	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  and	  it	  was	  now	  disseminating	  them	  to	  the	  media.	  	  	   The	   following	   day	   in	   an	   interview	   with	   the	   Sunday	   Telegraph	   Attorney	  General,	   Lionel	   Murphy,	   argued	   the	   same	   point	   stating	   that	   ‘ASIO	   had	   been	  involved	  in	  large	  scale	  leaks	  of	  its	  files	  over	  a	  number	  of	  years’.	  Murphy	  said	  that	  he	   had	   interviewed	   members	   of	   ASIO	   in	   March	   1973	   about	   the	   leaking	   of	  political	   information	   regarding	   people	   affiliated	   with	   the	   left,	   similar	   to	   those	  contained	  in	  The	  Bulletin.	  ‘First	  they	  denied	  it’,	  said	  Murphy,	  ‘then	  they	  admitted	  it’.	  Murphy	  was	  ‘absolutely	  horrified’	  to	  find	  that	  despite	  written	  instructions	  to	  cease	  this	  activity	  the	  organisation	  was	  still	  engaged	  in	  ‘passing	  out	  information	  designed	   to	   damage	   people	   with	   whose	   political	   beliefs	   ASIO	   officers	   did	   not	  agree’.	  Whitlam	  was	  said	   to	  be	   furious.	  He	  ordered	  an	   immediate	   investigation	  (Sunday	  Telegraph	  23	  June	  1974:7).	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Shortly	  after,	  Whitlam	  met	  with	  Deputy	  Director	  of	  ASIO,	  Phillip	  Gilbert,	  and	   senior	   staff	   to	   discuss	   The	   Bulletin’s	   article.	   Whitlam	   demanded	   to	   know:	  what	  ASIO	  material	   the	   article	   had	  been	  based	  on,	  who	  wrote	   it,	   under	  whose	  direction,	   and	  what	  were	   the	   circumstances	   of	   it	   being	   released	   to	   the	  media.	  Gilbert	  confirmed	  that	   the	  material	  contained	   in	  The	  Bulletin	  was	   indeed	  based	  on	   the	   aforementioned	   ASIO	   Special	   Projects	   document.	   The	   author	   of	   the	  document	  said	  Gilbert,	  was	  Robert	  Swan,	  a	  researcher	  in	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  Branch.	   Despite	   this	   admission,	   Gilbert	   insisted	   that	   the	   document	  was	   not	   an	  assessment	  of	  Cairns	  but	  rather	  a	   ‘collection	  of	  public	  utterances,	  and	  activities	  and	  an	  interpretation	  of	  them’.	  Attempting	  to	  mitigate	  ASIO’s	  culpability,	  Gilbert	  went	  on	  to	  explain	  that	  the	  practice	  of	  distributing	  material	  to	  the	  press	  via	  the	  Special	  Projects	  Branch	  had	  been	  approved	  by	  the	  former	  Attorney	  General,	  Sir	  Garfield	  Barwick.	  On	  his	  instructions,	  ASIO	  was	  permitted	  to	  ‘provide	  material	  to	  the	  press’.	  Whitlam	  asked	   for	   an	   assurance	   that	   ‘this	   sort	   of	   stuff’	   is	   no	   longer	  produced	  by	  ASIO.	  Gilbert	  assured	  Whitlam	  that	  the	  ties	  between	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  Branch	  and	  the	  media	  had	  been	  severed	  in	  September	  1972.	  In	  relation	  to	  how	  the	  press	  had	  access	  to	  ASIO	  material,	  Gilbert	  mentioned	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	   the	   Skripov	   affair,	   ASIO	   had	   distributed	   files	   to	   the	   press	   and	   that	   Peter	  Samuel	  was	  among	  such	  journalists.	  Whitlam	  ended	  the	  meeting	  by	  requesting	  a	  list	  of	  all	  other	  journalist	  involved	  	  	  (NAA:	  A	  12694,	  18).	  	   Later	  that	  day	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  Peter	  Barbour,	  sent	  Whitlam	  that	  list.	   While	   this	   archival	   document	   identifies	   some	   of	   the	   journalists	   involved,	  many	   of	   the	   names	   are	   still	   expunged	   from	   the	   record.	   The	   document	   does,	  however,	   contain	   some	   important	   names	   and	   publications.	   For	   example,	   Peter	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Coleman	  of	  The	  Bulletin	  and	  Quadrant	  magazine	  is	  named	  as	  one	  journalist	  that	  received	  ASIO	  files.	  Another	  is	  Robert	  Mayne	  from	  the	  Sydney	  Morning	  Herald.	  It	  is	  from	  this	  evidence	  —	  and	  that	  provided	  in	  the	  preceding	  discussion	  —	  that	  it	  would	  seem	  reasonable	  to	  conclude	  that	  ASIO	  had	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  supplied	  selective	   information	   to	   ‘dependable’	   journalists	   in	   order	   to	   promulgate	   their	  own	   political	   views.	   In	   a	   curious	   endnote	   to	   the	   list	   given	   to	   Whitlam,	   Peter	  Barbour	   claimed	   that	   the	   publication	   of	   ASIO	   information	   in	   The	   Bulletin	  ‘appears	  to	  result	  from	  a	  breach	  of	  trust	  and	  not	  from	  an	  unauthorised	  leakage’	  (NAA:	  A	  12694,	  18).	  The	  Prime	  Minister,	  however,	  did	  not	  agree.	  	  	   	  Whitlam	   later	   reflected	   that	   the	   dissemination	   of	   ASIO	   material	   to	   the	  press	  was	  wholly	  unwarranted	  and	  outside	  its	  function	  (Whitlam	  1985:171).	  On	  2	   July	   1974,	   he	   held	   a	   press	   conference	   at	   Parliament	   House,	   Canberra.	   One	  reporter	  asked	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  whether	  he	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  articles	  appearing	   in	  The	  Bulletin.	  Whitlam	   simply	   replied	   that	   ‘anybody	  who	  wants	   to	  know	  the	  titles	  and	  dates	  of	  the	  documents	  in	  this	  category	  which	  were	  prepared	  by	   ASIO	   can	   get	   that	   list	   from	   Mr	  Walsh	   as	   soon	   as	   this	   gathering	   disperses’	  (Whitlam	  2	   July	  1974:	  8).	   In	  doing	  so,	  Whitlam	  released	  the	   full	  content	  of	  one	  ASIO	   document	   that	   had	   been	   supplied	   to	   The	   Bulletin	   entitled:	   ‘Croatian	  Nationalist	  Movements	  and	  Activities	  in	  Australia’	  along	  with	  the	  titles	  of	  sixty-­‐seven	  other	  briefing	  papers	  which	  ASIO	  had	  distributed	  to	  the	  Australian	  media	  between	   the	   years	   of	   1962	   through	   to	   1972	   (NAA:	   A	   12694,	   18).	   All	   of	   the	  documents	  originated	  from	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  Branch.	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Consequently,	  The	  Bulletin’s	   publication,	   and	   the	   public	   exposure	   of	   the	  sixty-­‐seven	   briefing	   papers	   Whitlam	   released,	   revealed	   the	   extent	   of	   ASIO’s	  media	  operations	  and	  the	  political	  purpose	  to	  which	  they	  were	  put.	  This	  was	  a	  pivotal	  moment	   for	  the	  Whitlam	  government	  because	   it	  not	  only	  demonstrated	  how	   politicised	   ASIO	   had	   become,	   but	   also	   substantially	   justified	   his	   previous	  commitment	  to	  reforming	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  community.	  The	  result	  was	  not	  only	  the	  airing	  of	  ASIO’s	  improprieties,	  but	  also	  the	  most	  substantial	  review	  ever	  conducted	  of	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  services.	  	  	  
Hope	  
	   ‘We	  found	  a	  security	  service	  that	  had	  been	  badly	  politicised’110	  	   	  In	  a	  press	  statement	  released	  on	  21	  August	  1974,	  Whitlam	  announced	  the	  appointment	  of,	  Justice	  Robert	  Marsden	  Hope,	  of	  the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  Royal	  Commissioner	  to	  inquire	  into	  Australia’s	  intelligence	  and	  security	  services	  (Media	  release	  21	  August	  1974:1).111	  The	  Hope	  Royal	  Commission,	  as	  it	  became	  known,	  was	  convened	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  history	  of	  the	  intelligence	  and	  security	   services	   of	   Australia,	   with	   reference	   to	   the	   purpose,	   function,	   and	  administration	  of	  each	  agency,	  the	  general	  coordination,	  control	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  services,	  and	  the	  use	  made	  by	  the	  Australian	  government	  of	  the	  information	  provided	  by	   the	   organisations.	   The	  Commission	  provided	   recommendations	   to	  the	  future	  status	  and	  operations	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  1).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  George	  Brownbill,	   Secretary	   to	   the	  Royal	   Commission	   on	   Intelligence	   and	   Security,	  
Royal	  Hope	  Commission	  Showed	  ASIO	  ‘Incompetent’,	  (2008)	  ABC	  Radio	  National,	  27	  May.	  	  	  111	  See:	  http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/transcripts/00003359.pdf	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The	   Commission	   began	   hearings	   in	   March	   1975	   and	   delivered	   its	   final	  report	  to	  the	  Governor	  General	  on	  21	  April	  1977.	  	  In	  total,	  Justice	  Hope	  delivered	  eight	   reports	   many	   of	   which	   contain	   several	   volumes	   and	   appendices.	   The	  findings	   of	   the	   Royal	   Commission	   placed	   in	   the	   public	   domain	   a	   substantial	  amount	   of	   evidence	   about	   how	   the	   Australian	   intelligence	   community	   had	  interacted	   with	   politics,	   government,	   the	   media	   and	   wider	   society	   for	   the	  previous	   seven	   decades.	   Whitlam’s	   promise	   to	   reform	   the	   intelligence	  community	  had	  begun,	  however,	  his	  government	  would	  not	  survive	  to	  see	  any	  of	  Hope’s	   recommendations	   implemented.	   This	   would	   be	   left	   to	   the	   Fraser	  government.	  	  	   The	  fourth	  report	  of	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  comprising	  four	  volumes	  was	  presented	   to	   the	   Governor	   General	   on	   24	   December	   1976.	   It	   dealt	   specifically	  with	   ASIO	   and	   examined	   the	   central	   issue	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	   of	   the	  chapter:	   the	   issue	   of	   leaks	   and	   improper	   dissemination	   of	   intelligence	   to	   the	  media.	   During	   the	   course	   of	   his	   inquiry,	  Hope	   found	   that	   on	   several	   occasions	  ASIO	  had	  provided	  intelligence	  material	  to	  institutions	  and	  people	  that	  were	  not	  its	   rightful	   consumers.	   ‘Evidence	   available	   to	   me’,	   reported	   Justice	   Hope,	  ‘satisfies	  me	   that	   ASIO	   has	   in	   the	   past	   provided	   selected	   people	  with	   security	  intelligence	  material	  for	  publication.	  It	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  ASIO’s	  intention	  that	  the	  material	  not	  be	  attributed	  to	  it’.	  On	  this	  issue,	  Hope	  accepted	  Robert	  Mayne’s	  testimony	   and	   cited	   his	   case	   as	   a	   specific	   example	   of	   this	   ‘misconceived	  enterprise’.	   The	   evidence	   presented	   to	   the	   Commission	   confirmed	   that	   ASIO’s	  Special	   Projects	   Branch	   was,	   indeed,	   responsible	   for	   the	   production	   of	   this	  material.	  Justice	  Hope	  went	  on	  to	  contend	  that	  ASIO’s	  Special	  Projects	  function	  of	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disseminating	   material	   to	   media	   outlets	   was	   ‘improper	   in	   the	   extreme’	   and	   a	  practice	  that	  ‘must	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  resume’	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  4	  A:	  128–129).	  	  	  	  	   In	  Hope’s	  view,	  the	  dissemination	  of	  intelligence	  to	  the	  press	  was	  beyond	  the	   organisation’s	   function.	   He	   stated	   that	   	   ‘ASIO	   should	   not	   provide	   security	  intelligence,	   in	   any	   form,	   either	   directly	   or	   indirectly,	   and	   whether	   on	   an	  attributable	  basis	  or	  not,	   to	   the	  press	  or	  other	  media’.	  Hope	  made	   it	   clear	   that	  such	  actions	  would	  likely	  result	  in	  politicisation	  which	  in	  turn	  could	  undermine	  ASIO’s	  effectiveness.	  To	  be	  an	  effective	  organisation,	  Hope	  concluded	  that	  ASIO	  must	   have	   the	   confidence	   of	   all	   political	   parties.	   ‘If	   ASIO	   becomes	   directly	  involved	   in	   the	   public	   dissemination	   of	   security	   intelligence,	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	  accused	  of	  taking	  a	  partisan	  political	  position.	  It	  is	  most	  important	  that	  ASIO	  be	  beyond	  reproach	  in	  this	  regard’	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  4	  A:	  128–130).	  	  	   Perhaps	   the	  most	   important	   condition	  underpinning	  why	   the	  disclosure	  of	   intelligence	  had	  been	  allowed	   to	   find	   its	  way	   into	   the	  public	  sphere	   through	  the	  media	  without	   any	   consequence	  was	  made	   by	   Hope	   in	   the	   findings	   of	   his	  fourth	   report.	   The	   problem	   stemmed	   from	   an	   ambiguity	   in	   the	   1956	  ASIO	  Act	  (Cwlth).	   As	   Hope	   pointed	   out	   ‘the	   [1956	   ASIO]	   Act	   contains	   no	   express	  provisions	   prohibiting	   the	   unauthorised	   or	   improper	   communication	   of	  intelligence,	   and	   imposes	  no	  penalties	   in	   this	   regard’	   (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  4	  A:	  116).	  Effectively,	  a	  liberal	  reading	  of	  the	  legislation	  enabled	  the	  Director	  General	  to	  use	  his	  own	  discretion	  regarding	  to	  whom	  intelligence	  was	  communicated.	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The	   issue	   related	   specifically	   to	   Section	  5	   (1)	   (a)	   of	   the	  Act.	  This	   clause	  authorised	  the	  Director	  General	  to	  communicate	  intelligence	  to	  such	  persons	  and	  in	   such	   manner	   as	   the	   Director	   General	   considers	   to	   be	   in	   the	   interests	   of	  security	   (ASIO	   Act	   1956).	   This	   point	   indicates	   that,	   although	   the	   leaking	   of	  intelligence	   material	   to	   various	   media	   outlets	   was	   improper,	   and	   perhaps	   an	  aberration	   of	   ASIO’s	   function,	   it	   was	   not	   beyond	   ASIO’s	   statutory	   limits	   and	  therefore	   not	   illegal.	   	   Because	   ASIO	   spoiling	   operations	   were	   rationalised	   as	  counter	   propaganda	   activities	   —	   and	   thus,	   a	   legitimate	   matter	   relating	   to	  national	   security	   —	   the	   circulation	   of	   some	   intelligence	   material	   could	   be	  justified	   under	   legislation.	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   leaking	   of	   intelligence	   to	   the	   press	  provided	   the	   perfect	   opportunity	   in	   which	   ASIO	   could	   express	   its	   private	  political	  views	  in	  public.	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  practice	  was	  essentially	  legal	  and	  thereby	   did	   not	   entail	   any	   costs	   to	   the	   intelligence	   service.	   This	   point	   is	   very	  closely	  aligned	  to	  the	  findings	  provided	  in	  Bar-­‐Joseph’s	  (1995)	  study	  in	  which	  he	  found	  executive	  oversight	  was	  not	  sufficient	  to	  limit	  intelligence	  intervention	  in	  politics.	   However,	   in	   the	   above	   cases,	   rather	   than	   limitations	   of	   executive	  oversight	   it	   was	   limitations	   found	   within	   the	   legislation	   that	   enabled	   ASIO	   to	  intervene	  in	  politics	  via	  media	  intercession.	  	  	   Justice	  Hope	  recognised	  that	  the	  legislation	  had	  potential	  for	  abuse.	   ‘Any	  Director	   General	   who	   reads	   section	   5	   (1)	   (a)	   of	   the	   ASIO	   Act	   as	   authority	   to	  engage	   in	   propaganda,	   however	   “laudable”	   embarks	   on	   a	   misconceived	  enterprise’	   (NAA:	   A	   8908,	   4	   A:	   128–129).	   It	   was	   on	   this	   point	   that	   Hope	  recommended	  a	  provision	  be	  inserted	  in	  to	  the	  Act	  ‘to	  control	  the	  dissemination	  of	   security	   intelligence,	   and	   prohibit	   improper	   or	   unlawful	   communication	   of	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such	   information’.	   But	   Hope	   argued	   that	   the	   decision	   regarding	   the	  dissemination	  of	  such	  material	  remain	  with	  the	  Director	  General.	  He	  stressed	  it	  must	  only	  be	  disclosed	  if	  such	  material	  was	  pertinent	  to	  national	  security.	  Hope	  recommended	  that	  any	  disclosure	  by	  other	  unauthorised	  persons	  be	  prohibited	  and	  subject	  to	  severe	  penalties	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  4	  A:	  255).	  	  	  	  On	   Hope’s	   advice,	   amendments	   were	   later	   made	   to	   the	   ASIO	   Act	   1979	  (Cwlth)	   and	   a	   clause	   inserted	   which	   imposes	   a	   penalty	   of	   two	   years	  imprisonment	   for	   the	   unauthorised	   communication	   of	   information	   (ASIO	   Act	  1979,	   Part	   3,	   Section	   18	   (1&2)).	   Nevertheless,	   the	   power	   to	   communicate	  intelligence	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   organisation	   remains,	   to	   this	   day,	   a	   discretionary	  power	  vested	  in	  Director	  General.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  and	  preliminary	  findings	  	  The	  preceding	   discussion	   shows	  how	   an	   intelligence	   service	   can	   use	   its	  own	  product	   as	   a	   political	  weapon	   through	   the	   selective	   dissemination	   of	   that	  information	   to	   the	   media.	   The	   chapter	   introduced	   the	   historical	   context	  regarding	  the	  ASIO–media	  relationship	  and	  then	  focused	  on	  three	  case	  studies	  to	  provide	   an	   analysis	   of	   how	   this	   interaction	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   form	   of	  politicisation.	  Evidence	  indicates	  that	  the	  very	  institution	  charged	  with	  collecting	  and	  securing	  the	  secrets	  of	  state,	  did	  on	  occasion	  spin	  those	  secrets	  for	  political	  advantage.	  Several	   tentative	   findings	  have	  already	  been	  stated	  relating	   to	  what	  conditions	   underpin	   this	   behaviour	   in	   each	   of	   the	   specific	   case	   studies.	   The	  following	   discussion	   reviews	   this	   analysis	   and	   then	   provides	   a	   conclusion	  regarding	  the	  findings.	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   Previous	   examinations	   of	   the	   interaction	   between	   intelligence	  organisations	   and	   the	   media	   do	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   help	   support	   some	   of	   the	  findings	   already	   presented	   in	   this	   chapter.	   For	   example	   as	   with	   McKnight’s	  (2008	  b)	  study,	  this	  chapter	  tends	  to	  confirm	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  ASIO	  and	   the	   media	   was	   unbalanced.	   In	   most	   instances,	   it	   was	   ASIO,	   or	   the	  conservative	  side	  of	  politics	  that	  benefited	  from	  the	  leaks.	  Likewise,	  a	  similarity	  between	   Rovner’s	   (2011)	   concept	   of	   ‘intelligence	   subverting	   policy’	   through	  well-­‐placed	   leaks	   to	   the	   media	   was	   apparent	   in	   the	   case	   regarding	   security	  clearances.	   A	   dominant	   feature	   of	   this	   case	   was	   that	   well-­‐placed	   leaks	   to	   the	  press	  seem	  to	  have	  acted	  as	  a	  means	  of	  maintaining	  pressure	  on	  the	  government.	  Although	   Whitlam	   eventually	   changed	   his	   mind	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   staff	   security	  clearances,	   it	   cannot	   be	   ruled	   out	   that	   such	   repeated	   criticism	   and	   media	  questioning	   regarding	   the	   wisdom	   of	   the	   decision	   was	   a	   result	   of	   pressure	  emanating	  from	  somewhere	  within	  ASIO	  and	  expressed	  through	  the	  media.	  	  	   Findings	   from	   Bar	   Joseph’s	   (1995)	   study	   are	   also	   relevant.	   Issues	  regarding	  a	  low	  level	  of	  professional	  ethic	  and	  attempts	  at	  political	  intervention	  are	   only	   partially	   evident.	   More	   importantly,	   however,	   issues	   pertaining	   to	  political	  control	  and	  oversight	  are	  abundantly	  clear.	  In	  all	  of	  the	  cases	  examined	  in	   this	   chapter,	   legislative	   mechanisms	   were	   not	   sufficient	   to	   limit	   ASIO	   from	  intervening	   in	  politics	   through	   the	  media,	   but	   rather	  may	  have	   facilitated	   such	  actions.	  Essentially,	  ambiguities	  within	  the	  ASIO	  Act	  1956,	  and	  the	  discretionary	  powers	  vested	  in	  the	  Director	  General,	  allowed	  ASIO	  to	  use	  the	  media	  as	  a	  tool	  of	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political	  influence	  and	  spin.	  While	  the	  findings	  of	  these	  studies	  help	  draw	  some	  initial	  conclusions,	  some	  factors	  need	  further	  examination.	  	  	   In	  each	  of	  the	  cases	  examined,	  there	  are	  several	  important	  conditions	  that	  may	  have	   stimulated	  ASIO	   to	   leak	   information	   to	   the	  media.	   Perhaps	   the	  most	  remarkable	   condition	   that	   explains	   ASIO’s	   use	   of	   the	   media	   as	   a	   political	  intercessor	  is	  that	  such	  behaviour	  was	  sanctioned	  under	  an	  ambiguity	  contained	  in	   the	   Commonwealth	   legislation.	   In	   this	   sense,	   ASIO’s	   use	   of	   the	   media	   was	  perhaps	  improper,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  unconstitutional	  or	  illegal.	  Given	  this	  situation	  the	  question	  of	  professional	  ethic	   is,	  perhaps,	   redundant	  because	  ASIO’s	  use	  of	  the	  media	  was	  within	  the	  legislative	  framework	  of	  the	  ASIO	  Act	  1956.	  However,	  that	  such	  a	  situation	  could	  have	  arisen	  reveals	  one	  significant	  conclusion.	  During	  the	   period	   under	   discussion,	   the	   legislative	   oversight	  mechanisms	   designed	   to	  prevent	   the	   political	   abuse	   of	   the	   organisation’s	   powers,	   actually	   imbued	   the	  organisation	   with	   the	   power	   to	   conduct	   such	   activity	   in	   a	   legal	   fashion.	   As	   a	  result,	   the	   cultivation	   of	   media	   assets	   and	   the	   dissemination	   of	   selective	  intelligence	   material	   to	   them,	   no	   matter	   how	   prejudicial,	   did	   not	   entail	   any	  significant	  costs	  to	  the	  intelligence	  organisation	  itself.	  Moreover,	  it	  probably	  only	  intensified	  such	  behaviour.	  	   When	  comparing	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  cases	  there	  are	  some	  similarities	  worth	  further	  examination.	  Each	  of	  the	  cases	  examined	  exhibits	  one	  particularly	  strong	  theme	  in	  relation	  to	  why	  this	  practice	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	   of	   politicisation:	   a	   clear	   political	   bias	   in	   the	   content	   of	   the	   information	  leaked.	  The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  information	  provided	  to	  the	  press	  by	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ASIO	   focused	   on	   left	   wing	   political	   issues.	   This	   bias	   was	   barely	   offset	   by	  information	  leaked	  to	  the	  media	  that	  focused	  on	  right	  wing	  politics.	  For	  example,	  of	   the	   sixty-­‐seven	   ASIO	   papers	   that	  Whitlam	   identified	   as	   being	   leaked	   to	   the	  media,	   only	   two	   papers	   were	   focused	   on	   right	   wing	   political	   issues.112	  This	  evidence	   implies	   a	   clear	   intention	   to	   either	   embarrass	   or	   discredit	   individuals	  associated	  with	   the	   left	   and	   Labor	   Party	   policy.	   In	   light	   of	   such	   evidence,	   it	   is	  probably	   reasonable	   to	   conclude	   that	   ASIO’s	   leaks	   to	   the	   media	   had	   a	   clear	  partisan	  political	  motivation.	  	  	   There	   is	   also	   another	   similarity	   in	   each	   of	   the	   cases	   examined	   that	   is	  significant	  for	  analysing	  how	  such	  actions	  constitute	  politicisation:	  	  the	  timing	  of	  the	   leaks.	  For	  example,	   in	   the	  case	  of	  Robert	  Mayne	  and	  The	  Analysis	  magazine	  explanations	  can	  be	  found	  at	  two	  levels.	  First,	  only	  three	  months	  before	  Mayne	  was	   approached	   to	   establish	   the	   magazine,	   the	   ALP	   Federal	   Conference	   had	  seriously	  considered	  abolishing	  ASIO.	  Second,	  The	  Analysis	  magazine	  would	  have	  begun	   production	   at	   a	   time	   when	   it	   seemed	   almost	   certain	   that	   the	   Liberal	  Party’s	  twenty-­‐three	  year	  term	  in	  office	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end.	   It	   is	  perhaps	  no	  coincidence	  that	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  new	  Labor	  government	  coming	  to	  office	  that	   intelligence	   files	   were	   supplied	   to	   a	   magazine	   with	   the	   intention	   of	  publishing	  discrediting	  information	  on	  left	  wing	  individuals.	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  The	   first	   document	   was	   prepared	   by	   the	   Special	   Projects	   Branch	   and	   entitled:	  ‘Croatian	  Nationalist	  Movements	  and	  Activities	  in	  Australia’	  and	  appeared	  in	  the	  Bulletin	  under	   the	   headline	   ‘How	  ASIO	   sees	   the	   Croats’	   on	   6	   July	   1974.	   The	   Second	   document	  was	   also	   prepared	   by	   the	   Special	   Projects	   Branch	   in	   June	   1972	   and	   entitled:	   ‘The	  National	  Socialist	  Party	  (A.S.P.A)’,	  which	  was	  published	  in	  the	  Bulletin	  as	  ‘The	  Impotent	  Nazi’s	  –	  by	  ASIO’,	  on	  16	  November	  1974.	  	  See	  NAA:	  A	  12694,	  18,	  for	  further	  details.	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The	   timing	   of	   the	   leaks	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   security	   clearance	   case	   is	   also	  relevant.	   Only	   two	   weeks	   after	   the	   Whitlam	   government	   assumed	   office	   and	  announced	   its	   intention	   not	   to	   have	   staff	   security	   cleared,	   damaging	   stories	  began	  appearing	   in	   several	  Australian	  newspapers.	   Similarly,	  on	  10	   June	  1974,	  Dr	   Jim	   Cairns	   became	   Deputy	   Prime	   Minister.	   Twelve	   days	   later	   The	   Bulletin	  published	  extracts	  of	  an	  ASIO	  dossier	  on	  Cairns,	  which	  tended	  to	  underscore	  his	  ‘Socialist’	   tendencies	   and	   emphasise	   his	   ‘radical’	   political	   views.	   In	   each	   case,	  there	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   strong	   correlation	   between	   the	   timing	   of	   the	   leaks,	   the	  publishing	  of	  that	  information,	  and	  a	  significant	  political	  event.	  	  	  	  	   This	  points	  to	  a	  second	  conclusion.	  It	  was	  at	  important	  political	  moments	  that	   intelligence	   was	   leaked	   and	   then	   published.	   This	   suggests	   a	   concerted	  attempt	   to	   undermine	   and	   discredit	   the	   political	   significance	   of	   those	   events.	  	  The	  importance	  of	  leaking	  and	  publishing	  at	  the	  opportune	  time	  must	  surely	  be	  that	  it	  presents	  the	  maximum	  chance	  of	  inflicting	  the	  most	  political	  damage.	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  leaks	  and	  their	  subsequent	  publication	  constitutes	  enough	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  leaks	  were,	  indeed,	  politically	  motivated.	  	  	   A	   key	   consideration	   in	   understanding	   the	   events	   under	   discussion	   is:	  what	  was	  the	  actual	  purpose	  of	  leaking	  information	  to	  the	  media?	  The	  evidence	  indicates	   that	   ASIO	   had	   a	   long	   history	   of	   using	   the	   media	   for	   the	   legitimate	  purpose	   of	   counter	   propaganda	   activities.	   	   But	   it	   also	   shows	   that	   ASIO	   had	   a	  history	  of	  leaking	  selective	  political	  information	  to	  the	  media	  that	  would	  damage	  the	  standing	  of	  left	  wing	  organisations	  and	  individuals.	  With	  the	  Mayne–Analysis	  case,	   ASIO	   attempted	   to	   establish	   a	   magazine	   with	   the	   express	   purpose	   of	  
	   320	  



































	   322	  






The	  means,	  forms,	  and	  conditions	  of	  intelligence	  
politicisation:	  An	  assessment	  
	  
	  
Key	  findings:	  The	  means	  	  In	   response	   to	   question	   one,	   the	   empirical	   case	   studies	   reveal	   four	  principal	   means	   of	   politicisation	   in	   the	   Australian	   context.	   They	   are:	   (1)	  
promotion,	  mainly	  by	  using	  intelligence	  to	  promote	  the	  rationale	  and	  necessity	  of	  a	  policy	  choice,	  (2)	  persuasion,	  often	  through	  the	  public	  disclosure	  of	  intelligence	  to	  persuade	  a	  sceptical	  audience	  toward	  the	  wisdom	  of	  a	  policy	  initiative,	  and	  (3)	  by	   using	   intelligence	   to	   discredit	   an	   opposing	   policy	   or	   political	   position.	  However,	  the	  findings	  indicate	  that	  intelligence	  organisations	  tended	  to	  politicise	  intelligence	   for	   a	   fourth	   reason:	   to	   subvert	   or	   undermine	   a	   policy	   initiative	   or	  political	   goal.	  Taken	   together,	   these	   findings	  provide	  a	  basis	   for	  understanding	  how	  politicisation	  has	  occurred	   in	  Australia.	  Although	  each	  of	   these	  means	  are	  somewhat	  linked	  they	  can	  be	  studied	  as	  discrete	  units	  of	  analysis.	  The	  following	  discussion	  examines	  each	  unit	  of	  analysis	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  providing	  a	  detailed	  answer	  to	  the	  first	  research	  question.	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Chapter	   one	   reveals	   two	   of	   the	   four	   means	   of	   politicisation	   identified	  above.	   Consider,	   for	   example,	   case	   study	   one:	   ‘the	   New	   Hebrides’.	   Evidence	  indicates	   that	   the	  Barton	  government	  directed	  an	   intelligence	  official	   to	  obtain	  information	   that	   would	   help	   achieve	   its	   predetermined	   foreign	   policy	   goal.	   In	  this	   case,	   the	   Barton	   government	   was	   not	   seeking	   guidance	   on	   developing	   a	  policy,	   but	   looking	   for	   information	   to	   justify	   a	   policy	   it	   was	   determined	   to	  implement.	   The	   means	   of	   politicisation	   in	   this	   case	   were	   promotion	   and	  persuasion.	  Wilson	   Le	   Couteur	  was	   dispatched	   to	   the	  New	  Hebrides	   to	   collect	  information	   that	   the	   Barton	   administration	   could	   use	   to	   persuade	   the	   British	  government	   into	   annexing	   the	   islands	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   Australian	   security.	  More	  importantly,	   this	   intelligence	  was	  then	  selectively	  presented	  to	  the	  public	  through	   publication	   in	   The	   Age	   newspaper.	   The	   objective	   was	   not	   only	   to	  promote	  the	  wisdom	  of	  such	  a	  policy	  position	  to	  domestic	  audiences,	  but	  also	  to	  persuade	  the	  British	  government	  of	  the	  need	  to	  implement	  such	  a	  policy.	  In	  this	  case,	  intelligence	  was	  not	  used	  to	  inform	  policy	  development,	  but	  to	  advocate	  for	  it.	  	  	   Politicisation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  promoting	  a	  predetermined	  policy	  choice	  was	  also	   a	   significant	   theme	   occurring	   in	   case	   study	   three,	   outlined	   in	   the	   first	  chapter.	  In	  1905,	  the	  Deakin	  government	  had	  argued	  strongly	  that	  an	  emerging	  Japan	  posed	  a	  significant	  threat	  to	  Australian	  security.	  His	  government	  pressed	  for	  a	  policy	  that	  would	  see	  Australia	  take	  responsibility	  for	  the	  naval	  defence	  of	  its	   principal	   ports	   and	   harbours.	   Community	   fears,	   inflamed	   by	   the	   media	  reporting,	  suggested	  that	   Japanese	  spies	  were	  mapping	  Australian	  coastlines	   in	  order	  to	  prepare	  for	  raids	  and	  possible	  invasion.	  	  Deakin	  argued	  for	  the	  creation	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of	  an	  Australian	  naval	  squadron	  to	  address	  the	  possibility	  of	  Japanese	  raids	  and	  defend	  against	   any	  naval	   incursions.	  But	   the	  British	  government	  dismissed	   the	  idea	   that	   Japan	  posed	  any	   threat	   to	  Australia	  and	  argued	   that	   the	  British	  naval	  presence	   in	   the	   Pacific	   would	   preclude	   any	   possibility	   of	   invasion.	   Initial	  intelligence	   assessments	   fell	   in	   line	   with	   the	   British	   view	   and	   discredited	   the	  claims	  of	   Japanese	  spying.	  The	  Deakin	  government	  subsequently	  rejected	  these	  intelligence	  estimates.	   It	  did,	  however,	  accept	  a	  revised	   intelligence	  assessment	  indicating	  evidence	  of	  Japanese	  spying,	  which	  proved	  to	  be	  more	  consistent	  with	  the	   government’s	   policy	   goals.	   This	   case	   suggests	   that	   when	   intelligence	  organisations	   produce	   different	   assessments	   of	   the	   same	   problem,	   political	  leaders	  will	   tend	   to	   accept	   those	   that	   support	   their	   policy	   positions	   and	   reject	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  The	  supporting	  assessments	  in	  this	  case	  were	  then	  invoked	  to	  promote	   the	   policy	   of	   an	   Australian	   naval	   squadron	   and	   persuade	   those	   who	  doubted	  the	  necessity	  of	  such	  policy.	  	  	  	  	   These	   findings	   suggest	   that	   politicising	   intelligence	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	  political	  strategy.	  For	  instance,	  political	  leaders	  may	  use	  intelligence	  to	  advance	  their	   own	   political	   goals	   while	   also	   using	   it	   to	   obstruct	   others	   from	   achieving	  theirs	   (Hastedt	   2013:	   10).	   Although	   this	   study	   supports	   the	   proposition	   that	  politicisation	  can	  be	  used	  strategically	   for	   the	  means	  of	  promotion,	  persuasion,	  and	   discrediting	   opposition,	   it	   also	   shows	   that	   such	   a	   strategy	   is	   rarely	  successful.	  This	   is	  made	  clear	   in	   the	   findings	  of	   the	   third	  chapter.	  For	  example,	  Prime	   Minister	   William	   Hughes,	   sought	   and	   obtained	   intelligence	   information	  that	  could	  be	  used	   to	  bolster	  public	  support	   toward	  his	  government’s	  policy	  of	  compulsory	  military	  conscription	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  Hughes	  used	  the	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intelligence	   services	   to	   supply	   information	   that	   could	   be	   used	   against	   his	  political	  enemies	  and	  discredit	  those	  who	  opposed	  his	  policy	  goals.	  	  Groups	  and	  individuals	  opposed	  to	  the	  government’s	  policy	  were	  put	  under	  surveillance	  and	  thoroughly	   scrutinised	   because	   they	   threatened	   the	   success	   of	   the	   policy	   of	  military	  conscription.	  In	  this	  case,	  politicising	  intelligence	  did	  become	  part	  of	  the	  government’s	   strategy.	   Intelligence	   was	   used	   to	   promote	   the	   wisdom	   of	   the	  policy	  of	  military	  conscription,	  persuade	  domestic	  audiences	   toward	  voting	   for	  the	   policy	   in	   two	   referenda,	   and	   to	   discredit	   the	   standing	   of	   groups	   and	  individuals	   opposed	   to	   Hughes’	   policy	   position.	   Despite	   the	   politicisation	   of	  intelligence	   as	   a	   political	   strategy,	   the	   findings	   from	   this	   chapter	   show	   it	   was	  unsuccessful.	  The	  results	  of	  two	  referenda	  saw	  the	  policy	  of	  military	  conscription	  defeated	  on	  both	  occasions.	  	  	  	  	  	   But	  the	  use	  of	  intelligence	  as	  a	  political	  strategy	  can	  go	  beyond	  the	  cut	  and	  thrust	   of	   electoral	   politics.	   Findings	   indicate	   that	   politicisation	   can	   emerge	   as	  part	   of	   a	   political	   battle	   for	   control	   and	   influence	   over	   the	   intelligence	  bureaucracy.	   This	   involves	   political	   leaders,	   or	   intelligence	   organisations,	  broadening	   their	   influence	   over	   the	   administrative	   environment	   to	   establish	  tighter	   control	   over	   the	   operations	   and	   conduct	   of	   an	   intelligence	   service.	  Tighter	   administrative	   control	   thereby	   enables	   closer	   conformity	   to	   policy	  deliberations.	  Chapter	  four	  considered	  this	  process.	  Findings	  indicate	  that	  in	  the	  late	   1940s	   a	   paucity	   of	   intelligence	   policy	   led	   to	   a	   fragmented	   and	   highly	  personalised	   intelligence	   community.	   Both	   military	   and	   civilian	   intelligence	  services	   served	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   respective	   political	   masters.	   When	   two	  public	   servants	   were	   appointed	   to	   address	   maladministration	   and	   reform,	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political	   and	   military	   leaders	   intervened	   and	   manipulated	   the	   inquiries	   to	  maximise	  their	  own	  interests.	  The	  military	  used	  its	  intelligence	  resources	  to	  not	  only	   maintain	   autonomy	   from	   government,	   but	   also	   to	   discredit	   the	   lead	  investigator,	   Lieutenant	   Colonel	   John	  Mawhood,	   and	   to	   disguise	   allegations	   of	  corruption,	  failings,	  and	  abuse.	  	  	  Political	   leaders	   did	   the	   same	   but	   for	   a	   different	   reason.	   They	   used	   the	  civil	   intelligence	   services	   to	   manipulate	   the	   Duncan	   inquiry	   so	   that	   it	   would	  deliver	   findings	   allowing	   their	   expanded	   control	   over	   the	   intelligence	   services.	  	  In	  sum,	  controlling	  reform	  mattered	  because	  controlling	  the	  bureaucracy	  meant	  that	   the	   intelligence	  services	  could	  be	  moulded	  to	  suit	   the	  political	  needs	  of	   its	  masters.	  In	  the	  end,	  intelligence	  reform	  was	  hobbled	  by	  a	  politicised	  inquiry	  and	  bureaucratic	  self-­‐interest.	  	  	   Although	   these	   findings	   suggest	   politicisation	   is	   not	   usually	   an	   effective	  strategy	   for	   advancing	   partisan	   political	   goals,	   nevertheless,	   it	   remains	   an	  inherently	   ‘persuasive	   act’	   (Rovner	   2011:	   48;	  Woodard	   2013:97).	   Chapter	   five	  proposed	   that	  when	  political	   leaders	   face	   strong	   opposition	   to	   a	   policy	   choice,	  intelligence	  could	  be	  used	  to	  persuade	  a	  sceptical	  audience	  toward	  their	  political	  goals.	   The	   chapter	   demonstrated	   how	   intelligence	   could	   be	   used	   to	   fend	   off	  attacks	  by	  discrediting	  political	   opposition.	   For	   example,	  when	   introducing	   the	  Communist	  Party	  Dissolution	  Bill	  in	  1950,	  Prime	  Minister	  Robert	  Menzies,	  cited	  ASIO–derived	   intelligence	   material	   in	   parliament	   to	   emphasise	   that	   the	  Communist	   Party	   had	   an	   undue	   influence	   on	   the	   Australian	   Trade	   Union	  movement.	  Although	  intelligence	  was	  used	  to	  substantiate	  this	  argument,	  the	  bill	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was	   unsuccessful	   and	   eventually	   declared	   invalid	   by	   the	   High	   Court.	   	   Still,	  successive	  Attorney	  Generals	  persisted	  with	  the	  same	  tactic	  of	  using	  intelligence	  in	  parliament	   to	  denigrate	   their	  political	  opponents.	  On	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  during	   the	  Vietnam	  War	   intelligence	  was	  disclosed	   to	   the	  public	   to	   exaggerate	  the	   alleged	   subversive	   nature	   of	   the	   Peace	   Movement	   and	   to	   justify	   the	  government’s	   heavy-­‐handed	   response	   to	   it.	   Likewise,	   MP	   William	   Wentworth	  pressured	  ASIO	   to	   supply	  him	  with	   intelligence	   information	   that	  he	   could	   then	  use	  in	  public	  to	  expose	  and	  discredit	  anyone	  that	  was	  allegedly	  involved	  with	  the	  Communist	   Party.	   In	   each	   instance,	   intelligence	   was	   used	   strategically	   to	  promote,	   persuade	   or	   discredit.	   It	   was	   politicised	   because	   political	   leaders	  solicited	   intelligence	   not	   to	   inform	   policy	   development	   and	   advance	   national	  aims,	  but	  to	  substantiate	  a	  predetermined	  policy	  goal	  and	  disarm	  threats	  to	  this	  goal.	  	  	   Political	   leaders	   may	   work	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   intelligence	  organisations	   exist	   to	   support	   the	   development	   of	   their	   policy	   objectives	  (Lowenthal	   2004:	   234).	   But	   this	   assumption	   may	   represent	   an	   idealised	  relationship	   between	   intelligence	   and	   policy.	   Evidence	   suggests	   that	   at	   times	  intelligence	  organisations	  can	  do	  the	  opposite	  and	  actually	  work	  to	  undermine	  a	  policy	  goal.	  Chapter	  six	  offered	  several	  examples	  of	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	  intervening	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  a	  democratically	  elected	  government	  to	  undermine	  a	   policy	   initiative.	   Subverting	   policy	   in	   these	   cases	   became	   a	   means	   of	  politicisation.	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Evidence	  presented	  in	  chapter	  six	  demonstrates	  that	  intelligence	  officials	  leaked	   selective	   information	   to	   the	  media	  which	  was	  designed	   to	   discredit	   the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  Australia,	   left	  wing	  activists,	  and	  the	  peace	  movement,	  but	  also	   to	   undermine	   the	   Whitlam	   government’s	   security	   clearance	   policy.	   Two	  aspects	   of	   this	   strategy	   indicate	   why	   the	   leaks	   could	   be	   deemed	   politically	  motivated.	   	   First,	   the	   overwhelming	  majority	   of	   the	   information	   leaked	   to	   the	  media	   was	   intended	   to	   damage	   left	   wing	   political	   issues.	   Almost	   none	   of	   it	  contained	  criticisms	  of	  conservative	  or	  right	  leaning	  political	  groups.	  Second,	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  leaks	  was	  important.	  It	  was	  at	  politically	  opportune	  moments	  that	  that	   intelligence	   material	   was	   leaked	   and	   then	   published	   indicating	   that	   the	  purpose	  was	  to	  inflict	  the	  maximum	  political	  damage.	  	  	  	   In	   this	   thesis,	   evidence	   suggests	   that	  when	   political	   leaders	   face	   strong	  opposition	  to	  a	  policy	  choice	  they	  will	  often	  be	  tempted	  to	  politicise	  intelligence.	  They	   tend	   to	   do	   this	   as	   a	  means	   of	   promoting	   their	   policy	   goals,	   persuading	   a	  sceptical	  audience	  toward	  the	  wisdom	  of	  their	  decisions,	  or	  to	  discredit	  groups	  and	   individuals	   that	   oppose	   their	   policy	   positions.	   Politicising	   intelligence	   as	   a	  means	  of	  achieving	  these	  goals	  is	  rarely	  successful.	  On	  other	  occasions,	  evidence	  indicates	   that	   intelligence	   organisations	   might	   engage	   in	   similar	   patterns	   of	  behaviour	   but	   for	   different	   reasons.	   The	   organisation	   may	   use	   their	   own	  resources	  to	  undermine	  the	  political	  leadership	  or	  subvert	  a	  desired	  policy	  goal	  of	   a	   government	   if	   they	   believe	   that	   policy	   or	   administration	   to	   be	   a	   threat	   to	  their	   organisational	   interests.	   In	   sum,	   the	   politicisation	   of	   intelligence	   is	   the	  result	  of	  actions	  occurring	  in	  two	  separate	  groups:	  those	  of	  political	  leaders	  and	  intelligence	  organisations,	  each	  of	  which	  has	  its	  own	  motives.	  These	  findings	  are	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expanded	  upon	  further	  in	  the	  proceeding	  discussion,	  which	  attempts	  to	  identify	  in	   greater	   detail	   how	   the	   forms,	   or	   techniques	   of	   politicisation,	   can	  operationalize	  the	  means.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Key	  findings:	  The	  forms	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   one,	   scholarly	   attention	   to	   the	   subject	   of	  intelligence	   politicisation	   has	   made	   important	   advances	   to	   the	   field	   of	   study.	  Extant	   research	   has	   uncovered	  many	   instances	   of	   politicisation,	   identified	   the	  variant	   forms	   it	   can	   take	  on,	   and	  provided	   analysis	   of	  why	   it	  might	   occur.	   Yet,	  more	  work	  needs	   to	  done.	  First,	  most	  of	   this	   literature	   is	   focused	  on	   the	  US	  or	  U.K.	  experience.113	  With	  a	   few	  exceptions,114	  very	   little	  research	  has	   focused	  on	  Australian	  context.	  Second,	  the	  literature	  still	  lacks	  any	  general	  consensus	  about	  what	   exactly	   constitutes	   politicisation,	   and	   third,	   it	   also	   lacks	   any	   substantial	  theoretical	  discussion	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  and	  the	   means	   of	   politicisation.	   Question	   two	   of	   this	   thesis:	   which	   forms	   of	  
politicisation	   can	   be	   found	   in	   the	   Australian	   context,	   was	   designed	   to	   evaluate	  these	   issues.	  The	  aim	  is	   to	   identify	  which	  of	   these	  variants	  had	  occurred	   in	   the	  Australian	   historical	   context	   and	   probe	   their	   structure.	   But	   this	   question	   also	  raised	   another	   finding.	   There	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   relationship	   between	   the	   forms	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  For	  a	  selection	  of	  notable	  US	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  see:	  Ransom,	  R	  (1987);	  Betts,	  R	  (2007);	  Rovner,	  J	  (2011);	  Hastedt,	  G	  (2013).	  British	  studies	  include	  Glees,	  A	  &	  Davies,	  P	  (2004);	  Bar-­‐Joseph,	  U	  (1995)	  which	  includes	  a	  study	  on	  Israel.	  	  	  114	  See:	  Ball,	  D	  (2001)	  and	  McKnight,	  D	  (2008	  a).	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and	  the	  means	  of	  politicisation.	  This	  finding	  is	  explained	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  the	  following	  discussion.	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  question	  two,	  the	  type	  of	  evidence	  produced	  in	  this	  study	  provides	   a	   speculative	   rather	   than	   definitive	   answer.	   	   Three	   key	   findings,	  however,	  are	  worth	  noting.	  First,	  seven	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  were	  identified	  in	  the	   case	   studies,	   although	   some	   forms	   were	   more	   prominent	   than	   others.	  Second,	  these	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  appear	  to	  put	  the	  means	  into	  operation.	  And	  third,	   most	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   seem	   to	   be	   inter-­‐related	   and	   occur	  simultaneously.	  The	  following	  discussion	  will	  focus	  on	  identifying	  and	  explaining	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  and	  discuss	  their	  connection	  with	  the	  means.	  	  	  	  
	  
(1)	  Direct	  manipulation	  In	   this	   study,	   the	   first	   identified	   form	   of	   politicisation	   is	   direct	  manipulation.	   Although	   the	   parsing	   of	   direct	   manipulation	   varies	   from	   those	  described	  as	  ‘top–down	  politicization’	  through	  to	  ‘hard	  politicization’	  it	  typically	  involves	   efforts	   from	   political	   leaders	   to	   force	   intelligence	   assessments	   to	   fit	  policy-­‐making	  preferences	  (Betts	  2007:	  67;	  Hastedt	  2013:	  10).	  In	  its	  more	  overt	  form,	  direct	  manipulation	  tends	  to	  occur	  when	  intelligence	  officials	  are	  told	  what	  conclusions	  to	  reach.	  But	  forcing	  intelligence	  to	  conform	  to	  policy	  prescriptions	  can	   also	   come	   about	   through	   more	   understated	   methods.	   Mulgan	   (2007)	   and	  Rovner	  (2011)	  for	  example,	  cite	  evidence	  of	  direct	  manipulation	  occurring	  as	  a	  result	  of	  appointing	  like–minded	  intelligence	  officials	  who	  can	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  deliver	   information	  to	  please	  their	  political	  masters.	  Other	  studies	  (Riste	  2009;	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Lucas	   2011)	   affirm	   that	   on	   rare	   occasions	   direct	   manipulation	   can	   transpire	  through	   the	   creation	   of	   politically	   motivated	   intelligence	   bodies.	   This	   study’s	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  this	  literature.	  	  	  Identifying	  instances	  of	  direct	  manipulation	  in	  this	  study	  was	  elusive,	  but	  some	  evidence	  points	  to	  it	  occurring.	  Direct	  manipulation	  in	  an	  overt	  form	  was	  only	   present	   in	   the	   second	   case	   study	   of	   chapter	   two	   dealing	   with	   ‘New	  Caledonia’.	  It	  appears	  that	  Major	  General,	  Edward	  Hutton,	  directly	  intervened	  in	  the	   intelligence	   collection	   and	   assessment	   process	   in	   order	   to	   control	   the	  outcome.	  In	  this	  case,	  first	  Hutton	  removed	  an	  intelligence	  officer	  who	  produced	  an	  intelligence	  assessment	  that	  did	  not	  please	  the	  War	  Office	  in	  London.	  He	  then	  appointed	   an	   officer	  whom	  he	   trusted	  would	   deliver	   intelligence	  material	   that	  was	   more	   conducive	   to	   both	   his	   and	   the	   War	   Office’s	   military	   goals.	   Second,	  Hutton	   directly	   intervened	   in	   the	   analytic	   process	   to	   ensure	   the	   intelligence	  product	   would	   conform	   to	   his	   and	   the	  War	   Office’s	   desired	   objectives.	   In	   this	  case,	   evidence	   indicates	   a	   relationship	   between	   the	   form,	   or	   technique	   of	  politicisation,	  and	  the	  means.	  The	  form	  of	  direct	  intervention	  enabled	  Hutton	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  intelligence	  produced	  would	  be	  persuasive	  enough	  to	  please	  the	  War	  Office	  thereby	  promoting	  their	  objectives.	  	  	  	  	   Other	  forms	  of	  direct	  politicisation	  are	  more	  obvious.	  The	  appointment	  of	  intelligence	  officials	  sympathetic	  to	  government	  policy	  is	  one	  means	  of	  ensuring	  that	   intelligence	   will	   be	   more	   conducive	   to	   achieving	   policy	   objectives	   (Jervis	  2010:	   200;	   Rovner	   2011:	   30).	   This	   was	   found	   in	   chapter	   three	   when	   Prime	  Minister,	  William	  Hughes,	  appointed	  Major	  George	  Steward,	  to	  head	  the	  Counter	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Espionage	  Bureau	   in	  1916.	  Hughes	   and	   Steward	  not	   only	  held	   similar	   political	  and	   ideological	   attitudes,	   but	   they	   also	   shared	   similar	   proclivities	   against	   left-­‐	  wing	   political	   groups.	   The	   historical	   record	   shows	   that	   the	   Counter	   Espionage	  Bureau	   (and	   later	   SIB)	  was	   imbued	  with	   achieving	   the	   same	   objectives	   as	   the	  Hughes	  government	  —	   that	  of	   suppressing	   the	  political	  views	  of	   the	   Industrial	  Workers	   of	   the	   World,	   Trade	   Unions,	   Irish	   Catholics	   and	   activist	   groups	   that	  dissented	   against	   the	   government’s	   policy	   of	   compulsory	  military	   conscription	  (Cain	   1983:20).	   It	  was	   only	  when	   this	   problem	   had	   become	   so	   acute,	   that	   the	  Australian	  Governor	  General,	  Ronald	  Munro	  Ferguson,	  stepped	  in	  and	  removed	  Steward	  as	  head	  of	   the	  Bureau	  because	  he	  had	  become	  so	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	   political	   initiatives	   of	   the	   Hughes	   government.	   In	   sum,	   the	   evidence	  presented	   in	   this	   case	   indicates	   that	  direct	  manipulation	   (the	  appointment	  of	   a	  like–minded	   intelligence	   official)	   did	   enable	   the	   Hughes	   government	   to	   use	  intelligence	  as	  a	  means	  of	  discrediting	  its	  political	  opponents.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  The	  political	  appointment	  of	  like–minded	  intelligence	  leaders,	  is	  only	  one	  form	   of	   direct	   politicisation.	   Another	   takes	   place	  when	   intelligence	   bodies	   are	  created	  to	  produce	  assessments	   that	  serve	   the	  specific	  objectives	  of	   the	  policy-­‐maker	  (Riste	  2009:181).	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  Australian	  Protective	  League,	  described	  in	  chapter	  three,	  is	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  such	  a	  practice.	  The	  composition	  of	  the	  League’s	  board	  indicates	  its	  politically	  motivated	  objectives.	  It	  was	  stacked	  with	  a	  privileged	  group	  of	  private	  citizens	   loyal	   to	   the	  government	  and	   its	  war	  aims.	  The	  League’s	  purpose	  was	   to	  collect	   intelligence	  material	   that	   could	  help	  the	  government	  prosecute	  groups	  and	   individuals	  opposed	  to	   its	  policies.	  As	   in	  the	  examples	   reported	  above,	  direct	  manipulation	  —	   that	  of	   creating	  a	  private	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intelligence	   organisation	   —	   enabled	   the	   Hughes	   government	   to	   acquire	  intelligence	   that	   could	   be	   used	   as	   a	   means	   of	   undermining	   and	   discrediting	  groups	  and	  individuals	  that	  sought	  to	  oppose	  a	  desired	  policy	  objective.	  In	  short,	  the	  form	  of	  politicisation	  and	  the	  means	  appear	  to	  be	  related.	  	  	  
(2)	  Publicising	  intelligence	  National	   security	   intelligence	   has	   been	   described	   as	   the	  most	   secretive	  function	  of	  a	  government	  (O’Connell	  2004:	  191).	  But	  some	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  cast	  this	  secret	  function	  in	  a	  very	  public	  light.	  The	  publicisation	  of	  intelligence	  is	  one	  example.	  This	  occurs	  when	   intelligence	   is	  put	   to	   a	  political	  use	   in	   a	  public	  environment	   having	   the	   effect	   of	   turning	   secret	   intelligence	   into	   part	   of	   a	  government’s	   communication	   strategy.	   Political	   leaders	   usually	   go	   public	   with	  intelligence	   to	   advance	   their	   political	   or	   policy	   agenda.	   This	   action	   is	   likely	  motivated	   by	   the	   need	   to	   sell	   and	   build	   support	   for	   an	   initiative,	   but	   also	   to	  persuade	  sceptics	  that	  an	  opposing	  position	  is	  imprudent.	  Publicisation	  tends	  to	  manifest	  via	  unauthorised	   leaks	   to	   the	  media,	   and,	   through	  public	   reference	   to	  sources	  and	  analysis	  from	  political	  leaders	  (Hastedt	  1987:	  57;	  2005:421).	  	  	   Chapter	  two	  describes	  a	  concerted	  attempt	  at	  publicising	  intelligence.	   In	  1901,	   the	   Barton	   government	   wanted	   the	   New	   Hebrides	   annexed	   within	   the	  British	   Empire	   to	   protect	   Australia	   from	   possible	   French	   aggression	   in	   the	  Pacific.	   But	   the	   British	   government	   continually	   rebuffed	   such	   a	   proposal.	  Intelligence	  officer,	  Wilson	  Le	  Couteur,	  was	  dispatched	  to	  the	  islands	  on	  7	  August	  1901	  to	  collect	  information	  on	  French	  activity.	  His	  assessment	  was	  presented	  to	  the	   Barton	   government	   on	   26	  November	   1901.	   Le	   Couteur’s	   assessments,	   like	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Barton’s	  policy	  goals,	  were	  highly	  critical	  of	  French	  settlement	  on	  the	  island	  and	  emphasised	   that	   the	   British	   government	  was	   providing	   little	   protection	   for	   its	  own	   subjects.	   From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   politicising	   intelligence	   through	  publication,	   the	   Barton	   administration	   presented	   this	   intelligence	   in	   The	   Age	  newspaper	   on	   three	   separate	   occasions.	   These	   findings	   also	   suggest	   a	  relationship	  between	  the	  form	  of	  politicisation	  —	  publicisation	  —	  and	  the	  means	  of	   politicisation	   —	   promotion	   and	   persuasion.	   In	   this	   case,	   publicising	  intelligence	  put	  into	  operation	  the	  means	  of	  promoting	  the	  Barton	  government’s	  policy	  goal	  and	  helped	  persuade	  sceptics	  toward	  the	  value	  of	  the	  policy.	  	  	  	  
(3)	  Partisan	  politicisation	  	  Politicising	   intelligence	   enables	   political	   parties	   to	   use	   intelligence	   for	  partisan	  political	  gain	  as	  they	  contend	  with	  each	  other	  for	  influence	  over	  political	  issues	   or	   policy	   determinations	   (Ransom	   1985:	   28).	   In	   this	   sense,	   intelligence	  can	  be	  used	  to	  score	  political	  points,	  reinforce	  partisan	  political	  arguments,	  or	  to	  parry	  alternative	  political	  viewpoints.	  When	  used	  in	  such	  a	  manner,	  intelligence	  organisations	  take	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  becoming	  aligned	  with	  certain	  political	  parties	  or	  politicians.	  This	  form	  of	  manipulation	  is	  termed	  partisan	  politicisation	  (Rovner	  2011:	  208).	  	  	   But	   variant	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   can	   often	   have	   inter-­‐related	   or	  overlapping	   meanings,	   with	   some	   occurring	   simultaneously	   (Treverton	   2008:	  92).	   Evidence	   presented	   in	   chapters	   five	   and	   six	   identify	   a	   conceptual	  inconsistency	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  publicisation	  of	  intelligence	  and	  the	  partisan	   politicisation	   of	   intelligence.	   Chapter	   five	   demonstrates	   that	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conservative	   coalition	   prime	   ministers	   and	   successive	   Attorney	   General’s	  throughout	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   cited	   intelligence	   through	   public	   channels	   to	  gain	  partisan	  political	  advantage.	  On	  several	  occasions,	  intelligence	  was	  used	  to	  strengthen	  the	  government’s	  political	  argument	  about	   the	  subversive	  nature	  of	  communism,	   the	  peace	  movement,	   and	   to	   question	   the	   loyalty	   and	   integrity	   of	  Labor	   Party	   officials.	   There	   are	   two	   underlying	   constants	   throughout	   these	  examples.	  First,	   intelligence	  was	  politicised	  because	   it	  was	  used	  specifically	   for	  partisan	  political	  advantage.	  	  Second,	  secret	  intelligence	  was	  frequently	  disclosed	  to	  the	  public	  through	  parliamentary	  debates	  and	  Hansard	  publications	  to	  bolster	  the	  government’s	  case.	  	  	   The	   evidence	   presented	   in	   chapter	   six	   demonstrates	   the	   inter-­‐connectedness	   of	   publicisation	   and	   partisan	   politicisation.	   In	   this	   case,	   a	   small	  group	  of	  ASIO	  officers	  leaked	  intelligence	  information	  to	  media	  representatives.	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  put	  secret	  intelligence	  into	  a	  public	  forum	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	   damaging	   the	   integrity	   of	   members	   of	   the	   Communist	   Party	   and	   the	   Labor	  Party.	   The	   leaks	   were	   surely	   instances	   of	   partisan	   politicisation	   because	   the	  information	  was	  in	  no	  way	  politically	  neutral.	  Rather	  the	  leaked	  intelligence	  was	  slanted	   to	   benefit	   the	   conservative	   government.	   In	   addition,	   publicisation	  occurred	  because	  the	  secret	  intelligence	  in	  question	  was	  to	  be	  published	  in	  The	  
Analysis	   magazine	   and	  The	  Bulletin	   newspaper.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   publicising	   of	  partisan	   intelligence	   material	   again	   appears	   to	   have	   put	   the	   means	   of	  discrediting	  into	  operation.	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(4)	  Cherry	  Picking	  The	  partisan	  use	  of	  intelligence	  is	  also	  closely	  related	  to	  another	  form	  of	  politicisation	  described	  as	   cherry	  picking.	  Cherry	  picking	  occurs	  when	  political	  leaders	   selectively	   choose	   intelligence	   that	   justifies	   their	   policy	   choices	   and	  reject	  or	  suppress	  intelligence	  that	  does	  not	  (Davies	  2004:	  511–512).	  This	  form	  of	  politicisation	  goes	  directly	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  how	  intelligence	  is	  used,	  or	  not	  used,	  by	  governments	  for	  political	  advantage.	  The	  historical	  evidence	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis	   suggests	   that	   Australian	   governments,	   of	   various	   political	   persuasions,	  have	  on	  occasion	  been	  more	  inclined	  to	  accept	  intelligence	  when	  it	  fits	  their	  own	  predilections,	  and	  to	  dismiss	  it	  when	  it	  does	  not.	  	  	  	   For	   example,	   in	   1907	   the	   Deakin	   government	   rejected	   intelligence	  assessments	  about	  Japanese	  spying	  on	  the	  North	  Coast	  of	  Queensland.	  It	  rejected	  intelligence	   that	   did	   not	   support	   the	   policy	   goal	   of	   developing	   an	   independent	  naval	   squadron,	   but	   accepted	   intelligence	   that	   did.	   A	   key	   indicator	   that	   cherry	  picking	   occurred	   here	   is	   that	   the	   Deakin	   government	   did	   not	   ask	   intelligence	  officials	   to	   revise	   their	   judgments	   for	   inaccuracies,	   but	   instead	   accepted	   an	  alternative	   intelligence	  assessments	   that	   reported	  evidence	  of	   Japanese	  spying.	  This	   intelligence	  was	   likely	   accepted	   because	   it	   helped	   justify	   the	   necessity	   of	  establishing	   an	   Australian	   naval	   squadron	   to	   patrol	   Australian	   coastlines	   in	  defence	  of	  Japanese	  incursions.	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These	   findings	   highlight	   that	   political	   leaders	   need	   not	   directly	  manipulate	  intelligence	  to	  conform	  to	  policy	  initiatives,	  but	  can	  pick	  and	  choose	  intelligence	   until	   they	   find	   what	   they	   are	   looking	   for.	   They	   might	   retain	  information	  that	  justifies	  their	  policy	  position	  but	  dismiss	  intelligence	  that	  could	  obstruct	   the	   success	   of	   their	   political	   goals.	   Also,	   cherry	   picking	   amply	  demonstrates	   how	   the	   forms	   of	   politicisation	   are	   connected	   to	   the	  means.	   For	  example,	   political	   leaders	   can	   select	   intelligence	   that	   lends	   support	   to	   the	  
promotion	  of	  the	  policy	  goals	  of	  their	  administration,	  and	  reject	  those	  that	  do	  not.	  They	  might	   also	   select	   intelligence	   that	  discredits	   opposing	   positions.	   In	   either	  case,	   cherry	   picking,	   as	   a	   form	   or	   technique	   of	   intelligence	   politicisation,	   can	  provide	  an	  effective	  means	  of	  promoting	   and	  advancing	   the	  partisan	  goals	  of	   a	  government.	  	  	  
(5)	  Indirect	  politicisation	  and	  (6)	  bureaucratic	  parochialism	  Two	  other	  forms	  of	  politicisation	  were	  found	  to	  occur	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  in	  chapter	  four.	  These	  forms	  are:	  bureaucratic	  parochialism	  and	  soft	  politicisation.	  	  	   The	   bureaucratic	   context	   in	   which	   intelligence	   organisations	   exist	  presents	   an	   opportunity	   for	   politicisation	   to	   take	   place.	   Bureaucratic	   politics,	  institutionalised	   biases,	   and	   personal	   interests	   can	   all	   help	   motivate	  politicisation	   (Gentry	   1993:	   234).	   For	   example,	   political	   leaders	   may	   seek	   to	  extend	   their	   influence	   over	   the	   intelligence	   bureaucracy	   in	   order	   to	   control	  better	   what	   their	   organisations	   do.	   This	   can	   be	   a	   measure	   taken	   to	   make	  intelligence	  more	   responsive	   to	   the	   political	   administration,	   and	   thereby	  bring	  intelligence	   closer	   in	   line	   to	   their	   policy-­‐making	   objectives.	   Likewise,	   an	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intelligence	  organisation	  can	  use	  their	  own	  resources	  to	  advance	  or	  protect	  their	  institutional	   interests.	   In	   short,	   bureaucracies	   use	   and	  manipulate	   intelligence	  for	  bureaucratic	  gain	  (Rovner	  2011:	  208).	  The	  methods	  used	  to	  achieve	  this	  form	  of	  politicisation	  vary	  from	  the	  direct	  to	  the	  more	  subtle	  and	  soft	  varieties.	  	  	   Examples	   of	   bureaucratic	   parochialism,	   as	   a	   form	   of	   politicisation	   are	  rare,	  but	  have	  occurred.	  One	  case	  demonstrated	  in	  chapter	  four	  was	  the	  army’s	  attempt	   to	   forestall	   an	   investigation	   into	   the	   Security	   Service	   and	   Army	  Intelligence	   in	  1941.	  Shortly	  after	   the	  Australian	  government	  appointed	  British	  Officer,	   Lieutenant-­‐Colonel	   John	   Mawhood,	   to	   report	   on	   the	   efficacy	   and	  operations	   of	   civilian	   and	   military	   intelligence,	   Army	   Intelligence	   officials	  intervened	   and	   obstructed	   the	   inquiry.	   Initially,	   Army	   Intelligence	   conducted	  unauthorised	  surveillance	  on	  Mawhood	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  discredit	  his	  qualifications	  and	  his	  personal	  integrity.	  Unsatisfied	  with	  the	  results	  the	  army	  appointed	  their	  own	  investigator,	  Alexander	  Duncan,	  to	  conduct	  the	   inquiry.	   It	   is	   likely	  that	  the	  army’s	  behaviour	  was	  motivated	  by	  parochial	   considerations.	  For	   instance,	   the	  army	  had	  established	  significant	  autonomy	  over	   its	   intelligence	  operations	  due	  to	   a	   lack	   of	   formal	   government	   policy	   and	   it	   wanted	   to	   maintain	   this	   control	  rather	  than	  submit	  to	  civilian	  supervision.	  	  	  The	   second	   reason	   the	   army	   intervened	   in	   the	   inquiries	   is	   probably	  because	   Mawhood	   would	   have	   revealed	   their	   involvement	   with	   a	   number	   of	  secret	  paramilitary	  organisations.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  army	  used	  its	  own	  intelligence	  resources	   to	  discredit	  Mawhood	  and	  attempted	  to	  stop	  his	   inquiry.	  They	   were	   partially	   successful.	   That	   Army	   intelligence	   officials	   attempted	   to	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(7)	  Intelligence	  subverts	  policy	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   have	   argued	   that	   politicising	   intelligence	   is	   a	   strategy	  often	   attempted	   to	   benefit	   a	   political	   leader,	   party,	   or	   incumbent	   government.	  But	   I	   have	   argued	   and	   shown	  why	   this	   is	   usually	   an	   unsuccessful	   strategy	   for	  achieving	  a	  policy	  goal.	  However,	   the	  findings	  suggest	  that	  politicisation	  can	  be	  induced	   by	   an	   intelligence	   organisation	   to	   damage	   a	   political	   leader	   or	   policy	  decision,	  and	  in	  one	  specific	  case,	  it	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  successful.	  This	  form	  of	  politicisation	   described	   as	   ‘intelligence	   subverting	   policy’,	   occurs	   when	  intelligence	  organisations	  produce	  assessments	  that	  undermine	  policy	  decisions	  or	  leak	  specific	  information	  to	  undercut	  public	  support	  for	  a	  policy	  goal	  (Rovner	  2011:	  32).	  In	  this	  sense,	  intelligence	  is	  politicised	  because	  rather	  than	  supporting	  policy,	   it	  undermines	   it	   through	   tacit	   interference	   in	   the	  government’s	  political	  affairs.	  	  	  	  The	   Whitlam	   ‘security	   clearance’	   case	   of	   1973	   is	   one	   example	   of	   an	  intelligence	  organisation	  attempting	  to	  subvert	  the	  policy	  choice	  of	  government.	  A	  dominant	  feature	  of	  this	  case	  is	  that	  some	  ASIO	  officers	  leaked	  information	  to	  the	   media	   in	   order	   to	   undermine	   the	   Whitlam	   government’s	   security	   vetting	  policy	  decision.	  The	  motivation	   appears	   to	  have	  been	   that	  ASIO	  officers	  held	   a	  principled	   stance	   against	   the	   policy	   and	   they	   sought	   to	   apply	   pressure	   on	   the	  government	   to	   change	   the	   decision.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   strategy	   appears	   to	   have	  succeeded	  and	  the	  Whitlam	  government	  changed	  its	  decision.	  Although	  this	  case	  is	  an	  instance	  of	  an	  intelligence	  organisation	  inducing	  politicisation,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	   determine	   exactly	   what	   impact	   the	   strategy	   had	   on	   the	   result.	   However	  unclear	   this	  may	   be	   a	   link	   appears	   between	   the	   form	   of	   politicisation	   and	   the	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means.	  The	  form	  of	  politicisation:	  subversion,	  acted	  as	  a	  means	  of	  discrediting	  the	  Whitlam	  government’s	  policy.	  	  	  
Implications	  and	  limitations	  The	   case	   studies	   in	   this	   thesis	   demonstrate	   how	   intelligence	   has	   been	  politicised	  in	  Australia	  and	  by	  what	  means.	  Several	  implications	  follow.	  The	  most	  outstanding	   is	   that,	   political	   leaders,	   when	   looking	   for	   a	   means	   to	   support	   a	  controversial	  policy	  decision,	  will	  sometimes	  politicise	  intelligence	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  promote	   their	   policy	   goals	   or	   to	   disarm	   opposing	   positions.	   Even	   so,	  politicisation	   is	   rarely	   a	   successful	  method	   of	   implementing	   a	   policy	   initiative.	  Here	  matters	   become	  unclear.	   The	  difficulty	   of	   evaluating	  why	  politicisation	   is	  often	   an	   unsuccessful	   strategy	   becomes	  more	   acute	  when	   trying	   to	   determine	  the	   reasons	   for	   its	   failure.	   Here,	   it	   could	   be	   asked:	   was	   politicisation	   an	  unsuccessful	   strategy,	   or	  was	   the	   one	   implementing	   it	   ineffective?	   Answers	   to	  this	   question	   would	   require	   substantial	   investigation,	   which	   is	   beyond	   the	  indented	  design	  of	  this	  study.	  	  	   The	   patterns	   identified	   in	   the	   preceding	   discussion	   also	   indicate	   that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  means	  of	  politicisation	  and	  the	  form	  it	  takes	   on	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   form	   appears	   to	   facilitate	   the	   means.	   Full	  explanation	   here	   is	   again	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   study.	   This	   being	   the	   case,	  additional	  research	  on	  this	  aspect	  of	  politicisation	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  determine	  the	   veracity	   of	   my	   findings.	   Although	   identifying	   the	   means	   and	   forms	   of	  politicisation	  gets	   to	  one	  part	  of	   the	   issue	  explaining	  how	  and	  why	   it	  occurs	   in	  the	   Australian	   context,	   it	   leaves	   questions	   about	  what	   conditions	  might	   evoke	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this	   behaviour	   unanswered.	   The	   next	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   addresses	   this	  question.	  	  	  
Key	  findings:	  The	  conditions	  	  Question	   three	   of	   this	   study	   was	   designed	   to	   identify	   the	   various	  conditions	  that	  have	  led	  to	  instances	  of	  intelligence	  politicisation	  in	  Australia	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  what	  circumstances	  might	  educe	  this	  behaviour.	  In	  response	  to	  this	   question,	   three	   conditions	   were	   identified	   which	   help	   explain	   why	  politicisation	   emerged.	   They	   are	   (1)	   political,	   (2)	   sociocultural,	   and	   (3)	  conditions	  relating	  to	  oversight	  and	  ministerial	  control.	  The	  following	  discussion	  examines	  these	  conditions	  in	  greater	  detail.	  	  	  
Political	  conditions	  Several	  writers	  have	  suggested	  that	  instances	  of	  intelligence	  politicisation	  	  are	   linked	   to	   political	   conditions.	   According	   to	   Michael	   Handel,	   politicisation	  occurs	   because	   of	   the	   ‘elementary	   fact	   that	   intelligence	   is	   essential	   to	   the	  promotion	   of	   almost	   all	   political	   interests,	   including	   those	   of	   an	   intelligence	  organization’	  (Handel	  1989:	  195).	  Rovner’s	  study	  drew	  a	  similar	  conclusion.	  He	  found	   that	   ‘politicization	   is	   inexorably	   rooted	   in	   domestic	   politics’	   because	  political	   leaders	   will	   use	   intelligence	   to	   undercut	   challenges	   to	   their	   policy	  initiatives,	  but	  also	  to	  sell	  the	  wisdom	  of	  their	  choices	  (Rovner	  2011:	  188–189).	  Both	  Handel	  and	  Rovner’s	  conclusions	  are	  generally	  consistent	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study.	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One	  of	  the	  most	  consistent	  findings	  across	  cases	  examined	  in	  this	  study	  is	  that	  under	  tumultuous	  political	  conditions	  intelligence	  was	  subjected	  to	  political	  influence	   for	  reasons	  of	  political	  expediency,	  and	  thus	  politicised.	   In	   this	  study,	  two	   interrelated	   factors	   tend	   to	   explain	   why	   this	   occurred.	   First,	   intelligence	  organisations	  were	  intimately	  involved	  in	  addressing	  questions	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policy.	  Second,	  any	  organisation	  charged	  with	  collecting	   information	  on	  such	  topics	  and	  providing	  it	  to	  political	  leaders	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  drawn	  into	  politics	  (Ransom	   1987:	   25).	   On	   several	   occasions,	   domestic	   intelligence	   organisations	  collected	   information	   on	   Australian	   politicians	   who	   strongly	   opposed	   a	  government	   policy	   initiative.	   This	   information	   was	   then	   supplied	   to	   political	  leaders	  who	  then	  used	  it	  to	  undermine	  and	  criticise	  their	  political	  opponents.	  	  	   To	  put	  this	  finding	  into	  perspective	  it	  is	  worth	  reconsidering	  two	  notable	  cases	   examined	   in	   this	   study.	   For	   example,	   the	   conscription	   campaigns	   of	  October	   1916	   and	   December	   1917	   had	   created	   a	   bitter	   and	   devising	   political	  atmosphere.	  	  Prime	  Minister	  William	  Hughes	  faced	  opposition	  to	  his	  policy	  goal	  of	   implementing	   compulsory	   military	   conscription	   from	   members	   within	   his	  own	   Labor	   Party.	   Under	   such	   conditions,	   the	   Counter	   Espionage	  Bureau	   (later	  SIB),	   Military	   Intelligence,	   and	   the	   Censor’s	   Office	   accrued	   vast	   quantities	   of	  information	   on	  politicians	  who	   opposed	   this	   goal.	   The	  most	   notable	   files	  were	  kept	   on	   J.	   H.	   Catts,	   Member	   of	   the	   House	   of	   Representatives,	   and	   Queensland	  Premier	   T.	   J.	   Ryan.	   But	   files	  were	   also	   kept	   on	   several	   other	   Labor	   politicians	  who	   supported	   the	   anti-­‐conscription	   movement.	   In	   response,	   Hughes	   had	   no	  scruples	   with	   using	   the	   acquired	   intelligence	   information	   to	   denounce	   and	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discredit	   his	   political	   opponents	   as	   disloyal	   and	   subversive	   (NAA:	   B	   197,	  2021/1/270;	  MP	  16/1,	  1017/60).	  	  	  	   The	  Vietnam	  War	  also	  created	  a	  similar	  divisive	  political	  atmosphere.	  On	  several	  occasions,	  prime	  ministers	  and	  successive	  attorney	  generals	   selectively	  used	   intelligence	   material	   to	   assail	   their	   political	   opponents	   in	   public.	   Harold	  Holt	   and	   Malcolm	   Fraser	   cited	   ASIO	   intelligence	   material	   in	   parliament	   to	  discredit	   anti-­‐war	   activists	   who	   challenged	   their	   Vietnam	   War	   policies.	   On	  another	  occasion,	  intelligence	  collected	  on	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  Jim	  Cairns	  was	  provided	  to	  ‘friendly’	  journalists	  and	  published	  in	  an	  Australian	  newspaper	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  discredit	  his	  socialist	  ideals	  and	  tarnish	  his	  anti-­‐Vietnam	  War	  stance	  (McKnight	  1994:	  212	  &	  148–149).	   In	  1984,	  after	  reviewing	  the	  activities	  of	   the	  intelligence	   community	   for	   a	   second	   time	   Justice	   Hope	   acknowledged	   that	  intelligence	   files	  were	   kept	   on	  members	   of	   the	  Australian	  Parliament	   although	  they	   were	   few	   in	   number	   (Hope	   1984:	   150).	   But	   Hope	   also	   identified	   that	   at	  various	   times	   ministers	   had	   misused	   ASIO,	   and	   on	   other	   occasions	   they	   had	  expected	   too	  much	   from	   it	   (Hope	   1984:	   5).115	  In	   each	   case,	   turbulent	   political	  conditions	  motivated	  political	  leaders	  to	  politicise	  intelligence	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  disarming	  opposition	  and	  advancing	  their	  own	  policy	  agenda.	   In	  this	  sense,	   the	  political	   context	   in	   which	   an	   intelligence	   service	   functions,	   the	   questions	   it	  addresses,	  and	  conditions	  surrounding	  the	  use	  of	   intelligence,	   in	  effect,	  make	   it	  vulnerable	  to	  political	  manipulation	  and	  politicisation.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Hope	  made	  this	  statement	  in	  the	  abridged	  General	  Report.	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Social	  conditions	  A	   second	   condition	   somewhat	   related	   to	   the	   first,	   is	   that	   contentious	  policies	   like	   those	   described	   above	   can	   generate	   social	   ferment	   within	   the	  broader	   community,	   giving	   rise	   to	   dissenting	   social	   movements	   and	   activist	  groups	   opposed	   to	   government	   measures.	   	   Although	   the	   surveillance	   and	  monitoring	   of	   dissenting	   groups	   and	   individuals	   has	   been	   an	   activity	   of	   the	  Australian	   intelligence	   community	   since	   the	   First	   World	   War,	   the	   empirical	  evidence	   presented	   in	   this	   study	   suggests	   that	   when	   pressure	   groups	   emerge	  and	  directly	  challenge	  a	  government	  policy,	  it	  is	  political	  leaders	  who	  sometimes	  respond	  by	  using	  intelligence	  to	  control	  dissent	  and	  stifle	  political	  opposition.	  A	  critical	   factor	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	   this	  condition	   is	   that	  a	  policy	   initiative	  must	  summon	  strong	  opposition	  from	  a	  well–organised	  and	  publicly	  visible	  pressure	  group.	   Only	   if	   political	   leaders	   perceive	   that	   these	   groups	   pose	   a	   substantial	  threat	  to	  the	  success	  of	  their	  policy	  will	   intelligence	  be	  used	  to	  stifle	  dissenting	  views.	   At	   this	   level	   of	   analysis,	   the	   threat	   perception	   is	   all-­‐important,	   because	  most	  of	  the	  time,	  these	  groups	  pose	  very	  little	  danger	  to	  the	  success	  of	  a	  policy	  goal.	  	  	   This	  condition	  helps	  explain	  what	  led	  to	  further	  instances	  of	  politicisation	  examined	   in	   this	   study.	   During	   World	   War	   One	   for	   example,	   organised	  opposition	   groups	   such	   as	   the	   Industrial	   Workers	   of	   the	   World	   (IWW),	   Irish	  nationalists,	   and	   several	   anti-­‐conscription	   movements	   emerged.	   Collectively,	  these	   groups	   were	   well	   organised,	   and	   their	   agitation	   against	   compulsion	  represented	  a	  direct	  and	  public	  challenge	  to	  the	  Hughes	  government.	  The	  IWW	  distributed	   through	   their	   journal	   Direct	   Action	   material	   openly	   challenging	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conscription	   to	   an	   estimated	   ten	   thousand	   subscribers	   (Cain	   1983:	   15).	   In	  November	  1917,	   an	  estimated	  one	  hundred	   thousand	  anti-­‐conscriptionists	   and	  Irish	  nationalists	  gathered	  at	  Richmond,	  Melbourne,	  to	  protest	  against	  the	  policy	  of	   military	   conscription.	   	   Hughes	   responded	   by	   directing	   the	   civil,	   military	  intelligence	   services,	   and	   state	   police,	   to	   place	   these	   groups	   and	   individuals	  under	  surveillance.	  Their	  mail	  was	  censored	  and	  their	  telephone	  calls	  monitored.	  Intelligence	   and	   police	   officials	   raided	   the	   premises	   of	   several	   organisations.	  Printing	  presses	  were	   seized.	  Printed	  material	   related	   to	  anti-­‐conscription	  was	  confiscated.	   At	   the	   more	   extreme	   level,	   several	   members	   of	   the	   IWW	   were	  imprisoned	   and	   later	   the	   organisation	   was	   declared	   unlawful.	   Under	   such	  conditions	   when	   pressure	   groups	   are	   perceived	   to	   threaten	   the	   success	   of	   a	  policy	   initiative	   political	   leaders	   can	   use	   intelligence	   to	   defend	   the	   prevailing	  political	  and	  social	  orthodoxy.	  	  	   The	  same	  conditions	  surfaced	  when	  the	  peace	  movement,	  radical	  student	  groups,	   and	   the	   anti-­‐war	   movement	   challenged	   the	   standing	   of	   government	  policy	   toward	  the	  Vietnam	  War.	   In	   this	  case,	  critical	  opposition	   to	   the	  war	  was	  met	  with	  counter–claims	  that	  that	  the	  peace	  movement	  was	  communist	  inspired	  and	  thereby	  subversive.	  Throughout	  the	  Vietnam	  War,	  most	  notably	  during	  the	  Moratorium	   of	   1970,	   protest	   activity	   in	   Australia	   became	   increasingly	   well	  organised	   and	   directed	   at	   attracting	   publicity	   to	   prompt	   social	   and	   political	  change.	  ASIO	  kept	  close	  tabs	  on	  groups	  and	  individuals	  involved	  with	  the	  various	  movements.	   Prime	  ministers	   and	   senior	   government	   officials	   directed	   ASIO	   to	  provide	  them	  with	  this	  information.	  It	  was	  then	  used	  against	  protest	  groups	  and	  critics	   of	   the	   government’s	   policy	   to	   discredit	   their	   standing	   (McKnight	   1994:	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218–221).	   In	   both	   of	   the	   above	   cases,	   contentious	   policy	   initiatives	   created	  turbulent	  social	  conditions.	  These	  conditions	   in	  turn	  aroused	  groups	  that	  could	  possibly	  threaten	  the	  success	  of	  a	  government’s	  political	  and	  policy	  agenda.	  The	  findings	   of	   this	   study	   indicate	   that	   in	   response	   to	   such	   conditions	   political	  leaders	  will	  sometimes	  look	  to	  intelligence	  in	  order	  to	  weaken	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  activist	  groups,	  quash	  dissent,	  and	  stifle	  opposition.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conditions	  regarding	  oversight	  and	  ministerial	  direction	  One	   final	   consideration	   helps	   explain	   why	   politicisation	   may	   have	  emerged	  in	  the	  case	  studies	  this	  thesis	  examines.	  The	  condition	  can	  generally	  be	  classified	   as	   structures	   relating	   to	   oversight	   and	   ministerial	   control	   of	   an	  intelligence	  organisation.	  	  	   A	   fundamental	   condition	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   an	   efficient	   and	  politically	  neural	   intelligence	  service	   is	   that	   the	  organisation	  and	   its	   leaders	  be	  subject	  to	  responsible	  oversight,	  control	  and	  direction.	  The	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  Intelligence	   and	   Security	   led	   by	   Justice	  Hope	   reported	   in	   1977	   that	   Australian	  ‘agencies	   lack	  proper	  guidance,	  direction	  and	  control’	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  3	  B:	  3).	   In	  his	   second	  Royal	   Commission	   in	   1984,	  Hope	   returned	   to	   the	   issue	   stating	   that	  ‘the	   question	   of	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   the	  Director	   General	   should	   be	   subject	   to	  ministerial	   direction	   is	   a	   vexed	   one’.	   As	   Justice	   Hope	   recognised,	   the	   problem	  was	  that	  a	  balance	  needed	  to	  be	  found	  providing	  for	  sufficient	  ministerial	  control	  of	   an	   intelligence	   organisation,	   but	   to	   limit	   the	   potential	  misuse	   of	  ministerial	  power	  (Hope	  1984:	  310–311).	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  historical	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  conditions	  governing	  the	  degree	  of	  ministerial	  control	  and	  external	  oversight	  of	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Australian	   intelligence	   organisations	   prior	   to	   1979	   were	   indeed	   problematic,	  sometimes	  resulting	  in	  politicisation.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  intelligence	  officers	  and	  organisations	  have	  often	  been	  used	  as	  servants	  of	  their	  political	  masters	  rather	  than	   servants	   of	   the	   government	   as	   a	   whole.	   While	   the	   political	   and	   social	  conditions	   described	   above	   partly	   explain	   why	   politicisation	   has	   occurred	   in	  Australia,	  the	  link	  between	  strong	  ministerial	  control	  and	  politicisation	  must	  also	  be	  considered.	  	  	   Consider,	   for	  example,	  what	  enabled	  William	  Hughes	   to	  use	   the	  Counter	  Espionage	   Bureau	   as	   a	   means	   of	   controlling	   dissent	   and	   opposition	   to	  government	   policy	   during	   the	   conscription	   campaigns.	   As	   Prime	   Minister	   and	  Attorney	  General,	  Hughes	  was	  responsible	  for	  controlling	  the	  Bureau	  (Cain	  1983:	  xi	  &	  21).	  At	   this	   time,	   there	  was	  no	  bi-­‐partisan	  approach	  to	  matters	  of	  security	  and	   intelligence.	   Ministerial	   authority	   over	   the	   Bureau	   was	   vested	   in	   the	  executive,	  which	  was	  controlled	  by	  Hughes	  and	  dominated	  by	  members	  of	  one	  political	   party.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   there	   was	   no	   independent	   scrutiny	   of	   what	  information	   the	   Bureau	   was	   collecting	   and	   supplying	   to	   the	   government,	   let	  alone	  oversight	  of	  its	  use.	  Such	  control	  allowed	  Hughes	  to	  use	  the	  Bureau	  for	  the	  interests	   of	   his	   own	   government	   rather	   than	   the	   broader	   national	   interest.	   A	  clear	   indication	   of	   the	   authority	   exercised	   by	   Hughes	   is	   demonstrated	   by	   the	  deference	  the	  Director	  of	   the	  Bureau	  conceded	  to	  him.	   ‘In	   future	   I	  shall	   look	  to	  you	  for	  direction’	  George	  Steward	  informed	  Hughes	  on	  2	  February	  1917	  (NAA:	  A	  3932,	   SC	   298).	   Two	  months	   later,	   Australian	  Governor	  General,	   Ronald	  Munro	  Ferguson,	  expressed	  concern	  about	   the	  situation.	  Ferguson	  wrote	  to	  his	  British	  superior,	  Walter	  Long,	  that	  Steward	  was	  now	  ‘under	  the	  direct	  instruction	  of	  the	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P.M.’,	   emphasising	   that	  his	  activities	  were	  not	  known	  to	  anyone	  except	  Hughes	  and	   the	   Minister	   of	   Defence	   (Novar	   Papers	   MS	   696,	   Series	   4,	   Item:	   902).	  Unfettered	   ministerial	   control	   and	   a	   paucity	   of	   bi-­‐partisan	   oversight	   created	  conditions	   under	  which	   Hughes	   could	   ensconce	   the	   Bureau	   to	   serve	   the	   same	  political	   objectives	   as	   his	   government.	   In	   short,	   the	  Bureau	   served	   the	  Hughes	  government’s	   political	   interests	   because	   the	   Hughes	   government	   exerted	  considerable	  authority	  over	  control	  and	  direction	  of	  the	  Bureau.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  Bureau’s	  work	  centred	  around	  monitoring	  Hughes’s	  political	  enemies.	  	  	  	  	  	   Similar	  conditions	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  events	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  five.	  The	  long	   duration	   of	   the	   conservative	   coalition	   government	   from	   1949	   through	   to	  1972	  is	  a	  notable	  example	  of	  how	  excessive	  ministerial	  control	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  bi-­‐partisan	   oversight	   might	   result	   in	   politicisation.	   During	   this	   period,	   ministers	  and	  senior	  government	  officials	  frequently	  requested	  intelligence	  information	  on	  their	   political	   foes	   and	   they	   used	   this	   information	   for	   partisan	   political	  advantage.	   On	   several	   occasions,	   Director	   Generals	   Spry	   and	   Barbour	   both	  resisted	  this	  practice.	  Assertive	  ministerial	  control	  underpinned	  by	  ambiguities	  in	   the	   1956	   ASIO	   Act	   (Cwlth)	   regarding	   the	   Director’s	   autonomy,	   provide	   a	  reasonable	   explanation	   as	   to	  why	   their	   resistance	  was	   ineffective.	   	   ‘Important	  questions	   arise	   as	   to	   the	   extent	   to	   which,	   if	   at	   all,	   ASIO	   should	   be	   subject	   to	  ministerial	   control’	   remarked	   Justice	   Hope	   in	   his	   review	   of	   the	   intelligence	  services.	  He	  noted	  that	  under	  section	  12	  of	  the	  1956	  Act,	  the	  appointment	  of	  the	  Director	   General	   could	   be	   ‘terminated	   inter–alia	   if	   he	   should	   refuse	   to	   obey	   a	  lawful	  order	  given	  to	  him	  by	  the	  minister’.	  	  	  Hope	  contended	  that	  the	  term	  ‘lawful	  order’,	   however,	   constituted	   some	   ‘legal	   doubt’	   in	   how	   the	   Act	   should	   be	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administered.	  Under	  this	  provision,	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  ASIO,	  as	  stipulated	  in	  the	  conditions	  of	  his	  or	  her	  employment,	  was	  contractually	  obligated	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  directions	  of	  the	  minister.	  Hope	  suggested	  the	  1956	  Act	  be	  amended	  to	  remove	   any	   legal	   doubt	   or	   ambiguity	   of	   the	   Director	   General’s	   autonomy.	   In	  future,	   Hope	   recommended	   the	   Director	   General	   should	   be	   subject	   ‘in	   general	  terms’	  to	  proper	  direction	  of	  the	  Minister	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  4	  A:	  163	  &	  170).	  	  	  	   It	  light	  of	  Hope’s	  findings,	  McKnight	  suggests	  that	  the	  partisan	  activity	  of	  ASIO	  during	   this	   time	  did	   not	   arise	   solely	   because	   the	   organisation	  was	  out	  of	  
control,	  but	  rather,	  it	  occurred	  because	  ASIO	  was	  firmly	  under	  ministerial	  control	  (2008	  a:	  708	  Author’s	  emphasis).	  The	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  support	  McKnight’s	  thesis	  and	  indicate	  that	  for	  over	  twenty	  years,	  consecutive	  attorney	  generals	  —	  the	  designated	  office	   responsible	   for	  ASIO	  —	  exercised	  significant	  control	  over	  the	  organisation.	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  political	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  politicise	  the	   intelligence	  they	  were	  receiving	  with	   little	   interference.	   In	  short,	   this	  study	  found	   that	   ministerial	   control	   during	   this	   time	   was	   subject	   to	   insufficient	  legislation	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  independent	  scrutiny.	  Directors	  General	  had	  virtually	  no	  means	   of	   resistance	   under	   legislation,	   and	   ministers	   took	   advantage	   of	   this	  situation.	   This	   evidence	   suggests	   that	  ministerial	   control	   when	   left	   unchecked	  can	   in	   some	   instances	   diminish	   the	   political	   neutrality	   of	   an	   intelligence	  organisation,	  and	  lead	  to	  politicisation.	  	  	   By	   1972,	   it	   was	   no	   secret	   that	   the	   issue	   of	   ministerial	   control	   and	  oversight	   needed	   attention.	   Amending	   the	   1956	   ASIO	   Act	   (Cwlth)	   was	  recommended	  by	  Justice	  Hope	  after	  the	  Royal	  Commissions	  in	  1977,	  and	  again	  in	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1984.	  Yet,	  Hope’s	  recommendations	  were	  only	  partially	  successful.	  	  For	  example,	  in	   1979,	   sections	   of	   the	   1956	   ASIO	   Act	   were	   amended.	   New	   legislation	   then	  imposed	   a	   statutory	   requirement	   that	   the	   Director	   General	   of	   ASIO	   ‘consult	  regularly	  with	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition’	  (ASIO	  Act	  1979	  Part	  III,	  Section	  21).	  Until	  this	  section	  of	  the	  Act	  was	  amended,	  legislation	  substantially	  restricted	  the	  ability	   of	   Director	   Generals	   to	   act	   in	   a	   bi-­‐partisan	   manner,	   and	   for	   several	  decades	  prior	  to	  this	  change,	  legislation	  did	  not	  require	  leaders	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	   be	   briefed	   on	   matters	   of	   intelligence.116	  Moreover,	   the	   extent	   of	   executive	  control	  over	  the	  intelligence	  community	  meant	  that	  the	  government	  was	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  existence	  of	  some	  intelligence	  organisations	  hidden	  from	  parliament	  for	  decades	  (NAA:	  A	  8908,	  3	  A:	  48–49).	  	  	   As	   to	   problems	   relating	   to	   ministerial	   control	   and	   direction	   of	   the	  organisation,	   legislative	   reform	   as	   recommended	   by	   Justice	   Hope	   was	  implemented,	  but	   then	   revised.	   Initially	  Section	  8	  of	   the	  1979	  ASIO	  Act	   (Cwlth)	  provided	   that	   the	   Director	   General	   is	   subject	   to	   the	   general	   direction	   of	   the	  Minister,	   and	   the	   Minister	   is	   not	   empowered	   to	   override	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	  Director	   General,	   except	   under	   certain	   circumstances	   (ASIO	   Act	   1979,	   Part	   II,	  section	   8).	   Section	   8	   of	   the	   Act	  was	   subsequently	   amended.	   The	   term	   ‘general	  direction’	   was	   replaced	   with	   ‘direction’	   of	   the	   Minister.	   In	   other	   words,	   full	  ministerial	  control	  over	  the	  organisation	  was	  reaffirmed,	  thus,	   the	  potential	   for	  ministerial	  abuse	  was	  only	  partially	  resolved	  (McKnight	  2008	  a:	  722).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  It	   was	   not	   until	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Intelligence	   Services	  Act	   2001	   (Cwlth),	   that	  statutory	  regulations	  required	  the	  Director	  General	  of	  the	  Australian	  Secret	  Intelligence	  Service	   (ASIS)	   to	  brief	   the	  Leader	  of	   the	  Opposition.	  See	   Intelligence	  Services	  Act	  2001,	  Part	  3,	  section	  19.	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Historical	  trends	  in	  politicisation	  and	  its	  reform:	  final	  reflections	  	  More	  than	  one	  hundred	  years	  after	  intelligence	  was	  first	  used	  in	  Australia	  to	  gain	  political	  advantage,	  many	  of	  the	  same	  issues	  remain.	  Beginning	  in	  1901	  intelligence	  was	  used	  to	  expand	  Australia’s	   interests	   in	   imperial	  policy	  making.	  But	   this	   established	   a	   precedent.	   The	   legacy	   of	   which	   would	   continue	   for	  decades.	  As	  this	  study	  has	  demonstrated,	  by	  1972	  politicisation	  became	  a	  fairly	  entrenched	  practice.	   Indeed,	   the	  cases	  selected	   in	   this	   study	  reveal	  a	  perennial	  trend.	   What	   appears	   is	   a	   pattern	   of	   subtle	   politicisation	   building	   to	   the	   more	  explicit	   manipulation	   of	   intelligence	   for	   political	   gain	   followed	   by	   efforts	   at	  reform	   to	  prevent	   the	  practice.	  Unfortunately,	   such	   reform	  measures	  have	  had	  limited	  success.	  	  	  The	   early	   cases	   of	   politicisation	   occurring	   in	   the	   Barton	   and	   Deakin	  governments	   could	   be	   considered	   subtle	   and	   somewhat	   innocuous.	   But	   in	   the	  following	   years,	   more	   deliberate	   attempts	   to	   use	   intelligence	   as	   a	   political	  weapon	  occurred	  under	   the	  Hughes	  government	   in	  1914–1918.	  This	   study	  has	  shown	  that	  efforts	  were	  made	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  to	  limit	  the	  use	   of	   intelligence	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	   political	   oppression	   and	   partisan	  advantage.	  But	  legitimate	  reform	  was	  circumscribed	  because	  each	  agency	  and	  its	  political	   masters	   sought	   to	   maintain	   their	   own	   control	   over	   the	   intelligence	  bureaucracy.	   Problems	   addressing	   the	   maladministration	   of	   the	   intelligence	  bureaucracy	  took	  a	  back	  seat.	  Consequently,	  reform	  stalled.	   	  By	  the	  start	  of	   the	  Cold	   War,	   the	   same	   patterns	   re-­‐emerged.	   Starting	   with	   the	   Menzies	  administration	  in	  late	  1949,	  intelligence	  was	  again	  being	  used	  to	  make	  the	  case	  for	  government	  policy.	  For	  over	  the	  next	  twenty	  years	  this	  pattern	  was	  not	  only	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repeated,	  but	  it	  also	  gathered	  significant	  momentum	  eventually	  reaching	  a	  point	  when	  reform	  was	  again	  deemed	  necessary.	  	  	   When	  the	  Whitlam	  government	  was	  elected	  in	  1972,	  the	  politicisation	  of	  intelligence	   had	   become	   such	   a	   problem	   that	   his	   government	   again	   sought	  reform	  and	  appointed	  the	  Hope	  Royal	  Commission	  to	  investigate.	  But	  as	  several	  scholars	   have	   observed,	   Hope’s	   final	   recommendations	   only	   resolved	   some	   of	  these	   issues	   (Seddon	   1982:	   375–380;	  McKnight	   1994:	   296;	   Hocking	   2004:47).	  Although	   this	   study	   concludes	   in	   1975,	   evidence	   presented	   in	   chapter	   one	  indicates	  that	  the	  same	  patterns	  appear	  to	  have	  continued	  beyond	  this	  time.	  	  	   The	  alleged	  politicisation	  of	  intelligence	  by	  the	  Howard	  government	  in	  the	  lead	   up	   to	   the	   invasion	   of	   Iraq	   in	   2003	   is	   one	   notorious	   example.	   This	   was	   a	  spectacular	  case	  —	  but	  it	  was	  little	  more	  than	  a	  continuation	  of	  what	  had	  been	  going	   on	   for	   at	   least	   the	   previous	   seventy-­‐five	   years,	   and	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   not	  remarkable.	  In	  the	  Australian	  context,	  Iraq	  was	  only	  spectacular	  because	  it	  was	  routine.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Parliamentary	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  ASIO,	  ASIS	  and	  DSD	  (Herein	   PJCAAD)	   examined	   allegations	   of	   politicisation	   in	   December	   2003	   and	  submitted	   its	   findings	   in	  March	   2004.	   The	   Committee	   noted	   that	   ‘changes	   did	  occur	   in	  the	  nature	  and	  tone	  of	   the	  assessments’	  which	  gave	  the	  appearance	  of	  intelligence	  assessments	  supporting	  desired	  government	  objectives.	  Their	  report	  found	   that	   ‘distortions’	   in	   the	   intelligence	   process	   and	   reporting	   ‘may	   have	  occurred’.	   But	   the	   committee’s	   findings	   suggested	   that	   these	   distortions	   arose	  from	  within	  the	  intelligence	  community	  because	  it	  found	  that	  there	  was	  ‘no	  overt	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pressure	   from	   government	   to	   change	   assessments’	   and	   no	   evidence	   that	  ‘political	  pressure	  was	  applied	  to	  the	  agencies’	  (PJCAAD	  2003:	  54).	  	  	   Significantly,	   the	   committee	   applied	   a	   rather	   restrictive	   definition	   of	  politicisation.	   It	   looked	   only	   for	   evidence	   of	   political	   arm–twisting	   or	   direct	  politicisation.	   For	   instance,	   despite	   examining	   evidence	   that	   Prime	   Minister	  Howard	  and	  Foreign	  Minister	  Downer	  had	  cited	   intelligence	  material	   in	  public,	  not	  only	  from	  Australian	  agencies,	  but	  also	  from	  those	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	   Britain	   on	   several	   occasions,	   the	   committee	   discounted	   that	   such	   action	  constituted	  any	  form	  of	  politicisation	  or	  political	  impropriety.	  In	  the	  committee’s	  own	  words,	  this	  behaviour	  was	  ‘acceptable’	  because	  the	  Australian	  government	  ‘was	  moderate	  and	  more	  measured	  than	  that	  of	  either	  of	  its	  alliance	  partners’	  in	  its	  public	  use	  of	  intelligence.	  The	  committee	  came	  to	  the	  anodyne	  conclusion	  that	  many	   of	   the	   anomalies	   regarding	   intelligence	   reporting	   and	   the	   use	   of	   it	  were	  ‘hard	   to	   explain’.	   It	   recommended	   that	   there	   should	   be	   an	   independent	  assessment	  of	  the	  Australian	  intelligence	  community	  in	  light	  of	  matters	  raised	  by	  the	  pre-­‐war	  intelligence	  on	  Iraq	  (PJCAAD	  2003:	  91–98).	  	  	  	  	  	   Phillip	   Flood	   was	   appointed	   by	   the	   Howard	   government	   in	   December	  2003	  to	  address	  these	  issues	  in	  closer	  detail.	  He	  was	  to	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  oversight	  and	  accountability	  and	  the	  ability	  of	   the	   intelligence	  community	  to	  deliver	   ‘high	   quality	   and	   independent	   advice	   to	   government’	   by	   probing	   the	  conduct	  of	  ONA,	  ASIS,	  the	  Defence	  Intelligence	  Organisation	  (DIO),	  The	  Defence	  Imagery	   and	   Geospatial	   Organisation	   (DIGO),	   and	   the	   Defence	   Signals	  Directorate	  (DSD)	  (Flood	  2004:	  1).	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  Flood’s	  appointment	  was	  immediately	  questioned	  because	  he	  had	  strong	  ties	  binding	  him	  to	  the	  intelligence	  bureaucracy.	  Flood	  was	  not	  only	  the	  former	  Director	   General	   of	   ONA,	   but	   also	   a	   former	   Secretary	   of	   the	   Department	   of	  Foreign	  Affairs	  and	  Trade.	  This	  sparked	  criticism	  that	  Flood	  would	  be	  forgiving	  of	   the	   intelligence	   community’s	   performance	   (O’Neil	   2011:22).	   	   Indeed,	   the	  Labor	  Party	  also	  condemned	  the	   inquiry	  on	  such	  grounds.	  Shadow	  Minister	   for	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Kevin	  Rudd,	  released	  a	  press	  statement	  on	  4	  March	  2004	  stating	  that	  the	  appointment	  of	  Flood	  to	  head	  the	  inquiry	  would	  be	  a	  ‘conflict	  of	  interest’	  (ABC,	   PM	   Program,	   4	   March	   2004).	   On	   10	   March	   2004,	   Rudd	   informed	  parliament	  that	  Flood’s	  terms	  of	  reference	  were	  ‘inadequate’	  because	  the	  inquiry	  would	  not	  properly	  deal	  with	  ‘the	  problem	  of	  policy	  driven	  analysis’.	  The	  inquiry	  was	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  flawed	  intelligence	  analysis,	  while	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  political	  leaders	  misused	  intelligence	  was	  exempt	  from	  scrutiny.	  Based	  on	  these	  points,	  Rudd	  informed	  parliament	  that	  ‘the	  Labor	  Party	  has	  no	  confidence	  in	   the	   inquiry’	   (House	   of	   Representatives	   10	   March	   2004:	   26542–3).	   In	   this	  context,	   Flood’s	   appointment	   might	   be	   considered	   politicised.	   Despite	   such	  objections,	  Flood	  proceeded	  with	   the	   investigation	  and	  submitted	  his	   report	   in	  July	  2004.	  	   The	   Flood	   inquiry,	   indeed,	   applied	   a	   narrow	   definition	   of	   politicisation	  looking	  only	   for	   instances	  of	  direct	  manipulation.	  For	   that	   reason,	  Flood	   found	  nothing	  of	  importance.	  ‘The	  inquiry	  has	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  politicisation	  of	  the	  assessments	   on	   Iraq,	   either	   overt	   or	   perceived’	   he	   reported.	   No	   ‘analyst	   or	  manager	   was	   the	   subject	   of	   either	   direct	   or	   implied	   pressure	   to	   come	   to	   a	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particular	   judgment	   on	   Iraq	   for	   policy	   reasons,	   or	   to	   bolster	   the	   case	   for	  war’	  (Flood	   2004:	   28).	   Given	   that	   Flood	   found	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	   intelligence	  community	  had	  bent	  to	  political	  demands,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  he	  did	  comment	  on	   the	   public	   use	   of	   intelligence	   by	   political	   leaders.	   Flood	   acknowledged	   that	  ‘public	   disclosure	   of	   intelligence	   assessments	   carries	   real	   risks	   and	   can	  distort	  the	   assessments	   process’,	   but	   he	   went	   on	   to	   justify	   the	   practice.	   The	   issue	   of	  publicising	   intelligence	  was	   framed	  as	  one	  of	  political	   transparency.	  This	   failed	  to	  recognise	  not	  only	  the	  long	  history	  of	  publicising	  intelligence	  in	  the	  Australian	  context,	   but	   also	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   practice.	   Flood	   recognised	   that	  although	   the	   public	   use	   of	   intelligence	   ‘had	   caused	   some	   discomfort	   within	  intelligence	  agencies	  around	  the	  world’	  he	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  the	  public’s	  right	  to	  know	  and	  the	  government’s	  right	  to	  explain	  the	  context	  of	  their	  policy	  decisions,	  which	   ‘required	   the	   public	   presentation	   of	   intelligence	   based	   material’	   (Flood	  2004:	  158).	  	  	  According	  to	  this	  analysis,	  publicising	  intelligence	  becomes	  a	  measure	  of	  improving	   government	   transparency.	   The	   assumption	   being	   that	  what	   is	   open	  will	   improve	   accountability.	   It	   does	  not	   recognise	   that	  political	   leaders	   can	   co-­‐opt	  the	  imprimatur	  of	  intelligence	  to	  promote	  the	  government’s	  agenda	  and	  use	  it	   to	   persuade	   a	   sceptical	   audience	   toward	   the	   necessity	   of	   that	   decision.	   Nor	  does	  it	  recognise	  the	  impact	  this	  has	  on	  the	  intelligence	  community’s	  credibility	  when	  political	  leaders	  cite	  intelligence	  that	  may	  be	  incomplete	  or	  inaccurate,	  as	  was	   the	   case	   with	   Iraq	   in	   2003.	   For	   that	   reason,	   such	   behaviour	   can	   actually	  damage	  the	  integrity	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  intelligence	  community.	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   Wilson	   regarding	   the	  disabilities	  of	  the	  British	  Colonists’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   9,	   ‘Letter	   Dated	   4	   July	   1901	   –	   premature	  publication	  of	  the	  grievances	  of	  Mr	  Wilson’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   10,	   ‘Communications	   –	   Detective	   Lyons’	  errand	  in	  respect	  of	  Mr	  Le	  Couteur’s	  intended	  mission’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   12,	   ‘Letter	   dated	   1	   August	   1901	   from	   the	  Secretary	  Department	  of	  External	  Affairs	  to	  Mr	  Le	  Couteur’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   11,	   ‘Letter	   dated	   30	   July	   1901	   from	  Mr	   Le	  Couteur	  respecting	  his	  intended	  visit	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Government’.	  	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   14,	   ‘Letter	   dated	   1	   August	   1901	   from	   the	  Secretary	  –	  Bank	  draft’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   35,	   Bundle	   2,	   Item:	   18,	   ‘Letter	   dated	   18	   August	   1901	   covering	  reports	  on	  Aneityum,	  Tanna	  and	  Erromanga’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  35,	  Bundle	  2,	  Item:	  23,	  ‘Report	  dated	  26	  November	  1901	  –	  Mr	  Le	  Couteur’s	  Trip	  to	  the	  New	  Hebrides’.	  	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  35,	  Bundle	  7,	  Item:	  30,	  ‘Letter	  from	  Mr	  Le	  Couteur	  dated	  2nd	  July	  1902	  –	  Translation	  from	  “La	  France	  Australe”	  respecting	  the	  first	  convoy	  of	  the	  Australian	  Commonwealth	  Emigrants’.	  	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  168,	  Item:	  	  1904/2278,	  1904,	  ‘Departmental	  Inquiry	  re	  Leakage	  of	  Official	  Correspondence’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  84/1,	  Item:	  1856/1/5,	  ‘Speech	  by	  the	  Honourable	  Alfred	  Deakin	  MP	  Prime	  Minister	  on	  the	  Defences	  of	  the	  Commonwealth’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  168,	  Item:	  1904/	  184	  Part	  4,	  ‘Remarks	  by	  Chief	  of	  Intelligence	  in	  Reply	  to	  Newspaper	  Comments	  by	  the	  Hon.	  Alfred	  Deakin’.	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  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  153/10,	  Item:	  	  Whole	  Series,	  ‘Intelligence	  Summaries’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  153/10,	  Item:	  1833/3/17,	  ‘Intelligence	  Diary	  for	  October	  1907’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  153/10,	  Item:	  1833/3/9,	  ‘Intelligence	  Diary	  for	  February	  1907’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   84	   /1,	   Item:	   1849/2/18,	   ‘Formation	   of	   the	   Australian	  Intelligence	  Corps’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  84/1,	  Item:	  1877/5/4,	  ‘Japanese	  in	  Queensland’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  173/0,	  Item:	  s1905/144,	  ‘Defence	  of	  the	  Commonwealth	  -­‐	  Report	  by	  Lt.	  Col.	  Bridges	  as	  to	  recommendations	  likely	  to	  be	  made	  by	  Imperial	  Defence	  Committee’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   84/1,	   Item:	   1877/5/5,	   ‘Lieut	   J.	   G.	   Fearnley	   re	   Japanese	  Espionage	  and	  a	  Secret	  Service’.	  	  	  
	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  12383,	  Item:	  A/2/1	  Attachment	  2,	  ‘Copy	  of	  Attorney-­‐General's	  file	  1955/4432:	  AM	  Duncan	  -­‐	  Report	  on	  Security	  -­‐	  Security	  Service	  Report	  1941/42’.	  	  
	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  3932,	  Item:	  SC	  298,	  ‘Commonwealth	  Police’.	  	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  CP	  46/2,	  Item:	  24,	  ‘Commonwealth	  Counter	  Espionage	  Bureau’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   BP	   4/1,	   Item:	   66/4/605,	   ‘Papers	   regarding	  Miss	   Adela	   Pankhurst	  and	   Miss	   Celia	   Johns	   -­‐	   Women's	   Peace	   Army	   Brisbane	   Branch,	   and	   Anti-­‐Conscription	   League	   [Newspaper	   cuttings	   regarding	   meetings	   of	   Anti-­‐Conscription	   League]	   -­‐	   [Newspaper	   'The	  Woman	  Voter',	   edition	  No.	   176	   dated	  November	  11,	  1915]	  -­‐	  [contains	  verse	  –	  "I	  Didn't	  Raise	  My	  Son	  to	  be	  a	  Soldier"]’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   B	   741,	   Item:	   V/3426,	   ‘Adele	   Pankhurst	   –	   Anti	   Conscription	  Fellowship	  [Contains	  references	  to:	  Socialist	  Party,	  John	  Cain]’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  401/1,	  Item:	  CL	  355,	  ‘Jones	  V	  Holland	  and	  Anderson’.	  	  
	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  390/8,	  Item:	  1916,	  [Volume	  2],	  ‘Diary’,	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  16/1,	  Item:	  1915/3/1790	  A,	  ‘Re	  N.	  C.	  Anderson’.	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   95/1,	   Item:	   20/9/1916	   to	   18/4/1917,	   ‘3rd	   Military	   District	  Intelligence	  Reports	  (other	  suspicious	  actions)	  on	  the	  IWW	  [Industrial	  Workers	  of	  the	  World,	  aka	  'Wobblies']’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   95/1,	   Item:	   15/12/1916	   to	   15/2/1917,	   ‘3rd	  Military	   District	  Intelligence	  Reports	  (other	  suspicious	  actions)	  on	  the	  IWW	  [Industrial	  Workers	  of	  the	  World,	  aka	  'Wobblies']’.	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  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  6126,	  Item:	  70,	  ‘BARKER,	  Thomas’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   B	   741,	   Item:	   V/237,	   ‘William	   Andrew	   Buttham,	   Robert	   Ward	  Graham	  243	  William	  St.,	  Melb.	  IWW’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  741,	  Item:	  V/266,	  ‘R.S.	  Ross,	  343	  Queen	  Street	  and	  283	  Elizabeth	  Street,	  Melbourne	  -­‐	  I.W.W.’.	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  741,	  Item	  V/291,	  ‘Sinclair	  WAG	  –	  Vic.	  Red	  Ragger.	  Assault	  on	  Mr	  Tate.	  [Also	  Raid	  on	  Andrade's	  Bookshop]’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series	   A	   456,	   Item:	  W	   26/148/239	   PART	   1,	   ‘Imprisonment	   &	   release	   of	  Adela	  Walsh	  1917-­‐18’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  456,	  Item:	  W	  26/148/239	  PART	  2,	  ‘Adela	  Pankhurst,	  Prosecution	  under	  Unlawful	  Associations	  Act,	  Part	  2’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  197,	  Item:	  2021/1/270,	   ‘Hon.	  T.	   J.	  Ryan,	  Premier	  of	  Queensland.	  Disloyal	  Associations’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   456,	   Item:	   W	   26/217,	   ‘Conspiracy	   charges	   -­‐	   Ryan	   and	   Others	  [Thomas	   Joseph	   RYAN,	   Edward	   Granville	   THEODORE,	   Lewis	   McDONALD	   and	  Robert	  John	  Cuthbert	  BUTLER]’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  1573,	  Item:	  1917/17,	  ‘Federal	  Executive	  Council	  -­‐	  Minute	  Papers	  Approved	   1917	   -­‐	   Prime	   Ministers	   Department,	   1–170;	   Counter	   Espionage	  Bureau,	  XI-­‐X8’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   1049/1,	   Item:	   1916/014,	   ‘Intelligence	   Arrangements	   of	  Commonwealth	  Departments	  Co-­‐operation	  with	  Police’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  16/1,	  Item:	  1917/60,	  ‘J.H.	  Catts	  M.H.R.’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  16/1,	   Item:	  1918/262,	   ‘Mr	  Catts	  MP	  and	  Pamphlet	  "Labor	  and	  the	  War".	  Seizure	  &	  destruction	  of	  Pamphlet.	  Address	  given	  by	  Catts	  at	  Mildura	  &	  complaint	  by	  Mrs	  Skelton	  re	  rough	  handling	  at	  that	  meeting’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  741,	  Item:	  V/	  62A,	  ‘Special	  Intelligence	  Bureau	  –	  Circulars’.	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  8911,	  Item:	  	  240,	  ‘Reverend	  Dr	  D	  Mannix	  (Anti-­‐Conscription	  and	  Anti-­‐British	  Utterances:	  Sinn	  Feiner)’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  3932,	  Item:	  SC	  417,	  ‘Sinn	  Fein	  Propaganda	  in	  Australia’.	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   456,	   Item:	   W	   26/148/182,	   ‘Unlawful	   Associations	   Act.	  Administration	  by	  the	  police	  departments	  of	  the	  States’.	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  741,	  Item:	  V/280,	  ‘Censors,	  Australia,	  Names	  Supplied	  to’.	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  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  8911,	  Item:	  221,	  ‘Sinn	  Fein	  and	  Irish	  National	  Association’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series	   A	   1606,	   Item:	   F	   42/1	   Attachment	   1,	   ‘Archbishop	   Mannix	   [Press	  Reports	  and	  Correspondence]’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series	   A	   3932,	   Item:	   SC	   435,	   ‘Secret	   and	   confidential	   papers	   re	   duties,	  salaries,	   appointments	   etc.	   of	   Officers	   (a)	   Official	   Secretary	   to	   the	   Governor	  General	  (b)	  Official	  Secretary	  in	  Great	  Britain’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series	   B	   197,	   Item:	   1851/2/43,	   ‘Formation	   of	   "An	   Australian	   Protective	  League"	   on	   the	   same	   lines	   as	   "The	   American	   Protective	   League"	   -­‐	   The	  organisation	  responsible	  for	  the	  quietness	  of	  the	  German	  &	  Irish	  sympathisers	  of	  the	  Central	  Powers’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  9787,	  Item:	  2,	  ‘Council	  Of	  Defence	  Meetings	  23.4.18	  to	  12.4.20’.	  	  
	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   12383,	   Item:	   A/2/1/Attachment	   2,	   ‘Copy	   of	   Attorney	   General's	  file	   1955/4432:	   AM	   Duncan	   -­‐	   Report	   on	   Security	   -­‐	   Security	   Service	   Report	  1941/42’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  729/6,	  Item:	  15/403/199,	  ‘Secretary’s	  File	  –	  “Security	  Service”’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   5954,	   Item:	   805/1,	   ‘War	   Cabinet	   Minutes	   (Original)	   Volume	   5.	  Meetings	   27	   Jan	   1941	   to	   27	   Feb	   1941.	  Minute	  Nos	   676	   to	   873.	   [Also	   contains	  copies	  of	  Full	  Cabinet	  Minutes	  Nos	  FC29	  to	  FC31]’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   5954,	   Item:	   805/2,	   ‘War	   Cabinet	   Minutes	   [Original]	   Volume	   6.	  Meetings	  5	  March	  1941	  to	  4	  May	  1941.	  Minute	  Nos.	  874	  to	  1026’.	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   5954,	   Item:	   806/1,	   ‘War	   Cabinet	   Minutes	   [Original]	   Volume	   7.	  Meetings	  9	  May	  1941	  to	  18	   Jul	  1941.	  Minute	  Nos	  1027	   to	  1227.	   [Also	  contains	  copies	  of	  Full	  Cabinet	  Minutes	  Nos	  FC32	  to	  FC35]’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  729/6,	  Item:	  29/401/477,	   ‘Lt	  Col	  J	  C	  Mawhood	  Re-­‐call	  by	  War	  Office.	  Retention	  by	  Commonwealth	  Govt	  for	  Investigation	  of	  Security	  Matters’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  742/1,	  Item:	  M/7/168,	  ‘Mawhood,	  J.	  C.	  Lt-­‐Col	  –	  military	  mission	  104’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  1608,	  Item:	  G	  39/2/1,	   ‘War	  1939	  –	  Special	  Operations	  Executive	  (Mawhood	  Mission)’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  MP	  729/6,	  Item:	  15/403/95,	  ‘Security	  Service	  Organisation’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   508/1,	   Item:	   175/701/1646,	   ‘Complaint	   by	   Mr	  W.	   J.	   Mackay	  concerning	  treatment	  by	  Sir	  George	  Knowles’.	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NAA:	   Series:	   A	   6122,	   Item:	   2/	   Volume	   1,	   ‘The	   Association	   (Post	  War)	   and	   the	  New	  Guard	  (Pre	  War)	  Vol.	  1’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  367,	  Item:	  C	  94121,	  ‘The	  New	  Guard	  and	  "The	  Association"’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   CP	   30/3,	   Item:	   13,	   ‘Personal	   Papers	   of	   Prime	   Minister	   Lyons	  Correspondence	   'C'	   [Mrs	   J	  Cadman	   -­‐	  B	  Cattaneo,	   re	  WA	  election,	  pensions,	  D	  G	  Carruthers,	   E	   Carroll,	   employment,	   cigarette	   paper	   industry,	   personal	  representations,	   Wesley	   Central	   Mission	   (Melbourne),	   proposed	   Canberra	  Municipal	   Council,	   Canterbury-­‐Bankstown	   Unemployed	   Cricket	   Association,	   C	  Kingsford	   Smith,	   New	   Guard,	   D	   C	   Cameron,	   Callide	   Valley	   cotton	   industry,	  includes	  3	  talks	  by	  R	  G	  Casey,	  August	  1932}’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  B	  1535,	  Item:	  812/1/23,	  ‘Report	  on	  Alleged	  Connection	  of	  Defence	  Department	  with	  New	  Guard’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  369,	  Item:	  D	  585,	  ‘Formation	  of	  Citizens'	  Leagues’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  395,	  Item:	  NN,	  ‘Letter	  to	  A.G.	  re	  White	  Army	  (Vic.)’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  367,	  Item:	  C65663,	  ‘HASHIDA	  Sei	  (Major)’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  981,	  Item:	  JAP/145,	  ‘Japan	  –	  Aust.	  Visit	  of	  Yoshiro	  Yamashita	  and	  Major	  Sieyure	  Hashida’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   MP	   729/6,	   Item:	   15/403/76,	   ‘Security	   Service	   –	   Mr	   Duncan’s	  Report’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   A	   2676,	   Item:	   1986,	   ‘War	   Cabinet	   Minute	   No	   1986	   –	   Security	  organisation’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   	   A	   7452,	   Item:	   A	   48,	   ‘Establishment	   of	   ASIO	   -­‐	   Australian	   Security	  Intelligence	  Organisation’.	  	  	  NAA:	   Series:	   M	   1509,	   Item:	   7,	   ‘Australian	   Communist	   Party	   Dissolution	   Act	   –	  Implementation	  –	  Administration’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  6122,	  Item:	  1428,	  ‘Circumstances	  leading	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  ASIO’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  6122,	   Item:	  2429,	   ‘Records	  of	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  conversation	  and	  correspondence	  between	  Director-­‐General	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  1’.	  	  	  NAA:	  Series:	  A	  6122,	  Item:	  2147,	  ‘Record	  of	  conversation	  and	  correspondence	  between	  the	  Director-­‐General	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   Intelligence	  Co-­‐ordination	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   Script	   to	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